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THE PREMIERS OF QUEENSLAND 
Denis Murphy, a former reader in History at the Univer-
sity of Queensland, was a recognised authority on 
Australian labor history. At the time of his death in 1984 
he was President of the Queensland Labor Party and 
had been elected to a seat in state parliament. He wrote 
and edited many books on Queensland and Australian 
politics, including T.J. Ryan: A Political Biography dind 
Labor in Politics: The State Labor Parties in Australia 
1880-1920. 
Roger Joyce, a respected historian of nineteenth cen-
tury Australian political life, published widely on 
Australian and Queensland history. A reader in History 
at the University of Queensland, he accepted a chair at 
La Trobe University in 1975. He was also president of 
the Australian Historical Association. Roger Joyce died 
in 1984 shortly after the publication of his major 
biography, Samuel Walker Griffith. 
Margaret Cribb is a former reader in Political Science 
at the University of Queensland where she undertook 
research and has published numerous chapters and jour-
nal articles on Australian politics, the state govern-
ments, and industrial relations. In 1980 she edited 
Politics in Queensland with P.J. Boyce and has con-
tinued her research into Queensland politics. 
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Preface 
MARGARET BRIDSON CRIBB 
More than a decade has passed since the University of Queensland 
Press first published Queensland Political Portraits 1859-1952, 
edited by D.J. Murphy and R.B. Joyce. Now, under the title 
The Premiers of Queensland, the earlier work is being reissued, 
but with important additions — three new chapters dealing with the 
roles played in Queensland's political history by Premiers V.C. 
Gair, G.F.R. Nicklin and Sir Johannes Bjelke-Petersen. 
Queensland Political Portraits included studies of two men who 
were not premiers: Governor George Bowen who ruled without a 
legislature for the first six months of the life of the infant colony of 
Queensland, and from a later period, John Murtagh Macrossan, 
notable representative of northern interests in both the parliament 
and the government of his day. These two men were included for 
reasons amply justified in their introduction by the original editors, 
and there appears to be no good reason to omit them from this 
publication. 
The introduction of the new material on the last three 
Queensland premiers who, to date, have served out their terms of 
office, does take the work into the present day. It gives readers an 
opportunity not only to determine and assess the relative contribu-
tion of each of these men to the government of Queensland, but 
also to identify recurrent themes in this state's political history and 
the attitudes and values of Queenslanders, of which each premier, 
in his turn, was representative. 
In reissuing Queensland Political Portraits, the University of 
Queensland Press has reminded us, were such prompting necessary, 
of the incalculable value of Murphy's and Joyce's contribution to 
the study, understanding and appreciation of Queensland's 
political iiistory, and of the irreparable loss to this field their un-
timely deaths have occasioned. They died within four months of 
each other in 1984, each on the threshold of a new, fruitful and ex-
citing phase in his life. 
At his death, Roger Joyce, Professor of History at La Trobe 
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University, was within months of an early retirement. With his 
latest major work recently published — a biography of Sir Samuel 
Griffith, of which a preview is to be found in this book he 
already had made well-founded plans to continue his work in 
Australian history. But as his colleague, Professor Jack Gregory, 
noted in delivering the eulogy at Roger's funeral service. 
It was not to be . . . There is . . . a special dimension of sorrow at see-
ing such a life suddenly cut short while still flowing so strongly, con-
fidently and happily forwards towards another decade or so of creative 
work.' 
If these things can be measured, ephemeral though they may be, 
then in the case of Dr Denis Murphy, the tragedy is more profound 
and the loss less bearable given the range of his interests and ac-
tivities and his particular ability to stand out from his peers in every 
undertaking in which he participated. Having won the state seat of 
Stafford for the Australian Labor Party in a hard-fought and, at 
times, vicious contest less than eight months before his death, it is 
inconceivable that, had he lived, he would not have been chosen 
shortly thereafter as leader of the Opposition. It is also not beyond 
the bounds of possibility, had Labor regained the Treasury benches 
within the next decade or so, that Murphy himself would have 
become Premier of Queensland, and the subject, in his turn, of a 
political biography. If this thought appears fanciful and trespasses 
too far into the realm of "what might have been", other outstan-
ding political achievements by Denis Murphy remain to be 
acknowledged. Not the least of these was his single-minded and, as 
it sometimes must have seemed to him, single-handed resurrection 
of the moribund and divided Labor organization in Queensland 
both prior to and after his election as president of the state ALP 
branch in May 1980. 
In relation to publications such as Queensland Political Por-
traits, however, it is to Murphy, the academic historian, that we 
must turn. Given the scope of his many activities and that he came 
later than is customary to teaching, researching and writing history, 
his published output was prodigious. In collaboration with others! 
he edited and wrote a two-volume history of the Labor Party and 
Labor governments in Queensland from 1885 to 1957,2 which 
remains definitive, in which he destroyed several of the shibboleths 
dear to the heart of the Labor Party, about the role of trade unions 
in the formation of the ALP. As his colleague, Brian Costar noted 
in his own appreciation of his old friend, ' 
The key to understanding Denis Murphy's contribution to the writing of 
Australian history is that he was both a practical reformer and a pfac-
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tical historian. He studied, researched and wrote history with a purpose 
— to equip the modern Labor Party for the task of making Australia a 
just society.^  
With the most important of his major works — his splendid 
biography of T.J. Ryan — he whet our appetites for more. Before 
his death, he had begun work on a biography of Andrew Fisher 
with a planned study of John Curtin to follow, but sadly, these 
were never to eventuate. Ever conscious of the gaps in Queensland 
political history and in labour history generally, which even his 
gargantuan appetite for work could not hope to fill independently, 
he encouraged and cajoled colleagues and many of his students to 
undertake the appropriate research and saw to it that the results 
were published. Indeed, Queensland Political Portraits was one 
such publication. 
The many obituaries published at his death taken together pro-
vide a much more comprehensive and rounded picture of the man 
and his accomplishments than can be attempted here. Writing in 
the Daily Sun, Matt Robbins summed up Dr Murphy in these 
terms: "He was one of the greatest rarities in Labor politics; an 
author and academic, a tutor and historian, a mentor and leader."^ 
Yet he was only 47 years old when he died! 
As biographers, both Joyce and Murphy were concerned with the 
nature of political leadership, and one of the most easily iden-
tifiable themes running through these essays is that of the strong, 
powerful, authoritarian leader. Even the benign and paternal 
public persona of "The Gentleman Premier — Honest Frank 
Nicklin", as portrayed here, is known, for example, to have cloak-
ed a steely and unequivocal reaction to ministers perceived to be 
threatening coalition harmony. It is noticeable also that this strain 
of authoritarianism predates the rise of the organized party system. 
While the earlier premiers, lacking the unqualified support that 
party loyalty assumes, may have had to exercise their authority 
with more subtlety and finesse than subsequent leaders were oblig-
ed to use, nevertheless the evidence in this book is overwhelmingly 
in support of the "strong leader" phenomenon throughout 
Queensland governments and politics. 
For well into this century, of course, governments in Queensland 
were battling to maintain the state as a viable entity, administering 
what was in all important essentials a frontier society and one 
dependent entirely on the fruits of primary production for its 
economic prosperity. The state was underdeveloped and thinly 
populated, yet covering vast geographical areas. It lacked sufficient 
capital investment to shield the economy from the ill effects of 
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droughts, floods and rural recessions or the all-too-frequent col-
lapses of English and local financial institutions, which appeared to 
be endemic in the late nineteenth century. It needed strong leaders 
to keep the ship of state afloat as well as to meet the pressing 
demands of its more influential citizens, such as those for railways, 
more and better ports, and cheap labour. Yet the earlier premiers in 
this series were dependent for their parliamentary support on shif-
ting coalitions, on men who, opposing them one day, could hope to 
be, and sometimes were, drawn in as members of their ministries 
the next. As Gibbney notes in the chapter on Lilley, "In a house 
composed of rugged individualists, occupants of the Treasury ben-
ches constituted the only party" (page 73). It is not surprising then 
to find that though most of them could be classified as strong 
leaders, they held government for only relatively short periods of 
time. With the exception of Mcllwraith and Griffith, those two 
giants of the era who, each in more than one premiership, led the 
state for totals of six and eight years respectively, and of 
Queensland's first elected premier, Herbert, who remained for six, 
the average term in office for a Queensland premier from 1859 to 
1915 was two years. 
If one regards the T.J. Ryan Government (1915-1919) as the first 
to come to power in Queensland supported by an established party 
organization, then an analysis of subsequent governments to 1987 
reveals that the pattern of leadership changes alters significantly 
from that point. Again, if one ignores the aberrations occurring 
through untimely death or a recognized incapacity for leadership, 
as in the case of Pizzey and Gillies respectively, the shortest term in 
office is the three years of A.E. Moore and his Country Progressive 
National Party Government. These years, however, coincided with 
the worst of the Great Depression when governments world-wide 
were turned out of office by their electors. On the Labor side, 
Forgan Smith's ten-year Premiership remains a record, though it is 
far surpassed for the conservatives by Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen's 
almost two decades at the helm. 
There seems little doubt that one of the major contributing fac-
tors to this increased longevity in office of Queensland premiers 
after 1915, and, coincidentally, to long periods of stable one-partv 
government, was the rise of disciplined polifical parties and their 
accompanying party organizations. Provided the incumbent did 
not fly in the face of party policy and persist in so doine his 
political party provided a premier, both inside parliament and 
without, with an assurance of the support of his parliamentarv 
party colleagues between elections, and with the confidence and 
authority, as an electorally successful leader, to dominate his peer 
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When the Labor premiers in this book are studied, we find that 
from Ryan onwards a close working alliance forged between the 
leaders of the powerful Australian Workers' Union and those of 
the ALP provided these men with a stable and significant source of 
power during their terms in office. The study of Gair, however, 
clearly shows that once this alliance was shattered and the AWU 
power brokers moved into active and sustained opposition to him, 
Gair's days as parliamentary leader of his party were numbered. 
The non-Labor parties in Queensland had much greater diffi-
culty in establishing firmly rooted party organizations and it was 
not until the 1940s that either the Liberal or the Country (subse-
quently National) Party was able to accomplish this. From that 
time, party loyalty to its parliamentary leader became a particular 
feature of the National Party, as did a close working relationship 
between the leaders of the parliamentary and organizational wings. 
This was enhanced further by an alteration to the arrangement for 
choosing ministers introduced during Nicklin's term of office. 
Election by the party's members of parliament was replaced by per-
sonal selection by the premier. This added immeasurably to the 
power of National Party premiers in this state. Indeed, under Sir 
Joh Bjelke-Petersen, explicit loyalty to the leader himself, over and 
above that to the party, became the benchmark for inclusion in his 
ministries, particularly once the Nationals assumed office in their 
own right in 1983. While this can be seen as one example of the 
cronyism which so marked his Premiership, it also contributed to 
the rampant and uncontrolled authoritarianism which he exhibited 
as leader of his government. 
Other factors influenced the rise of these strong, even 
authoritarian, premiers. As we examine the periods prior to and 
then after 1922, the year in which the Legislative Council was 
abolished, in the first instance we find numerous examples of the 
defeat or the amendment of government legislation by the Upper 
House, while other Bills survived intact only after a stormy passage 
through the Council. 
Since 1922, unlike their counterparts in the other Australian 
states, no Queensland premier has had to take cognizance of the 
wishes of another group of parliamentarians outside the Lower 
House. This particularly advantaged post-1922 Labor premiers, 
much of whose legislation would have been savagely mauled or 
even defeated outright by a Legislative Council which would have 
remained as a strong, entrenched, conservative opposition. After 
1922, however, the premiers did not have to take meaningful regard 
even for the views of the Lower House, the Legislative Assembly, 
as they were faced invariably by impotent oppositions, weak not 
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only in numbers but also in the calibre and energy of many of their 
members. 
During the long periods of Labor government from 1915 to 1929 
and from 1932 to 1957, the Opposition consisted for the most part 
of shifting coalitions of country and city conservafives, backed by 
ineffective or virtually non-existent party organizations. Even when 
established, the effect of these organizations remained minimal un-
til 1957, as the ennui of long years out of government pressed 
heavily on and debilitated the opposition parliamentarians. When, 
with the fall of the Gair regime in 1957, a disbelieving and un-
prepared National-Liberal government was thrust into office, a 
role reversal took place. Now it was the Labor Party that was weak 
and divided. In the following years, until the end of the Bjelke-
Petersen Premiership, each time the ALP clawed its way back to 
electoral and parliamentary credibility it found itself put down 
again, first by its 1974 electoral decimation when only 11 Labor 
members were returned to parliament and, more recently by the at-
tempts of the late 1970s and early 1980s to democratize the party, 
which, once again, divided and demoralized it. 
In making a case for strong, authoritarian leadership as one of 
the noticeable features of Queensland's political history revealed in 
these studies, one further piece of evidence is to be found in the 
essays on Hanlon, Nicklin and Bjelke-Petersen. In 1949 Hanlon 
altered the electoral system from one which basically adhered to the 
"one person, one vote, one value" principle, to one of malappor-
donment, favouring the non-urban areas. In doing this, he not only 
ensured the continuation of Labor government (until the party split 
in 1957), but he also placed a most useful weapon in the hands of 
his opponents — one which they were quick to use when given the 
opportunity. Both Nicklin and Bjelke-Petersen, in turn, modified 
Hanlon's zonal electoral system in such a way as to make it less dif-
ficult for the National Party to retain government and harder for 
both the ALP and the Liberal Party to increase significantly their 
parliamentary representation. 
Consequently, for all these reasons, Queensland premiers in-
creasingly in this century have been able largely to disregard parlia-
ment and, strengthened and sustained by the party system and pro-
tected to some extent since 1949 by an advantageous electoral 
system, to direct more of their attendon and energy to exercising 
strong leadership within and over their party and government. 
It follows, then, that these studies also record the decline of 
parliament in this state, not only in the gradual but insidious 
debasement of the level of rhetoric and debate but, most impor-
tandy, in parliament's role of watchdog over the executive and its 
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administration. These premiers were never amenable to any sugges-
tions for strengthening the Legislative Assembly's ability to ex-
amine closely and to oversee their governments' administration. 
When pressed, they refused to countenance, for example, the set-
ting up of parliamentary standing committees with real and ongo-
ing powers of scrutiny and investigation. Without his unqualified 
and energetic support, the two select committees — on privileges 
and statutory regulations — "conceded" to parliament by Premier 
Bjelke-Petersen proved largely ineffective. 
The authors of these essays make a point of providing us also 
with assessments of their subjects' administrative capabilities. 
Seemingly, a proven capacity in this regard was almost a pre-
requisite for the highest elective office, particularly during the 
many years in which Queensland's leaders struggled to place their 
governments and economies on a sound financial basis. We note, 
for example, Herbert and Mcllwraith being praised for their 
administrative skills even by their opponents, while Philp, whatever 
his other faults, was seen as "a good administrator". 
Morrison, writing at the end of the 1950s, found that "Labor 
premiers have been traditionally very attentive to all their 
administrative responsibilities"' and added that in the incoming 
Nicklin Government, a similar care for such duties was expected. 
For both Labor and non-Labor alike, this sensitivity to the 
ministerial need for close attention to the detailed work of 
administration was occasioned largely by suspicion of the public 
service, many of whose members had been appointed by and served 
under the previous government formed by their political 
opponents. Inevitably, however, as a premier's term in office 
lengthened, these suspicious were allayed, particularly if, as in the 
case of Bjelke-Petersen, positive steps had been taken to 
"politicize" the middle and upper levels of the service.^  This "gen-
tle polidcization", as noted by Dr Walter (page 515), allowed Sir 
Joh, with his widely acknowledged aversion to detailed 
administrative duties, to delegate, with the utmost confidence, 
much of this work to his senior public servants. 
How different each of the subjects of this book is from all the 
others, not only in physical appearance but also in those elements 
of their personalities that are revealed here. Together they represent 
as diverse a collection of men as is likely to be met anywhere 
(women not finding Queensland's political culture conducive to 
elevation to high parliamentary office). Among others, we meet the 
cold and austere Theodore and that bluff and hearty buccaneer, 
Mcllwraith; the brilliant and charming Ryan and the true 
"establishment" gentleman, Robert Philp. We can almost hear 
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again Forgan Smith's exaggerated Scottish burr and Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen's repeated admonition to inquirers and critics, "Now 
don't you worry about that." 
Inevitably, the personality and character of each premier have 
had to be taken into account. These studies, in the main, are 
chronological narratives which provide many meaningful insights 
into the characters of their subjects while placing them also in their 
wider cultural, economic and class milieu. Nevertheless, in general 
they do not profess to use any of the psychoanalytical techniques 
which Dr Walter draws on to illuminate his essay on Bjelke-
Petersen. This majority approach is in keeping with Dr Murphy's 
professed views on the efficacy of psychoanalysis as a biographical 
tool. He believed: 
There is a danger in historians . . . placing too much relevance or in-
deed misplacing the relevance of events and forces in childhood, when 
evaluating any figures in history . . . I must confess to a degree of per-
sonal scepticism about carrying possible background influences too far 
in making them dominant factors in later behaviour patterns.^  
A close reading of the book as a whole brings to light a number 
of persuasive influences, capable of affecting the developing 
character of more than one future premier. The most obvious is the 
"unreflective" religious fundamentalism of Sir Joh Bjelke-
Petersen, followed by the Anglo-Celtic strain, as personified par-
ticularly by the Scots — Macalister, Mcllwraith, Philp, Kidston 
and Forgan Smith. The probable formative effect on the majority 
of Labor premiers of a background of Catholic Irishness also can 
be detected. Most of the latter rose from impoverished, working-
class households, impelled upwards by their own intellectual 
brilliance — in the case of Ryan — or by a tough-minded, organiza-
tional ability — as exhibited by McCormack. For Hanlon and Gair 
the final attainment of power seemingly resulted from a combina-
tion of years of party service, proven administrative ability and in 
Gair s case, the cunning, when it was needed, to outfox his party 
rivals. ^ ^ 
Only four of these seventeen premiers were native-born 
Queenslanders - Byrnes McCormack, Hanlon and Gair. 
Whatever cultural baggage the others may have brought with them 
to their adopted state, they appear to have settled els ly i^to th^ 
t t ' u n S Z o d Z ' V ' ' " " ^ ' '"^ ^°"^^' "Ho-e"'emained 
the Umted Kingdom. The majority of the nineteenth century 
premiers were of the middle class, leaders of a small privileged co7 
omal elite, of an "estabhshment" which embraced both city and 
country interests and wealth. The Labor premiers, on the other 
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hand, inherited a different birthright, that of the attitudes and 
values of the working men and women of their day. Of the later, 
National Party premiers, Nicklin was, and remained, represen-
tadve of the small-farming element in Queensland society, while a 
class of new-moneyed entrepreneurs and developers grew up 
around Bjelke-Petersen. 
All were parochial in many respects, stout defenders of their 
state's best interests at all times and not above whipping up and us-
ing state chauvinism for their own political purposes. Yet many 
were capable of a much wider outlook. Three — Ryan, Theodore 
and Gair — moved with varying degrees of success into the federal 
political arena; Forgan Smith was tempted but resisted; Bjelke-
Petersen sought it avidly but was thwarted in its attainment. Of 
them all, it is Griffith who today remains a national historical 
figure, largely for his roles in the movement towards Federation 
and in drafting the Commonwealth constitution, on which he was 
later to "rule" from his position on the High Court of Australia. 
The most highly educated and intellectually able were the lawyers 
— Lilley, Griffith, Byrnes and Ryan. They were men of ideas, of 
philosophical beliefs, concerned with the interrelationship of these 
beliefs with pohtics. It is in the practice of their governments most 
of all, therefore, that we look for signs of the application of some, 
at least, of their political convictions and guiding principles. Byrnes 
was too young and his career too short to enable such a judgment 
to be made. There is ample evidence, however, to sustain a view of 
Lilley and Griffith as radical reformers in the mould of classic nine-
teenth century liberalism. Yet there is testimony in these pages to a 
contrary judgment also: to influences on them frpm within the 
political environment which caused political expediency rather than 
liberal principles to govern their actions on many occasions. With 
the Ryan Government there are fewer fine lines of distinction to be 
drawn between pragmatism and principle. Democratic socialism 
formed a consistent and continuing basis for the development of 
government policies. Reforms were numerous and radical for the 
time; indeed, under Ryan's leadership Queensland was regarded by 
the rest of AustraHa as the "Bolshie state". 
Murphy argues that Ryan's programmes were able to be im-
plemented (even against a hostile Legislative Council) because they 
combined radical and rational reform with the practicable, and 
were pushed through with determination by men of intelligence and 
vision. It does not seem too harsh a judgment to conclude that 
subsequent Labor administrations, certainly those from the 
mid-1920s onwards, lacked much of the drive and ideological fer-
vour of that of the Ryan period. The "essential dynamism required 
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by a reformist party which derives from the creative tension bet-
ween 'ideologues' and practical reformers"« was missing. McCor-
mack, Forgan Smith and Hanlon consciously contrived to silence 
the radical dissidents within the party, many of whom were located 
on the left wing of the labour movement. Except for the occasional 
radical, reforming outburst, as in the establishment of the free 
hospital and maternal and child welfare systems, the hallmarks of 
the late Labor governments were a stalwart defence of earlier 
socialist gains and sound administration of the status quo — 
socialism in its mildest form. Eventually, this "conservative" 
socialism of the Labor party was replaced by the low-keyed, rurally 
based conservatism of the Nicklin Government, to be followed in 
its turn by the radicalism of Joh Bjelke-Petersen, though now of an 
ultra-conservative kind. 
This book chronicles two further themes in Queensland's 
political history — those of regionalism and development. The 
force of regional opinion and the need for regional electoral sup-
port in a highly decentralized state have weighed heavily on the 
minds of the state's leaders since 1859. Although not a premier, 
John Macrossan was included in the original publication because of 
his perceived importance as a politician from the northern region, 
whose interests he persistently and persuasively represented. From 
time to time, regional demands went hand in hand with strong local 
movements for secession by either the central or northern zones. 
With the centre of government located in the extreme south-east 
corner of the state, and its economic activity divided between the 
capital and a number of cities and towns hundreds of kilometres 
distant, distrust and suspicion of a Brisbane-based government and 
its activities surfaced early in Queensland's history. These feelings 
have been maintained and are ignored by the state's leaders at their 
peril. 
While the need to develop the state has been an overriding con-
sideration common to all Australian state governments, in 
Queensland the emphasis has been placed almost exclusively on the 
use, development and exploitation of the land. Whether it has been 
directed to increasing primary production of all kinds, to exploiting 
the mineral wealth, to encouraging high-rise office and con-
dominium building, or to facilitating the growth of the tourist 
industry, the central thrust of government measures and actions 
has been towards development of the state through land usage. 
This has been the primary consideration of both conservative and 
Labor governments, enshrined for the latter in Forgan Smith's 
remark quoted by Carroll that 
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No matter how much secondary industries may be established in 
Queensland, this state will continue, for all time, to be a primary pro-
ducing State . . . Primary production is the natural occupation of 
mankind . . . No one would desire for this state the industrialised type 
of civilisation which exists in many countries today, (page 403) 
Emphasis on land settlement and use was a matter of harsh neces-
sity for the earlier premiers, as they introduced measures to 
encourage population growth. For those who came later it was a 
matter of considered and settled policy, which was taken to its 
ultimate conclusion under Bjelke-Petersen's leadership in the 
development of the land at all or any cost. 
In the opening paragraphs of their introduction, Murphy and 
Joyce endorsed the view, now widely accepted, "that Queensland 
politics are different yet only in a sense that also applies to each of 
the other states". They noted that, while initially there were many 
similarities — of background, culture, language and institutions — 
between the colonies, nevertheless dissimilarities in geography, 
historical development and economic growth, together with other 
factors, subsequently combined to produce characteristics peculiar 
to each state. 
For Queensland, the most striking difference has been the conti-
nuing strength and dominance of the National Party, a position it 
has not attained in any other Australian state or in national 
politics. Since the 1920s, first groups representing rural interests 
and then the National Party itself habitually have gained more seats 
in parliament than any of the conservative city-based parties. When 
the two have come together through amalgamation or in coalition 
the country element has been predominant, as it was in A.E. 
Moore's government and in the National-Liberal coalitions led by 
Nicklin and Bjelke-Petersen. Since 1983 the National Party has 
been able to govern in its own right. While a modicum of this suc-
cess can be attributed to the rurally weighted electoral system, other 
more significant explanations must be found for the overall 
predominance of the party, a party which, though it has changed its 
name from Country to National and brought a number of urban 
electorates into its fold, still also claims the exclusive representation 
of country people and their interests. 
The emphasis placed throughout Queensland's history on land 
use and development in one form or another was noted previously. 
When the highly decentralised nature of Queensland's population 
is taken into account also, a situation can be seen to have arisen in 
which the values and attitudes to government of the rural sector, in-
cluding those engaged in subsidiary industries in country towns, 
came to have a pre-eminence unheard of in the more industrialized 
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and urbanized mainland states. Given the vital importance to the 
state's prosperity of all forms of primary production, the belief was 
fostered that those who owned and worked the land had a superior 
claim to the attention of governments; that their contribudon to the 
economy was of far greater value than that of city dwellers. When 
combined with an almost mystical sense of the virtue to be gained 
by living and working close to the soil, this "country-mindedness" 
became the cement that bound Queensland society together. It 
found part of its political expression in a reliance on strong leaders, 
on people who would support and act decisively upon the aspira-
tions and demands of the rural sector. Both Labor and non-Labor 
were attentive and responsive to these wishes, even though each 
directed its policies to different classes in rural society. It was to 
assist rural employees and itinerant workers that Labor brought 
them into the arbitration system and under rural awards. Orderly 
marketing and closer land-settlement schemes were implemented to 
help the small farmer. The pastoralist and large farmer clients of 
the National Party gained the requisite infrastructure of roads, 
bridges and dams; drought and flood relief; subsidies; and ap-
propriate legislation to allay fears of trade union power. 
Inherent also in' country-mindedness was a set of social values 
ascribed to, in particular, by country people, but shared also by 
others in Queensland society. These encompassed strong, religious 
convictions, loyalty to the Queen and staunch opposition to 
republicanism, and a belief in the sanctity of the family unit and in 
the universality of certain moral values. These were coupled with 
an antipathy to and fear of change, other than that associated with 
the weather and the alternation of the seasons. In personifying 
these values himself and preaching their timeless validity up and 
down the state, Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen touched a deep and respon-
sive chord in a substantial number of Queenslanders. 
Societal attitudes and values do change, however, and we have 
reached another point in Queensland's political history where 
deviations from those of the past are now discernible. Brisbane is 
no longer a large country town; of the capital cities, it is now sur-
passed only by Sydney in the number and height of its skyscrapers. 
Rapid urbanisation has taken place, not only of the whole south-
eastern corner of the state but also in the towns and cities strung 
out along the eastern seaboard. While no doubt regionalism and 
development will remain fundamental directives of future govern-
ment policy, there are clear signs that growing numbers of citizens 
will no longer accept that the latter must be at any cost Grouos 
representing environmental, quality-of-life and social concerns of 
many kinds can no longer be ignored or denigrated as their support 
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increases and their campaigns become more sophisticated. A more 
balanced approach to development appears to be an imperative for 
all future governments. No doubt later social historians will note 
also that a society which saw itself for so long as basically male, 
white, Anglo-Saxon and homogeneous is having to come to terms, 
albeit uncomfortably, with the fact that it is black and female also, 
and to some extent multicultural as well. 
One could only speculate what future biographers will find when 
the post-1987 premiers and their governments, in their turn, are ex-
amined and analysed. It is too early, also, to consider whether the 
changes of the first two years of the Ahern government and those 
inherent in the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Commission will 
mark a permanent alteration to the cyclical nature of Queensland's 
political history, identifiable since 1915. Unless a deep-seated 
transmutation takes place in the way in which government and 
pohtics have been conducted in Queensland for much of this cen-
tury, the Ahern Premiership could represent little more than a 
hiatus, an interregnum between a past and a future period of 
strong, authoritarian leaders presiding over long periods of one-
party government. 
June 1989 
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The Politics of Queensland 
D.J. MURPHY AND R.B. JOYCE 
Are Queensland's politics and its politicians different? Is there a 
"Deep North" type of politician, found only in Queensland and not 
in the other states? Some commentators and political scientists, even 
ones who have lived in Queensland in recent times, seem to believe 
that many Queensland voters walk about with pieces of straw in their 
mouths and are distantly related to the hillbillies of America. If the 
"Deep North" argument is accepted, one might expect the political 
leaders of Queensland, in its first hundred years of self-government, 
to be anything but memorable. An examination of those leaders, 
however, reveals quite the opposite. 
We would concede that Queensland politics are different, yet 
different only in a sense that also applies to each of the other states: 
New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, 
and Tasmania are also different in their politics and in their history. 
Various factors made for differences—geography, economic op-
portunities, separate constitutions, and the characteristics of the 
earliest settlers. Australian history has traditionally been written as 
if all parts of the continent have similar backgrounds, and this 
approach has some validity. However, while the national sentiment 
has been strong in all states and while the movement towards the 
dominance of our politics by Commonwealth governments since 1901 
has been almost inexorable, we would argue strongly that there is 
still a case for the analysis of state characteristics. 
Queensland's differences were dominant when separation from 
New South Wales was won in 1859. Many of them have remained. 
The Queensland colony dwarfed in area its former parent, let alone 
tiny Tasmania; it has remained thinly populated, relying far more 
on primary production than its more thickly populated, industrialized 
eastern neighbours. New South Wales and Victoria; its population 
was more evenly spread throughout the colony, with several signifi-
cant ports competing with the capital city for trade and with the 
capital having considerably less political and commercial influence 
than those of the other colonies: it lacked the unique hope for a 
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"paradise of dissent" behind the foundation of South Australia, or 
the optimism of the progenitors of Western Australia; unlike 
Western Australia it shared a Pacific Ocean consciousness with the 
other eastern colonies, yet it was more aware of the proximity of 
northern neighbours. It should also be remembered that Queensland 
was tardy about entering the Federation and was contemplating its 
own separate Commonwealth when the representatives of the other 
colonies were meeting in 1897 and 1898, without Queensland, to 
settle the wording of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of 
Australia. Such differences might be expected to lead to different 
qualities in its political leaders, who had to face different problems 
from their counterparts elsewhere in Australia. 
This book attempts to assess the contribution of sixteen of the 
most significant figures in Queensland politics between 1859 and 
1952. Fourteen of these were chosen because they were important 
premiers; one of the others, George Ferguson Bowen, was the first 
Governor, and had considerable political influence; John Murtagh 
Macrossan was chosen because of his distinctive personality and to 
illustrate the different outlook of north Queensland. 
It is now more than a century since Queensland became self-
governing. In that period there have been thirty-one premiers. This 
allows an average of less than four years for each incumbent, which 
is misleading in that it obscures the relative stability of Queensland 
politics. In any case longevity in office is no guarantee of outstanding 
ability or of any major contribution to politics. In common with the 
other Australian states, Queensland has had its fair share of poor 
and incompetent premiers leading Cabinets loaded down with 
mediocrities. Nevertheless, Queensland produced political leaders of 
outstanding ability who were to become national figures. In Samuel 
Griffith, T.J. Ryan, and Edward Theodore, Queensland had three 
premiers equal to any premier of the other states, and their transfer 
to wider fields reduced the length of their Queensland service. 
Amongst those who were restricted to careers in Queensland, Charles 
Lilley, Thomas Mcllwraith, William Kidston, William McCormack, 
William Forgan Smith, and Edward Hanlon seem at least to equal 
the norm for competency among state premiers. Comparisons must 
remain speculative, however, until we have more colonial and state 
histories, but at least this book should provide state historians with 
a yardstick by which to measure their local identities. 
in 1859 Queensland inherited responsible government, which had 
been acquired by New South Wales a few years earlier in 1856 
Part of the inheritance was a bicameral legislature and an executive 
formally led by the Queen's representative, the Governor In 
accordance with the Constitution the Governor nominated the 
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members of the Legislative Council, while by convention the 
executive was appointed by the Governor on the advice of the leading 
member from the popularly elected lower house, called the Legisla-
tive Assembly. This house gained in power, and Queensland became 
unique among Australian states in 1921 when a Bill was passed by 
both houses of parliament abolishing the Legislative Council. The 
lower house was elected for five-year terms until 1893, when three-
year parliaments began; the suffrage based on residence or property 
qualifications was gradually expanded, although plural voting was 
not abolished until 1905, when women were also enfranchised. 
Women were not eligible to stand for parliament until T.J. Ryan 
amended the Elections Act in 1915. 
In the nineteenth century Queensland's population increased 
dramatically, rising in round figures from 30,000 to 330,000 in thirty 
years. The model of the politician primarily representing local 
interests remained strong, and diminished only as population grew 
and party structures became formalized. In 1859 Queensland had 
only sixteen electorates returning a total of twenty-six members; in 
1890 sixty electorates returned seventy-two members, and finally, 
at the 1912 election there were single-member electorates only, with 
seventy-two electorates returning as many members. The number 
of electorates was reduced to sixty-two in 1931, increased to seventy-
five in 1949, to seventy-eight in 1958, and to eighty-two in 1971. 
Throughout the early parliaments, elected members claimed to 
be independent of each other, but groupings soon appeared that were 
partly based on common interests—for instance pastoralists against 
agriculturalists, or country against city. These groupings did not 
include all parliamentarians nor did they resemble the discipline of 
modern party systems. Within twenty years, however, Queensland 
had moved towards a party system stemming from earlier groupings. 
By 1880 Thomas Mcllwraith, leader of the Natiorialists (or Con-
servatives), and Griffith, leader of the Liberals, could each count 
on a high proportion of faithful votes from their followers. Outside 
parliament, too, rudimentary party organizations had begun. 
This division seemed to vanish in the 1890 "Griffilwraith", a 
coalition formed under the two previously opposed leaders. Yet closer 
analysis of the period, dominated by the so-called "Continuous 
Ministry" lasting from 1890 to 1903, shows that political alignment 
was related to previous divisions. Thus William Kidston was to claim 
allegiance from the old Liberals against Robert Philp as the leader 
of the old Conservatives. Changes were not all due to the new political 
factor of the emerging Labor Party, which represented urban and 
rural workers as well as farmers, miners, and some small busi-
nessmen. Labor was first represented in parliament in 1888; by 1898 
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it had emerged as the official Opposition and had a brief spell of 
office in 1899, giving Queensland the distinction of having "the first 
Labor government in the world". The period that saw the fusion 
between Liberals and Conservatives was also marked by the begin-
ning of a separate party primarily represendng farming interests. 
After 1915 the Queensland political structure was similar to that 
of the rest of Australia; the same two parties were dominant, while 
there was the emergence of farmers' (or Country) parties from within 
the conservative party. 
Throughout Queensland's history the ability of its political leaders 
and their styles of campaigning and government have been important 
factors in the colony's and the state's politics. This book shows how 
Robert Herbert won grudging respect because of his ability, how 
Arthur Macalister emerged as a leader of local interests, how Lilley 
organized radical views from Queensland's separation, and how 
Macrossan worked vigorously for northern interests. In the 1880s 
Griffith and Mcllwraith seemed not only to Queenslanders but to 
other Australians to be local versions of Gladstone and Disraeli. The 
passing of these Queensland premiers from the leadership of politics 
left a vacuum in the 1890s, which was only partially filled by Thomas 
Byrnes. His early death at thirty-eight, while creating its own legend, 
left the state bereft of outstanding political figures. Philp, though 
he had succeeded in business and as an administrator, was to be 
an ineffective premier, and it was not until Kidston emerged as 
Treasurer in the Labor-Liberal coalition of 1903 and then as Premier 
in his own right in 1906, that Queensland again had a political leader 
of great ability who was able to leave a positive mark on the state's 
laws and government. Though Kidston split his own Labor Party 
in 1907, his place was soon taken by a group of Labor leaders who 
looked to future reforms, not to past squabbles. The emergence of 
Ryan and Theodore made the effects of the Kidston split short-lived 
(unlike that of 1957). Queensland politics from 1915 to 1952 can 
likewise be recalled in terms of political leaders. Chapters in the 
second half of the book suggest why Ryan and Theodore can be 
classed as the outstanding premiers of the twentieth century; why 
Arthur Moore failed; and why McCormack, Forgan Smith', and 
Hanlon, as the strong men of their parties, dominated their 
governments. 
This study ends in 1952 since the primary records on which these 
biographies arc largely based are not yet available for the last 
quarter-century. It is difficult, loo, to gain historical perspective on 
contemporary events when all the recent premiers except Jack Pizzey 
are still alive. Vet it is possible to argue some comparisons in the 
same terms as we have used for the previous period, while leaving 
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it to future historians to confirm or contradict our interpretations. 
Both Vince Gair and Frank Nicklin qualify for inclusion in 
subsequent biographical studies of this kind. Although Gair can be 
seen as failing as the strong man of his own party and being at least 
half responsible for the loss of office by Labor in 1957, he was a 
capable leader and administrator and remains, in terms of votes 
gained at general elections, one of the most popular premiers. Nicklin 
was the longest-serving premier. He unexpectedly took office in 1957 
and quickly changed the electoral rules so that he would not be 
defeated in any election swing in the manner that Arthur Moore, 
his only Country Party predecessor as premier, had been twenty-
five years earlier. After the brief Premiership of Pizzey and Gordon 
Chalk (sworn in while the Country Party elected its new leader), 
Queensland was led by Joh Bjelke-Petersen. Where both Pizzey 
and Chalk had made sizeable reputations in other portfolios before 
becoming premier, Bjelke-Petersen's reputation as a Minister was 
anything but high. He is certainly one of the most contentious of 
the state's premiers and the only one to have or to need a state-
financed news service that dwarfs that of any other state government 
in Australia. We leave a judgement on his competence as a premier 
to later historians. 
This book deals with political leaders rather than with political 
parties, and it is not intended to be a political history of Queensland. 
Nevertheless, as this introduction suggests, it is impossible to talk 
about politicians outside the framework in which they operate. The 
capital city, Brisbane, has been less important in Queensland politics 
than have the capitals of other states in their own political 
development. At various stages there have been sizeable separation 
movements in northern and central Queensland which have focused 
on anti-Brisbane sentiments, as well as on positive arguments for 
separate northern and central colonies. Griffith relied largely on 
Brisbane and south Queensland votes to govern, but had to placate 
central and northern pressures by devising a scheme for dividing 
Queensland administratively. Mcllwraith won votes from the north 
and centre of the state by supporting the interests of pastoralists 
and sugar planters. The pattern changed after Labor won sizeable 
votes in the northern and central areas in the election of 1893. This 
removed the support for separation that had come from the 
pastoralists and large sugar planters, since they feared the prospect 
of colonies in the centre and north dominated by Labor sympathizers. 
The separation movements emphasized the unfortunate geographical 
position of Brisbane as the colony's capital city, and administrative 
and business centre. Had Brisbane been geographically more equidis-
tant from the main centres of industry it might not have earned such 
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low priority among non-metropolitan politicians. 
Anti-Brisbane sentiment in Queensland politics, besides support-
ing separation, also reflected the importance of regional loyalties in 
the colony. These regional loyalties were heightened by the competi-
tion of local ports, served by their own regional railways and 
administered by local harbour boards. Brisbane metropolitan elec-
torates returned fewer than one-quarter of Legislative Assembly 
members for most of Queensland's history, and even after World 
War II, when Brisbane's population grew, metropolitan electorates 
returned only one-third of the members. "Brisbane-bashing", or 
attacks on Queen Street government, remained a common factor 
among all politicians outside the metropolitan area. 
The emergence of the Labor Party heightened the importance of 
social, economic, and constitutional reform as issues in Queensland 
politics. Colonial radicals and liberals, led by Griffith, had already 
introduced reforms in land-holding, labour relations, education, 
welfare, and franchise. These reforms, however, did not proceed as 
quickly nor in such depth as the Labor Party demanded. Most of 
the major reforms in agriculture, land-holding, welfare, and labour 
laws stemmed from Labor governments. 
Queensland's population has been spread fairly evenly throughout 
the state, even if there has been an increasing concentration in the 
south-eastern corner. The spread has been largely due to a combina-
tion of pastoral, mining, and agricultural industries, which have been 
the most important issues for political debate in Queensland, along 
with constitutional and electoral laws. Successive governments 
imbued with the "unlimited development" syndrome borrowed 
heavily to push railways from coastal ports to open up new farming 
land and to serve mining centres. The notion that the good life for 
Queenslanders was to be found in agriculture remained strong before 
and after the emergence of Labor governments in the twentieth 
century. Only for brief periods between 1883 and 1915 did busi-
nessmen have the opportunity to create their own ideal state. The 
simple fact, particularly after federation, was that Queensland could 
compete with the other states in primary, but not in secondary, 
mdustry. r j , 
«f IrfcK'"^''^^"u^ °^ agrarianism and the relatively weak position 
Thfs led "^ o ^ K^'^r"* '""r^ Queensland politics a rural emphasis. 
or in iustifvina thp o^rr, ^ • "^ "^^  ' " ^^^ allocation of resources 
in 1952. "^^ ^ • "®se patterns were clear 
Queensland Political Portraits is thus a study of sixteen 
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state's most significant political leaders against this background. 
Most of these politicians are also, we believe, worthy of remembrance 
for their own sakes. Although several of the men whose biographies 
are included here had careers that extended beyond Queensland 
politics, the emphasis has been kept on their careers in Queensland. 
The authors were at liberty to write about their subjects in the broad 
context of their times and were given free rein to interpret the 
political careers as they saw them. It is inevitable that there has 
been some overlapping of particular events. Not all of this has been 
removed in the editing, since it often provided two opposite points 
of view. Where such events are treated in different chapters, readers 
should consult the Index. Biographical details of all premiers, to the 
present, are to be found in the Appendix. For the political careers 
of other Queensland politicians see the various volumes of the 
Australian Dictionary of Biography and D.B. Waterson, A Bio-
graphical Register of the Queensland Parliament, 1860-1929. 
D.J. Murphy 
R.B. Joyce 
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1 George Ferguson Bowen and 
Robert George Wyndham Herbert 
The Imported Openers 
R.B. JOYCE 
The colony of Queensland was created on 10 December 1859, after 
the British Government had eventually passed the Act authorizing 
its separation from New South Wales. As first Governor the Colonial 
Office had chosen Sir George Ferguson Bowen, who in turn had 
chosen as his private secretary Robert George Wyndham Herbert, 
who was also to act as colonial secretary "independent of local 
influences"' until arrangements had been made to choose 
Queensland's first parliament. 
Who were these two men and why did they come to Australia? 
The middle-aged Bowen saw the governorship as a step in a colonial 
career. He was thirty-eight when appointed, having been born on 
2 November 1821 in Ireland where his father, Edward, was rector 
of Taughboyne in County Donegal. George was educated at Charter-
house, and Trinity College, Oxford. His university career was 
distinguished, for he was twice president of the Union and he 
graduated in 1844 with first-class honours in classics. He then began 
to read law at Lincoln's Inn and may have thought of joining the 
services, for in 1846 he had some naval training, serving for sixteen 
days in the Victory. His dominant interests were not naval, however, 
and from 1847 to 1851 he was rector of the Ionian University at 
Corfu. While holding this post he joined the colonial service as 
political secretary to the government of the Ionian Islands. It was 
in this capacity that he met and impressed Gladstone. 
Bowen travelled widely while in the Ionian Islands, writing several 
political pamphlets and three books. At the age of twenty-five he 
married Roma Diamantina, the daughter of Count Candiano di 
Roma, president of the Senate of the Ionian Islands. 
George Bowen: Governor of Quccn.sland 1859-66 
Robert Herbert: MLA (Leichhardt) 1860-63, (West Moreton) 1863-66; Premier and 
Colonial Secretary 1859-66; Premier and Vice-President of Executive Council 20 
July-7 August 1866; Acting Colonial Treasurer 1864 
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Robert George Wyndham Herbert 
Premier, 10 December 1 8 5 9 - 1 February 1866 
20 J u l y - 7 August 1866 
(Courtesy Oxley Library) 
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ROBERT GEORGE WYNDHAM HERBERT 
Despite his colonial service Bowen was still contemplating an 
academic career, and he was elected to a fellowship at Brasenose, 
which he held from 1851 to 1854. 
He had campaigned in favour of Gladstone in the 1852 elections, 
further impressing the liberal leader, whose patronage was the most 
significant factor in his appointment as Governor of Queensland. 
Herbert, younger than Bowen, shared his view that the value of 
a Queensland appointment was its providing colonial experience 
helpful for advancement elsewhere. Herbert was twenty-eight when 
appointed, having been born on 12 June 1831 in Brighton, England, 
where his father, Algernon, was a barrister and fifth son of the first 
Earl of Carnarvon. Robert was educated at Eton, and Balliol College, 
Oxford. His university course was, like Bowen's, distinguished and 
he graduated in 1854 with honours and prizes and was elected a 
fellow of All Souls. He graduated in law with a B.C.L. in 1856, 
was called to the Bar in 1858, and took his D.C.L. in 1862. Like 
Bowen he had impressed Gladstone, having worked for him from 
1855 as private secretary when Gladstone was Chancellor of the 
Exchequer in Lord Aberdeen's government. Later in 1858 Gladstone 
offered Herbert another post as private secretary but he refused it 
because it carried no salary. The offer from Bowen in 1859 was 
accepted because he wanted a public appointment rather than to 
practise law. 
In Queensland Bowen has been traditionally pictured as delighting 
in full authority, and hence as reluctant even to initiate parlia-
mentary government. For more than six months after he reached 
Brisbane it appears that he acted as a true autocrat, delegating only 
a shadow of power to Herbert. Even towards the end of his eight 
years as Governor, during the financial crisis of 1866, he appears 
to act autocratically—crushing the suggestion of his Colonial 
Treasurer, overriding the advice of his Premier, saving constitutional 
face only by falling back on the faithful Herbert. Public opinion 
compared him with Governor Bligh in New South Wales, or Elgin 
in Montreal in 1849. 
A truer picture would show a reluctant autocrat striving from the 
beginning to hand over responsibility and from then on guiding the 
colonists in the evolution of their independence. Indeed autocrats 
were already anachronistic in British colonies in 1859. The history 
of the second British empire is far more a matter of the evolution 
of free local institutions than the retention of power by English rulers. 
Responsible government as developed in the nineteenth century by 
Forbes and Wentworth in Australia, or Howe and Baldwin in 
Canada, had now been accepted by the Colonial Office in London. 
Twenty years after the Durham Report the broad principle was 
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established; what remained were efforts by colonists to define its 
limits and to extend its application, for instance by reducing still 
further the list of matters that London felt to be vital to the Empire 
as a whole. 
Although some Queenslanders were aware of these issues, in the 
1860s the majority of the colonists were to give far closer attention 
to the more immediate problems of land, labour, and development. 
Indeed there was a general impression that the battle was won now 
that independence from New South Wales had been achieved, so 
Bowen was welcomed as a friendly tutor in the enjoyment of the 
fruits of independence, rather than as an alien autocrat. 
Suffering as we have been from the evils consequent upon a distant 
Legislature, which, however well disposed, could not, from the nature 
of the case, either understand or provide for our requisites with sufficient 
promptitude, wc hail the advent of Separation and your Excellency's 
arrival with feelings of heartfelt gratitude to our beloved Queen.-
Paradoxically Bowen, although the representative of the Crown, 
became the champion of Queensland's evolving independence within 
the Empire. 
Yet the fact remains that Bowen arrived in the colony on 10 
December 1859 and ruled without a legislature for six months. Is 
there any explanation for this delay? A constitutional reason existed 
in the wording of the Order-in-Council of 6 June 1859 that created 
Queensland. Bowen was told that it was not practicable as the law 
stood to complete the electoral rolls before 26 April. Bowen sincerely 
regretted this prolongation of his position "as the sole fountain of 
authority"^ and pressed the New South Wales Governor, Sir William 
Denison, to issue the proclamation for the elections as soon as 
possible. As this proclamation was gazetted on 31 December, only 
three weeks afier Bowen's arrival, no charge of delay can be sustained 
against him. 
In any case it was not strictly accurate that Bowen was "the sole 
fountain of authority" since on the very day he assumed office he 
obeyed Colonial Office instructions by appointing Herbert as his 
Colonial Secretary; he also appointed an attorney-general, and within 
a week had formed an executive council. Its members were not all 
imported, for both Ratcliffe Pring, the Attorney-General, and R.R. 
Mackenzie {.w Appendix), the Colonial Treasurer, were resident 
Queenslanders. Bowen. it seems, referred matters of any importance 
to h.s council, and evidence exists that he wished it would accept 
fu ther respons.b.hty. On 16 December a representative of the 
Australasian Steam Navigation Company contacted Bowen to 
inform h,m that the company's ships would call at Brisbane on "he r 
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way to northern Queensland ports if paid a subsidy. Bowen refused 
to make a decision without referring to his Executive Council. 
However, he drafted a reply for the Council's consideration. Even 
a request to Bowen for a civil position from a family friend in 
Cornwall was referred to Herbert for his formal reply." Clearly such 
details show how Bowen took pains to avoid the slightest suspicion 
of autocratic action. 
Another limitation on his autocracy was the existence of adminis-
trative departments whose structure, personnel, and regulations were 
largely inherited from New South Wales. Nor was this all: Brisbane 
had its town council and a native police force of 127 representing 
law and order. The twenty thousand people of Queensland who had 
elected representatives for the responsible parliament of New South 
Wales, and had experienced these local institutions, were unlikely 
to accept autocracy. 
Finally, Bowen was unswerving in his deference to the powers of 
the future legislature. So in January 1860 he recorded a minute to 
the effect that existing schools would be maintained and Catholic 
schoolmasters paid under existing regulations because only the future 
Queensland parliament could decide any change in education policy. 
This deference was accepted by the Executive Council; thus in the 
rejection on 3 April I860 of the claim by Ipswich to be proclaimed 
a sub-port for customs purposes, the point was made that "the subject 
... [needed] the sanction of the legislature".' 
Instead then of a governor making decisions autocratically, there 
was a web of control, with Bowen always seeking to delegate his 
responsibility. Insofar as written records can show the subtleties of 
the exercise of power, it appears that Herbert was slow in offering 
advice, let alone making decisions. Few minutes were written by 
Herbert on the papers of his own department in these early months; 
far more were written by Bowen, who also drafted many letters 
signed by Herbert. Bowen became increasingly disappointed with 
this reluctance of Herbert and other departmental heads to lighten 
his load. Thus it was with relief, not disappointment, that Bowen 
greeted the first parliament in May 1860. This can be deduced from 
his minutes: "Let the Colonial Secretary decide now", or "I must 
have a minute from the Responsible Minister before 1 sign", and 
his somewhat petulant minute of 28 May, for Herbert and the Clerk 
of the Executive Council: 
It appears to mc that all these papers should be dealt with by the 
Responsible Minister of the Department. Now that this Colony has the 
happiness to enjoy a Ministry directly Responsible to the Assembly, the 
Governor wishes to sec only such papers as require his signature, or which 
arc to bo submitted to the Council, or which may give him useful or 
interesting information." 
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Up to May 1860 Bowen had every opportunity of exercising power. 
He had knowledge of practically every matter which came before 
his government, just as he was readily accessible to all his subjects: 
"Public Officers, GenUemen from the Country, or any other persons 
wishing to communicate with him personally on business which will 
submit of no delay will be received in any day, or at any hour, that 
he may happen to be at home."' But instead of welcoming and trying 
to increase this power, Bowen was always the reluctant autocrat. 
From May 1860 to February 1866 Herbert was the elected leader 
of the Queensland Government. In 1860 he was invited to contest 
three seats, and was returned unopposed in the electorate he chose, 
Leichhardt. Bowen's voluntary bowing-off his central position spot-
lighted Herbert, whose growing confidence and maturity can be 
judged from his increasing initiative, which is discernible at every 
level. Herbert soon became the actual leader, as Colonial Secretary 
in charge of the multifarious minutiae of administration, as vice-
president of the Executive Council, and as Premier in the Legislative 
Assembly. 
Bowen had not abdicated his infiuence in matters of importance 
or of imperial concern. Indeed his voluminous despatches to suc-
cessive Secretaries of State for the Colonies show his vital concern 
for every aspect of Queensland's development. The clear distinction 
remains, however, between an autocrat and one who wields influence 
and power within the legally defined limits of a governor in a colony 
enjoying responsible government. 
Behind the parliamentary front there was an expanding adminis-
trative structure. Bowen himself had framed the organization of the 
Queensland civil service, his minute gaining the "entire concurrence" 
of his Executive Councillors on 23 January 1860, significantly 
printed before gaining execudve approval in the Gazette dated 21 
January.' The scheme provided for entry to the public service by 
examinations, seeking men of merit rather than using patronage for 
appointments. Examinations were held from September 1860, with 
Herbert making the selections for the first few years. 
Bowen hoped to work through an efficient public service organized 
in departments "in each of ... [which] permanent Under Secretaries 
have been appointed ... quite competent in all eventualities, to carry 
on the general business of administration". Bowen agreed that legally 
these Under-Secretaries were "under the supervision of the Gov-
ernor but only m his capacity "as Head of the Executive".' Again 
c o n ' r ^ r r T ' ^^^^ ^u^^" accepted and worked within the evolving 
concepts of responsible government 
JusTifred'at?easTbv"thf"""' ' " r ' ^ ^ P ^ ^ - ^ Public service seem jusniieo at least by the papers of the Colonial Secretary's Depart-
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ment. In contrast with the first six months, culminating in Bowen's 
minute of 28 May 1860, a routine seems to have been satisfactorily 
developed. Minor matters bear no more than the initials of Herbert; 
very few papers are referred to Bowen for his attention. Unnecessary 
work by either Herbert or Bowen was saved by such procedure. 
Any hint of arbitrary action by the Governor was increasingly 
suspect with the administration, even his pre-parliamentary decisions 
still in operation. The question of the London agents for the 
Queensland Government illustrates this growing sensitivity. In 1859 
F. Mangles and Company applied to Bowen for this agency. In 
February 1860 the company was given the agency, with the approval 
of the Executive Council, yet clearly at Bowen's instigation. In 
December 1862 a departmental officer who examined the files 
concluded that the "altered circumstances of the colony" made 
reconsideration desirable, and so in August 1863 the Executive 
Council recommended the calling of fresh tenders.'" 
A clear evolution can be seen in the amount of responsibility 
accepted by Herbert as head of the administration. Increasingly he 
gave advice and made decisions in his minutes. He took over the 
role of the Bowen of early I860, each working in the framework 
of his constitutional position, each apparently trusted by his sub-
ordinate officers. Herbert, however, was able to leave far more to 
the civil service—indeed the majority of his minutes are those 
reporting for departmental action the decisions of the Executive 
Council. 
After May I860 it is clear that Bowen worked with "the advice 
and consent" of the legislature. At its head was the Executive 
Council, now a "Responsible Ministry under Parliamentary Govern-
ment", with the three members appointed in December 1859 now 
holding their places as parliamentary leaders "subject to resignation 
on losing the confidence of the majority of the Assembly"." 
Bowen and Herbert were also held in check by the Legislative 
Council. Initially the New South Wales Governor had the power 
to choose its members; but he had consulted Bowen, and after the 
Queensland parliament met, Bowen was empowered to summon 
councillors, who would hold office for life. He was able to fill only 
eleven of its fifteen places as "all the more active and infiuential 
politicians desire seats in the Lower House". Bowen was sceptical 
of the value of having two legislative chambers, discussing whether 
to eliminate the Council or to introduce some form of election for 
it. He agreed that it might have some value as "an obstacle to any 
too hasty legislation" since all its "Members have individually a large 
stake in the welfare of this Colony".'-
Bowen imported another outsider to act as its president. Sir 
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Charles Nicholson, who had been Speaker of the first Legislative 
Council of New South Wales for eleven years. Although resident 
in Sydney, Nicholson had interests in Queensland as the holder of 
extensive properties. As his parliamentary experience was far greater 
than that of either Bowen or Herbert, his aid, particularly on 
procedural points, was invaluable, although he stayed for only four 
months. 
To succeed Nicholson as president Bowen chose Lieutenant-
Colonel Maurice O'Connell, who after a varied army career had been 
a squatter first at Port Phillip then in the Burnett and Port Curtis 
districts. He had also held government positions, most recently as 
Government Resident at Port Curtis. As he had been twelve years 
in the north he considerably increased the proportion of local leaders. 
He was still in office when Bowen left Queensland. 
In June 1861 after the attempted swamping of the New South 
Wales Council (the Premier, Charles Cowper, had failed in 1858 
to persuade the Governor, Sir William Denison, to appoint fifteen 
more councillors), the Queensland Legislative Council resolved to 
reconstitute itself on an elective basis. Bowen reported that the 
change was supported both by his government and himself. Mean-
while his sincere belief in responsible government was suggested by 
his strong support of a proposal to limit his power of appointing 
councillors. Bowen upheld his government's suggestion that coun-
cillors should be nominated by the Governor-in-Council rather than 
by the Governor. He advised the Colonial Office that 
no men of ability, character and self-respect could be found to undertake 
the duties of Responsible Ministers, if they were liable to see their 
measures defeated or thwarted by a hostile majority in the Legislative 
Council, created without their advice or consent ... any attempt on the 
part of a Governor to surround himself with a camarilla, or to create 
an oligarchy opposed to the Ministry enjoying the confidence of the 
Representatives of the people, would not only end in piteous and 
ridiculous failure as far as concerns that Governor personally ... [but] 
more important ... it might seriously impair the powerful and legitimate 
influence which the Crown can always exercise in this loyal and sensible 
community, under the present form of administration, whenever it may 
think fit to interfere for the benefit of the Colonists themselves, or for 
the general good of the Empire at large." 
The Secretary of State for the Colonies accepted the change, so long 
as the president of the Legislative Council was still chosen personally 
by the Governor. Bowen in reappointing O'Connell as president (as 
an original member, his term expired in May 1865), referred the 
appointment to his Ministers, who concurred in the choice while 
admitting the Governor's right of nomination. 
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The attitude of Bowen to the Legislative Council shows his keen 
realization of the needs of responsible government. There is no 
question of his using his powers of appointment or influence to check 
the rights of the elected lower house. 
Within this lower house, the Legislative Assembly, Bowen had 
no direct power. Was he working through Herbert as Premier? 
Herbert's first task after his election was to establish himself in the 
Assembly, where he faced strong opposition from individuals like 
Arthur Macalister {see Ch. 2) and Charles Lilley (see Ch. 3). 
Herbert's repudiation of Bowen's opening speech as Governor, 
denying that it was a statement of his political programme, was an 
odd move considering that he had been acting as Colonial Secretary 
for six months, and presumably could have drawn up the opening 
speech himself. Perhaps it was intended to point the lesson that 
Herbert was constitutionally separate from Bowen. If so, commen-
tators missed the message. For instance, a newspaper writer accepted 
Herbert's repudiation and hoped that future governors' speeches 
would not be seen as "mere effusions emanating from the Vice-Regal 
brain".''' Herbert survived his early crises—such as when an amend-
ment to the Address-in-Reply was passed only by the Speaker's 
casting vote—and later challenges, both because of his own 
capabilities and the lack of an organized, unified opposition. 
Herbert was to become the clear leader in the house, and his 
speeches gained confidence as the years passed, especially as his 
pronouncements obviously presented government policy. Two news-
paper impressions, the first of 1860 and the second of 1862, give 
a balanced view as well as suggesting his increasing maturity: 
[Herbert's] style of speaking is effective but peculiar. There is no attempt 
at oratory, and we do not believe that the attempt, if made, would be 
successful but there is, nevertheless, a persuasiveness ... [He] speaks 
rapidly, in well-chosen language, and in an off-hand, conversational style 
— j^ust as if he had hold of a friend by the button-hole ... The opinion 
formed of Mr. Herbert at the commencement of the session, namely that 
he was well qualified for the position he holds, has been undoubtedly 
confirmed. While Pring carries the bounce, and Mackenzie the honesty 
of the Cabinet, Herbert has the brains." 
Then in 1862 
Mr. Herbert is no orator as Blakeney is, or Watts, or Lilley. or Pring. 
He never rises for the mere purpose of making a sensation, which is the 
peculiar province of the true orator nor is he often in a hurry to rise 
... yet he is an excellent speaker ... a correct and forcible speaker who, 
without any appearance of strategy, advances his argument in perfect 
order ... Whenever you see him rise to speak you have a comfortable 
feeling that light is about to break on the subject, and you are seldom 
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disappointed. Rapid in his delivery ... without any apparent effort, in 
a tone quite conversational ... without one superfluous word, he will lay 
the whole matter before you with extreme simplicity, and make you 
consider how you had formerly failed to apprehend it ... Mr. Herbert 
personally has the confidence of every member of the Assembly. No one 
doubts his ability, and in matters of real importance his honesty is 
unquestioned." 
One of the few who could see litde virtue in Herbert was Charles 
Bernays, writing in the 1910s as, perhaps, a Queenslander still 
resenting the slur of an imported premier: 
As a public speaker our first Premier was not what one would describe 
in these days as impressive. The language, as might be expected, was 
good, but his delivery was slightly halting, and his argument not too 
cohesive. There are five-and-twenty men in our Legislative Assembly to-
day with not a fifth of his education, who would catch more votes with 
an hour's speech than he would by talking every night for a week ... We 
don't import Premiers to-day ... the local product is the best suited to 
our requirements." 
The balance of opinion is against Bernays, and rather supports the 
judgement of an early historian, Coote: "in the local Parliament he 
became an easy but not an impressive speaker, and his influence 
in debate consisted rather in the matter than in the manner of what 
he said ... that he was the mainstay of Sir George Bowen for some 
years cannot be doubted."'* 
Establishing Herbert's role in parliament and his relationship to 
Bowen needs an assessment of their parts in the legislation that was 
introduced. Bernays suggested that Bowen was the intelligent 
instigator of these laws, whereas Coote and more particularly the 
press writers quoted gave Herbert the main credit. The evidence from 
the administrative level shows the youthful Herbert ever gaining 
confidence and playing an increasingly significant role. Is the 
evidence the same at this parliamentary level? 
Reading Herbert's speeches supports the pwint of the clarity and 
simplicity of his matter, and certainly suggests the brevity and 
directness of his manner (although the Hansard-v/riters" custom of 
reporting in indirect speech makes judgement difficult). Evidence 
exists of Herbert's growing confidence and of the deference paid to 
any opinion he expressed, even in the bitter debates during the 
financial crisis of 1866. He was helped by the lack of a developed 
Opposition during most of his time as leader. Throughout his first 
ministry, from 29 May 1860 to 1 February 1866—the whole life 
of the first parliament (to May 1863) and much of the second-
he needed little tactical skill because of this lack of opposition Even 
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in 1864 it was correctly stated that the nominal Opposition had no 
"material difference of opinion with honourable members on the 
opposite side of the House"." Various groups of members joined 
forces on certain issues but the combinations were many; the 
situation was far from a division on modern party lines. 
Further, as parliament was so restricted in its sittings, many 
matters had to be decided either within the administrative depart-
ments or by the Executive Council. Up to 1864 not even the sessions 
of any parliament lasted for more than one-third of the year—in 
I860, 112 days; 1861, 106; 1862, 79; 1863, 93—and after that in 
one year only, 1866, were sessions to last for more than half the 
year—in 1864, 141 days; 1865, 136; 1866, 197; and 1867, 174. When 
actual sitting days are calculated the figures become even more 
striking. In the circumstances of the colony a reasonable defence 
could be made for these infrequent sessions. Bowen explained the 
position by showing that for 
the usual annual session ... the months of May, June, July and August, 
are, in this Colony, the most generally convenient period ... at which 
those members who have the greatest stake in the country can absent 
themselves from the superintendence of their own affairs, with the least 
risk of damage to their private interests.* 
Nevertheless this factor limited the possibility of legislative attention. 
Few major matters could be left for eight months (August to May), 
so that the power of the administration and executive vis-a-vis the 
legislature was strengthened. 
Another limitation arose from the inexperience of most members 
in parliamentary procedure. This applied to Herbert, who lacked any 
direct parliamentary experience. He had knowledge of procedures 
behind the floor of the House of Commons but no experience of 
the immediate needs in debates. It was like his legal training, good 
theoretically but lacking the court experience of conducting his own 
cases. But if Herbert lacked direct experience, the majority of his 
fellows in the Assembly were mere neophytes. Since members had 
been elected in New South Wales since 1842, with the northern areas 
(later to be Queensland) represented a year later, it could be expected 
that more would have gained experience. But not until 1850 had 
these northern areas been represented by a resident north of the 
Tweed, so large were the New South Wales electorates. Of the few 
who had been in the southern house, not all desired to sit in 
Queensland's new lower house. Such facts allowed imported lumi-
naries to shine brighter, especially Herbert, who with his ability and 
inside knowledge as Premier learned faster than most of his fellows. 
Turning to the laws passed by Herbert's ministries, the hardest 
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problem is to assess the respective parts played by Bowen and 
Herbert in their planning. It is known that Bowen had definite ideas 
on most major issues; his despatches prove this. Herbert's hand is 
apparent in the drafting of many Bills: he put forward arguments 
in the Assembly and elsewhere about projected legislation. What 
is missing is proof of the actual origin of Bills put before the 
legislature. For instance, Bowen's despatch of I October I860 
discusses the first eighteen Acts of Queensland and encloses 
Herbert's memorandum on the most important of these—education 
and land. But does the despatch consist only of Bowen's ideas, the 
memorandum Herbert's? The thesis of a sharing of responsibility 
seems feasible, and certainly from the evidence it is hard to 
overthrow. For just as no evidence exists of the discussions in the 
Executive Council, similarly no record remains of private discussions 
between Bowen and Herbert, which could well have preceded any 
formal Council considerations. Such a thesis does not challenge the 
argument that Bowen was reluctant to exercise full power and 
sensitive about responsible government. The thesis is simply a 
deduction from the nature of the two men. Although Bowen was 
Governor and Herbert Premier they were close because of their 
backgrounds and friendship, both outsiders in a new colony with 
similar legal education; they were in constant contact. It would not 
be realistic to underestimate the originality of either man, but the 
few ways in which they were different hardly eliminate the possibility 
of joint decisions. The ten-year gap in their ages was not significant; 
nor were the differences in their social position or temperament. 
Bowen was married with children, while Herbert was a bachelor; 
Bowen may have had greater social ease and, though reserved, 
reputedly had personal influence with many different types, whereas 
Herbert remained aloof, with few confidential friends. These are 
hardly differences that divide men politically. 
Is there any way of attributing a greater share of the planning 
of legislation to either man? In the early months the older Bowen, 
with his five years of colonial experience in the Ionian Islands behind 
him, seemed to be the instigator, but as Herbert gained confidence 
and took on more and more responsibility his knowledge and its 
application must have increased his influence. Most legislation can 
thus be termed "Bowen-Herbert" or "Herbert-Bowen" in 
Queensland's first six years. 
Education was one major question faced by Bowen and Herbert. 
They introduced new legislation replacing the New South Wales 
Acts. In 1860 three Acts were passed, the Primary Education Act 
the Grammar Schools Act, and the State Aid Discontinuance Act' 
Under the first Act the Government helped local efforts in opening 
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primary National schools. Under the Grammar Schools Act secon-
dary schools could be established by the Government's providing up 
to £2000 when £1000 had been collected locally. Bowen of Charter-
house and Herbert of Eton intended these schools to fill the place 
of the English public schools and the Queen's Colleges in Ireland. 
For tertiary education there were provisions for scholarships from 
these schools to British or Australian universities. Again the Oxford 
background of Bowen and Herbert is plain, while Bowen as an 
imperialist hoped that besides being "highly beneficial to the 
individuals" these scholarships would "strengthen the cordial rela-
tions existing between this Colony and the Mother-Country". Bowen 
was deeply interested in educational problems: his speech at the 
opening of the first grammar school at Ipswich was a spirited defence 
of classical education and competitive examinations.^' 
The main education issue of the 1860s was the ending of State 
aid to religion. A State-controlled Board of General Education 
controlled primary schools, the State appointed the majority (four 
of seven) of trustees for the grammar schools, and the State ended 
the annual payment of £1000 "on account of Public Worship". In 
1860 Bowen expressed disapproval: he would have "preferred ... to 
see the system of 'State Aid' continued on a liberal scale, for, at 
least, some few years more, until Churches should have been built 
and Public Worship firmly established, not in the towns only, but 
also throughout the pastoral districts of the Colony". He stressed, 
however, that he had no intention of interfering with the decision 
of the legislature. Herbert's personal views are not made explicit 
in his memorandum, although he set out clearly the expected 
advantages to religion of the voluntary system. 
The ending of State aid had preceded the arrival on 2 September 
of Dr Tufnell, the Anglican in charge of the new bishopric of 
Queensland, who was soon protesting at what he interpreted as 
prejudice by the first Board of General Education against church 
schools. When, however, the second Board of General Educadon had 
a majority of Anglicans, some thought Queensland might be spared 
"that bitter hostility between the several denominations which has 
ever arisen, and can hardly fail to arise, from the warm discussion 
of the question of 'State-Aid' "." The Anglican Herbert expressed 
this hope, and his sentiment was endorsed by Bowen, who made much 
of the decision by both houses of the Queensland parliament to open 
their deliberations with prayer, chosen again from the liturgy of the 
Church of England." 
The issue proved unavoidable, however much Bowen and Herbert 
might deprecate "bitter hostility". It arose when consideration was 
given to the question of precedence between the Chief Justice and 
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the bishop of the Church of England. In New South Wales the former 
had precedence and Bowen feared that 
to assign to the Bishop of Brisbane a relative rank in Queensland higher 
than that of the Bishop of Sydney in New South Wales would (as I 
am advised) tend to aggravate the feelings of jealousy and ill-will created 
in colonies where there is no church Establishment, and where all 
Religious Communions are equal in the eye of the Colonial laws, by the 
precedence already given to the local Head of the Church of England. 
It is a matter of regret that the feelings to which I allude should exist, 
but ... [already they do exist] to a considerable extent." 
The precedence of the Church of England over other Christian 
Churches created further difficulties. Somewhat naively Bowen 
confessed that he had hitherto avoided "all difficulty from conflicting 
claims to precedency [between bishops] by simply taking care that 
the rival dignitaries are never asked to dinner at Government House 
on the same day", and asked approval to "persevere in this discreet 
course"." 
By October 1863 the Queensland Government's education system 
was being criticized by both the Anglican and Catholic bishops. 
Bowen now defended the system not only because the majority of 
both houses supported it, but also because 
all the arguments which tell in favour of National Education in Ireland 
[where Bowen was born] acquire vastly greater force in a young Colony 
where there is no Established Church, and where the population is so 
thinly scattered over an enormous area that it would be simply impossible 
in most localities, (even if it was desirable,) to maintain separate schools 
for each religious denomination.-" 
Bishop Quinn, the Catholic, had made his opposition to the State 
scheme plain from his arrival, in approaches to Bowen that treated 
the Governor as if he were an autocratic ruler. Quinn's first vehement 
protest was against the precedence assigned to Dr Tufnell. Bowen 
pointed out that he was bound "/o obey his Instructions; and that 
a Roman Catholic in ... [his] place could give ... no other answer", 
for it had been laid down that "the Episcopate which derives its rank 
from the Queen's Letters Patent, should take precedence of any other 
Episcopate not deriving its rank from any such Letters Patent". For 
this same reason Bowen refused Quinn's face-saving scheme to grant 
precedence to Tufnell as ''Senior Bishop", based on his arrival in 
Brisbane before Quinn. 
Quinn's next tactic was to ally himself with Tufnell against the 
education system. Petitions and public meetings were organized in 
protest, with Quinn and Tufnell sharing the platform. Bowen claims 
that these meetmgs "were attended chiefly by Irish Roman Catho-
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licks,—the Members of the Church of England and of all the 
Protestant communions looking askance at the proceedings of the 
two Prelates". Bowen therefore tended to discount these meetings 
since Catholics comprised only about one-quarter of Queensland's 
population, and no Catholic had a seat in either house. 
Quinn's next direct move was advising Bowen of the bishops' plan 
to introduce a denominational system with a board on which the 
two bishops and clergymen from other Churches would be in the 
majority. As this board was to be "irresponsible to, and independent 
of, the Government of the day—in short—an imperium in imperio", 
Bowen gave the idea short shrift. He also advised Quinn to petition 
parliament, not him, stressing the restrictions on his powers as 
Governor of a colony under parliamentary government. 
Quinn's next step was a revealing comment on how he viewed the 
power structure. He told Bowen he had 
ascertained that Mr. Cardwell [the Secretary of State for the Colonies] 
resigned the office of Chief Secretary in Ireland on account of his 
disapproval of the National system of Education. Would it not be good 
policy on your Excellency's part, now that your term of office in 
Queensland is drawing towards its close, to ingratiate yourself with the 
Secretary ... by discouraging the system to which he is so strongly 
opposed? 
Bowen not only denied the reason suggested for Cardwell's resigna-
tion but also pointed out that "every English Statesman would regard 
with pain and displeasure the conduct of any Governor who could 
be induced to violate his duty and the law of the land in the hope 
of personal advantage". Further, any attempt by any secretary of 
state or any governor "to dictate in any purely local matter" would 
be strongly resisted by all classes and parties. 
Turning to threats, Quinn predicted "dreadful consequences" if 
Bowen could not be persuaded. Bowen retaliated by assuring Quinn 
that "the arm of the law was quite strong enough to repress any 
... disturbance from whatever quarter it might begin". Later there 
were rumours of moves to petition for the removal of Bowen from 
Queensland and his replacement by a Catholic governor (who was 
even named—Sir Dominick Daly). 
Bowen in reporting to Cardwell this rather sensational interview 
tended to limit its political significance and predicted that the "novel 
alliance" would be almost forgotten in a few months. He was quite 
certain that the legislature would continue its support of the National 
system, with perhaps some support for "non-vested" schools of all 
denominations." 
Bowen was glad to be assured from London that his conduct with 
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Quinn was approved. The Secretary of State agreed that in education 
policy Bowen's "Advisers ... [had] exercised their Constitutional 
functions in conformity ... with the general opinion of the Community 
... and with ... advantage to the people of Queensland".^' Bowen then 
received, through Herbert, a strong declaration of local support. In 
a speech at Ipswich Grammar School Bowen had publicly answered 
Quinn by declaring his inflexible determination to uphold the spirit 
of the Constitution. Herbert reported that "the press and all the 
educated portion of this community, without distinction of political 
party or social class" welcomed the Governor's declaration; further, 
Herbert felt that Bowen's views expressed the feelings held not only 
by the Ministry "but also by their political opponents in the 
Parliament, and by nearly all the education, intelligence and property 
of Queensland". The only opposition Herbert listed was from "many 
thousands of the Irish peasantry" now in Queensland, over whom 
Quinn "probably calculates ... [to] retain his influence ... for a longer 
period, by keeping up in this Colony the semi-political semi-religious 
agitation to which they were accustomed in their native island"." 
Bowen took the whole dispute as an illustration of how influential 
a governor could become within the framework of responsible 
government. 
A Governor may, by infiexibly maintaining in all local disputes that 
dignified neutrality which belongs to the Crown that he represents, do 
much towards moderating the vehemence of controversies which would 
otherwise become irreconcilable ... by a judicious use of the influence 
rather than of ihe authority of his office, a Governor may exercise a 
powerful control over the entire course of affairs, and may generally 
secure the adoption of the Colonial Legislature of any measures 
recommended by the Imperial Authorities. But the extent of the influence 
of the Governor of a Colony possessing Representative institutions 
depends chiefly on the amount of the confidence felt by the Colonial 
Ministry and Parliament that he will never make a partial or unconstitu-
tional use of his authority."" 
Bowen would have hoped, and he has much justification, that his 
generalization could be applied as a panegyric to the first five years 
of his gubernatorial role in Queensland. 
Extravagant claims, especially by Bowen, have been made about 
Queensland's land code based on the four Acts of I860 Soon after 
Bowen arrived he realized the vital importance of land legislation 
saying that 
While mairitaining ... a dignified neutrality between contending parties 
I hope to lend my aid and influence to a conciliatory and equitable 
settlement o( the land question, which otherwi.se threatens to become 
in Australia an irritating contest between rival classes and interests like 
Ihe Corn-Laws in England, and the Agrarian-Laws at Rome " " 
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After the four Acts were passed he felt that his hopes had been 
exceeded and, without pledging himself to concurrence in all their 
details, regarded the Acts "as a practical and satisfactory settlement 
of this much-vexed question, which is still embittering the social life, 
and retarding the material progress of the neighbouring and older 
Colonies"." Going even further, Bowen claimed that the results 
"surpassed the most sanguine hopes which I entertained" for it 
"settled that long quarrel between the pastoral and agricultural 
interests which has raged in all new countries since the days of Abel, 
the 'keeper of sheep' and Cain, the 'tiller of the ground' "." 
Land questions had been before both Bowen and Herbert from 
their first hours in the colony. Herbert realized some of the 
difficulties, for instance writing: 
I am afraid that when it is considered that the survey cannot keep pace 
with the requirements of intending purchasers of land in comparatively 
small blocks—it is idle to expect that it will afford the merit of forestalling 
the wants and providing against confusion among the claims of the many 
pioneers of discovery and occupation.'" 
The evidence of concern about this central issue by both Bowen and 
Herbert, let alone by the survey and lands officers, makes it difficult 
to give full credit to any individual for the land code. Historians 
have called it Herbert's code, but it is difficult to determine to what 
extent he suggested or framed the four Acts. His memorandum on 
lands, nominally addressed to Bowen, is equally an explanation of 
the principles of the code for the Secretary of State for the Colonies. 
Further, the code fits into the history of Australian land policy, which 
was shaped by diverse factors: the experience of the Hawkesbury 
settlers; John Macarthur's achievements; the rivalries between ex-
clusive and emancipist land-users; and the experiments of Western 
Australia and South Australia, including Wakefield's theories. 
Queensland had been settled as part of the northern movement of 
the squatters; the Australian pattern of disputes between agricultur-
alists and pastoralists already existed whatever Bowen and Herbert 
might hope. 
Indeed the principles which Herbert sets out admit the limited 
choice open to legislators. The main object was "the settlement of 
the country", particularly by promoting agriculture. Yet to gain a 
"desirable class of [British] settlers", Queensland had to compete 
with both the price and quality of land available in Canada and the 
United States of America or New Zealand. Even if the price of land 
was reduced to 5s an acre, instead of £1, this would not overcome 
the disadvantages of a new colony 16,000 miles from Britain. Cheap 
land, as Wakefield had pointed out, led to speculation and Herbert, 
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agreeing, wrote that "the bona fide intending agriculturist on the 
spot ... [preferred] to pay the higher price for good land rather than 
to see the operations of the speculator encouraged". Besides, a 75 
per cent cut in price would lead to "serious disturbance [of] the 
existing value of property"." 
Although the suggested solution of a land order scheme was hardly 
new—it had been suggested by the Australian Emigration Office 
in London in November 1859, and by Queensland's Surveyor-
General A.C. Gregory in January 1860--Herbert could possibly be 
given credit for its details. 
Agricultural hopes were largely based on the belief in the future 
of cotton in Queensland. Cotton-growing had begun in the 1840s, 
then in the 1850s a few bags of cotton had been shipped to Liverpool. 
Bowen thought cotton-growers were well worthy of encouragement, 
and wrote to a prospective planter in December 1859 that the 
Queensland Government was anxious to give "to all gentlemen 
engaged in cotton cultivation every advantage consistent with the 
existing land regulations of this colony, which can be modified only 
by the Queensland Parliament"." 
Besides cotton, the possibilities of cane sugar were also recognized. 
For although sugar plantations were still referred to as "new" in 
1867, Louis Hope, the first large-scale grower, was in Queensland 
in 1859. Bowen as early as November 1859 listed sugar as one of 
the future products of the colony." His optimism was supported by 
successful experiments around Maryborough, where sugar had been 
grown that was finer, in Bowen's opinion, than any he had seen at 
Mauritius. This opinion was backed by an analysis of canes from 
Maryborough sent to the 1855 Paris Exhibition. 
Herbert in 1860 wanted to give further inducement for the 
extension of plantations, so he introduced a scheme whereby further 
land orders were to be given as a premium for successful cultivation. 
Herbert became one of Queensland's earliest optimistic promoters 
by boasting of "this Colony possessing ... the richest soil and the 
finest climate in the world".'* The land code provided for specific 
agricultural reserves around each of the major ports and towns. 
Herbert gave priority to agriculture because it was of such "deep 
interest, not only to those engaged in pastoral pursuits, but to all 
classes of the community"." Yet his very statement impliedly 
admitted the importance of the pastoral industry, vital to 
Queensland's economy. Already in 1860 the colony had three and 
a half million sheep, nearly half a million cattle, and twenty thousand 
horses. The squatters' influence could not be denied. Even before 
^ ' 'T f l ? ° ' ^^" ^^"^ *'^^" '^^'•"^^ '"'•o'" London that "the most anxious 
and difficult question ... will be the squatters. But ... you will wisely 
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abstain as much as possible from interference. Avoid taking part 
with one or the other" of the rival interests.'" Bowen had tried to 
avoid clashes between pastoralist and townsman, or pastoralist and 
agriculturalist. Socially it seems clear that much of his sympathy 
was on the side of the squatters. He gave fulsome praise to the 
gentlemen-squatters he met in his extensive tours; he enjoyed 
hunting, shooting, and fishing with them, and indeed recommended 
that no governor lacking these primary outdoor skills should ever 
be sent to Queensland. Yet all this did not prevent his encouragement 
of either sugar or cotton. 
Bowen seems to have felt that the three Acts providing for the 
leasing of Crown lands would satisfy the squatters, and that they 
would not resent the reservation of agricultural areas. One of 
Herbert's major concerns in these Acts was to avoid the "great evil" 
of speculators, who were obtaining tenders for runs but leaving them 
unstocked until they could unload for "a sufficient price". These 
speculators were forcing the true pastoralist "at largely increased 
danger and expense, to a location far beyond the limits of 
settlement"."' By the new Act occupation licences were to be offered 
for the first year of areas up to 100 square miles. Within nine months 
the licensee could apply for a fourteen-year lease on the condition 
that the run must be stocked to one-quarter of its assumed capacity. 
Encouragement was to be given for improvements. 
Credit can be given to Bowen and Herbert for the extent of their 
realizadon of the value of the pastoral industry to Queensland, rather 
than for the fact of its expansion. Further, in that they carefully 
refrained from supporting either the squatters or their opponents, 
their part in this expansion must have been limited. Likewise Herbert 
had remained politically neutral, with squatters and strong anti-
squatters both supporting and opposing his government. A contrast 
can be made with the "pure merino" Ministry led by Robert 
Mackenzie (see Appendix) in 1867. Finally, the fact that in 1868 
a new Lands Act was introduced, lowering the price of land and 
including free selection before full survey, and in 1869 a new Pastoral 
Leases Act giving longer tenure, meant that the so-called Herbert 
code did not survive. 
A central feature of the land legislation was its provisions for 
encouraging immigration. Looking simply at the population figures, 
which rose from 28,000 in 1860 to 99,901 in 1868, it would seem 
that much credit should be given to the leaders of the Government. 
Yet the same sort of limitations which applied to pastoral expansion 
need to be made here. Many migrants would have come whatever 
the policy of the Government, and the very moves that had led to 
the desire for separation must have encouraged new settlers. Granted 
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all this, it is apparent that both Bowen and Herbert wished for as 
rapid an expansion of population as possible. Typical of many similar 
pronouncements by Bowen was his verdict in December 1860 that 
the "most pressing need of Queensland is an accession of population 
to develope the rich and varied resources and capabilities of our vast 
territory"."^ 
Many frustrations and difficulties occurred in the working of 
immigration policy. The land order scheme, insofar as it aimed at 
the creation of a small land-owning class, was not highly successful, 
and was varied in 1864. Bowen's ideas for the immigration of Indians 
failed, the alternative schemes for Chinese did not serve the purpose 
of tropical agriculture, and South Sea Islanders (the so-called 
Kanakas) came in despite rather than through government policy. 
The methods of German immigration were condemned in 1865, and 
temporarily stopped from late 1866 to the end of 1869 at a time 
when Queensland badly needed agricultural workers. 
Bowen transmitted to London a request for Indian migrants in 
December 1860, combining with it a plea for a share of Chinese 
workers for Queensland."' By April 1861, he expressed preference 
for Indians over Chinese. He reflected popular opinion, warning that 
"owing to events ... in the neighbouring Colonies, and to a variety 
of reasons, having reference chiefly to questions of character and 
social habits, the proposed importation of large bodies of Chinese 
would be regarded unfavourably by the peoples of this Colony". On 
the other hand, Indians as British subjects accustomed to English 
management would be more acceptable. Bowen from his Mediter-
ranean experience had yet another string to his bow—Maltese 
labourers, "generally sober and industrious and ... accustomed ... to 
the cultivation of cotton in a climate closely resembling ... 
Queensland".*' Those who brought them in would be entided to 
grants of land. 
The introduction of Indians was delayed because the Colonial 
Office insisted on a Queensland Act to control such migration, and 
that the Act should be reserved for imperial approval."^ Herbert 
thought an Act unnecessary because of the Masters and Servants 
Act, which he thought would protect the coolie against oppression 
by his employer. Bowen also resented the attitude of the Colonial 
Office, especially as neither the West Indies nor Mauritius had been 
asked to reserve legislation in similar circumstances. He also thought 
the issue showed a lack of British confidence in the Queensland 
parliament and in himself as Governor.** 
Irked by the delay, Bowen revived discussion of introducing 
Chinese labourers. Then in 1862 the Queensland parliament in-
troduced an Act providing for Indian migrants. The Regulations 
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were reserved for approval by the Colonial Office. 
As Herbert was going in August 1862 to England on "urgent 
private affairs", Bowen advised the Colonial Office that Herbert 
could give any further explanation needed. Bowen was confident that 
"nine-tenths of the property, education and intelligence of all classes 
in this community""' were on his side, but in a later despatch in the 
same month of July he had to transmit petitions adopted at meetings 
held in the Schools of Arts in Brisbane and Ipswich against the 
immigration of either Indians or Chinese.** Later another-petition, 
promoted by a Brisbane ironmonger, attacked the "immoral and 
heathen Chinese".*' Bowen discounted these petitions despite clear 
evidence that they reflected considerable working-class opposition 
to any form of cheap labour. Since Bowen was sincerely convinced 
that white men could not do strenuous work in the northern areas 
of the colony he could not appreciate this opposition. "All reasonable 
men of every side", he wrote, 
admit that if the resources of the vast intertropical districts of Queensland 
are to be developed at all, they must be developed by the aid of Asiatics 
of some race, and that, if capitalists and colonizing companies are not 
permitted to introduce Indian labour under proper regulations and 
supervision, they will ere long deluge Northern Australia with Chinese, 
Malays, Polynesians, and hordes of other barbarians underno regulations 
or supervision whatsoever.^ 
Despite Herbert's presence in London more frustrations followed. 
The Colonial Office reply, received six months after Bowen's 
despatch of July 1862, suggested modifications in the plan, notably 
that only unskilled labourers should be sought—thus partly meeting 
the objections of the working class in the towns. Bowen urged the 
relaxation of other conditions, for instance resisting the claim that 
Queensland should pay for returning the labourers to India. His 
pleading was in vain for both the British and Indian authorities 
refused to agree. DisapfKjinted, Bowen in September 1863 com-
plained that the lack of Indian labourers would be the death-knell 
of cotton in Queensland. 
He found some compensation, however, in the immigration of the 
first labourers from the South Seas. Bowen had approved Captain 
Towns's importation of sixty Polynesians, although hinting that this 
could be the start of unregulated labour if the main deterrent, the 
expense of chartering vessels, was overcome. To check this new extra-
legal labour traffic both Herbert and Bowen had insisted on gaining 
full information from Towns and on giving as much publicity as 
possible to his replies. Towns claimed that his instructions to the 
captain and interpreter on his recruiting vessel, and his letter to 
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missionaries, gave guarantees against "any species of Slavery or 
Kidnapping of these natives". Bowen agreed, adding evidence of 
Towns's good character and his established position, as well as the 
practical point that as his plantation was only forty miles from 
Brisbane it was under the eye of "the Government, of the Magistracy, 
and of a viligant Press". Bowen assured the Secretary of State that 
he had personally inspected the labourers on this plantation." 
Further difficulties with terms for introducing Chinese immigrants 
had Bowen close to despairing of any plan for Asiatic labour. He 
told the Colonial Office that as cotton "really affects the Mother-
Country far more intimately than the Colony", the continued 
restrictions, difficulties, and delays would be felt far more keenly 
at Manchester than in Brisbane." 
The eventual approval in July 1864 of the Act and regulations 
allowing immigration from India left Bowen flat; the four-year 
struggle had clearly deflated his enthusiasm. In any case no 
advantage was taken of the Act for, so Bowen was informed, both 
sugar and cotton planters preferred South Sea Islanders to Indians 
as "stronger and more tractable"." Bowen's later years as Governor 
saw the beginning of the efforts to legalize and control this South 
Sea Island traffic. In April 1867 Captain Luce, the Senior Naval 
Officer in Australia, reported the murder of Europeans in various 
Pacific islands allegedly committed in revenge for the loss of many 
of their countrymen carried away three years before to Queensland 
and the Fiji Islands by Europeans, who hired them as labourers and 
promised to return them to their homes in twelve months. Bowen's 
Executive Council sought excuses for limited action. Only 382 
Islanders, they claimed, had landed in Queensland, 78 of whom had 
been returned to their homes. As far as Queensland was concerned, 
it was argued that the Masters and Servants Act applied to labour 
contracts wherever made, but if further legislation was required "the 
Council do not doubt but that the Colonial Parliament will be ready 
to pass any measure which facts and documents hereafter to be laid 
before them may show to be absolutely necessary". As a practical 
measure the Council ordered police magistrates to inspect planta-
tions in their areas. 
Luce expressed himself satisfied that the labour traffic would be 
carried on with great justice "and ... [would] be of great benefit 
to the natives themselves". Bowen, too, having again inspected 
Towns's plantation, found that the 160 Islanders there "all seemed 
to be well-fed, well clothed, and perfectly contented". Several whose 
term was nearly over told Bowen that they would return to 
Queensland and "would induce their wives and numbers of their 
countrymen to accompany them".** 
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So for Bowen the story of cheap labour finished on a brighter 
note. Sugar seemed to be replacing cotton as a possible agricultural 
staple, while Kanakas were replacing the Indians and Chinese he 
had advocated. 
A visionary plan of Bowen's that reached fruition was the 
establishment of a settlement on Cape York. The case provides one 
example of where his enthusiasm shaped the policy decisions of 
Herbert and his government. Even before Bowen had reached 
Brisbane he visualized "a chain of capacious Harbors ... at successive 
intervals along the coast" as outlets for the produce of the interior." 
Then in February 1860 he had suggested a small station on Cape 
York as a refuge for the crews of ships wrecked in and around the 
dangerous waters of Torres Strait. Another purpose for this station 
was to be a telegraphic post on the projected line from Australia 
to Java. Further, he argued that a Cape York settlement would not 
suffer from the disadvantages of unhealthiness, and remoteness from 
Torres Strait, which had led to the abandonment of Port Essington 
and Melville Island.*' Beyond this Bowen sought New South Wales 
and imperial co-operation and carried out careful research, studying 
everything that has been published upon it, from the "Relation" of ... 
Torres ... , down to the latest reports of Her Majesty's Surveying ships 
and to the most recent Admiralty Charts. I have also consulted with 
Sir William Denison, and with a number of scientific and practical men 
both in Australia and in England." 
Although approval by the imperial Government was delayed because 
of legal doubts as to the north-western territorial rights of 
Queensland*', Bowen continually speculated about the best place for 
a settlement. He preferred a site near the top of Cape York, detailing 
eight reasons: as a port of refuge; a store depot; a coal port; a control 
post over the Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders; a centre for 
geographical research, missionary enterprise and eventual co-
lonization; a military defence post; a sign of the influence and 
prestige of Great Britain; and, with highest hopes, the future 
Australian Singapore." 
The Imperial Government was concerned at costs and the 
Queensland Executive Council approved the settlement on conditions 
entailing "no trouble and only an insignificant expence [sic] on the 
Imperial Government".'" 
Bowen urged rapid English action, to avoid a year's delay if the 
brief Queensland parliamentary session was missed. The Admiralty 
was the first to act, instructing its local Commodore to go north 
with Bowen to choose the best site. On this voyage lasting between 
August and October 1862 a site was chosen at Port Albany and 
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named Somerset, after the First Lord of the Admiralty. 
The settlement was eventually launched in July 1864 under the 
control of John Jardine as Police Magistrate and Commissioner of 
Crown Lands. Bowen gave him his Instructions, comparing his 
relationship to the officer commanding the defence forces, naval 
marines, as "analogous to that of the Governor of a Colony to the 
Officer Commanding Her Majesty's Troops therein"." Bowen gave 
Jardine particular instructions about the Aborigines, who were to 
be protected so long as they remained peaceable and well disposed. 
Bowen hoped that Somerset would prove to be a point from which 
missionary enterprise, as well as British commerce and colonization, 
would spread over north-eastern Australia and eventually perhaps 
over New Guinea and other portions of the Indian Archipelago. 
Bowen's own ideas at Brisbane were to be propagated from Somerset. 
Determined "that no effort calculated to promote the success of 
the new settlement shall be wanting on the part of myself and of 
my Government"," Bowen showed undeniable interest in everything 
concerned with Somerset. He fully reported all details of progress 
and urged-further steps like the setting-up of a steamship line 
between Cape York and Timor to complete the steam link between 
Sydney and Singapore. 
The settlement never thrived, however, and in 1865 the Admirahy 
asked if it could withdraw its marines by July 1867. The Queensland 
Executive thought the question was imperial rather than colonial. 
Bowen tried to persuade the Admiralty to expand, to set up new 
depots, and argued that Queensland was willing to defray all costs. 
However, the Admiralty was firm in its decision to withdraw and 
eventually Bowen had to send a detachment of Queensland's water 
police to Somerset. 
Bowen was also dissatisfied with mission work. The first mis-
sionary reached Somerset in February 1867. Bowen, supported by 
his Executive Council, stressed how inadequate one missionary was 
when the Aborigines were spread over territory three times as large 
as France. 
The Somerset venture illustrates several facets of Bowen's rule. 
It typifies his support of expansion, repeated in his active support 
for the beginnings of Port Denison, Cardwell, Burketown, and 
Townsville. It typifies the blunting of his early enthusiasm by 
imperial delays. For, however understandable these may have been 
in relation to all aspects of British policy, as an imperialist in 
Queensland Bowen could not hide his frustrations and eventually 
his cynical resignation. It shows his interest in defence questions, 
also revealed by his support for the formation of volunteer forces 
begun in Brisbane and Ipswich early in 1860. It reveals his interest 
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in the Aborigines. Finally it shows how far his colony, weak militarily 
and financially, needed outside support; however much Bowen 
trumpeted for Queensland, in any real sense his was a weak and 
dependent position. 
Bowen always claimed to rule within the framework of responsible 
government, so that actual power rested with the legislature. Can 
this claim be borne out in an examination of the two major challenges 
to his rule, by Judge Lutwyche from 1859 to 1864, and in the 
financial crisis of 1866? 
The first issue with Lutwyche concerned the franchise for the first 
Queensland elections; legal luminaries, arguing from precedent, 
disagreed among themselves, while Bowen concentrated on political 
points. 
Bowen had no choice at this time; the decision was in the hands 
of Governor Denison, who directed that the qualification for electors 
would not be manhood suffrage but a more limited qualification as 
in the 1853 Act. Bowen disagreed with Lutwyche on political 
grounds. Whereas Lutwyche argued that an Imperial Act should be 
passed to amend the 1859 Order-in-Council, Bowen thought such 
an Act would be superfluous if the Queensland Government im-
mediately introduced manhood suffrage, and arbitrary if the 
Queensland Government was opposed to manhood suffrage. Bowen 
realized that the Imperial Government must not show any "desire 
to interfere in the internal affairs of these communities". He 
suggested a declaratory despatch from London instructing him to 
assent to "any well considered and properly framed Act" passed to 
amend the 1859 Order-in-Council. He thought that such a colonial 
Act should not be reserved, which might be politically "inconvenient 
and unpopular"." On this issue Bowen bent backwards to consider 
the sensitivity of the colonists. 
Besides rectifying the franchise blunder in the Order-in-Council, 
Bowen hoped that the Civil List could be revised; this again involved 
Lutwyche, who had a strong case in protesting against the judge's 
amended salary of £1200. The salary of the first resident judge of 
Moreton Bay had been raised to £2000. Lutwyche succeeded in 
February 1859 at the same salary, £2000. Lutwyche had protested 
on the salary issue before separation and his protest had been upheld 
by the New South Wales law officers—who agreed that he was 
legally entitled to £2000. Bowen had accepted this legal opinion and 
Lutwyche continued to be paid £2000 after separation. Bowen was 
concerned lest the Queensland Government when elected might 
disregard the opinion of the New South Wales law officers, and insist 
on reducing the judge's salary. He was sure the question should be 
left to the legislature, for any interference by the Imperial Govern-
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ment would risk "wounding the sensitive, but, perhaps, not altogether 
unconstitutional jealousy felt by Colonists of any uninvited in-
terference by the Imperial Legislature in their local concerns"." 
On this and other issues Lutwyche could have little quarrel with 
Queensland, especially as he admitted that he preferred living in 
Brisbane to Sydney. But when parliament met, Lutwyche's position 
degenerated. Although Herbert and his supporters defended the 
£2000, much opposition developed and an amendment was passed 
putting the judge's salary at £1200. Bowen reserved the Bill for 
imperial consideration, mainly because of Lutwyche's increasing 
protests. Lutwyche petitioned the Queen, urging the disallowance 
of the Bill, and bombarded Herbert with letters. His trump card 
was to assert that the Legislative Assembly of Queensland was 
illegally constituted because of the way it had been elected. 
Bowen thought this unfair since Lutwyche had not brought the 
defect formally under the Government's consideration before any 
laws were passed. If he had, some measures could have been taken 
to legalize the Assembly. Lutwyche promised not to publicize his 
opinion until the Colonial Office replied, which Bowen welcomed 
for at least delaying the "infinite confusion" if all the work of the 
first session was null and void. While London was considering the 
Bill, Lutwyche was still paid £2000. Herbert was responsible, 
although he knew that this amount was "in direct opposition to the 
recorded views of an overwhelming majority of the Parliament, and 
might therefore not improbably become the subject of a vote of 
censure or want of confidence"." 
Lutwyche increased his public agitation at meetings and in the 
press. In this campaign Lutwyche claimed to represent the "ultra-
democradc party" of Charles Cowper in New South Wales — Lut-
wyche had been Solicitor-General and Attorney-General in this 
Cabinet — against a reactionary, conservative Queensland Govern-
ment. 
The Imperial Government eventually recommended that the 
Supreme Court Bill be reconsidered by the Queensland parliament, 
in line with earlier arguments that Lutwyche was entided "in equity 
and in law" to the higher salary." 
The reconsideration proceedings of 1861 revealed the sensitivity 
of the Queensland parliament about its responsibility, jusdfying 
Bowen's concern at even the suspicion of imperial interference. Both 
houses passed the new Bill granting Lutwyche £2000, as well as 
accepting four of five other amendments he had suggested. But they 
supported their executive in refusing to accept Lutwyche's fifth 
amendment—naming him as Chief Justice—and they condemned 
his political campaign. 
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Lutwyche accepted his commission under the new Act and was 
sworn in. Then he refused to recognize or execute any of the Acts 
of the Queensland parliament, and petitioned the Queen to declare 
the new Supreme Court Act, as well as the Legislative Council, 
unconstitutional! 
He now had no scruples about publishing this petition in the 
Brisbane Courier, and intensified every aspect of his campaign 
against the Government. By this stage Bowen's attitude was chang-
ing. So far he had "maintained a strict neutrality during the quarrel 
... into which [Lutwyche] had thought proper to enter with the 
Government and Legislature ... I have invariably treated ... [him] 
not only with the respect due to his office but with much personal 
courtesy and kindness". But now he agreed fully with the condemna-
tion of Lutwyche's publication of the petition, endorsing a press 
comment that a "more undignified course, and one more insulting 
to the Home Government it would be impossible to pursue"." 
Bowen's wavering from his official neutrality reflects Herbert's 
obvious impatience and annoyance with Lutwyche. The tone of the 
twenty-eight pages of Herbert's memorandum of 25 August shows 
how thoroughly irritated he had become. What Herbert described 
as a chronicle of "well-known and incontrovertible facts" often 
smacks of Lutwyche's own rhetoric.'* 
Moderation and balance were indeed hard to maintain when 
Lutwyche wrote of a "life and death struggle", and threatened a 
"direct and violent collision" with the legislature." It became 
increasingly difficult to deal with Lutwyche, for whatever the merits 
of his earlier position he concentrated increasingly on the improve-
ment of his personal status. Thus he wrote to Herbert—and, as ever, 
had his letter published in the press—that he would "petition the 
Queen to disallow any Act of the Colonial Legislature providing for 
an increase in the number of Judges of the Supreme Court in which 
I am not appointed by name to the office of Chief Justice". Herbert 
in reply pointed out the constitutional barriers against such an Act. 
Bowen in his comments could not resist the allegation that Lutwyche 
was a political appointment as a New South Wales judge and not 
a Crown nominee, so that it was "singular that the child of 
Responsible Government in New South Wales should attempt to 
override Responsible Government in Queensland".™ 
In July 1862 the Executive Council empowered the British 
Solicitor-General to choose a chief justice for Queensland. Bowen, 
obviously listing the qualities which he thought Lutwyche lacked, 
hoped for a "Judge of good personal character, of common sense, 
and strict impartiality, diligent in the discharge of his public duties, 
and animated by an honest and intelligent zeal for the public 
welfare".'' 
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Lutwyche petitioned the Queen against the appointment of an 
additional judge, as he had threatened, but clearly his star was 
setting. The efficacy of his threats of refusing to execute the Acts 
of the 1862 session was weakened by the likely arrival of another 
judge. Bowen, in his letter forwarding comments on the petition, 
claimed to have maintained "strict neutrality", but revealed his 
feelings in urging that "the immediate appointment of a Chief Justice 
... is absolutely indispensable to re-establish general confidence in 
the administration of justice so severely shaken ... by the conduct 
and character of the present sole Judge"." 
He expressed his disquiet even more clearly when he sought the 
opinion of the British law officers about a governor's powers, using 
the example of "the very probable case" of an address from the 
colonial legislature "praying for the removal of a Judge". If a 
governor's decision had to be referred to England, "a seditious and 
profligate sole Judge, wielding in his single person the vast powers 
of the Supreme Court, might, in the course of even far less than 
seven or eight months, inflict injuries and oppressions such as no 
strong and free British country will endure without 'taking the law 
into their own hands' "." 
On 23 February 1863 James Cockle was sworn in as Chief Justice. 
The hopes of Herbert and Bowen that they were to be spared further 
trouble from Lutwyche were dispelled by his political manifesto of 
28 May 1863, published in the Courier. It was a spirited defence 
of the independence of every Australian judge from all Crown offices, 
a defence which, justifiable in theory, must be read in the context 
of his own ambition's warping of his judicial impartiality. Bowen 
bridled against the manifesto: 
Probably there is no precedent in England for an onslaught of this nature 
on the Ministry and Parliament of the day by a criminal and common 
law Judge, in the midst of the excitement of a general election. But even 
if there be any precedent of the kind it is certain that it would give but 
a faint idea of the amount of evil caused in a small colonial community 
of about fifty thou.sand ... .souls by this overt act on the part of one of 
the two Judges who constitute ihe Supreme Court. I need scarcely say 
that I should consider Mr. Lutwyche's conduct equally deplorable if he 
had issued his manifesto in favor of, instead of against, the political party 
now in office.'^  
Bowen's petulance was coloured by the whole three-and-a-half-year 
struggle, marred on Lutwyche's side by clear self-aggrandizement 
On personal rather than theoretical grounds it was suggested in 
the Council that a select committee should enquire into the conduct 
of Lutwyche, with the eventual declared object of presenting an 
address for his removal from the Bench. But this solution was 
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rejected as impracticable by a conference of the Chief Justice, 
Bowen, and Herbert. They feared that a political fight over Lutwyche 
would make the remedy worse than the disease. Further, the lack 
of a suitable local replacement for Lutwyche as a judge was a factor 
to be considered, especially as the local Bar would not welcome 
another English importation. 
Instead Cockle wrote privately to Lutwyche hinting that the public 
expression of his political opinions was believed to be affecting his 
impartiality as a judge. Lutwyche answered with an excellent defence 
of judicial freedom but agreed to restrain himself. So ended his overt 
political activity, a classic illustration of how personal ambition can 
co-exist with ideals. For Lutwyche had a case against Bowen and 
Herbert; he honestly disagreed with their political views but he ruled 
out effective debate by the extremes of his campaign, which was 
clearly coloured by his ambition, whether to retain his £2000 or to 
be chief justice. 
In the prolonged Lutwyche battle Bowen had managed to appear 
largely aloof, unlike Herbert who bore the direct brunt (however 
undeservedly) of the judge's ire. But in the brief 1866 financial crisis 
it was Bowen who was to be pilloried, with Herbert appearing as 
a stooge dragged back from the English boat by Bowen to serve his 
despotic ends. 
Herbert had indeed politically departed. On 1 February 1866 his 
long term as Colonial Secretary was rounded off. He had resigned 
some months before his intended departure for England on private 
grounds (rumours hinted that he was to be married) and to give 
his successor Macalister experience in controlling the executive and 
administration before the legislature met. 
Then in July the Government was faced, while enjoying "a 
profound political and social quietude"," with an unexpected eco-
nomic crisis. On 11 July news was obtained of the stoppage of Agra 
and Masterman's Bank, which had undertaken the negotiation of 
a loan of £1 million for Queensland. The Treasurer, J.P. Bell, a 
squatter, immediately informed the house that he proposed to issue 
inconvertible paper notes to the value of £200,000 based on 
government credit. Bowen, convinced that Bell was repeating the 
mistake of the issuing of assignats in the French Revolution and 
of greenbacks in the United States of America, advised Bell that 
he could not sanction such a Bill and would reserve it. When Bell 
persisted, Bowen approached Macalister, told him he disapproved 
of the proposed solution, and suggested additional taxation and the 
issue of Treasury bills. 
Bowen was criticized for intervening in a matter that must be 
under the control of the colonial parliament. All Bowen's careful 
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development of his reputation for considering the susceptibilities of 
the colonists about responsible government seemed to have vanished. 
He was reviled by his executive; he was attacked in parliament, in 
the press, and at public meetings. Cries were heard of "despot", "go 
home", and threats uttered of burning down Government House and 
stoning him like Elgin at Montreal in 1849. Finally a petidon was 
presented asking the Queen to recall him, but by this time in 
September the storm of the crisis had passed and Macalister, premier 
again, expressed his opposition to the petition and his assurance that 
neither house supported it. 
Macalister had refused to govern after Bowen's intervention and 
resigned without introducing any Bill. Bowen accepted Macalister's 
second offer of resignation, after first urging reconsideration. It was 
then that Bowen turned to Herbert, who after 20 July managed to 
find sufficient support. Through Herbert, Bowen introduced his 
suggested financial measures, and as Queensland began to recover, 
so did Bowen's reputation begin to return. Herbert, the stopgap, 
dropped out after eighteen days on 7 August, and a fortnight later 
had left for England with the Brisbane Courier fervently hoping he 
would stay there. 
The problem of the 1866 crisis is whether Bowen's intervention 
could be justified on constitutional grounds, or whether he had 
overstepped his powers as Governor of a colony enjoying responsible 
government. Bernays comes out on Bowen's side: "fortunately we 
had a strong governor ... who found an excuse in the Queen's 
Instructions for dishing ... [Bell's] hare-brained scheme ...of flooding 
Queensland with 'greenbacks' without a gold backing"." The Secre-
tary for State for the Colonies retrospectively praised Bowen, having 
"no hesitation in approving entirely of ... [his] refusal to adopt a 
course at variance with ... [his] Instructions"." 
It is true that Bowen could quote specific Instructions to reserve 
such a Bill. On the other hand Macalister and Bell argued that as 
the matter was a case of "urgent necessity" (again quoting the words 
of the Instructions), the need for reservation was removed. 
The question remains whether Bowen was justified in his drastic 
intervention. One argument, which goes a certain way towards 
vindicating the action, was that Macalister would have been defeated 
had he introduced Bell's Bill. The parliamentary happenings of the 
week seem to support this point, especially Macalister's defeat on 
10 July, on a clause of a Land Bill. The majority against him of 
four seemed small, although Bowen pointed out that it was equivalent 
to a defeat by eighty in the much larger House of Commons. The 
mam crises arose on the next day. First Bell announced his scheme, 
then Macalister declared that despite his defeat, "it would not be 
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advantageous to the colony—nor do I think the majority of this 
House would desire—that the Government should go out of office". 
Herbert supported Macalister as the "dissolution of Parliament— 
a course which I shall resist to the uttermost—would be very 
unsatisfactory until our finances are in a better state". Some 
opposition members pressed for resignation, but on 12 July their 
leader, Pring, announced that, after consultation, the Opposition 
refused to "interfere with the projects of the Government in 
endeavouring to extricate the colony from its present position",'* and 
offered aid in the financial crisis. These proceedings seem to cancel 
out the defeat of 10 July. 
But the attitudes to Bell's scheme tell a different story. Bell on 
12 July adopted the unusual course of moving that the house form 
a committee of the whole to consider the desirability of the 
Government's issuing legal tender notes. Herbert at once showed his 
opposition in moving that a select committee be appointed to enquire 
into the best course to adopt. 
The question whether such a Bill should be reserved for royal 
assent was raised in parliament in this same debate. Pring asked 
Macalister if Bowen was prepared to take the responsiblity of giving 
this assent. Macalister was non-committal so Pring riposted that "it 
would be all lost labour of the House to discuss and pass such a 
Bill, if His Excellency would not give the royal assent to it". The 
Attorney-General, Lilley, then defended the power of parliament as 
"an independent and co-ordinate branch of the Legislature ... 
[legislating] on its own responsibility without consulting his Ex-
cellency". Pring continued to press for a statement of Bowen's 
position on the ground that "every Bill ... brought before the House 
by the Government was first laid before the Executive Council, of 
which His Excellency was the head—had that been done in this 
case?". Lilley denied that this was the constitutional custom. 
Macalister retaliated by asking Pring if he had received "any 
instructions to ask in this House if the Government have any 
authority for the course they have taken". He stated as his own 
opinion that "it is quite possible that His Excellency will feel it his 
duty ... to assent to it". Pring denied having received any instructions 
to ask his question, which was based on his knowledge of the Royal 
Instructions. At the end of the debate Herbert's motion for a select 
committee was passed and the committee immediately began its 
deliberations." 
This debate hints at Bowen's active intervention. Bowen admitted 
that Bell had put the proposed Bill before him on 12 July, and that 
Bowen immediately made his opposition perfectly clear. Bell had 
acted "though I had twice informed him, in answer to his enquiries, 
that I could not assent to it".*" 
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Further Bowen intervened in the deliberations of the select 
committee by sending a letter through Bell to be placed before its 
members. Bowen's excuse for this letter was that at the Government 
House ball on Friday, 13 July, he was accused of being the real 
originator of Bell's plan. Bowen asked Bell to contradict this rumour. 
Bowen claimed that Bell made no objection to putting an explanatory 
letter before the committee, although Bell denied this. 
Bowen defended his intervention at great length, resting his case 
generally on the ground that imperial interests of an extraordinary 
nature" were involved in this Bill. The impropriety of his intervention 
still remains; certainly it was unnecessary unless he was convinced 
that the greenbacks scheme was an immediate danger. It is difficult 
to prove such a contention. 
Although Bowen once averred that it was irrelevant for him to 
consider the character of the policies suggested by his Ministers, 
since he never intended to place any trammels on the activities of 
his government, a clear case emerges from Bowen's own despatches 
and letters that his objection to the substance of Bell's scheme were 
at the core of his actions. Bernays's interpretation of Bowen finding 
"an excuse in the Instructions" is closer to the apparent facts than 
Bowen's claim to have acted solely on constitutional principles. 
Another weakness in Bowen's case is his selection of Herbert. A 
direct conflict of opinion exists here: Bowen stated that Macalister, 
when his resignation was accepted, advised Bowen to send for 
Herbert and George Raff, a Minister without Office. Macalister in 
the house mentioned only Raff. Explanation is needed to justify 
Bowen's turning to Herbert, who was supposed to be leaving on the 
next mail steamer. The dearth of leaders in the small band of thirty-
two seems one rational explanation, but does not go far enough. The 
part played by Herbert in the events from 11 July onwards suggests 
close co-operation with Bowen. The crisis in fact provides clear 
evidence of their continued joint efforts. 
It is difficult to question Bowen's sincere belief in the principles 
of responsible government. What the 1866 crisis shows is how at 
that stage in the evolution of these principles a strong governor, 
convinced that the course of action suggested by his advisers was 
unwise, could not only find a reason for intervention but also justify 
It and subsequent irregularities. It would have needed a strong 
premier, convinced that his course of action was necessary, to have 
resisted not only the Governor but also the Colonial Office. If Lang 
eventually was defeated in New South Wales in 1932, how could 
Macalister succeed in 1866? 
If Bowen can be shown to have favoured some of his responsible 
advisers, what were his attitudes towards Queenslanders? He 
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claimed to have maintained a "dignified neutrality" towards all of 
them. Yet evidence exists of bias; in particular his views express a 
lack of sympathy with the working classes. The same feeling can 
be discerned in Herbert, who faced political opposition on this issue. 
A number of members, mainly from Brisbane electorates and backed 
by the Courier (from 9 April 1864 called the Brisbane Courier), 
maintained criticism of his Premiership, particularly on the franchise 
question. In each crisis of the 1860s—this franchise issue, the dispute 
with Quinn, Lutwyche's castigations, and the 1866 financial troubles 
—somehow both Bowen and Herbert blamed the working classes 
for disaffection. 
Perhaps most eloquently revealing of Bowen's position was his 
disapproving comment on "the harmony of feeling which often exists 
between the extremes of autocracy and of ultra-democracy in their 
dislike of the regular and cautious action of constituted 
legislatures".'^ The problem lies in determining the range of Bowen's 
socio-political tolerance with these extremes, and particularly in 
deciding where his ultra-democracy began. He endorsed some of the 
signs of democratic advance he found in Australia. He appreciated 
the contrast with the English political structure reformed only by 
the 1832 Reform Bill. He sincerely believed the sentiments of his 
rejoinder to the "workingmen" of Brisbane: "every man—Governor, 
Judges, Magistrates, Clergy, and all—every man, I repeat, is 
emphatically a 'Working Man'. Let us, then all unite cordially in 
advancing our common interests. Capital is powerless without labour, 
and labour is unprofitable without the aid of capital"." But limits 
can be found to his concept of equality. Labour should not claim 
too much. The virtues of "education, intelligence and property" set 
men apart and were to be preserved; only the "sober and industrious" 
worker content with his position was to be praised. 
Bowen claimed that the 1861 Masters and Servants Act, in-
troduced by Herbert, defined "more clearly than has hitherto been 
attempted the delicate relations existing between the employers and 
the employed in a country under democratic institutions"."" Yet the 
spirit of this Act seems to be clearly against the servant, even if 
other provisions exist for the recovery of wages and property from 
the master. 
Hints as to the limits of "ultra-democracy" emerge in comments 
on public outcries at the time of the various political crises. For 
instance Bowen showed no appreciation of the working classes' fear 
of cheap labour. He thought their petitions were 
got up by a few individuals... who seek to make political capital by trading 
on the prejudices of the mass of the working men in our towns, who 
now regard the introduction of Asiatic labour into Australia with feelings 
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akin to those with which the mass of the working men at home formerly 
regarded the introduction of machinery into England. 
He contrasted the attitude of "the more intelligent and far-seeing 
of the working classes, and the whole body of employers".'* 
Lutwyche was condemned by Herbert as a political appointment 
of Cowper, "then the leader of the ultra-democratic Party in New 
South Wales". Herbert claimed that petitions to the legislature in 
favour of Lutwyche came from public meetings where not "a single 
member of Parliament, a single alderman or a single other citizen 
of standing" was present.'*' 
Both Herbert and Bowen felt that Quinn was opposed by "nearly 
all the education, intelligence and property of Queensland", sup-
ported only by many thousands of the Irish peasantry keeping up 
their semi-political and semi-religious agitation." 
In 1866 the Commissioner of Police was asked to report on the 
genuineness of the signatures on the petition to recall Bowen. He 
deduced that mainly newly arrived immigrants, the idle populace 
of the streets, and unemployed workmen had signed it: "the petition 
has not been signed by a single person of influence or position, and 
the entire movement is universally regarded with ridicule or con-
tempt." Bowen quoted this verdict with approval, being convinced 
that he had the support that counted.'* 
The Queensland parliament was elected in a way far removed from 
any taint of ultra-democratic tendencies. In February I860, even 
before the first elections, Bowen had suggested that Queensland 
should impose some limits on the New South Wales 1858 system. 
He proposed a year's residence and an education test for electors. 
As the majority of newcomers were labourers the first qualificadon 
would have told against them more than others, as would the second, 
considering their limited opportunities for education. 
Herbert's government introduced these ideas in an abortive 
Electoral Bill of 1862, providing votes only for settled residents with 
property qualifications, and disenfranchising those who could not 
read or write. The 1864 Electoral Bill, which also lapsed, provided 
that voters would have to sign their names. C.W. Blakeney criticized 
the Bill, claiming that it would disenfranchise 3491 men (about 10 
per cent of adult males). This argument of the franchise cannot be 
pushed too far against Bowen and Herbert, for even the 1872 
Electoral Act had residence (six months) and property qualifications. 
However, the fact of growing opposition to Herbert's ministries in 
the towns shows that the working class was increasingly dissatisfied 
with these restrictions. 
This evidence suggests, then, a lack of sympathy with many of 
this class, whose numbers were fa.st increasing. Likewise at the 
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opposite limit, Bowen and Herbert were unsympathetic with extreme 
autocracy both in practice, whether represented by Bishop Quinn 
or any squatter, and in theory. So Bowen tacitly approved the lack 
of "paid idlers or sinecurists ... [or] a Church establishment... House 
of Lords, or hereditary principles of any kind to which democratic 
sentiments and prejudices are hostile"." 
This leaves a wide central group to whom Bowen and Herbert 
showed impartial fairness. One of the main reasons for Herbert's 
long term of office was that, unlike the other MLAs, he was not 
committed to any local interest. The Brisbane merchant, the Ipswich 
magistrate, the Darling Downs squatter, the German farmer, the 
coastal cotton-grower, the northern pioneer, and the sober and 
industrious worker were all assured of careful consideration of their 
problems. In a decade before the advent of political parties in the 
modern sense, at a time when interests and personal feelings were 
so important, this independent impartiality kept Herbert aloof and 
in control. Bowen stood alongside Herbert, deliberately withdrawn 
constitutionally to encourage responsibility, perhaps even more 
desirous than Herbert of seeing Queensland progress. 
Undoubtedly to both of these men Queensland was but a stepping-
stone in a career. After leaving Brisbane Bowen was successively 
Governor of New Zealand (1863-73), Victoria (1873-79), 
Mauritius (1879-82), and Hong Kong (1882-86). Herbert became 
more influential than Bowen for, after a brief period as Assistant 
Secretary in the Board of Trade (1867-70), he joined the Colonial 
Office where for over twenty years (1871-92) he was Permanent 
Under-Secretary. Bowen's ideal premier was to become "the perfect 
permanent official".* Queensland had gained from their presence. 
The personal fights, into which even Bowen and Herbert were drawn, 
the political squabbles of the late 1860s—all suggest that Queensland 
would have been far worse governed by a weaker governor and a 
more partial premier. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Arthur Macalister 
(Courtesy Oxley Library) 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
2 Arthur Macalister 
"Slippery Mac" 
PAUL WILSON 
Arthur Macalister was a prominent figure in Queensland politics 
from 1859 to 1876. During these sixteen years he held a seat in 
the Legislative Assembly for all but fourteen months. He was a 
Minister for a total period of nine years, led a government on three 
occasions, and was Legislative Assembly Chairman of Committees 
in 1860-61 and Speaker in 1870-71. After leaving politics in 1876, 
he became Agent-General for Queensland in London until his 
retirement in 1881.' 
He is included in this biographical treatment of Queensland 
polidcs not only because of his long period of service but also for 
his colourful character, apostasies, and notoriety as a breaker of 
promises (which led to his political nickname of "Slippery Mac"). 
But he had other qualities as well, the most important of which was 
willingness to be an active and practical administrator at a time when 
few Ministers could or would work full-time in their departments. 
Above all this, he was a man who sought and relished political power. 
His motivation could have lain in his impoverished childhood, but 
although he reached the high points of colonial society he never learnt 
to manage money, and ended his life bankrupt. 
Macalister has received severe criticism for his changes of political 
allegiance. He stands out primarily in early Queensland political 
history because he was the first, in 1862, to leave the existing 
Opposition. Yet Charles Lilley (see Ch. 3) did the same thing in 
1865, and Robert Mackenzie (see Appendix) left the Government 
for the Opposition in 1862, returned to the Macalister Adminis-
tration in 1866, left again in July, and then defeated Macalister to 
become premier a year later. In this period of political individuality, 
with a very loose, almost non-existent party structure, a politician 
had room to make his own decisions, but was obliged to keep promises 
Arthur Macalister: MLA (Ipswich) 1860-68 and 1872-76, (Eastern Downs) 1868-71: 
Secretary for Lands and Public Works 1862-66; Premier and Secretary for Lands 
and Works 1866: Premier and Colonial Secretary 1866-67; Secretary for Public 
Lands and Works 1868 69: Secretary for Public Works and Goldnelds 1869-70; 
Premier and Colonial Secretary 1874-76; Secretary for Public Works and Mines 1874 
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that he had already made. Macalister's frequent breaking of such 
undertakings, both to parliamentary colleagues and to his electors, 
was conspicuous. He often made promises he could not keep, but 
on other occasions he simply broke promises because it suited him 
to do so. He broke his promise to the Ipswich electors in 1862 when 
he accepted office under Robert Herbert {see Ch.l). He broke his 
undertaking to Mackenzie in the same year, in the matter of who 
should be Acting Colonial Secretary in 1862-63. The Fitzgerald 
Affair of 1869 is probably the most glaring example of Macalister's 
disregard for loyalty and of his ability to sacrifice his political 
colleagues for his own position. If Macalister could readily forget 
things that had happened in the past, many of his contemporaries 
could not. The acceptance of the position of Speaker from Arthur 
Palmer {see Appendix) in 1870 was another example of Macalister's 
political opportunism. Towards the end of his active political career 
he became even more unreliable, but a good deal of this vacillation 
was the result of failing health and loss of memory rather than 
deliberate scheming. His difficulties in his own electorate over the 
education issue in 1875 show Macalister being trapped by his own 
opportunist promises to an electorate on one hand and the need to 
placate his political colleagues on the other. 
Throughout his career, and despite all his faults, Macalister had 
an amazing ability to survive. His record in resurgence is quite 
remarkable. Why did electorates and colleagues tolerate him? His 
astuteness as a politician involved him in dubious tactics but, at the 
same time, it was recognized that he had considerable skill in 
controlling political groupings. His political experience, his adminis-
trative ability—especially demonstrated in the first ten years of his 
career—together with his long legal experience made him a practical 
asset in a ministry. Possibly his practical administrative capability 
outweighed his known faults. 
Macalister's political career belongs to the pre-party period in 
Queensland. Personal ambition and loyalties, parochial pressures and 
interests, and electoral support influenced by political and adminis-
trative favours explain his early policies rather than clear-cut 
"liberal", "conservative", or "squatter" party allegiance. After 1865 
he was a "liberal", when that term meant very little else than "non-
pastoral" and "agrarian reformer". Towards the end of his career 
Macalister was more and more out of touch with a new political 
environment that reflected the beginnings of a completely new 
political game; it was a game of more closely defined political 
philosophies, temporarily exemplified by Samuel Griffith {see Ch. 
6) and Thomas Mcllwraith {.see Ch. 5). The political system in 
Macalister's time shows some of the features of the Loveday and 
Martin model: some reflection of their "nuclei" can be seen in the 
Queensland "bunch" system, e.g. the West Moreton bunch, the 
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Rockhampton bunch, and, of course, the Ipswich and Brisbane 
bunches. But the bunch system owed more to common parochial 
interest than to personality-based "cores".^ A study of Queensland 
politics between 1859 and 1885 reveals a perplexing pattern of "ins" 
and "outs", but the rate of change is not quite as rapid as in New 
South Wales. This may be partly explained by the comparative lack 
of political sophistication in Queensland at the outset in 1859, when 
only a handful of men had had practical experience in New South 
Wales, Macalister being one of the least experienced. Politicians in 
Macalister's time had a fairly unfettered range of action available 
to them, qualified only by the personal undertakings given to their 
colleagues and electors—usually on specific legislation or policies 
—and their personal intention or ability to keep their promises. 
Against the background of seeking the perquisites of office and the 
ability to do favours for one's friends and supporters, the only clear 
uniform ideal one can see for most of Macalister's period is one that 
Loveday and Martin suggest, that of "efficient administration and 
rapid development of the Colony's material resources".^ 
Arthur Macalister was born in Glasgow, Scotland, in 1818. He came 
from a poor family and had to overcome severe obstacles to gain 
an education. Macalister qualified for the study of law and became 
a writer to the signet. He and his wife emigrated to New South 
Wales in 1839 and in April 1840 he obtained the position of Clerk 
to the Bench and postmaster at Scone, in the Hunter Valley. He 
was dismissed from the government service in May 1841 when he 
opened a general store. By March 1842 he was bankrupt, and he 
then apparently returned to the law. In 1850 he qualified for practice 
as a solicitor, attorney, and proctor in the colony of New South 
Wales. He arrived in Brisbane in July 1850, and set up practice 
in Ipswich. 
During the 1850s Macalister became a leading citizen of Ipswich 
and built a solid political base in the town and surrounding district. 
Ipswich grew rapidly as the business centre and port for the 
expanding pastoral industry. The citizens of Ipswich saw it as the 
future capital of any new colony and rivalry with Brisbane grew 
apace. Macalister. the first solicitor in the town, built up a good 
practice with a wide clientele. He was a leading town figure and 
helped to found the Ipswich hospital; he was also an active 
separationist. It was a reflection of social position that he became 
a founding member of the exclusive North Australian Club in 1857. 
His political activity began in 1856, when he unsuccessfully contested 
the Stanley Boroughs election for the New South Wales Legislative 
Assembly in alliance with Frederick Forbes. Macalister stood again 
in the 1858 election for the United Pastoral Districts seat, but lost 
narrowly. The 1858 Electoral Act gave Macalister exactly what he 
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wanted-an Ipswich electorate. He won the seat easily in June 1859, 
utilizing the solid local support he had built up during the decade. 
He took his seat in Sydney in September 1859 and sat for a brief 
period until the Robertson Government was defeated in October. 
With the separation of Queensland on 10 December 1859, he ceased 
to sit as a New South Wales member. 
Macalister had little real claim to prospective membership of the 
provisional Executive Council set up by Governor Bowen {see Ch. 
1). He stood successfully for the new Legislative Assembly, winning 
one of the three Ipswich seats. Taking his seat on 22 May 1860, 
at the opening of Queensland's first parliament, in an Assembly 
which "was looked upon as a body of individuals",* Macalister chose 
the opposition benches. In that body of men with limited political 
experience, Macalister's short membership of the New South Wales 
Assembly helped to earn him the appointment of Chairman of 
Committees. His performance in this role attracted favourable 
comment. He took part in attacks on the Herbert Government, but 
did not assume any leadership role in the Opposition. In the 1861 
session he joined Lilley in proposing that the Legislative Council 
be made an elective body, and strongly supported Lilley's attempts 
to remove the two-thirds provision for constitutional amendment in 
both houses. Then, suddenly, on 10 June 1861, Macalister resigned 
his seat, saying that he could not see the use of persevering in 
opposition to the conservative and lacklustre Herbert Government, 
which represented only a minority of Queenslanders. Whether he 
took this action as a genuine protest to attract attention to himself 
is not clear. Then he changed his mind, contested the election caused 
by his own resignation, and won it, albeit on a very small poll. He 
promised his supporters that he would not accept ministerial office 
in the Herbert Government.* When he returned to the Assembly, 
he moderated his attacks on the Government. At the same dme, 
he began to clash openly with Lilley. Early in 1862 Herbert's first 
Secretary for Lands and Works, St George Richard Gore, resigned. 
Herbert then offered the post to Macalister, who accepted despite 
his promise to the electors. Taking up duty on 21 March 1862, he 
commenced four years of continuous service in a post which was 
no sinecure but which offered status and infiuence and the opportuni-
ty for political favours to supporters. Although Macalister was never 
a squatter, and certainly no bushman or farmer, and although he 
sometimes failed to see the very real problems of the pastoralists, 
he helped to bring administrative efficiency to the control of Crown 
lands at a time when pastoral expansion was booming. 
Macalister faced his first real crisis when he was chosen by 
Herbert in July 1862 to be Acting Colonial Secretary while Herbert 
was absent in the United Kingdom. Mackenzie, the Colonial 
Treasurer, claimed that he had been promised the post and that in 
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any case he was senior to Macalister. Mackenzie resigned from the 
Government and published his correspondence with Herbert on the 
matter. Accusing Herbert and Macalister of deception, and referring 
to Macalister as "that individual", Mackenzie claimed that he had 
"never believed in him as a colleague".' The two Scots, of widely 
differing backgrounds, were to clash again many times in the future. 
Macalister took Herbert's place for the nine months, attracting a 
good deal of criticism in the process, even from the pro-Government 
Queensland Daily Guardian, which commented that "less of the 
pantomimic gesture, vituperation, and egotism would better have 
become the dignity of a Minister of the Crown".' Herbert returned 
in dme for the 1863 session and an Assembly deadlock soon 
developed over the legislation, introduced by Macalister, to give 
Queensland its first railway. The railway legislation was only the 
catalyst in a popular demand for a new election, based on con-
siderable dissatisfaction with the Herbert Government, as well as 
the rapid increase in population since 1860. In the following election 
Herbert won a slightly stronger position in the Assembly, at the cost 
of a more coherent Opposition led by Mackenzie. In the new 
parliament the railway legislation passed all stages. Macalister also 
introduced two Land Bills, which considerably revised the 1860 
legislation. 
Macalister occupied a secure position in Herbert's government, 
taking a particular interest in railway works and remaining unmoved 
by numerous accusations of misuse of his position. Some of the 
charges consisted of political "Secretary-baiting", but very likely 
many others were well founded. Macalister would indeed have been 
an unusual political figure for his time if he had not used his position 
for giving favours to his friends.* However, the Department of Public 
Lands dealt with a very large workload with considerable efficiency, 
for which Macalister can take some credit. His position in the 
Government made it almost certain that when Herbert decided to 
return to England, Macalister would succeed him. Herbert made 
this decision late in 1865 and although he did not intend to leave 
until August 1866, he resigned in January so that Macalister and 
his administration could settle in while his advice was still available. 
Still enjoying a solid base of support in Ipswich, which he had helped 
to make the terminus of the new railway, Macalister had, by early 
1866, built up a valuable fund of administrative experience and 
Assembly support. 
Macalister induced Mackenzie to leave the opposition leadership 
and become Colonial Secretary in his new government, while 
Macalister took the unusual course of retaining the Lands and Works 
portfolio for himself. This action was an indication of the importance 
he attached to the new land legislation he planned to put before 
the parliament in the 1866 session. Most press opinion favoured the 
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new Government, although in some quarters fears were expressed 
that there was too reckless an approach to government borrowing 
and that some economies were necessary.' Macalister chose to ignore 
the warning and continued the high rate of government expenditure 
on the railway, on immigration, and on general public works. As 
was expected, the Macalister Government made its land legislation 
the main business of the 1866 session. For the first time in 
Queensland, a clear political difference existed between those who 
for theoretical or practical reasons demanded that more agricultural 
land be made available in the south-eastern districts and those 
"inside" squatters whose vested interests demanded that the existing 
pastoral leases in these areas be allowed to continue without 
interference. Despite the success of some of the Darling Downs 
pastoralists in securing some of their land by pre-emption and 
purchase, they were afraid that the urban theorists would deprive 
them of the leasehold lands they needed to make their operations 
profitable. As an added complication, after a number of good seasons 
1866 proved to be a drought year. As the Queenslander pointed out, 
both the general public and the squatters wanted a "liberal" land 
law, the only problem being the differing interpretations of 
"liberal".'" After long debate, the issue of the upset price of alienated 
land came to a vote on the night of 10 July, when the Government 
was defeated by four votes. 
The next morning news arrived by telegraph and steamship that 
Agra and Masterman's Bank in London had failed. Macalister and 
his Treasurer, J.P. Bell, overreacted by announcing that if nego-
tiations with other banks failed to produce more credit, the Govern-
ment, as one of several measures, intended to issue unsecured 
government notes. This announcement caused a furore in Brisbane 
business circles and Governor Bowen announced that he would not 
approve any such legislation. The crisis heightened as Bell found 
himself unable to obtain any credit and government salaries were 
threatened. Macalister, despite the availability of other financial 
remedies, took an uncompromising stand on the issue of legal notes; 
Bowen refused to give way and Macalister resigned on 17 July. 
Bowen at first refused to accept the resignation, but did so the 
following day, when the government members resigned again. 
Popular opinion supported Macalister and mob action took place 
against Herbert and other politicians, who were called on by the 
governor to form an interim administration. Some believed, however, 
that Macalister seized on the notes issue as a good excuse to extricate 
his government after its defeat on land legislation. With the removal, 
by Macalister's resignation, of the legal notes problem, Herbert was 
able to arrange for the Government to carry on and a good deal 
of the heat quickly went out of the situation. In mid-August Bowen 
called on Macalister to form a new administration to replace 
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Herbert's caretaker government and Macalister accepted. Despite 
problems of unemployment and a potentially serious riot in Brisbane 
on the night of 11 September", the new Government took energetic 
measures to reduce unemployment, stop immigration, and restore 
normal conditions. When the Assembly met on 18 September, it was 
asked to approve increased tariffs on imports, and the imposition 
of stamp duties. Public spending was severely curtailed and business 
remained at a low level of activity, but the worst appeared to be 
over. The constitutional and economic crisis of 1866 marks the 
turning-point in Macalister's political career. Never again did he 
enjoy the general confidence that he had won on his succession to 
Herbert early in 1866. 
In the 1867 session of parliament, Macalister's government lost 
considerable ground, mainly due to constant attacks on his handling 
of the whole question of railway construction. Macalister badly 
mishandled a dispute within his own Cabinet, which resulted in John 
Douglas {see Appendix) being forced to recontest his seat when he 
resigned the Treasury in favour of Lands and Works.'' Macalister 
chose to hold an election on the basis of renewed land legislation 
incorporating easier conditions of agricultural selection and as a 
general appeal to the electorate for a vote of confidence. The new 
Assembly contained thirteen new members out of a total of thirty-
two. Soon after it met, Mackenzie, once again leading the Opposition 
in the house, led a strong attack on Macalister's administration. 
Although he won two crucial divisions on the Address-in-Reply, 
Macalister decided on 14 August 1867 to resign. He admitted that 
he did not have the numbers to pass his land legislation and, as that 
was the measure upon which he had been re-elected, he saw no 
alternative for his government.'^ 
Mackenzie formed a government openly pro-squatter in its 
composition. Macalister, instead of taking up the position of 
opposition leader, as might have been expected, took little part in 
the proceedings for some weeks. He made no attempt to co-ordinate 
the and-squatter forces and virtually abandoned claims to leadership 
of the Opposition. When he did return to the Assembly, Mackenzie 
and Palmer effectively neutralized his presence by subjecting him 
to yet another attack on his handling of railway construction. Late 
in the session Macalister returned to the offensive, attacking the 
Government for its failure to reduce expenditure and to introduce 
its promised land legislation. But Macalister's intemperate and 
erradc behaviour in the Assembly drew criticism from all sides and 
he continued to lose support. His attacks on Mackenzie's new land 
measures were ineffectual. 
In return for a free hand in setting the terms of a new Pastoral 
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Occupation Bill, Mackenzie was prepared to allow the Assembly a 
liberal agricultural settlement measure, largely based on Macalister's 
1867 legislation. Macalister termed it "an attempt to please every-
body", which indeed it was, and a successful ploy at that. Despite 
this the Mackenzie Government in turn was rapidly losing its popular 
support on the grounds of administrative inefficiency. Had 
Macalister been in a stronger position amongst the members in 
opposition, he could have taken advantage of the situation. As it 
was, he tried to take the reins of opposition but failed.'" The 
Mackenzie Government was forced to an election in August 1868. 
Macalister initially offered himself for the electorate of Ipswich, but 
when he refused to give his supporters there an undertaking to oppose 
the Brisbane-Ipswich Railway (the construction of which he re-
garded as inevitable), he was forced to withdraw. Leaving his old 
electorate, he decided to contest the seat of Eastern Downs, a rural 
area surrounding, but not including, Warwick, and where the 
confrontation between squatter and selector was particularly bitter. 
His reception by the anti-squatter element was enthusiastic. They 
saw in him an experienced, astute, pro-railway, pro-selector politi-
cian, who had always managed to get benefits for Ipswich and who 
could be expected to do the same for the Eastern Downs. The 
completion of the railway southward from Toowoomba to Warwick, 
as well as a link from Ipswich to Brisbane, was their most cherished 
hope.'* Macalister was elected unopposed. But his performance in 
the Assembly was half-hearted and colourless and not a real attempt 
to lead the Opposition, the Brisbane Courier remarking on his 
"rather rusty and threadbare arguments"." After Macalister's 
resignation in August 1867 and his subsequent erratic performance, 
Lilley and the other members of the liberal Opposition were 
suspicious of Macalister and seriously doubted his continuing ability 
to lead either the Opposition or a government. This feeling of 
suspicion and lack of confidence, and the potential conflict between 
Lilley and Macalister over leadership of the non-squatter interests 
were to bedevil the relations between the members of the government 
which Lilley was shortly to form, and were to overhang the endre 
polidcal process from late 1868 to mid-1870. 
The Mackenzie Administration resigned on 25 November 1868 
and Lilley formed the new government after T.H. Fitzgerald, a 
central Queensland representative, had failed. The negotiations 
preceding this move contained the seeds of the crisis that Macalister 
was to precipitate in the following January.'^ Macalister accepted 
office under Lilley as Secretary for Public Lands and Works. The 
Assembly met briefly in December to approve carry-on finance and 
then adjourned to give the new Government time to prepare 
legislation. 
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During the recess, reports reached Brisbane that Fitzgerald had 
revealed publicly the moves that preceded the appointment of the 
Lilley Government. Fitzgerald allegedly said that Macalister had 
proposed a combination of southern (Macalister) and northern 
(Fitzgerald) interests, with Fitzgerald heading the combinadon as 
Colonial Secretary. Fitzgerald claimed that when he had been invited 
to form a government, Macalister had suddenly withdrawn his 
support; Macalister had subsequently tried to involve Fitzgerald in 
the destruction of the Lilley Government after they had both been 
made members of it. 
Political speculation was rife as parliament reassembled, but 
members were still surprised to see Macalister cross the floor and 
sit with the Opposition. In a personal explanation, Macalister 
indicated that Fitzgerald had belatedly denied the reports of his 
speeches, and had told Macalister that the northern half of the colony 
disliked and distrusted him. Macalister had therefore submitted his 
resignation. Macalister confirmed that he had, as leader of the 
Opposition, negotiated with Fitzgerald and A. Archer (the Member 
for Rockhampton), to gain their support for a possible new govern-
ment in November 1868. He denied having offered the position of 
premier to Fitzgerald. When Fitzgerald, as the mover of the 
amendment to the Address-in-Reply, was invited to form a govern-
ment, Macalister had advised instead the putting forward of his own 
name to the Governor. But Fitzgerald had deceived him and had 
unsuccessfully tried to form an administration, which Macalister 
refused to join. Macalister maintained that he had been reluctant 
to join Lilley's government, which included Fitzgerald, until per-
suaded to do so by T.B. Stephens, parliamentarian and proprietor 
of the Brisbane Courier. Macalister concluded his explanation with 
an assertion that "he now had no hesitation in stating that a much 
stronger Government than that now in office might be formed in 
that House"." 
In reply, Lilley told the Assembly that Macalister's manoeuvrings 
had been known to him as early as 27 November and that he had 
received no reply when he asked Macalister to declare his intentions. 
Fitzgerald in his turn announced that he had now resigned as 
Colonial Treasurer, and that he felt sure that Macalister had 
misunderstood him. He confirmed his lack of confidence in 
Macalister as government leader, but expressed regret that 
Macalister had resigned his post. Two days later, however, 
Macalister rejoined the Lilley Government as Secretary for Public 
Works and Mines. In the meantime W.H. Walsh, presumably with 
Macalister's support, had moved a motion of no confidence in Lilley's 
administration, but Macalister abandoned him and the motion was 
lost 18 to 2.''' 
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It is not possible to say what happened to influence Lilley and 
Macalister between 26 and 28 January, but it is reasonable to 
suppose that Lilley felt that Macalister was necessary and Fitzgerald 
dispensable. On top of all the recriminations and accusations, Lilley's 
offer to Macalister caused a storm in the Assembly, R.T. Atkin 
maintaining that Macalister's reappointment was "like a dog return-
ing to its vomit".-" Despite all the upheaval, Macalister came out 
of the whole affair with a Cabinet post and salary, while Fitzgerald 
was discredited. 
The affair, however, marked the beginning of the Eastern Downs 
electors' severe disenchantment with Macalister. He was not getting 
them the expected parochial advantages and the Warwick Argus, 
which hitherto had strongly supported him, launched a series of 
attacks on his performance. Macalister was unable to persuade the 
Government, constrained by economic necessity, to accelerate the 
completion of the Warwick railway. His attempts to legislate for 
better conditions on the goldfields were unsuccessful. Relations 
within Lilley's Cabinet, always strained, were finally ruptured by 
Lilley's unilateral decision to purchase three ships in Sydney to 
replace the services of the Government's mail contractor, the 
Australasian Steam Navigation Company. When parliament met in 
April 1870, the Government lasted only two days. Lilley virtually 
admitted that he no longer had the support of his own Ministers 
and resigned on 27 April 1870. 
If Macalister had expected to succeed Lilley as premier, he was 
to be disappointed. Bell, who had led the move against Lilley, could 
not form a government. Macalister was not sent for but Palmer was 
commissioned, and the pro-squatter interests were back in the saddle. 
Macalister still had the Fitzgerald affair hanging over him, as well 
as the obvious dislike and jealousy of Lilley, but undaunted, he led 
off with an attack on the Palmer Government, calling for a vote 
of no confidence. After a heated and lengthy debate. Palmer won 
the division but decided to ask for a dissolution and seek a mandate. 
In the ensuing election for the Eastern Downs, Macalister. despite 
an initially cool reception, again won the seat unopposed, on a 
platform of land legislation reform.^' Palmer obtained a bare working 
majority in the new Assembly and rumours began to circulate before 
the house met that Macalister would accept the position of Speaker 
from the Government, making Palmer's majority quite safe. To the 
distress of his supporters, Macalister did so after he had adopted 
the unusual course of speaking in support of his own candidacy. 
Palmer effectively shelved a potential opponent and reinforced his 
Asscinbly majority. Macalister, with Lilley as a strong rival opposi-
tion leader, accepted temporary neutrality on £800 per year. His 
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action in accepting the Speakership was looked upon as an outright 
betrayal of the liberal group. 
In the 1870 session Macalister had a fairly quiet time as Speaker, 
compared with what was to come in 1871 and 1872. Macalister gave 
an important ruling in 1870 when he decided that a majority of two-
thirds of the Assembly was not necessary to remove the two-thirds 
provision itself within the Constitution Act of 1867." This had little 
practical effect, however, as the Council rejected the related 
legislation. By the lime parliament reassembled in April 1871 Lilley's 
Opposition was determined to obstruct by every possible means the 
programme of the Palmer Government. Macalister found himself 
in the unenviable position of referee in this undignified process, 
earning condemnation from both sides. A crisis was reached in June 
1871 and Palmer sought another election. From an uncomfortable 
position in the A.sscmbly, Macalister moved to an equally uncom-
fortable one in his own electorate. Attempting to address a meeting 
in Allora, "he was his.scd and hooted, the lights being put out, and 
he was not allowed a hearing".-" He effectively lost the election when 
Lilley, in a speech at Warwick, delivered a blistering attack on 
Macalister, calling him "unreliable as a partisan ... as unstable as 
water, as fickle as the wind, and as timid as a hare".-'' Despite 
Macalister's promises of renewed support for the Ipswich-Brisbane 
railway, he was defeated. Macalister retired from the political scene 
for ihc first time since 1859, and disappeared from public view for 
fourteen months. 
During 1872 events in Ipswich led to his rclurn to politics. The 
three silting members seemed ineffective despite the presence of one 
of them, J.M. Thompson, in the Cabinet. Then one died suddenly. 
In the by-clcction that followed, Macalister, campaigning on a strong 
platform of local issues, was elected unopposed to fill the vacancy.-
Reconciliation with Lilley took place and together they mounted an 
attack on Palmer, achieving a tied vote on a motion of no confidence. 
Palmer carried on, however, only agreeing to a new election when 
the question of Supply for 1874 was held up by the Assembly; its 
grounds were that as the 1872 Act providing an extended franchise 
was about to come into force, the electorate should be consulted. 
Under ihc new conditions (forty members in single-member elec-
torates) Palmer lost his inajoriiy. and Macalister was successful in 
Ipswich against Thompson. Macalister was now once again within 
easy rc;ich of becoming premier. 
When the new parliament met. Palmer's nominee for ihc Speaker-
ship was defeated, and P;ilmcr announced his resignation Lilley 
announced lo the Assembly ihal Macalister had formed a new 
govcrnmcnl; he himself retired from politics shortly afterwards to 
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take a position on the Supreme Court Bench. Public and press 
reaction to the new Government was generally favourable, the 
overriding qualification being that everyone hoped that Macalister's 
faults had been cured by "the sharp lessons of adversity".-'' 
Macalister .soon made clear his intention to replace the 1869 Land 
Act with a new measure so that dummying could be stopped and 
agricultural selection could be made on any area of any run in the 
settled districts, the leased halves of which had hitherto been 
immune. The land legislation was not successful and its failure forced 
his government into large-scale compulsory resumptions in the 
settled districts to keep its electoral promises of land for agricultural 
settlement. The facilitation of gold-mining together with an increase 
in the rate of railway building were also important points in his 
announced policy, including the completion of the Ipswich-Brisbane 
link. He even attempted to legislate for payment of members of 
parliament, but this Bill met the same fate at the hands of the Council 
as had its predecessors. 
Soon rumours of ministerial dissension were circulating. The first 
open sign of trouble was Macalister's dismissal of Thomas 
Mcllwraith after a severe disagreement over the route of the 
proposed Gulf railway. As E.O'D. MacDevitt, the Attorney-General, 
had already resigned, Mcllwraith's departure led the press to wonder 
if "there must be some nitro-glycerine element in the Macalister 
administration that causes these frequent explosions"." 
The Governor's speech at the opening of the 1875 session echoed 
Macalister's expressed intentions of the previous year. The Govern-
ment proposed resumption of more land for agriculture, payment 
for Assembly members, more railways, and a new Bill on education. 
Macalister in this session became more and more bad-tempered and 
intolerant in the Assembly. On 25 June 1875 he collapsed in what 
was termed "an apoplectic fit",-" in culmination of a long period 
of ill health that had begun in 1867. He returned to duty after only 
a fortnight, but had to cope with the heated debate over S.W. 
Griffith's Education Bill. Macalister came out of the debate badly, 
reliant as he was upon the Catholic vote in Ipswich: he left himself 
open to attack from both sides by adopting an ambivalent stand. 
After the session ended, Macalister left for the United Kingdom, 
ostensibly to look into the operation of the immigration system and 
the Agent-General's office.-' During his visit he was awarded the 
C.M.G. and in February 1876 was presented at Court. He was feted 
in his home town, Glasgow, at a banquet given by the Lord Provost. 
Press reports of 1^ ' lather fulsome speech at this banquet stirred 
up some acid press comment in Brisbane. As early as February 1876, 
newspapers reported that Macalister intended to resign as Premier 
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to become Agent-General. On his return to Queensland in April, 
Macalister emphatically denied these reports. It was obvious to all 
that his health was bad. From within his own Cabinet, Griffith was 
an obvious rival for leadership and William Hemmant was showing 
signs of open revolt. Rumours of Macalister's retirement grew 
stronger and shortly afier the 1876 session began, on 7 June 1876, 
he announced his resignation. Palmer accused Macalister of doing 
a deal with George Thorn {see Appendix), the incoming Premier, 
for the job of Agent-General in return for resignation. Macalister 
denied these allegations and the Governor reported that Macalister's 
health had caused him to resign.™ Finally the accusations were borne 
out by the gazettal of Macalister as Agent-General on the very day 
he left Queensland for the last time.^' 
Travelling via the United Slates as Queensland's representative 
at the Philadelphia International Exhibition, Macalister arrived in 
London late in 1876. The two main tasks of the Agent-General's 
Office were the recruiting and despatch of immigrants to Queensland 
and the purchase of equipment, mainly for the railways, and its 
forwarding to Queensland. On the surface, between 1876 and 1879, 
things worked smoothly, but there were rumours of inefficiency and, 
more seriously, the contention that relations between Macalister and 
his Chief Clerk, Hamilton, had reached crisis point. Each refused 
to speak to the other and office business was carried on by the 
exchange of notes. 
Mcllwraith became premier in 1879 and travelled to London to 
expedite the purchase of material for the large programme of railway 
expansion he had planned. He was appalled by what he found, 
confirming the rumours that had reached Queensland, and he 
dismissed Hamilton forthwith. During Mcllwraith's visit a contract 
was let for the purchase and shipment of 15,000 tons of rails. As 
soon as Mcllwraith returned to Queensland, Griffith and Hemmant 
alleged that Hamilton had discovered evidence of misconduct in the 
rails contract on the part of Mcllwraith, Macalister, and Ashwell 
(an engineer), and had been fired as a result. Hemmant also accused 
Mcllwraith of having the rails shipped in vessels in which the latter 
had a direct financial interest. Mcllwraith, making no secret of the 
mess he had found in the London office, denied the charges. The 
Government agreed to a select committee of inquiry sitting in 
Brisbane. It returned a divided verdict—Griffith, Dickson, and 
McLean dissenting from the majority view that the charges'were 
without foundation." 
The controversy gathered momentum, as part of the political 
struggle between Griffith and Mcllwraith. Eventually the Govern-
ment agreed to a royal commission, which held its London sittings 
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in March and April 1881. It was all too obvious that Macalister's 
health had now completely broken down under the strain of the 
controversy. His evidence before the Commission was vague and 
contradictory. The Commission, however, cleared Macalister and the 
others of any charges of misconduct, except on one minor point. Its 
report on the management of the London office made oblique 
reference to Macalister's inefficiency. 
In May 1881 Macalister had to take six months sick leave. Then 
on 4 October 1881 Mcllwraith introduced a Bill to the Assembly 
to grant Macalister a pension of £500 per year, as he could not afford 
to retire on his own means." After a mixed reception the Bill passed 
both houses, and as soon as it received assent Macalister resigned, 
on 19 October 1881. He retired to Glasgow, where he died, having 
been declared bankrupt, on 23 March 1883. 
Macalister has been called the "father" of the Queensland railway 
system.'" As an astute politician, he was well aware of the value of 
promoting better communications and his role in the founding of 
the railway system should be seen in this light. Macalister earned 
the "father" soubriquet mainly as an Ipswich politician and Secre-
tary for Lands and Works at the time when general opinion favoured 
the construction of a railway to the interior. As early as 1856, shortly 
after New South Wales and Victoria had established their first 
railways (1854), Macalister publicly supported "cheap tramways" 
(horse-drawn), but not expensive high-capital railways." In ac-
cordance with this preference he was active in the formation of the 
Moreton Bay Tramway Company in I860," but he severed his 
connection after six months. The company intended to build and 
operate a horse-drawn tramway from Ipswich to the Darling Downs, 
but it failed to attract sufficient capital and its plans and plant were 
purchased by the colonial Government in 1862, an action promoted 
by Macalister as Secretary for Lands and Works." There appears 
to have been general agreement that if railways were to be built, 
the Government would have to take responsibility, an opinion which 
was shared by Governor Bowen." One of Herbert's successful tasks 
whilst in the United Kingdom in 1862-63 was to arrange loan finance 
for a railway project. Macalister appears to have become quite 
determined to push the railway scheme as hard as he could, for the 
electoral benefit of himself and the Herbert Government. 
Opposition to Macalister's Railway Bill was based on parochial 
and economic objections, rather than any general rejection of 
railways as such. The Government as a whole was suffering some 
erosion of popular support, the Rockhampton politicians wanted a 
railway in their area, and some members felt that the necessary loan 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
60 PAUL WILSON 
was loo heavy a load lo place on the young colony. A close vote 
on the Railway Bill in the Assembly proved to be the catalyst in 
forcing an election. During the election break, Macalister appointed 
Abraham Fitzgibbon to survey a route for the Ipswich-Toowoomba 
railway." Fitzgibbon made a very hurried survey and submitted his 
report on 9 July 1863. He recommended a gauge of three feet six 
inches, on the basis of lower cost, but suggested that earthworks 
be wide enough lo lake a gauge of four feet eight and half inches 
"whenever it may be necessary to lay down a heavier description 
of permanent way ...".*" 
When the Railway Bill came before the new Assembly in August 
1863, Macalister energetically promoted it in debate. He would hear 
no argument against the narrow gauge, defending it on the basis 
of cost, and causing an exasperated Mackenzie to remark that "the 
honourable member was as short-sighted, as ignorant, and as 
obstinate as a child unborn on all matters relating to railways".'" 
In the light of the later recriminations levelled personally at 
Macalister, it is as well to remember that in the Railway Bill debate, 
Herbert, Douglas, Lilley, W.H. Groom, J. Taylor, and C. Coxen 
all supported the Bill, spoke highly of Fitzgibbon, and accepted his 
reputation as a competent engineer."^ The Bill became law and 
received assent on 22 September 1863. 
The question of gauge was raised again when the Assembly met 
in May 1864. Mackenzie claimed that, at the end of the previous 
session, Macalister had agreed to seek overseas advice before making 
a final decision on gauge. Instead, said Mackenzie, Macalister had 
gone ahead on Filzgibbon's report, engaged a contractor (Peto, 
Brassey & Belts), and had commenced work on a three-foot-six line."' 
At the same time, opposition members queried the connection 
between Macalister, Fitzgibbon, and the English engineer Sir 
Charles Fox, whom, on Filzgibbon's advice, the Government had 
engaged as consultant on the purchase of railway equipment."" 
Macalister denied having promised to seek opinions before proceed-
ing and defended the reputations of both Fitzgibbon and Fox. As 
a sop lo the central Queensland representatives, Macalister in-
troduced late in the 1864 session a resolution for expenditure on 
a line from Rockhampton to Weslwood. 
Construction of the Ipswich-Toowoomba railway went ahead and 
by 31 July 1865 the first section (Ipswich to Bigge's Camp, now 
Grandchester) was completed. By late 1865 Macalister was being 
warned by the contractors that Filzgibbon's estimates for the Litde 
Liverpool and Main Range crossings were far too low, Despite this 
he pressed on with railway expansion, moving for the lines from 
Toowoomba lo Warwick and Dalby and for construction to start 
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even before the line from Ipswich reached Toowoomba. At this point, 
loo, arose an issue which was subsequently to cause Macalister much 
trouble—the Ipswich-Brisbane rail link. Macalister declared that 
the Government did not want a railway competing with established 
water transport."' 
By early 1866 Fitzgibbon had suspended the contractors on the 
Little Liverpool work and had assumed supervision of construction 
himself. The contract was re-awarded but Filzgibbon's report, in 
May 1866, that the whole Ipswich-Dalby-Warwick scheme would 
cost £422,860 more than was originally estimated caused a predic-
table parliamentary and public uproar."' The financial crisis of July 
1866 brought a cessation of work on railway construction and it did 
not resume until later in the year. When parliament met in May 
1867, Macalister's railway policy received spirited attack."' 
The defeat of the Macalister Government in August 1867 removed 
him from control of railway policy and exposed to attack his actions 
between 1863 and 1867. A parliamentary select committee was 
appointed to investigate railway construction. Macalister was not 
called on lo give evidence and the committee did not produce a report. 
The main effect sought by the Mackenzie Government was the 
political neutralization of Macalister. 
Despite his posts in the Lilley Government as Secretary for Lands 
and Works (1868-69) and Secretary for Public Works and Gold-
fields (1869-70), Macalister was unable to get the Toowomba-
Warwick line completed, a factor in the growing disenchantment 
of his Eastern Downs supporters from 1868 lo 1870."' The line lo 
Helidon was opened (8 March 1869) and a survey of the Ipswich-
Brisbane link undertaken, but lack of finance prevented further work. 
During the election campaign of June 1870, in a speech at Warwick, 
Macalister proposed that a railway should be built linking Roma 
with the Gulf of Carpentaria, construction lo be paid for by grants 
of freehold land to the contractors. The proposal did not impress 
his Warwick audience, impatient at the non-completion of the line 
from Toowoomba. His speech was followed by a restatement in the 
Warwick Examiner and Times of all the sins and omissions of the 
colony's railway policy under Macalister."' When Macalister re-
turned to power as Colonial Secretary in January 1874, he supported 
the extension of the Central Line from Weslwood lo the Mackenzie 
River and the speedy completion of the Brisbane-Ipswich line. But 
he also expressed his preference for land-financed private railway 
construction in the inland areas of the colony. As a result, Mcllwraith 
was authorized to negotiate for the construction of a line from Dalby 
to Roma and then lo the Gulf of Carpentaria. When Mcllwraith 
brought back a firm proposal, he found that Macalister, on a tour 
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of northern areas, had agreed lo route changes which took the 
proposed railway "through all the constituencies of the north; it 
meandered from one to the other".'" This led to Mcllwraith's 
resignation from the Government and Macalister's rejection of the 
proposal. In the 1875 session the Continental Railways Bill was 
debated, a Bill empowering the Government lo build the Gulf 
Railway by using the proceeds of land sales rather than by land 
grants, as originally suggested. The Bill was amended in the 
Assembly and "Western" substituted for "Continental". In its final 
form the Western Railway Act provided only for a line from Dalby 
to Roma to be financed from land revenue." Macalister, more than 
any other legislator, was responsible for the narrow-gauge railway 
system in Queensland, but claims to his "fatherhood" of the system 
are harder to substantiate. 
Possibly Macalister's Scottish background made him particularly 
interested in education. He paid more than routine political attention 
lo it throughout his career and, like railways, it caused him a good 
deal of political trouble. The nineteenth century was characterized 
by bitter disputes between the advocates of sectarian and secular 
education and the principle of State aid to church schools, and 
Macalister became entangled in both controversies. 
In the 1850s he repeatedly supported the introduction of National 
(i.e.. Slate) schools," but Slate aid lo both Church and school played 
some part in his election victory in 1859 when he obtained the 
Ipswich Catholic vole on promises lo this effect." He was appointed 
a member of the Board of General Education in Queensland in 
October I860 and chairman in April 1862, an office he held until 
August 1866. He was prominent in the moves lo establish Ipswich 
Grammar School and was one of the founding trustees.'" In the 
election of November 1873 for the new single seal of Ipswich, 
Macalister made the issue of State aid lo church schools the focus 
of his policy. He opposed the reinlroduclion of full Slate aid but 
expressed support for the continuation of non-vested schools." 
Macalister won the Catholic vole from his opponent, J.M.Thompson, 
with Patrick O'Sullivan, the leader of the Ipswich Catholic communi-
ty, coming out in open support. The voting was 305 to 279." 
Education was not mentioned in Macalister's Ministerial Statement 
in the new parliament in March 1874. But Griffith, who had entered 
the Assembly in 1872, introduced a private Bill for the abolition 
of non-vested schools on 8 April 1874." Macalister declared the Bill 
a non-government issue, with freedom of vole for government 
members. He himself thought the non-vested was the cheapest 
system available and voted against the Bill." Having passed through 
the Assembly in late May, the Bill was not returned from the 
Council. 
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An 1874 royal commission, of which Griffith was a member, 
reported favourably on free and compulsory education, but presented 
a split report on secular education." Griffith, now Attorney-General, 
introduced a Bill largely based on the Commission's report on 8 June 
1874. Palmer refused lo allow the second reading of the Bill because 
Macalister was ill and not in the Assembly**; he alleged that 
Macalister's position was unclear as he had voted against Griffith 
the year before. On Macalister's return, the debate was resumed 
on 13 July. Hampered by the very poor slate of his health, he had 
difficulty in speaking, but he assured the Assembly that the Bill was 
most definitely a government measure. He still had personal 
reservations about "free and compulsory" education, but to interfere 
with the present system of free Slate schools would be a "monstrosi-
ty". Personally, he would prefer religious schools, but thought that 
Stale education must be secular: "the Stale has no religion and 
therefore can teach none". He did not deny that he had favoured 
the continuation of the non-vested schools in 1873, but he felt that 
the mood of the country had changed against that continuation, and 
he had changed his opinion as well. This rather rambling speech 
gave no comfort to Griffith and unloosed a storm about Macalister's 
head." The Opposition made good use of it and the press commented 
that "the action of the Premier will be considered nothing short of 
direct recantation"." The greatest danger lo Macalister was the 
possible loss of his own seal at the next election because of the 
alienation of the Ipswich Catholic community. Despite the con-
troversy, the Bill passed the Assembly by a comfortable margin, then 
survived excessive amendment by the Council and became law on 
10 September 1875. For Macalister, the education debate and his 
disastrous performance in it probably contributed lo his decision lo 
resign in June 1876, as it is very likely that he would have lost Ipswich 
had he contested it again. 
Macalister was a politician who used the land question for every 
electoral advantage he could squeeze from it. He maintained 
throughout his career a theoretical devotion lo the ideals of the liberal 
school of "yeoman" agricultural settlement. This devotion was 
tempered by the dual factors of the complexity of practical adminis-
tration and the demands of political expediency. At the height of 
his career, the Brisbane Courier summarized his policy as being "in 
fact of so chameleon-like a character, that it is rather difficult to 
describe in plain terms what he means"." 
Macalister supported "attempts to create a prosperous yeomanry 
by Act of Parliament"." He was typical of those opportunist liberal 
politicians who knew very little of the practical problems of farming 
in a totally alien and often totally unsuitable environment. Macalister 
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was indeed a townsman, capable of losing himself on a clear bush 
track. He had little real sympathy for either squatter or selector 
because he never understood their practical problems. For all this, 
he made certain contributions to the body of Queensland land 
legislation and lo the administration of the Lands Department, as 
its ministerial head from 1862 lo 1866 and in 1868-69. This 
administrative role left him open, probably justifiably, lo many 
attacks from political opponents, based on accusations of patronage, 
jobbery, and interference in the processes of land administration." 
Despite this, Macalister earned some credit for what efficiency the 
Crown Lands Office attained during his period of secretaryship in 
1862-66."' 
On the political front, Macalister began in 1856 with a commit-
ment to the general continuation of the 1847 Regulations but with 
shorter leasehold periods, freehold of agricultural land by auction 
only, and with a low upset price lo encourage the small farmer." 
Running for a pastoral seal in 1858, he look up an equivocal stance 
of opposition lo free selection, support of a Wakefieldian upset price 
of £l per acje for freehold land, and as assessment of pastoral rentals 
on established productive capacity and not area.'* In his brief period 
as a New South Wales MLA in 1859, he undertook to oppose free 
selection as proposed by Robertson." 
As a member of the new Queensland Legislative Assembly, 
Macalister opposed the four Herberl-Bowen Bills on land matters. 
Macalister made a particularly strong attack on the pre-empdve 
right of pastoral tenants, and swung back lo his 1856 espousal of 
a low upset price, 5s per acre. His opposition to pastoralists was 
confined lo the Downs or "inside" squatters and he did not oppose 
the Unoccupied Crown Lands Bill.™ His own opportunity to initiate 
land legislation followed his appointment as Secretary for Lands and 
Works early in 1862. He introduced a Bill designed to stop 
trafficking and speculation in pastoral runs, a practice which had 
grown rapidly after 1860, by imposing a compulsory stocking 
provision. Macalister's most important legislative contributions were 
in 1863, in the form of the Pastoral Leases Bill and the Agricultural 
Reserves Bill. The former introduced the principle of licence before 
leasehold for pastoral runs and divided the colony into "settled" and 
"unsettled" areas. In the settled areas, runs could be leased for a 
maximum of only five years, whilst in unsettled districts leaseholds 
could be granted, after stocking, for fourteen years. The Darling 
Downs was not included among the settled districts. The Agricultural 
Reserves Bill provided for the selection, after survey, of lands up 
to 320 acres in proclaimed agricultural reserves, at an upset price 
of £1 per acre plus survey fee, and the grant of freehold title after 
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a year, provided that the selector had resided on his block and had 
cultivated the whole and fenced one-sixth of it.'" The exclusion of 
the Darling Downs from the "settled" classification and the confine-
ment of agricultural settlement to proclaimed reserves ensured a 
situation of no "real rivalry for the land"." Consequently very little 
effective agricultural development took place. 
In 1864 accusations of his ministerial misconduct coincided with 
the passage of the Pastoral Assessment Bill, a measure designed lo 
simplify rental assessment or runs in the outer pastoral districts, and 
a concession to the practical problems of surveying vast areas of 
pastoral land.'" Macalister held off demands for resumption of Downs 
runs for agricultural settlement. He was accused of misconduct in 
a number of land matters, rural and urban, one of the latter being 
the grant of land at Petrie Bight in Brisbane to the Brisbane Gas 
Company, of which Macalister himself was company solicitor.'" 
By 1865 economic difficulties encountered by the genuine farmers 
who had selected under the Acts of I860 and 1863 led Macalister 
to introduce the Agricultural Reserves Act Amendment Bill, which 
removed the fencing requirement and reduced the cultivation 
requirements. The Bill was rejected by the Council on the grounds 
of the nuisance of straying stock but, had it passed, it could well 
have accelerated the rale of dummying on reserves, already being 
carried out under the previous Acts."' Urban opposition prevented 
Macalister from going ahead with a Bill to give the "outside" 
squatters compensation for improvements.'" 
When Macalister became premier early in 1866, he retained the 
Lands and Works portfolio instead of becoming Colonial Secretary, 
showing "determination lo force through his lands policy"." His 
policy centred on the part-political and part-practical aspiration of 
more land for agriculture on easier terms, meaning, in effect, the 
resumption of Downs leases. He wanted consolidation of land law 
into one measure, simplification of regulations, and, most significant-
ly, he helped to introduce the first real note of active conflict between 
the squatters and the urban liberal agrarians by remarking that "it 
is useless to think that, under any selfish or class arrangement, it 
either could, or can now, be possible to stem the current of the public 
demand for the occupation of the land by settlers for the cultivation 
of the soil"."'' Macalister was well aware of the political advantage 
of using the expansion of agriculture as a tactic in gaining urban 
anti-squatter support. He was equally well aware that many squatters 
realized the need for agriculture, as he himself realized the colony's 
need for the pastoral industry. At the same time, he always held 
to a "liberal"" general line in his land policies, maintaining as a point 
of principle that progressive agricultural settlement in Queensland 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
66 PAUL WILSON 
was a vital part of the development of the colony. In this respect 
he belonged to an altruistic group which believed "that the only good 
land policy was a policy which would bring out the inherent greatness 
of Queensland ..."." The great advantage of this altruism was that 
it allowed a flexibility of approach, which Macalister used lo the 
fullest extent. 
Macalister tried the lactic of splitting squatter opposition by 
introducing concurrently the Crown Land Sales Bill and the Pastoral 
Tenants Relief Bill. The latter was intended to get the support of 
the "outside" squatters by offering extended leases and lower rentals. 
But the tactic failed and the Bill was discharged. The Sales Bill went 
to a select committee. It retained the reserves selection and auction 
procedures already established. But the Select Committee proposed 
a leasing system for unsold agricultural land, allowing lime payment, 
based on a fixed upset of £1 per acre. After a long debate, the Bill 
was defeated in committee on the night of 10 July 1866. The next 
day news arrived in Brisbane of the London financial collapse and 
the subsequent crisis resulted in the land matter being dropped. 
Although J.P. Bell was Secretary for Lands and Works in the 
new Macalister Government after mid-August 1866, Macalister took 
ministerial responsibility for the Leasing of Crown Lands Bill 
introduced on 19 September. The Bill represented what could be 
saved from the Land Bill of July 1866 and provided for the leasing, 
on a time payment basis, of surveyed land inside or outside 
agricultural reserves, which was put up for auction and unsold after 
thirty days. The usual rent was 2s 6d per acre, over eight years, 
with grant of title at the end of that time. The unpaid balance could, 
if Ihc selector preferred, be paid off in full at any lime. Whilst there 
had been leasing provisions attached to freeholding selection in the 
1860 legislation,'"" this was the first time that a pure leasing/purchase 
scheme had been put lo the parliament. It also introduced the concept 
of the Queensland grazing farm."' The Bill became law on 11 October 
1866. Waterson sees the measure as a ploy engineered by Macalister 
to secure Downs squatter support, in a government which included 
J.P. Bell, J.D. McLean, J. Watts, and St George Gore, all "inside" 
squatters. Waterson also sees it as the real beginning of dummying 
on the Downs."- The consequences of the Act do not alter the fact 
that the principle of selection by leasehold had become legally 
established. This precedent provided a firm basis for the 1868 Crown 
Lands Alienation Act which, although it failed lo stop dummying, 
established many small farmers on the land. A careful examination 
of the success of the I 866 Act in areas other than ihe Darling Downs 
might well qualify Walcrson's views. 
The following year Macalister proposed bringing most of the 
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Darling Downs, all of Wide Bay, all of East and West Moreton, 
and coastal Port Curtis and Kennedy lands under the classification 
of "Settled" areas and of allowing, before and after survey, free 
selection of blocks of 40-360 acres, by leasehold time payment." 
He was defeated, and Mackenzie became Colonial Secretary. 
Macalister criticized Mackenzie's Crown Lands Alienation Bill of 
1868 and abstained from voting. One of the points made in his 
electoral speeches in the Eastern Downs in September 1868 was the 
provision of land for farmers who were in purchase competition with 
the squatters.'" Lilley made Macalister Secretary for Public Lands 
and Works in his government, but after the Fitzgerald affair 
Macalister retained only Works. Even during the brief period he 
was in the Lands Office, Macalister became the target for accusa-
tions of dummying.*' The only land legislation of consequence 
introduced by the Lilley Government was the Pastoral Leases Bill, 
in fact a measure close to Mackenzie's Bill of 1868, which had lapsed. 
Macalister did not speak to this Bill. 
Land questions were useful lo Macalister in making his political 
comeback in 1872-73. Doubtless speaking tongue-in-cheek, he 
demanded to know why the Government did not "introduce a 
comprehensive measure that would place the whole of the lands in 
such a position that every man in the colony who desired to do so, 
could lake up land and settle upon it without either difficulty or 
danger?"*'' Of all the members, he should have known the answer 
to that question. As part of his general attack on the Palmer 
Government Macalister could be comfortably theoretical from the 
safety of the opposition benches. Before the election of November 
1873, he promised lo put a stop lo dummying and to make available 
more land for grazier-farmers."' 
Back in office in January 1874 as Colonial Secretary, he had to 
redeem his promises. He made T.B. Stephens Secretary for Public 
Lands, and the "inside" squatters were not left in any doubt that 
the Government meant lo obtain more agricultural land on the 
Downs.*" The focus of the attack was to be the compulsory 
resumption of land in the leased halves of settled district runs. 
Stephens introduced a Bill late in May 1874 which sought free 
selection on leased halves of runs, resumed half of the areas of all 
runs in the settled districts, and introduced more anli-dummying 
provisions."' After it had been passed by the Assembly, the Council 
negotiated on the selection clauses and then blocked it. The 
Government responded by giving notice of compulsory resumption 
under the terms of the 1868 Act, which required a resolution by 
both Assembly and Council.'" The resolution received final approval 
on 2 June 1875. Acceptance of the measure by the Council was the 
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result of Macalister's expressed intention to appoint enough pro-
Government Councillors to pass it if the existing Council did not 
agree to it." 
This action was coupled with the successful passage of the Crown 
Lands Alienation Act of 1875, which amended the 1868 and 1872 
Acts by enlarging the homestead area to 640 acres, lowered the age 
of intending selectors from twenty-one lo eighteen, and allowed 
selectors already holding fewer than 640 acres to make another 
selection either distant from or adjoining their own.'^ The intention 
of the Government was to ease the conditions of selection lo attract 
more people from overseas and other colonies and to do away with 
the land order system. The problem of dummying was partly resolved 
by Stephens's actions of early 1874," even though, as the 
Queenslander pointed out, "it is almost impossible to dispossess a 
selector of his land for non-fulfilment of the conditions during the 
currency of his lease".'" On this note of continuing confusion over 
the interpretation of the land laws of the colony, and the unsolved 
problems of promotion of agricultural settlement and the provision 
of pastoral tenancies sufficiently balanced between governmental 
financial return and incentive for the graziers, Macalister left the 
colonial scene. 
Macalister's political career can be summarized by describing it 
as six years of rise and fourteen years of decline. From 1860 lo 1866 
Macalister achieved rapid promotion in the political world from 
opposition member to premier, by way of four years of hard 
administrative work in the Lands and Works portfolio. The financial 
crash in the United Kingdom in 1866 was hardly Macalister's fault, 
but he inust bear part of the responsibility for the severity with which 
the direct results of that crash affected the infant colony. His 
extensive programme of railway and other public works placed the 
strain on the colonial economy that caused it lo collapse when 
continuing loan funds became temporarily unavailable from London. 
Macalister had to carry much of the blame for the state of the colony 
while it made a long and slow recovery. His haste in letting railway 
contracts before proper surveys had been made, with resultant rises 
in initial costs, was a mistake which lost him much support. The 
turning-point of Macalister's career was his defeat in August 1867. 
His health began to give trouble about this time, and the combined 
effects of the financial crisis and the criticism of his railway policy 
resulted in his defeat by Mackenzie. 
Afier 1867 he was never sure of his political position. He had 
to leave his electorate of Ipswich in 1868 over the Brisbane-Ipswich 
railway issue. Despite his initial success on the Eastern Downs, he 
was never close enough to his electorate there to establish a firm 
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hold on it, and his defeat in 1871 was the result of progressive 
disillusionment, brought to a head by his acceptance of the Speaker-
ship. His feud with Charles Lilley negated a good deal of each man's 
effectiveness while they were both in opposition. The feud went back 
to 1861 and reached crisis points in 1869 and again in 1871. 
Macalister's acceptance of the Speakership from Palmer in 1870 is 
looked upon by most observers as his ultimate betrayal. From a low 
point of defeat in 1871, he came back into political prominence with 
renewed health and vigour in 1873. This renewal lasted long enough 
to make him Premier again in 1874, unopposed by Lilley who was 
shortly to move to the Supreme Court Bench. The renewal did not 
last long. The responsibilities of office soon wore down Macalister's 
health and the changing political scene in 1874-76 soon made him 
think of retirement and peace. Had his health been better, he might 
have fought on for a few years longer, but Daintree's resignation 
as Agent-General gave Macalister the opportunity for the position 
in London. He did not achieve the peace he sought in the new 
position. As a result of the office inefficiency tolerated by Macalister, 
the Steel Rails case, with its publicity and criticism of Macalister 
personally, eventually broke his health and forced his retirement. 
In the period of stable government under Herbert's leadership, 
Macalister achieved advancement. Left to his own responsibility, he 
was unfortuante in having to deal with unprecedented difficulties 
in Queensland, but on the whole he failed to cope with them. The 
controversial events in London from 1876 to 1881 were part of the 
unhappy twilight of his political career. 
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3 Charles Lilley 
An Uncertain Democrat 
H.J. GIBBNEY 
The year 1892 was a gloomy one for Queensland liberals. Reaction 
seemed to be triumphant everywhere and the progressives, apparent-
ly deserted by their old leader Samuel Griffith {see Ch. 6), seemed 
powerless. Henry Lawson, poet of the people, who had just returned 
to Sydney from Brisbane, expressed the feelings of the labor 
movement in what must have been one of the very worst of his many 
bad poems. 
Oh who will bear the battle's brunt 
And lead the ranks of Labour 
Our leaders blunder in the front 
While victory's a neighbour 
We need a man to guide us through 
The march is rough and hilly 
The army wants to know if you 
Are coming Charlie Lilley.' 
The hero thus apostrophized was a tall, distinguished sixty-two-year 
old with a long spade beard who had already been premier and chief 
justice of Queensland. He was charming, eloquent, and honest but 
a man of strong passions, iron determination, and an indestructible 
belief in his own virtue. His liberalism was a product of the 1840s. 
Fortunately, perhaps, his ability to "bear the brunt" in the new 
struggle of the 1890s was never really tested. 
Charles Lilley was born at Ouse Burn, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, on 
27 August 1827.^ His father, Thomas Lilley, was a working 
bootmaker. His mother, Jane Shipley, was connected with the 
influential Mitford family. Neither of his parents had much influence 
on him, however, as both died when he was young, leaving him to 
Charles Lilley: MLA (Fortitude Valley) 1860-74; Attorney-General 1865-66, 
1866-67; Premier and Attorney-General 1868-70; Colonial Secretary 1869-70. 
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be reared by his grandfather Shipley, custodian of the new castle 
after which the city was named. Lilley was educated at St Nicholas 
Parish School and in the late 1840s entered the office of William 
Lockey Harle, a Newcastle solicitor whom he later described as "a 
grinding Attorney. He kept me at work from twelve to fourteen hours 
a day ... The attorney meant well and I still think of him with 
kindness because while he worked me hard in my profession, he was 
very careful of the culture of my mind ..."' Lilley profited by the 
treatment, rapidly became chief clerk, and probably in 1848 was 
sent to take charge of Harle's newly opened London office. 
The radical political activity which had been a feature of 
Newcastle life for many years must have influenced the young Lilley. 
In London he was able to enrol for evening lectures at University 
College of London University, then one of the national centres of 
radical thought. He was formally articled to Harle on 2 October 
1849 and seemed to be launched on a promising legal career. 
Suddenly, on 3 December 1851, he enlisted as a private in the 1st 
Royal Dragoons. The reason for this drastic step is not clear but 
there is some evidence to suggest that the temptations of metropoli-
tan life had led him into a serious indiscretion": the army served 
him in fact as a refuge from possible prosecution. 
For three years Lilley led the rather humdrum life of a soldier 
in garrison at Manchester, Brighton, and finally at Preston in 
Lancashire. Here a major strike was impending and he incautiously 
fraternized with its leaders. He spoke frequently from public 
platforms, advocating temperance and urging moderation in in-
dustrial affairs but nevertheless incurring the displeasure of his 
superiors. He was given military punishment, went absent without 
leave on 6 May 1853, and on 10 June was sentenced to twenty-eight 
days in the barrack cells at Dorchester. This was virtually the end 
of his military career. On 6 February 1854 he bought his discharge 
for £30' and returned for a time to Preston, where he joined a 
committee to establish a free library. 
Early in 1856 it was agreed that Lilley's lapse would be forgotten 
if he emigrated, and he arrived in Sydney by the Ben Nevis on 6 
July as an assisted emigrant. He was said to be a schoolteacher. 
He saw few prospects in Sydney but soon became aware of the rising 
agitation for separation of the Moreton Bay District from New South 
Wales and decided to try his luck in the North. On 10 November 
he was articled in Brisbane to Robert Little, the district's senior 
solicitor.' 
Life on the frontier of civilization, six hundred miles from Sydney, 
was still fairly raw. Although it housed the still-sketchy adminis-
tration, Brisbane with a population below ten thousand was by no 
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means the centre of the new society, for the squatters of the Darling 
Downs preferred Ipswich to the erstwhile prison on the Brisbane 
River. Their wealth and intelligence made Ipswich a strong rival. 
The artisans and merchants of Brisbane, or, to be more precise, the 
four scattered, straggling villages of North Brisbane, South Brisbane, 
Kangaroo Point, and Fortitude Valley preached a liberalism that 
was principally a hostile reaction to the arrogant exclusiveness of 
squatting Ipswich. 
These differences had been temporarily submerged in the struggle 
for separation from New South Wales, a struggle in which Lilley 
soon found a place. On completing his articles with Little in 1857, 
he joined the printer William Belbridge to lease the Moreton Bay 
Courier from James Swan. Introduced to public life by his separatist 
leaders, he stood in for another speaker at a separation meeting on 
8 January 1858, then joined a standing committee on separation.' 
On 10 April 1858 Lilley married Sarah Jeays, daughter of a 
radically-minded builder. Soon afterwards he gave up the lease of 
the Moreton Bay Courier and returned to Little's office, representing 
the firm in court for the first time in November. He was not yet 
a community leader, being chosen last of twelve candidates for the 
committee of the School of Arts. 
The separation of Queensland from New South Wales was 
completed by Letters Patent of 6 June 1859. Robert Herbert, private 
secretary to Governor Bowen {see Ch. 1), took command of a 
nominated caretaker government to prepare for the first parlia-
mentary elections in May 1860. Supported by a group of working 
men, Lilley revived the nearly defunct Liberal Association and set 
out to win the Fortitude Valley seat for himself. Daniel Foley 
Roberts, a fellow solicitor practising mainly among squatters, fought 
him bitterly but Lilley won by three votes, held the seat for the rest 
of his political life, and was frequently referred to as "Lilley of the 
Valley". 
Herbert's firm conservative control of the house gave little scope 
for ambitious young radicals and for some time Lilley was able to 
concentrate on his private interests and legal practice. He sponsored 
an eight-hour movement, entered a partnership with James F. 
Garrick in March 1861, was called to the Bar in November, and 
"took silk" in December 1865. He was a defence solicitor in the 
classic action of 1861 when T.P. Pugh, his successor as editor of 
the Moreton Bay Courier, was charged with a seditious libel on the 
Legislative Council, a libel which most people believed was actually 
composed by A.J.P. Lutwyche, the presiding judge. 
In a house composed of rugged individualists, occupants of the 
Treasury benches constituted the only party. Lilley sat on the 
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opposition benches but this meant nothing since his idealist radical 
views were shared by few if any of his fellow members. He spoke 
frequently, made many friends, and rapidly established his name as 
a rising star with a most persuasive tongue. In October 1861 he 
caused a brief sensation by introducing a private member's Bill for 
the registration of prostitutes along the lines of recent English 
legislation. Everywhere he turned, however, he found a powerful rival 
in Arthur Macalister.'* With a strong power base in Ipswich and 
genius for intrigue, Macalister was always dangerous, but in July 
1862 he joined Herbert's ministry, leaving Lilley as the leading light 
of the opposition benches. 
Although Lilley had not been particularly happy as a soldier, he 
retained a belief common among nineteenth century radicals in the 
inherent virtues of a citizen soldiery. When Governor Bowen founded 
a volunteer infantry with elected officers in 1860, Lilley joined the 
Fortitude Valley company. As a public figure, he was at once elected 
captain. When Bowen learned of the imminent possibility of war 
with the United States over the Trent Affair in February 1862, he 
is said to have offered Lilley the position of Attorney-General if he 
would agree to introduce a Bill for military conscription. Lilley saw 
no danger to his principles in a system of universal service and was 
no doubt tempted by ambition. With a heavy sprinkling of volunteer 
officers in the house he believed that he had the numbers, but 
unfortunately he failed to take account of public opinion. In April 
1862 he presented to parliament a Bill for three years of selective 
service in a militia force under a system of rigid compulsion with 
no exemptions, and the resulting uproar almost concluded his 
political career.' The Irish objected vigorously; Brisbane radical 
leaders objected vigorously. The Rev. John Dunmore Lang added 
his powerful voice to the clamour and Lilley's own faithful consti-
tuents in Fortitude Valley objected most vigorously of all. On 30 
May he attempted to defend himself in a public meeting at Forster's 
Arms, a Valley hotel, and was nearly lynched. Before the Bill was 
due to come before parliament again, he hastily withdrew it. 
Lilley's brilliant oratory, clarity in debate, and strong personal 
following soon restored him to favour. In September 1865 Ratcliffe 
Pring. Herbert's Attorney-General, resigned in disgrace after a 
drunken scene in the house. John Bramston, a close friend of Herbert, 
took the position but Herbert's proposal to withdraw both political 
status and the right of private practice from the Attorney-General 
cooled Bramston's ardour. Lilley was then invited to accept the 
office. Despite his frequent attacks on Herbert and a particularly 
vigorous attack on Macalister for joining Herbert in 1862,'" he saw 
no reason for remaining in opposition. There was no firm body of 
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principle uniting the Opposition and it was clear that he could 
achieve more in office." When he accepted the offer on 9 September 
he was accused of accepting Bramston's leavings. His constituents 
disagreed and returned him in the ministerial elections without any 
opposition, indeed with some pride. 
Before the financial crisis of July 1866 Ratcliffe Pring asserted 
that the Governor could not assent under his instructions to the 
proposed Bill for inconvertible currency. Lilley, as Attorney-General, 
argued that it would be unconstitutional for the Government to seek 
the opinion of the Governor in advance on a particular piece of 
legislation. Pring proved to be right and Lilley resigned with the 
Ministry on 19 July. 
When the stopgap government organized by Herbert faced the 
ministerial elections, its Attorney-General, Pring, was defeated at 
Ipswich on 7 August. Macalister then formed a coalition including 
two Ministers of the stopgap government. In spite of the fact that 
the Ministry now contained a majority of the hated Darling Downs 
squatters, Lilley defied radical objections and once more became 
Attorney-General. 
The session of May 1867 was terminated after a fortnight when 
the house emphatically disapproved the transfer of John Douglas 
{see Appendix) from the Treasury to a new department of Public 
Works. The Macalister Ministry was still in a shaky position and 
Macalister confessed, in explaining his advice to the Governor, that 
he was unable to rely on the support of the house. 
The second session opened on 7 August. On 13 August the 
Government beat an amendment to the Address-in-Reply by only 
two votes. The Ministry then examined the composition of the house 
carefully and announced its resignation on 15 August. 
Once again in opposition, Lilley was freed from the problems of 
working with men whose principles he did not really share and was 
able to speak more freely. He introduced a Bill arising from his 
motion for consolidating colonial statutes of 1 May 1866 but his 
main contribution to the session was a speech on the Crown Land 
Sales Bill on 10 October 1867. He argued that government should 
act merely as trustee for the public lands with the object of making 
them freely available at no more than the cost of survey to those 
who could make the best use of them. He saw the land as 
Queensland's answer to the goldfields of other colonies. There must 
be something to make migrants ignore the geographical drawbacks 
of Queensland, and the right sort of land policy could do this. He 
was not motivated by any dislike for squatters as such but would 
oppose political domination by any single interest. The philosophical 
basis for his ideas had been expressed by John Stuart Mill. He 
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accepted Mill's argument that governments should interfere as litde 
as possible with the energies of the people, who should be allowed 
to follow their own devices without let or hindrance from 
government.'- He probably played some part in improving E.W. 
Lamb's Bill but was not formally associated with the select commit-
tee appointed on Macalister's initiative to revise it. 
Meanwhile Macalister, avid for office, had been intriguing against 
the Mackenzie Ministry. The Government duly fell in November 
1868 but Macalister was now trusted by nobody and failed to form 
a new government. When T.H. Fitzgerald also failed, Lilley was next 
in line and successfully formed his own Cabinet on 25 November 
1868. 
The maintenance of some cohesion in his heterogeneous crew for 
twelve months was a measure of Lilley's diplomatic skill. His only 
real confidant was Thomas Blacket Stephens, another north-country 
radical who became Colonial Secretary and left Lilley himself in 
the unusual role of Premier and Attorney-General. His Treasurer 
was T.H. Fitzgerald, who was a sugar planter devoted passionately 
to northern interests. The inevitable Macalister, dangerous because 
he was recruited reluctantly after his own failure, was Secretary for 
Public Lands and Works while John Douglas, an independent-
minded squatter with liberal, squatting, and northern interests was 
Postmaster-General. Lilley said later that he had only accepted office 
with the patriotic intention of trying to resolve the incessant and 
intolerable political turmoil.'^ If this was true, and it probably was, 
he deserves credit for it. His term was certainly no bed of roses. 
The first crisis came in January 1869. Fitzgerald believed that 
Macalister had used him for his own purposes and said so. Macalister 
believed that Fitzgerald had disclosed secret political negotiations; 
they quarrelled and Macalister precipitately resigned his office and 
invited anybody interested to try to form a better government. Lilley 
was furious, attacked Macalister savagely in the house, and refused 
him permission to enter what had been his own departmental office 
to retrieve personal papers.'" When he was cooler Lilley realized that 
Macalister was safer in than out of the Ministry, and after several 
days of negotiation he announced a Cabinet reshuffle. Fitzgerald 
was dropped and Macalister entered the Ministry, bringing with him 
the Darling Downs squatters Arthur Hodgson and James Taylor, 
who became Colonial Secretary and Secretary for Public Lands 
respectively; Stephens went to the Treasury. The stocks of the 
Ministry immediately began to sag. To placate a man whom he had 
bitterly abused only a few days before, Lilley had now alienated 
much of the liberal and radical wing by associating with the men 
of the Downs. He had lost face in the north by dropping the northern 
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stalwart Fitzgerald, and in the process had added another two 
difficult colleagues to his already difficult team. William Henry 
Walsh wrote acidly: 
there's, Lilley, Stephens and Douglas pitted in most questions against 
Taylor, Hodgson and Macalister and they are trying to carry on on the 
give and take system. Taylor and Hodgson and their "man Friday" want 
greater facilities in purchasing large blocks of land and 21 year leases 
to squatters ... these are hard nuts to crack for Stephens and Co and 
even Macalister but the set off is continuation of Cotton bonuses ... 
redistribution of electorates ... I asked Taylor if he could grant an 
interview ... "impossible", he said, "we sit in cabinet all day now."" 
With no payment of members, Lilley could not afford to neglect 
his profession and in 1869 he became involved in a case which invited 
further public criticism. A Rockhampton squatter called McDonald 
sued the Under-Secretary for Lands for damages over a disputed 
lease. When a decision in his favour was appealed to the Full Court, 
Lilley accepted McDonald's brief; then, in his role as Attorney-
General, he briefed Ratcliffe Pring as Q.C. for the Crown and duly 
appeared in court. The Full Court ordered a new trial. In the climate 
of the period Lilley's action was not strictly unethical, but it was 
at least unorthodox and at most thoroughly imprudent." 
Despite his constant assertion of democratic ideals, Lilley did 
nothing during his term of office to advance the cause of democracy; 
indeed on one occasion he was apparently guilty of directly sabo-
taging that cause. Radicals saw an urgent need to reduce the power 
of the squatting faction by a redistribution, but were hampered by 
a clause in the Constitution Act requiring a two-thirds majority for 
any constitutional change. In August 1869 Frederick Augustus 
Forbes, a private member, introduced a Constitution Act Amend-
ment Bill to repeal this clause. Lilley refused his support on the 
ground that the time was not yet ripe. In his experience, he said, 
the clause had proved a safeguard against rash legislation. There 
may have been covert political reasons for his position but it must 
have discouraged his supporters." 
A second crisis occurred in November 1869 when both Hodgson 
and Douglas resigned within a few days. They were replaced by the 
competent but unstable Ratcliffe Pring, and St George Gore, whom 
Lilley had long before stigmatized as inept. Both were deeply 
involved with the squatting faction and Taylor, the other squatting 
member, was already being openly accused of maladministering the 
Lands Department. 
Lilley now took for himself the office of Colonial Secretary 
traditionally held by the Premier and thereby became involved soon 
afterwards in two administrative measures which precipitated his 
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downfall. He had always been an enthusiast for education but public 
education schemes had hitherto been hampered by the drastic effects 
of the pastoral collapse of 1863. By the end of 1869 the gold of 
Gympie had improved the financial situation enormously and Lilley 
decided to seize the opportunity. Without consulting his colleagues, 
he suddenly abolished all fees in public schools and thereby increased 
the school population by six to seven thousand. Even strong 
supporters objected to his autocratic methods but Lilley as usual 
defied critics and, after his removal from office, publicly dared his 
opponents to reverse the policy. 
The Australasian Steam Navigation Company had long held a 
mail contract with the Queensland Government that gave it an 
almost monopolistic position in the Queensland coastal trade. In 1869 
the company demanded a steep increase in the contract rate. Lilley 
resisted firmly and in December, while visiting Sydney with the 
Governor, he wired to Stephens seeking authority to order the 
building of three ships for a government shipping line. Overriding 
the objections of his Cabinet, he signed the contract, and when the 
company at once moderated its demand he was able to renegotiate 
the deal to abandon two of the proposed steamers. These two 
successes provided much of the framework on which his subsequent 
reputation was built but initially at least they were polidcally 
disastrous. 
In February 1870 city members K.I. O'Doherty, S. Eraser, W. 
Hemmant, and G. Edmonstone called a public meeting to draw 
attention to the weaknesses of the Government. The meeting 
degenerated into an attack on Lilley's personal way of life. O'Doherty 
said that he had not yet sown his wild oats. Eraser complained of 
his prostituting himself to the company of pothouse frequenters." 
A week later the Warwick Examiner ran a leader on the same 
subject: Lilley's way of life had been the same for half a dozen years 
and ten years before he had been in trouble with the Speaker for 
"an exhibition of that independence which a hilarious excitement 
is apt to induce". Everyone knew his reputation in 1868 and he had 
neither given nor been asked for any pledge "/o eschew sack and 
live cleanly".'^ 
When the house met on 26 April 1870, Lilley found nobody 
prepared to move his Address-in-Reply and had to take the 
unprecendented and humiliating course of moving it himself. Joshua 
P. Bell then moved an amendment that the Government had lost 
the confidence of the house. He alleged that the history of the 
Government was fiaught with more disgraceful acts in its short 
career than that of any other government. The house, he said had 
seen Lilley at the beginning of his term of office as "either a great 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
CHARLES LILLEY 79 
man or a great fool" because his more important qualities were not 
equal to his volubility. He attacked the free education scheme as 
incompetent, accused Lilley of pettifoggery in respect of the shipping 
company and of extravagance in purchasing the steamers. Lilley's 
role in the McDonald v. Tully case, he said, had been motivated 
by personal greed, and collusion with Pring in the case had led to 
the latter's inclusion in the Ministry. 
There was a prolonged pause after Bell's amendment had been 
seconded; W.H. Walsh then suggested that the Government needed 
time to prepare a defence. W.H. Groom accused Taylor of malad-
ministering the Lands Department but promised to listen to any 
reasonable explanation. No explanations were forthcoming and when 
the amendment was put, it was passed 17 to 6. Only one of the six 
against, Henry Jordan, was outside the Ministry.^ 
In announcing his resignation next day, Lilley said that he had 
accepted office at the head of a coalition with the aim of resolving 
a parliamentary deadlock and, as was usual in coalitions, had been 
betrayed by a faction. He refused to explain his conduct in 
government and refused to offer any advice to the Governor. Both 
W.H. Walsh and Arthur Palmer {see Appendix) then emphasized 
that the censure was as much against his colleagues as against Lilley 
himself. He remained "the cleverest and most able man amongst 
them" but at the same time was "the miserable victim of a 
conspiracy". 
It is not very clear what all this amounts to but the silence of 
his own Ministers leads one to suspect that some at least of them 
had decided, for purposes of their own, to abandon him. One suspects 
the fine Italianate hand of Macalister and, from his subsequent 
actions, Lilley seems to have been of the same opinion. The Brisbane 
Courier suggested that "the Ipswich phalanx" had taken fright at 
proposals in the Governor's speech to extend the western railway 
to Brisbane.^' On the other hand Lilley had undoubtedly been unwise. 
His attempt at Realpolitik in January 1869, while it may have been 
necessary, was not calculated to improve his image. His role in 
McDonald v. Tully was at least equivocal and his dictatorial 
behaviour over the schools and the shipping line was hardly the way 
to win friends and influence people. 
Although he refused to explain himself in the house and thereby 
lost some support, he explained at length to his constituents in May. 
Most of the speech expounded the theme that the debacle was due 
to the Ipswich railway. Had he been prepared to leave the question 
alone, he asserted, he could still have been either Premier or at least 
Attorney-General to Palmer. As regards McDonald v. Tully, he 
argued that he had a duty as a lawyer to make his services available 
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to anybody prepared to pay. The Crown could, he said, have claimed 
his services nevertheless as a Q.C." Since he himself was virtually 
the Crown in the case, the argument was hardly convincing. 
When J.P. Bell failed to form a government. Palmer succeeded 
in forming another shaky coalition. He faced a three-day session 
in July 1870, then secured a dissolution. The resulting general 
election still gave Palmer command of only half the house but he 
was saved by Macalister, who accepted the Speaker's chair and 
thereby gave Palmer his bare majority. 
Lilley now succeeded in uniting all the opposition factions 
temporarily under his lead and went on to harass Palmer unmerci-
fully. He was much more effective, in fact, as leader of the Opposition 
than he had ever been as Premier. His first move was to introduce 
a private member's Bill to abolish the two-thirds clause of the 
Constitution. He explained that he had opposed Forbes's Bill of 1869 
because of a fear that the dominant party in the house might impose 
its own ideas, but had since lost that fear. His Bill was lost in the 
Council, but since circumstances had changed little in twelve months, 
his explanation seems remarkably thin and one suspects that he had 
opposed the Forbes Bill mainly because it was not his own. Late 
in the session the Government introduced a Redistribution Bill that 
was opposed vigorously by the Opposition because it was brought 
on too late in the session and was believed to favour the squatters. 
In the state of the house opposition was not difficult, and the Bill 
failed to secure the two-thirds majority still required for constitu-
tional change. Lilley saw, however, that electoral reform was the 
key to many problems and organized the Queensland Defence 
League to protect Brisbane interests. At the same time, he recruited 
Griffith as a liberal candidate for the next election." 
A second Bill introduced by Lilley in the first session of 1871 
to dispose of the two-thirds clause in the Constitution finally passed 
both houses successfully after a very stormy passage in the Council 
and the way was thus left free for a solid measure of electoral reform. 
Aware of the Government's shaky position, however, Lilley had 
already begun a campaign to take control of the house by judicious 
tactical use of the forms of debate, and Palmer soon found himself 
in serious difficulties. Fortunately for him, Sir Maurice O'Connell 
became Acting Governor at the crucial moment. Palmer, knowing 
that he could rely on O'Connell's sympathy, sought another dissolu-
tion and to everybody's astonishment it was granted. 
Palmer's return with a majority increased to six did not deter 
Lilley, who brightened the rather dreary wastes of the Address-in-
Reply debate with what was pracdcally a declaration of war. He 
referred to the Governor's speech as "cool insolence" and to the 
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arrangement for dissolution as " 'a vile conspiracy—a wicked 
conspiracy—a mischievous conspiracy ... The whole course of the 
squatting class in this Colony', he said, 'had been, up to this time, 
unfortunately for others and for the country, a great concerted 
conspiracy to hold for years and years ... the monopoly which they 
enjoyed of the public lands ...' " He went on to assert that 
O'Connell's notorious insolvency should have prevented his occu-
pancy of the viceregal chair and that Macalister had been bribed 
to accept the Speakership. The crux of his whole argument was that 
because of electoral injustice, the Opposition in fact represented a 
big majority of voters. The implication was obvious, and from then 
on the Opposition became even more actively obstructive. Lilley said 
little for a time but delivered another warning on 21 November: " 'It 
was dme', he said, 'that the House should come to an understanding 
that the opposition was not inclined to proceed with any bills of 
importance until they had before them the additional members 
bill ...' ". Palmer violently rejected the implication that the Opposi-
tion had any right to demand a particular Bill and two days later 
when opposition member H.E. King tried to introduce his own 
Addidonal Members Bill he was soundly defeated. 
Lilley's sometimes unfortunate propensity for clowning was dem-
onstrated in the debate on Supply on 28 November, when for half 
an hour he ironically insisted on speaking from the Ministerial 
benches, offering mockingly to defend "a set of muzzled sheepdogs" 
without fee because they were incapable of defending themselves. 
The opposition campaign was in effect a curious sort of filibuster. 
Whenever the Government seemed to be getting down to serious 
business, one or another opposition member would move the adjourn-
ment of the house, thereby changing the subject. Palmer claimed 
the right of a government to govern. Lilley argued that while the 
Government represented a minority of the people, the Opposition 
had every right to be obstructive. Lilley was of course completely 
unconstitutional but his tactics were nevertheless effective and the 
struggle eventually centred around the order of business. Lilley 
demanded that redistribution should have first priority. Palmer 
required that the Government should first be granted Supply. Public 
administration almost ground to a halt. 
The deadlock was broken on 12 June 1872 largely through the 
efforts of Samuel Griffith. The two leaders met and agreed that 
various stages of the two disputed measures would be taken 
alternately and would have precedence over all other business.^" The 
Redistribution Bill drove the first nail into the coffin of the squatting 
oligarchy. 
Despite this protracted battle, Lilley and Palmer remained person-
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ally friendly. Lilley had always been an enthusiastic advocate of a 
system of national education and in 1870 had fathered a private 
member's Bill to permit the holding of local examinations by London 
University. When Palmer decided in September 1872 to introduce 
a National Education Bill, he took the unprecedented step of inviting 
Lilley to draft it for him." The Bill was finally piloted to success 
by Griffith after Lilley had left political life but he nevertheless 
created the basic framework on which others were to build. 
In the first general election under the redistribution, held at the 
end of 1873, Palmer's government was defeated and Macalister 
invited Lilley to join his ministry. Lilley, who remembered 1870 only 
too well, refused, although promising general support. Macalister, 
like Lilley in January 1869, could not leave a dangerous rival with 
freedom to manoeuvre in his rear but, unlike Lilley, was able to find 
an easy way out. For some years there had been demands for a third 
judge in the Supreme Court. Macalister was able, therefore, to 
satisfy the demand and get rid of a rival by offering the position 
to Lilley. It was, in fact, the classical manoeuvre of "kicking a man 
upstairs". 
It is not easy to understand why Lilley accepted the offer. He 
was doing well at the Bar, apparently enjoyed political confiict, and 
had never shown any real sign of judicial temperament. His 
ignominious collapse in 1870 had certainly damaged his political 
standing but Macalister's offer demonstrated that his campaign in 
opposition had brought him once again to the front rank. The most 
likely solution seems to be that his rather hesitant acceptance was 
dictated mainly by vanity—a conclusion which is reinforced by the 
contemporary story that one condition was his succession to the post 
of chief justice on Sir James Cooke's retirement. 
At forty-four Lilley was handsome and popular. He was known 
as a gay dog with a dilettante interest in culture. His wife made 
little public impression, probably because of the twelve children who 
had been arriving almost annually since 1859. His dominant position 
at the Bar gave him a comfortable income and he was able to 
supplement it by dabbling occasionally in business ventures such as 
the Queensland National Bank and the Enoggera Gold Mining 
Company. His family responsibilities no doubt stimulated the 
longstanding interest in education which led him to become in 1868, 
and remain for many years, one of the trustees of Brisbane Grammar 
School and to endow an annual medal in both boys' and girls' 
grammar schools. In religion he adhered nominally to the Church 
of England, but claims made by other Churches suggest that he was 
not profoundly influenced by any. His main social activities were 
in freemansonry and in the Brisbane Musical Union. His most 
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noticeable characteristics were his fluent tongue, ready wit, and 
passionate determination. John Tighe Ryan described how, in a rage, 
he had thrown his gold watch on the floor and ground it to pieces 
with his heel. 
Lilley resigned his seat in parliament and was appointed on 16 
February 1874 as an acting judge during the absence of Lutwyche. 
The appointment was renewed in March and June to give time for 
the passage of an Act creating the new seat. The Act, however, 
seriously reduced the pension Lilley had been promised and he 
contemplated a return to political life. But it was now too late and 
on 4 July he was formally appointed a puisne judge.^" 
The Education Bill that Lilley had launched in 1873 was still in 
some difficulties and he was able to make one further contribution 
when Griffith appointed him chairman of a royal commission on 
the educational institutions of the colony in 1874. The report, 
submitted in March 1875, provided the basis of the State Education 
Act of 1875, which launched a modern system of education in 
Queensland. 
When Sir James Cockle left for England on leave in June 1878, 
Lilley superseded the ageing Lutwyche to become Acting Chief 
Justice and was confirmed in office when Cockle retired on 18 June 
1879. For a time after his elevation to the bench he had been 
consulted by the Liberal Party on political questions but by 1879 
he had drifted entirely into the rarefied atmosphere of the Bench. 
Offered a knighthood on 21 May 1881, he showed by his reaction 
a curiously ambivalent conception of radicalism. At first he declined 
on the ground that it recognized not his personal qualities but his 
office. The Colonial Office believed that he was foolishly piqued 
because Palmer, knighted earlier, would have precedence. When he 
was pressed, his objections evaporated and he accepted on 28 
October." For one of Lilley's pretensions as a democratic leader, 
it was a near-fatal blunder. He was never allowed by his enemies 
to forget the apparent contradiction and many of his erstwhile 
admirers no doubt found it difficult to take his radical declarations 
very seriously in the future. In February 1883 he went on leave to 
England, was presented to the Prince of Wales, and visited New-
castle. Soon after his return in March 1884 he was again in trouble. 
The political polarization of Queensland between squatters and 
townsmen had begun to change during the 1870s, and by the 1880s 
a more modern pattern had emerged. The Liberal Party under 
Griffith sought social progress. They were opposed by a business-
dominated party led by Thomas Mcllwraith {see Ch. 5) and his 
henchman Boyd Dunlop Morehead {see Appendix), who saw the 
future of the colony in a material development which would 
incidentally serve their own interests. 
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One of the main areas of conflict was the use of coloured labour 
in developing the far north and in December 1884 Lilley sentenced 
to death crew members of the labour-recruiting schooner Hopeful, 
accused of murder during a recruiting trip. The sentence shocked 
coloured-labour supporters, who argued that the evidence was 
suspect and that in any case the men had been following accepted 
customs. After some pressure the sentences were commuted to life 
imprisonment. Henceforth many saw the men as political martyrs. 
While Griffith remained in power, agitation for their release was 
ineffective but the general election of May 1883 turned mainly on 
Polynesian labour and the Hopeful men became a party symbol. 
When Mcllwraith became premier the question was soon raised 
again. On 15 October a petition with 28,070 signatures was presented 
to the Governor. A.J. Thynne, Minister for Justice, investigated the 
matter and reported that if all the evidence had been presented, the 
men would not have been convicted. Lilley, invited to report, believed 
that the petition was an emotional outcome of the last election, signed 
by people ignorant of the facts. It was, he said "an attempt to rule 
the administration of justice by popular clamor". Lilley's report was 
rejected by the Government and in due course the men were 
released.^' 
Lilley had found little reason to dislike his old squatting opponents 
personally and good reason for close friendships with some. In 
Mcllwraith's party, however, he discerned the robber baron men-
tality exemplified on the world stage by the American Jay Gould. 
The Government resented his role in the Hopeful affair; he resented 
the rejection of his advice and the reversal of his judgement. Friction 
soon led to minor explosions. In 1888, while presiding at an election 
tribunal, he instructed the shorthand reporter to replace his usual 
question and answer style of reporting by a connected narrative from 
the answers. When the Speaker dared to object, Lilley delivered an 
insulting personal rebuke in court: "I have received an intimation 
from the Speaker that neither he—whoever he may be—nor the 
House, are satisfied with the taking of evidence in the narrative form. 
1 will receive no directions from the Speaker nor from the House 
in this court ... The Speaker could hardly have reflected before he 
sent the message ... [he] was merely ... [a] conduit pipe ..."" This 
arrogant outburst provoked an angry reaction from Premier 
Morehead, who threatened to clip Lilley's wings. 
The first opportunity to do so came in September 1889 when, in 
delivering judgement on behalf of the full bench in Byrnes v. James. 
Lilley took the opportunity to complain bitterly that the Government 
had no right to appoint a taxing officer to the court without the 
concurrence of the judges. Indeed he claimed that the Government 
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had no jurisdiction of any sort in respect of court officials. This was 
clearly a direct challenge to the authority of government and 
Morehead promptly passed the Supreme Court Act of 1889, which 
spelled out in detail the power of the Government to appoint and 
control court officers insofar as they were administering public 
funds.'" 
These quarrels rekindled Lilley's old radical fire and the combina-
tion in 1890 of Mcllwraith and Griffith in the Griffilwraith aroused 
an anger that he found more and more difficult to control. He was 
incapable of disguising his opinions and became more and more 
outspoken. In a letter to the Brisbane Telegraph in September 1890, 
he attacked the payment of members, advocated an independent 
federal Australian republic, and hinted at the possibility that he 
might re-enter political life. The letter was greeted enthusiastically 
by the Australian Republicans^ and other radical journals. Hence-
forth, Lilley was the white hope of the left wing. 
He was, however, a curious champion. Speaking on the Electoral 
Districts Bill of 1870, he said: 
The bill proposed to give universal or manhood suffrage, or, in other 
words, to give every man, no matter what might be his position, an equal 
influence over the legislation of the Colony ... a shepherd or a labouring 
man would have an equal political influence on the legislation of the 
country as any highly educated or professional gentleman had, or any 
large employer of labour who contributed greatly to the revenue ... He 
objected to the bill on that ground ..." 
At the meeting in October 1891 to urge the settlement of the 
unemployed on small farms, he agreed that there was a good deal 
of distress, but urged caution because there were many loafers 
looking for work who prayed that they would not get it." Taken 
together, the two statements suggest an aristocratic distaste for the 
working class, but the resounding eloquence of an interview published 
in the Pall Mall Gazette in December 1891 was still sufficient to 
frighten the establishment and inspire the multitude: " 'I am a 
democrat', he said, 'and Australia is a democratic country ... The 
rule of the people and the will of the people is the guiding principle 
of Australian life. They are a free, bold people, and any attempt 
to govern them long on imperialistic and monarchical lines will be 
a failure ...' "'" 
In April 1891 Lilley was invited to lay the foundation stone of 
the new Brisbane Trades Hall. His exposition of principles on that 
occasion delighted his audience but must have shocked many of those 
who read it in the Brisbane Courier later. He advocated free 
education for all, and spoke of 
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the duty of labour ... to oppose ... the wealth of individualism ... [He 
was not a great believer in strikes?] but if there is no other remedy— 
and if they are likely to be successful—why, they may be resorted to 
unquestionably ... I think that we are not far from the day when he who 
does not work shall not eat and it is no use of any people who have 
been eating without working making a great face about it ..." 
He was congratulated by the Council of the Australian Socialist 
League, and the Council of the New South Wales Labour Electoral 
League invited him to a public reception in Sydney, an invitation 
which he regretfully declined. 
This sort of activity inevitably made Lilley more and more 
unpopular among his social equals. Scurrilous stories again began 
to circulate about his private life and he was incautious enough to 
allow an opening for serious attack. His son Edwyn was by now a 
barrister. Enemies alleged, with some truth, that he seemed unable 
to lose when appearing before his father and clients rushed to seize 
the supposed advantage. His successes were ascribed flippantly to 
"the Holy Trinity, Father, Son and Holy Ghost" or to "the light 
of the son". Whatever the cause, he was said to receive more briefs 
than any other three barristers together. In July 1890 M.B. Gannon, 
MLA, a Mcllwraith man, introduced a Justices Prevention Bill" 
modelled on New York state legislation to exclude sons from their 
fathers' courts. In the face of a common front by legal members, 
the Bill disappeared inconclusively from the notice paper in Novem-
ber. 
In 1888 the Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage Company 
of London accused its Brisbane board, including Sir Thomas 
Mcllwraith and Sir Arthur Palmer, of malpractice. Edwyn Lilley 
was briefed for the plaintiffs in the Supreme Court action which 
came to trial before the Chief Justice in November 1891. In March 
1892 Edwyn was permitted to change the pleadings and introduce 
new charges. Some weeks later the jury delivered a verdict. On most 
of the 123 questions put to them, their answers favoured the 
defendants. On two questions they disagreed. Lilley thereupon 
discharged the jury on the grounds that they had disagreed and that 
in any case no court could accept a verdict contrary to its own 
conscience. His own reserved judgement, which condemned the 
defendants on all significant points, was delivered on 16 August 
1892." 
There was an almost unanimous roar of protest. In the judgement 
Lilley had presented legal arguments for the course he had taken, 
but to the man in the street and to many lawyers the whole procedure 
seemed lo be a blatant denial of natural justice. 
As in 1870, he made very little attempt to justify himself publicly 
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and his motives are still a mystery. He must have been aware at 
least that his judgement could easily be reversed on appeal and one 
can only conclude that he was blinded by his own vanity and strong 
political feelings to the dangers of his course. Meanwhile in the 
middle of the case Gannon had once again moved in the house, on 
31 March, that no judge should sit alone or in chambers on any 
matter in which his son was a counsel. The motion was deferred 
several times but on 21 July it was passed by 40 to 4. 
The case was, of course, appealed to the Full Court and by special 
arrangement with New South Wales, Sir William Windeyer replaced 
Lilley on the appeal bench. The judgement was overturned on 13 
October and Stead's Review of Reviews remarked coldly the studied 
rudeness of Windeyer towards Lilley." 
Sir Thomas Mcllwraith swore vengeance" and his papers include 
the report of an enquiry agent employed in London to rake Lilley's 
past for unsavoury details. Nine days after the judgement was 
reversed, Lilley was granted three and a half months leave prior to 
redrement on 13 February 1893. Although the dangerous condition 
of his heart provided ample justification for retirement, it was 
generally believed that Mcllwraith had found a lever. Early in 
September Lilley left for a holiday in New Zealand, emphasizing 
to the press on his way through Sydney that he had no intention 
of making a political comeback. The holiday produced his one 
substantial literary survival—a travel piece on New Zealand written 
for a journal called the Antipodean, run by his journalist friends 
George Essex Evans and John Tighe Ryan. Its fiowery, old-fashioned 
prose is exemplified by an ecstatic rhapsody on female beauty—"oh 
earthy thought"."* 
In 1891, while still on the bench, Lilley had covertly taken the 
first steps towards a political renaissance by joining Robert 
Cruickshank and W.V. Ryott Maughan in launching a newspaper 
called the Chronicle.*' In April 1892 when Charles B. Fitzgerald, 
son of his old 1869 colleague, stood for Bulimba in a by-election, 
Lilley issued an encouraging letter for publication. Fitzgerald, still 
liberal rather than labor, was defeated but, convinced that only Lilley 
could save Queensland, he began a personal canvass in central and 
western Queensland for signatures inviting him to stand. 
Lilley was by now Queensland's most controversial figure. In 
liberal quarters a personality cult had developed similar to that 
surrounding some modern leaders. Of conservative reactions John 
Tighe Ryan wrote, 
the conservatives hate him, they say the devil is personating Lilley and 
the head of one of the leading Brisbane families who had Lilley's photo 
on a table ... took it from the frame the other day, tore it into fragemnts 
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and threw it on the floor, but the moment after he had turned his back, 
the Irish servant girl picked up the fragments, patched up the picture 
and put it in her box with pictures of Christ and the Blessed Virgin ..." 
In this sort of atmosphere his return from New Zealand was eagerly 
awaited and his contact with New Zealand liberals had apparently 
turned the scale. He announced his candidature soon after his return 
in March, one day after the return of Mcllwraith from abroad, 
because "we cannot leave the country in the hands of a pack of 
robbers"."' To Ryan, however, he wrote, "If I succeed, well—if the 
artery gives way, vale"."" 
Fitzgerald's campaign had raised a sympathetic echo in north 
Queensland where F.C.B. Vosper, a Charters Towers journalist, 
sought to induce the local branch of the Amalgamated Workers 
Association to support a requisition to Lilley to stand for Charters 
Towers. Vosper, who had been gaoled for seditious utterances during 
the shearers' strike, was a fiery young radical. He was soon at 
loggerheads with moderate leaders like Anderson Dawson {see 
Appendix) and John Dunsford who, in any case, had their own 
political axes to grind. The requisition campaign collapsed when 
Lilley courteously declined to accept any nomination for Charters 
Towers on the ground that he was physically unfit to travel there. 
Instead he nominated for North Brisbane against Sir Thomas 
Mcllwraith, accepting Thomas Glassey, the Labor leader, as running 
mate for the two-member constituency. Vosper thereupon left 
Charters Towers for Brisbane to edit a small propaganda organ 
called the Tribune for Lilley's campaign."' 
Lilley's conduct of the campaign was characteristically designed 
to please nobody but himself. In a predominantly middle-class 
constituency, he chose to ally himself with a labor party, seen by 
many voters as little more than a revolutionary mob. His Labor 
supporters on the other hand received little comfort. To a party 
already becoming hidebound by the notion of numerical democracy, 
his manifesto announced, "I stand alone without party ties, leaving 
those who will to follow me"."" To justify this naked assertion of 
the Fuhrer principle, he offered no reorganization of the social order 
but merely a collection of tired democratic cliches, promises to 
remove some local scandals, and the pursual of some personal hobby-
horses of limited public interest. The thirteen points of policy offered 
were: 
(1) Retrenchment, particularly of military expenditure and adminis-
trative economy; 
(2) Repeal of the Land Grant Railway Act; 
(3) Repeal of the Polynesian Laborers Act and maintenance of a while 
Australia; 
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(4) Maintenance of faith with public creditors and financial honesty; 
(5) Labor conciliation and Arbitration; 
(6) Electoral reform including abolition of deposits, the recall, adult 
male suffrage and eventually female suffrage; 
(7) Progressive land tax; 
(8) Easier land purchase; 
(9) Use of taxation to encourage industry; 
(10) Use of railway tariffs to encourage agriculture; 
(11) Protection of white labor; 
(12) Establishment of a university; 
(13) Restoration of public works destroyed by the recent floods."' 
Mcllwraith's already bitter hatred for Lilley waf M by this 
impudent challenge and the campaign was unusuany savage. A 
rumour, circulated presumably by Mcllwraith supporters, that Lilley 
would withdraw government deposits from the Queensland National 
Bank,"' caused a run on the bank which was only slopped by Lilley's 
firm denial of the story. Most Brisbane papers supported Mcllwraith 
and the cartoonists hammered unmercifully on the theme of the great 
democrat who had accepted a foreign title. 
Lilley's keynote speech at the Centennial Hall on 13 April was 
mainly an amplification of his manifesto. He drew a harrowing 
picture of the development of large semi-slave estates in the north 
because of the land-grant railways system, which would eventually 
suck the life out of the south. He denied that he was a labor agitator 
or even a labor leader but expounded eloquently a doctrine of the 
brotherhood of man. For one and three-quarter hours, he held a large 
audience entranced with an admirable histrionic display"' but, at the 
end, had to beg to be excused further effort. It was known only to 
a few of his supporters that arrangements had been made for a 
reserve candidate, Robert Huntley,'" in case the strain proved too 
great for him. 
The result of this burst of violent activity was failure. The poll 
on 20 April gave Mcllwraith 1574 and his partner Kingsbury 1481. 
Lilley polled 953 and Glassey 769. A re-count slightly reduced the 
figures for both Lilley and Glassey. The result was not surprising 
and it was probably due mainly to Lilley's charismatic personality 
that the pair secured the results that they did. Lilley had entered 
the contest with high hopes of achieving the impossible by the force 
of his personality and the result was a tremendous blow which 
darkened the last years of his life. He dearly wanted to remain in 
society in spite of his radical views but society thenceforth rejected 
him. On the other hand, the Labor party that he had sought so 
vigorously to woo now found him passe. 
In his declining years the old man travelled frequently in the 
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southern colonies. In March 1895 he was appointed Arbitrator for 
the New Zealand Government in the Midland Railway Case and 
in the week of hearings from 22-28 November 1895 was able briefly 
to savour again the heady atmosphere of legal confrontation. While 
passing through Sydney late in 1897 he had a serious heart attack. 
He hastily returned to Brisbane, where he slowly became more and 
more seriously ill and died on 20 August 1897. 
Lilley had some of the attributes of greatness but lacked foresight 
and the ability to assess men. It may not perhaps be too fanciful 
to attribute some of his other weaknesses to the early loss of his 
parents. Deprived of the usual outlets for juvenile vanity within the 
home, he sought outlets elsewhere, found his need easy to satisfy 
because of his personal qualities, and developed a taste for applause 
which never left him. His gruelling legal training developed in him 
an exaggerated respect for legal institutions and expanded his normal 
vanity to the point where he probably believed firmly that in his 
judicial role he could do no wrong. Given the sordid parochialism 
of the Queensland political scene in which he received his political 
education, it was easy for him to believe that the politician defendants 
of 1892 were undoubtedly guilty beings who deserved no mercy. 
There may have been good reasons for his belief but a court of law 
was not the place to apply it. 
Although Lilley never demonstrated any deep religious conviction, 
his radical beliefs clearly related more to the religion-inspired 
radicalism of the early nineteenth century than to the scientific 
socialism of later years. His advice to a young man on the reading 
required for a rounded education eschewed most of the classics of 
political theory and concentrated mainly on literary and historical 
works, with Marx's Das Kapital a rather absent-minded addendum. 
Lilley was not, in fact, the product of any school. He was very much 
an individualist whose ideas were generated from a well-stored mind 
alone." 
Before his death Lilley seemed to be accepting the inevitability 
of political machines and advised the Labor Party to exercise more 
care in selecting candidates, to develop a strong daily press, a 
stronger outside organization and, within the house, "a solid and 
independent phalanx—one distinct and separate battalion ready to 
join either side or desert either side at a moment's warning. This 
group should pursue an uncompromising and aggressive policy on 
military lines''.'^ Had he ever been tempted to join such a body, the 
result would undoubtedly have been disastrous. Lilley could never 
have found a place in the egalitarian world of the infant labor 
movement for, despite his claims, he was no egalitarian. 
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The obituary assessment of Lilley by the Sydney Bulletin is 
probably one of the fairest and best pieces ever published in that 
often erratic journal: 
Lilley had a weak strain in him—he accepted an English knighthood, 
he dearly loved popular applause—newspaper notice—he would unbosom 
himself to the greasiest little paragrapher and read complacently the most 
fulsome report of his luncheon conversation. Yet ... it was a man sick 
at heart and weary of everything who, the other day, went home to 
Brisbane to die. 
Lilley was of the Parkes type—strong rather than subtle, energetic 
rather than brainy. A masterful fellow—he wanted his own way in 
everything, and in youth generally got it ... All through his career he 
made enemies—bitter enemies—by saying and doing the things he held 
right careless of the cost to himself ... And no political corruption, no 
participation in banking swindles, no malversation of the public funds 
in the interests of himself or his friends or his creditors can be alleged 
against Charles Lilley. After a life of laborious public service he died 
poor—and honest.'' 
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"Jack the Hatter" 
HARRISON BRYAN 
The subject of this chapter was by no means the mightiest of 
Queensland politicians. But while in real life John Murtagh Macro-
ssan suffered the inevitable overshadowing of those who shared the 
Queensland political limelight with such giants as Sir Thomas 
Mcllwraith {see Ch. 5) and Sir Samuel Griffith {see Ch. 6), it is 
appropriate that here he should stand alongside his contemporaries. 
Macrossan's comparative obscurity is by no means a reflection 
on his abilities, which were undoubted, but rather on his ill-attended 
fortunes. Moreover, although it is conceded that his stature did not 
reach that of his friend Mcllwraith or his great rival Griffith, he 
might not necessarily be found any the less interesting on this 
account. Both in his own right and as a prefiguration in many ways 
of a future development in Queensland politics, John Murtagh 
Macrossan well deserves our attention. 
In the course of a tragically brief life he blazed like a minor meteor 
across our political heavens. It was unfortunate for him that there 
were at the same time two major luminaries already burning with 
rather more brilliance but, like some colonial Randolph Churchill 
or latter-day George Canning, he made his mark and his short stay 
is well remembered. 
The cynic, musing now on the great Irish emigration of last 
century, might well generalize that if the English rack-renter 
achieved nothing else he at least assured the New World of a 
sufficiency of policemen, publicans, and politicians. In actual fact 
we do not know whether this particular Irish politician came into 
that category. The only existing record of his birth refers to a place 
that never was, and the most likely interpretation of a clerk's mistake 
in transcription leads us to a morass of uncertainty, for the 1832 
John Macrossan: MLA (Kennedy) 1873-78, (Townsville) 1879-91; Secretary for 
Public Works and Mines 1879-83, 1888-90; Colonial Secretary and Secretary for 
Mines 1890 
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parish registers of Creeslough, County Donegal, no longer exist.' 
It is said that Macrossan was the son of a farmer, a reasonable 
assumption for that place and time, but it seems that his father was 
of sufficient means to send him to Glasgow at the age of sixteen 
and to keep him there for two or three years, to continue the "fair" 
education he had so far received in Irish private schools. All this 
took place in 1848, only two or three years after the Great Famine. 
There is some idea that he may have been intended for the Church, 
a theory supported by the fact that care and money were devoted 
to his education. Perhaps he did not feel disposed towards Holy 
Orders. Certainly he later reacted with some violence to the 
suggestion that he was an unfrocked priest. Perhaps those independ-
ent years in Glasgow proved too unsettling to a boy of mettle. At 
all events he stayed at home only a bare year or so after his return 
from Scotland and, by the time he was twenty-one, was on the 
diggings in Victoria. 
From Victoria Macrossan probably joined the secondary migra-
tion to the Otago district of New Zealand once the easier workings 
cut out. Only this is certain: by 1865 he was in Queensland. Even 
at a period so close to that of his public life, his doings are shrouded 
in mystery; not for another five years does he appear on record. 
Henniker Heaton,^ writing as long ago as 1879, said vaguely that 
Macrossan was attracted to north Queensland by the Peak Downs 
discoveries, while Doherty,^ the chronicler of Townsville, insists that 
he came with the Cape rush; C.A. Bernays," the biographer of 
parliament, will commit himself only to the Ridgelands goldfields 
and 1867, but Doherty is insistent that he worked a claim called 
"Saratoga" at Ravenswood. 
Whatever the truth of these various assertions, Macrossan sudden-
ly bursts into prominence in the north Queensland provincial press 
in the early 1870s and it is clear already that he is the leading spirit 
in the Ravenswood mining community. In 1871 he is found 
organizing the Ravenswood Miners Protective Association to con-
siderable effect, even to the extent of petitioning parliament for the 
removal of the local goldfield commissioner. This was a fierce batde 
with the local representative of law and good government and one 
that the miners' champion carried to some length, for in December 
of the same year he was under arrest, charged with assauUing 
Warden Hackett. 
The reports of the proceedings on this occasion, both in the police 
court and at Townsville where he was committed for trial, make 
good, exciting reading. Hackett's version of the affair was that he, 
a feeble old man, was suddenly without cause and without warning 
set upon by this desperate character Macrossan.' The defendant. 
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however, asserted that he had suffered extreme provocation. 
Moreover, he said, he had publicly aired his intention of adminis-
tering a well-deserved thrashing to a petty official who not only had 
scandalously defamed him but who also had long acted as an 
arbitrary and inefficient obstacle to the well-being and prosperity 
of the settlement. The slanders Macrossan alleged against Hackett 
related to Hackett's stating that he, Macrossan, was an unfrocked 
Jesuit priest, that he had deserted a wife and family, and that he 
was an active agent of Irish sedition.' 
There was certainly no doubt as to local sympathies. At the trial, 
for instance, though it was clear that probably scores of miners 
witnessed the incident, only the warden's second-in-command was 
prepared to state categorically who in fact had assaulted whom. 
Macrossan was bailed out of custody amidst scenes of wildest 
enthusiasm. In the true frontier tradition it was even asserted, 
incorrectly as it turned out, that bail of f 1000 was settled, in gold 
dust, by one Annie Smith, "a notorious shanty keeper". Macrossan's 
departure to Townsville was the occasion for a presentation dinner 
and his return, after being duly fined, that of a conquering hero; 
Hackett had meantime been transferred elsewhere, without explana-
tion. 
What manner of man was this who so captured the allegiance 
of these roughest of all diamonds? Almost alone among the leading 
political figures of this time he was a little man, prematurely stooped, 
slight, and with all the signs of feeble health. But, as if evidencing 
the inner fire that belied this weak exterior, he was possessed of 
piercing, deep-set eyes, and of a full, resounding voice that had great 
power to charm and compel, as it had also to estrange and embitter.' 
Much of his strength, and indeed Of his weakness, lay in his solitary 
nature. As a miner he was always a "hatter", one who preferred 
to dig alone and not in the boisterous comradeship of camp or 
working partnership; as "Jack the Hatter" he passed through twenty 
years of Queensland politics largely alone—feared, respected, and 
for the most part trusted.' He was little loved, perhaps, but he was 
surprisingly little hated. 
The simple facts of his career are these. In 1874 he was returned 
to the Queensland Legislative Assembly as one of the Members for 
Kennedy and, after some years in the house, threw in his lot with 
Mcllwraith, the newly risen leader of the conservative Opposition. 
In the 1878 elections he was defeated, but nevertheless was given 
the portfolio of Works and Mines in Mcllwraith's first Cabinet. The 
convenient retirement, however, of the new Member for Townsville 
created a seat for him which he held continuously till his death, 
twelve years later. He left the Ministry in March 1883 to engage 
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in a railway construction venture, thus anticipating by some six 
months Mcllwraith's own resignation after his defeat in the house 
over the land-grant railway proposals. He returned to power with 
Mcllwraith, again as Minister for Mines, in 1888. Some months later 
he became, in addition. Colonial Secretary under Mcllwraith's 
successor, Boyd Morehead {see Appendix). In 1890 he attended, 
together with Griffith, Sir Henry Parkes's Conference on Federation. 
The following year, though by then in opposition, he was again 
selected to accompany Griffith to the Federal Convention. Contrary 
to medical advice he insisted on attending and participating, thereby 
undoubtedly hastening his death in Sydney on 30 March 1891. 
Macrossan is an interesting figure, more perhaps by reason of what 
he did not do and say than otherwise, though indeed his actions and 
speeches were often striking enough. The most interesting point of 
all, perhaps, is that his place in our political history is demonstrably 
open to question. 
The general note of contemporary and later appreciation is 
sounded by Bernays, who sketches Macrossan in,his politician's 
notebook as perhaps our first representative in parliament of the 
working man. Writing when he did, Bernays saw Macrossan as a 
premonitory sign of Labor-in-politics. Bernays talks of "a baby 
democracy as instanced in John Murtagh Macrossan",' and the 
inference is clear from him as from all others that Macrossan came 
to the legislature dedicated to the task of shattering privilege, of 
at least sabotaging the squattocracy. 
To proceed from this view to even a cursory perusal of Macrossan's 
career is to note with some shock his long allegiance to the 
conservative party, his alliance with big business and bigger property. 
One soon has a picture of what seems to be a perfect example of 
the "transition" politician, the initial radical whom age, experience, 
and especially the exercise of responsibility convert to a conservatism 
that often surprises his ultimate colleagues and smacks of betrayal 
to his former comrades. British political history swarms with such 
conversions. 
A more careful study demonstrates the danger of such a hasty 
generalization. There seems considerable ground for doubting the 
original assumption. Did Macrossan, in fact, ever claim to be the 
political representative of the working man as such? There are three 
major themes in the story of his career. These are, first, his real 
reladonship to the working man (Macrossan the miner); second, his 
consistent championing of the region rather than the class he 
represented (Macrossan the northerner); and finally, his unsparing 
devotion to the federal cause (Macrossan the Australian). There are 
also sub-themes of interest. For example, one never really loses sight 
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of Macrossan the politician, the violent partisan on whom centres 
the fiercest controversy. But he is seen also to be a capable and 
fearless administrator. He was fearless too and unswerving in his 
religious adherence at a time when it was decidedly unpopular. 
Finally, we are never allowed to forget that Macrossan, in private 
life quiet and introspective to a fault, was in public a very 
considerable speechifier, considerable in both the quantity and the 
quality of his outpourings. 
To judge from their later reactions there seems little doubt tha-t 
the miners of Ravenswood and the other Kennedy camps expected 
Macrossan when they elected him to parliament to remain a narrow 
advocate of their interests—class, industrial, and regional. Macro-
ssan, on the other hand, never made any such promise. Indeed, from 
the very beginning, he pledged his support to both "the leading 
interests of the North, quartz mining and sugar growing", incom-
patible as these were on a purely class basis. In fact, from his very 
first election advertisement he can hardly have been said to have 
followed a very radical line.'" Even at this stage, for instance, he 
promised security of tenure to the squatters, though he distinguished 
here between the hard-working "outside" pastoralists and the land-
grabbing "cormorants" of the Darling Downs. In short, his whole 
election campaign was based on the representation of a region and 
all its constituent interests. 
The miners, however, were not deterred by this rather temperate 
espousal of their cause and, such was his local stature, voted 
overwhelmingly in his favour. 
It is well to bear in mind that this was a period before the principle 
of payment of members of parliament was established. An aspirant 
for political honours therefore was faced with the certainty of 
considerable financial sacrifice; only by appointment to ministerial 
rank could he hope to recoup in some measure the loss in income 
he sustained in serving his constituency. This alone would be enough 
to establish that Macrossan, on election eve in 1873, could no longer 
have been a simple working miner. In fact, though the details are 
vague, it is clear that by now he was a part-owner not only of one 
or more mines but also of a newspaper; some said, at the time, of 
two." 
Macrossan's more radical constituents took the view that his 
actions after election, and particularly his decision ultimately to 
support the squatter party, comprised major acts of treachery. They 
asserted that he had left for Brisbane committed, in effect, to what 
might loosely be termed the Liberal Party and that he "sold out" 
his constituency by joining the conservatives, presumably on the 
promise or hope of personal gain. 
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There seem to be two major questions here: first, had Macrossan 
actually committed himself in advance to any particular political 
party, and secondly, which party was, in fact, more likely to favour 
his constituents' interests? It would appear reasonable to consider 
these two points quite separately from the issue already raised, as 
to whether he ever did identify himself with any particular aspect 
of these interests. 
The first question can be very simply answered. Macrossan made 
it quite clear from the outset of his campaign that he committed 
himself in advance to neither party. The second can be met with 
equal succinctness by showing that in 1874 there was little in the 
constitution, past actions, or avowed platforms of the existing parties 
to render it likely that either group would harbour even the most 
timorously radical of sentiments, except perhaps inadvertently. 
It takes some effort to visualize the immaturity of party politics 
in Macrossan's Queensland. The large number of declared Independ-
ents in the house at any one time and the lack of party discipline 
reflected a gross untidiness in party boundaries over the colony at 
large. 
What party groupings there were had their historical basis in an 
opposition of interests between town and country, between the 
professions, infant secondary industries, and all the inevitable 
appendages of municipal development on the one hand and the 
squattocracy on the other. However, the picture had become 
hopelessly confused by the growth of two industries, mining and 
cane-growing, which refused to fit into even this vague class pattern, 
and by the genesis of regional groupings, particularly those of the 
north and centre of the state as opposed to the south. 
Add to this confusion the influence of the various religious groups, 
the very real personal dominance of a few outstanding leaders, and 
the well-established tradition of "log-rolling" by individual members, 
and it becomes increasingly clear that there could have been little 
hope of either party enunciating, far less following, a well-defined 
line on most questions of the day. 
Coming rather closer to Macrossan's actual choice of party, this 
general feeling of uncertainty would have been by no means 
moderated by the course of the respective election campaigns of the 
two groups. Moreover even if, on balance, it might appear that the 
Liberal platform was slightly more favourably disposed towards 
certain issues on which he stood committed, there were a number 
of fairly valid objections to his embracing it. In the first place. Liberal 
governments had put up a very scrappy showing to date. As the 
Brisbane Courier said, "they had never been in office except twice, 
both at unprosperous times; and on both occasions they were 
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unceremoniously kicked out, chiefly by their own rebellious 
followers".'^ Secondly, the party leader at this time was Arthur 
Macalister {see Ch. 2), whom the same journal described as "not 
a politician of very decided convictions".'^ 
Apart from these points, while the Liberals had yet to make clear 
their policy on the religious issue in education, it was an open secret 
that a strong group led by Griffith only awaited the opportunity to 
press statutory abolition of the non-vested schools, a move which 
Macrossan, as a good Catholic, was prepared to oppose with the 
utmost vigour. 
After the assembly of the Seventh Parliament, the Conservative 
ministry of Arthur Palmer {see Appendix), which had gone to the 
polls after the first really stable administration since separation, was 
defeated and Macalister took office. Macrossan, who voted for this 
change on the premise that Palmer was only the spiritual heir of 
the "Pure Merino" Robert Mackenzie {see Appendix), remained 
nevertheless on the cross benches. 
Despite its promising start, this Liberal Government followed 
fairly closely the precedent set by its fellows and, for the four years 
of its existence, was characterized by a considerable measure of 
internecine strife, together with very little in the way of effective 
legislation. 
Prior to 1876 the Government lost by resignation no less than 
three major Cabinet Ministers, one of whom, Mcllwraith, was 
uldmately to organize its downfall. It was common talk that the 
Premier was angling for a soft billet to which to retire and it soon 
became evident that the real strong man of the Ministry was Griffith, 
the young Attorney-General. 
By 1876 there was a rising tide of criticism, the tone of which 
was set by Macrossan who, from his independent position, moved 
a narrowly defeated vote of no confidence in the Government and, 
openly throwing in his lot with the Opposition, crossed to the 
Conservative benches.'" This was soon followed by the substitution 
of George Thorn {see Appendix) for Macalister as premier, the latter 
having at last organized for himself, as was said, the Agent-
Generalship in London. It was generally felt that Griffith was the 
power behind the throne. The opposition reaction to this manipu-
lation brought the first appearance of Macrossan as the Con-
servatives' main battery in debate." 
March 1877 saw a further bolstering up of the tottering Govern-
ment by the appointment of John Douglas {see Appendix) to replace 
Thorn as premier, and the Ministry struggled through to the end 
of the session under continuous attack from Mcllwraith, now 
formally leading the Opposition, and Macrossan, now recognized as 
principal opposition speaker. 
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Macrossan faced the 1878 elections a very different candidate 
from the intensely parochial miner who had stood before his fellow 
diggers five years before. His first parliament had established his 
worth. Quite apart from his more spectacular appearance as a 
speaker, he had done solid work in committee and earned a 
reputation for conscientious application to all worthwhile issues. 
True to his regional loyalties he had heralded his arrival in 
parliament in 1874 by subscribing, together with the other two local 
representatives of northern electorates, to a Northern Manifesto"' 
which outlined the claims and aims of the North. In 1875 he had 
secured a unanimous vote in favour of what was termed financial 
separation, a reorganization of the public expenditure to secure the 
return in public works to the North of an amount proportionate to 
its contribution to the revenue." The following year he had served 
actively on a royal commission into the implementing of such a 
scheme and in 1877,'* though then in opposition, had supported a 
government Bill to effect it." 
He had pronounced in favour of payment of inembers in his 
maiden speech,^" had argued for a move to regular hours of labour, 
and had demonstrated practical support for the mining industry by 
opposing a protective tariff on machinery and by his warm support 
for the constitution of a separate department of Mines. 
For the sugar industry he had demanded initially a supply of cheap 
coolie labour but, on more mature reflection, had decided that this 
must be accompanied by safeguards restricting such employment 
solely to the canefields. 
All in all, apart from his gradual translation to the Conservative 
ranks, he could have returned triumphantly at the head of the 
Kennedy poll had he done only this. Unfortunately for him, at any 
rate from a short-term point of view, he had done rather more. 
First, he had presented his enemies with a weak spot in his armour 
by his vigorous defence of the entrenched interests of Catholicism 
against the Non-Vested Schools Abolition Bill, '^ and later, the 
Education Bill." The sectarian issue was thenceforth to be ridden 
to death against him." 
Secondly, through no real fault of his own he had become 
associated with certain rather wild statements by the rump of ultra-
squattocracy in the house, on the occasion of his vote of no 
confidence. As if this were not enough, however, he had finally 
committed political suicide by opposing on one occasion the construc-
tion of a railway in his own electorate! Whatever the reason for this 
last action, and a case can well be made for it, it sealed his doom 
in the Kennedy. 
The irony of the elections was that, although he himself was 
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defeated, he was one of the major architects of victory for his party. 
The net result of the first intensive campaign the North had ever 
known was almost completely to reverse its traditional political 
allegiance. The new house assembled in 1879 with eight of the nine 
northern members Macrossan men, but without Macrossan himself. 
The reason for this personal disaster lay in a last-minute decision 
of his to contest Kennedy again, having discovered that one of the 
local candidates was not after all a "safe" man, rather than to stand 
for Townsville, where by now he had con^erable interests. Added 
to this had been the inevitable inattention to his own interests that 
had resulted from ensuring the success of his eight colleagues. 
It was not an irremediable disaster. A loyal party man stood down 
to allow his leader to secure the Townsville seat after all,^ " and 
Mcllwraith did not scruple to include the northern hero in his 
Cabinet. Even then all was not over, since the Opposition had the 
audacity to dispute this chivalry, their appreciation of Macrossan's 
worth to their opponents being demonstrated in this, as in the 
violence of their denunciation of the conduct of the ensuing election. 
On this last point, it is true that, by our standards, there was 
considerable evidence of at least the suspicion of polling ir-
regularities. Ironically enough, however, not only did Macrossan not 
need the votes he received, some said over-received, at the particular 
polling places concerned in the Opposition's complaints, he could 
have presented the total enrolment there to his opponent and still 
have had a two-thirds majority." 
The new Minister for Works plunged into his job with character-
istic vigour and, by the time parliament reassembled, the whole 
colony was discussing the results of his application. Sweeping like 
a tornado through the huge railway workshops at Ipswich, he had 
summarily dismissed over a hundred superfluous hands and scores 
more had been discharged from road gangs and lagging railway 
construction projects. This was not just the retrenchment Mcllwraith 
had prescribed as the remedy for the colony's financial instability 
after a session of uninspired Liberal rule. Senior officials were 
startled to hear Macrossan declare that not only would he make 
railways, but he would make them pay. The policy was to be not 
merely economy, but efficiency as well. 
Such drastic action could not fail to provoke opposition and the 
house buzzed with anticipadon of a lively session. It was not 
disappointed. Griffith, now formally leading the Liberal Opposidon, 
abandoned his cold aloofness for perhaps the only time in his career, 
and himself set the tone for one of the most abusive and unedifying 
debates in Queensland's legislative history. Macrossan was nothing 
loath to meet him at the level he chose. Already these two had 
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established themselves as implacable parliamentary foes. The second 
time Macrossan had opened his mouth in house in 1874 had been 
to sneer at Griffith^' and, even during the years when they were 
nominally on the same side, neither had let slip many opportunities 
for recriminadon. From 1876 on Macrossan seems to have regarded 
Griffith as his special charge. In this session of 1879 he earned the 
lasting gratitude of all contemporary cartoonists by insisting that 
Griffith had a twist in his moral character that prevented him from 
stating the truth." Poor Griffith! He never lived it down; the comic 
at Her Majesty's Opera House would sidle crab-wise on to the stage 
to inform a delighted audience that, like "our Sam", he had a "moral 
twist", and the future Premier was inevitably depicted as smoking 
a pipe of tobacco similarly labelled. 
The Opposition having eventually established, at least to its own 
satisfaction, that the Minister for Works had been guilty of gross 
religious and political victimization in the course of the workshop 
dismissals" and he having managed, in turn, to produce what 
purported to be evidence of fraudulent land dealings at Townsville 
on the part of Griffith,^' things quietened down a little; but it was 
to be only a temporary lull. 
The year 1880 saw the breaking of the great Steel Rails scandal, 
during which Griffith, in effect, accused Premier Mcllwraith of 
conspiring with members of his family to defraud the colony. 
Macrossan was doubly implicated in the ensuing parliamentary 
strife. In the first place, as Minister for Works he had been concerned 
with the original contract for steel rails with an English firm called 
Ibbotsen, the collapse of which had necessitated subsequent 
purchases by the Government at a much higher price. According 
to the Opposition he deliberately engineered the breakdown in the 
original negotiations to this end, and for his own profit. According 
to himself he acted in good faith throughout and was finally betrayed 
by ignorance. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the matter, few 
of his contemporaries seemed permanently estranged or affected in 
any way by Macrossan's involvement in the affair. 
In the second place, Macrossan flung himself without reserve or 
scruple into the debates to sustain and defend, by his force and 
eloquence, not only his own reputation and position but that of his 
leader and friend Mcllwraith, who was a very mediocre speaker.'" 
It was all legitimate party warfare to Macrossan and he excelled 
at it, his performance on this and other similar occasions causing 
his mourners later to write that "his impassioned speech frequently 
left the impression that he had, by force of argument, made the worse 
appear the better cause".'' This is just the kind of complication that 
besets any attempt at critical evaluation of any party politician— 
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how to disentangle the confusion of party tactics which surrounds 
and overlays the solid worth of a man as administrator and 
statesman. 
For, apart from his oratorical extravagance, John Macrossan was 
now, as always, hard at work on his ministerial responsibilities. 
Though it did not easily forgive his debating violence, the house in 
1881 allowed him at the second attempt to pass his Mines Regulation 
Bill, a most advanced piece of industrial legislation." The next year, 
1882, saw his Mineral Lands Act in the statute book. 
In 1883, however, to everyone's surprise, he suddenly resigned his 
portfolio. It was merely stated at the time that he was entering into 
a partnership in a railway construction project in New South Wales. 
Some years later, as we shall see, Macrossan insisted on ventilating 
the whole matter in a characteristically dramatic way. 
The Conservative Government fell some time after Macrossan's 
resignation, the occasion being Mcllwraith's land-grant railway 
proposals, and Macrossan and his leader were perforce in the political 
wilderness for some five years. They were far from inactive years, 
however. Macrossan obviously led the Opposition as a debater and, 
as always, contributed fully and clearly in committee, especially on 
matters in which he was particularly concerned. It was a period, 
for instance, of growing demand for the separation of the northern 
portion of the colony. By 1886 Macrossan had become convinced 
of the futility of trying to secure any measure of financial satisfaction 
apart from secession. 
On 20 August he moved for formal separation in a speech which 
the historian of the New State Movement has called "one of the 
five great statements of the case for local self-government"." To read 
this speech is to see Macrossan at his best. Its careful detail and 
its close reasoning strike a note of solid sincerity that is lacking from 
his normal utterances. He had obviously devoted much care to its 
preparation. Indeed his friends later insisted that it was the only 
occasion in his nearly twenty years in parliament when he was known 
to speak from notes. It was, of course, in vain. 
With regard to his personal political fortunes too, this was a 
decisive period. In 1886 Mcllwraith retired from politics and his 
place as leader of the Opposition was taken by Albert Norton. This 
could not have appeared as anything but a blow to Macrossan, since 
he had clearly been regarded as second-in-command of the first 
Mcllwraith Ministry. He had been a senior Minister for over four 
years and there were no longer in the house any members of his 
party who had held more senior portfolios. Moreover he had been 
carrying the debadng for years. His supplandng by Norton estab-
lished the fact, which was later to be reaffirmed, that the party. 
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while it was prepared to use him to the full, while indeed it might 
acknowledge his strength in a ministry and his indispensability in 
debate and argument, would not entrust him with its control. 
Most of the reasons for this are fairly obvious and are summed 
up in the single statement that his successful rival Norton was 
essentially a conciliator. As for Macrossan, his expressed opinions 
were too strong, his convictions too obviously entrenched, to allow 
him to weld together the heterogeneous elements which only the 
genius of Mcllwraith had so far managed to unite. 
There was Morehead, for instance, who more or less controlled 
the squatting rump in the party. Morehead apparently disliked 
Macrossan as thoroughly as Macrossan despised him. Then, too, the 
very fierceness of Macrossan's oratory, which had constituted one 
of his major party assets, may have seemed less desirable in a leader, 
implying as it did some lack of restraint, a destructive rather than 
a constructive attitude. Above all, there were plenty, even within 
the party, who suspected him of seeking too strongly to favour the 
regions and sects with which he was intimately connected. He had 
announced his conversion to full territorial separation for the North, 
for instance, and the Nonconformists had never forgotten the 
bitterness of the education debate of eleven years before. 
If the separation motion of 1886 demonstrated Macrossan's 
capacity for clear thinking and his ability, when he chose, to keep 
his Celtic temperament in check, another action in the same year 
showed his other side. He sent the Brisbane Courier a remarkable 
letter addressed to Sir Charles Lilley {see Ch. 3), the Chief Justice, 
openly accusing him of allowing political bias to cloud his judgement 
and of abusing his privilege in order to defame the writer. The 
Brisbane Courier, quite understandably, refused to print this ef-
fusion, so Macrossan insisted on reading it in full in the house. 
Among other choice phrases, he assured Sir Charles that portion 
of his judgement comprised "Words which the shallowest intellect 
can see were only hypocritical homage which vice pays to virtue". 
It must be said that, practically to a man, the house accepted 
Macrossan's explanation of the particular circumstances mentioned 
by the judge and completely exonerated him from any taint of 
corruption. On the other hand, again to a man, the members united 
in deprecating the the over-vehemence of his reactions.'" 
The subject on which Macrossan had proved so touchy was his 
resignation from the Ministry some three and a half years earlier. 
The position .seems to have been that, while still Minister for 
Railways, he had been approached with an offer of partnership by 
a contractor named McSharry, who was then engaged in railway 
construction in Queensland. This he very rightly declined, but in 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
JOHN MURTAGH MACROSSAN 107 
January 1883 he did accept a second offer to partner McSharry in 
a similar venture in New South Wales. However, he insisted on 
resigning from the Ministry, although Mcllwraith thought it un-
necessary, on the grounds that it might be embarrassing as a Minister 
to let contracts for which his partner, though in a quite separate 
undertaking, was a tenderer. 
The whole exchange highlights Macrossan's complex make-up. 
However conscientious and scrupulous he might have been, his 
vehement overstatement in debate almost inevitably gave rise to a 
suspicion of hypocrisy. Consequently he was forever the centre of 
controversy and partisanship: wherever he was there were certain 
to be the most virulent attacks, the choicest of parliamentary abuse. 
Another active legislative year for the mining industry was 1886, 
and it was typical of Macrossan that, on this subject, he knew no 
party but worked unselfishly with the Government he opfwsed to 
secure maximum benefits from quite a covey of Bills." Incidentally, 
at the same time, he was apparently completely uninterested in 
Griffith's preoccupation with general industrial conditions, as 
evidenced in an Employer's Liability Act and a Trade Union Act, 
in spite of the fact that his own Mines Regulation Act of 1881 had 
been the first Queensland Act to recognize the principle of employer 
liability. 
A fiercely contested election in 1888 produced the second 
Mcllwraith Ministry, which included Macrossan, inevitably, as 
Minister for Works and Mines. 
Again, almost inevitably, the first major legislative achievement 
of the new Government was a further Mines Regulation Bill, another 
advanced piece of industrial legislation." Apart from this universally 
acclaimed measure, his second term of office was a period of 
considerable upset for Macrossan. While it saw his greatest achieve-
ment of power, it also witnessed, at the same time, his further and 
final disappointment. 
During the 1888-89 recess, ill health forced Mcllwraith to resign 
as Premier, though he still retained a seat in the Cabinet. Macrossan 
was again passed over and the irrepressible Morehead took office. 
The same reasons which had kept the party leadership from 
Macrossan two years before still operated, although there is no doubt 
that in point of ability, application, and debadng power he was 
infinitely superior to his new leader. By now, however, the uncertain 
state of his health was added to his other worries. 
Despite this further frustration Macrossan seems to have been 
determined to increase his load of responsibility. He added to his 
Works portfolio the position of Colonial Secretary and also the 
Harbours and Marine Department previously supervised by the 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
108 HARRISON BRYAN 
Treasury. In every respect he was now the strong man in the 
Ministry, though it is not known how much this compensated him 
for his failure to attain also the nominal leadership. 
Some months later, on top of this disappointment and to aggravate 
his illness, came an equally bitter and quite sad breach with 
Mcllwraith, the man he most admired. Mcllwraith resigned from 
the Ministry on what appears to have been a pet over the question 
of its reluctance to finance his favourite project, the Central Railway 
Station. The inevitable recriminations dragged out at weary length 
and were notable even in a day and place characterized by the 
bluntest of blunt speaking. Among other charges Mcllwraith accused 
Macrossan and Hume Black of abusing their positions to forward 
northern interests. Referring to Macrossan's load of responsibility 
he exploded, "Why bless my soul, the man has got half the colony 
in his hands. That looks a little like as if he meant the great bulk 
of the influence of the colony to remain with the North."" An 
interesting statement this, since it was a common criticism of 
Macrossan that his northern interests tended to be forgotten when 
he was in office and revived only when he was in Opposition, for 
purely factional purposes. 
By now the northern question had become very confused in the 
public mind with that of black labour, as the sugar interests exerted 
their influence more and more openly in favour of separation. 
Macrossan's views on this question remained fairly constant through-
out, whether the suggested coloured labour force was Indian, 
Polynesian, or Chinese. 
Initially he had favoured coolie labour for the canefields. Later 
he insisted that this should be introduced only under careful 
regulation. Much the same view fairly consistently characterized his 
attitude towards Kanakas. Generally speaking he wanted the best 
of two worlds. He had the sugar interest and its need for a cheap 
labour force well in mind because sugar was a northern staple, but 
on the other hand he would not condone the spread of non-European 
labour into other occupations to the detriment of the European 
worker's living standards. His Chinese policy was far more vigorous. 
With two curious exceptions, he never ceased to attack and assail 
the Chinese, to limit their activities in Queensland, and to try to 
terminate their immigration. His mining experience lay behind this 
attitude. It was the miners who most hated, because they feared, 
the Chinese. Macrossan the worker was never so radical as when 
he was, in effect, Macrossan the miner. 
Perhaps the best evidence of the strength of his feeling on the 
Chinese question is his selection, by agreement of both party leaders, 
to represent Queensland at an intercolonial conference in Sydney 
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during the 1888 recess. This was before Mcllwraith had actually 
taken office for the second time. The conference recommended 
legislation by each colony to prohibit Oriental immigration. 
The closing years of Macrossan's career saw also a great accelera-
tion of the movement towards federation of the separate Australian 
colonies. As early as 1857 concerted action had been mooted but 
not until the early 1880s was anything really practical accomplished. 
There is on record an intercolonial conference of 1881, but the first 
major step was a convention in Sydney in late 1883, which drafted 
a bill for the constitution of a Federal Council of Australia. 
When this matter was debated in the Queensland parliament the 
following year, Macrossan spoke strongly in support of complete 
federation. From this position he never wavered. He might have been 
a rather uncertain liberal on general questions of industrial legisla-
tion; his Chartist principles could still let him play fast and loose 
with the payment of members issue; he was even capable of 
moderating his hatred of the Chinese on occasion for what appear 
to be suspiciously like party reasons; but he ever remained a most 
uncompromising supporter of federation. The federation he wanted, 
he said, must be "complete and simple" and on the broadest basis, 
"taken outside Governments and placed in the people"." With the 
exception of Griffith, he was undoubtedly the first major Queensland 
politician openly to espouse the federal cause and by far its strongest 
public supporter in the colony at the time. He was certainly the first 
leading Australian to die serving the cause. 
In 1889 Macrossan and Griffith were Queensland's represent-
atives on the Federal Council, though Griffith was actually out of 
office at the time. There was quite a sensation in Hobart at this 
cutting across of party boundaries but the decision was one which 
Macrossan supported very strongly, just as he did subsequent moves 
aimed at progressive liberalization of the Council." 
The following year Sir Henry Parkes convened a conference in 
Melbourne to settle preliminaries for a federal convention. To this 
conference again Macrossan and Griffith were delegated. It is a 
measure of the real worth of both men that they, who were such 
bitter foes in the local political arena, never experienced any trouble 
in sinking their differences and working enthusiastically together in 
this wider field. 
Macrossan made a notable contribution to this conference. The 
intensity of his conviction and the detail of his thought combined 
with the remarkable extent to his knowledge of constitutional law 
and practice to illumine a speech that was outstanding in a gathering 
justly stigmatized by Deakin as being characterized otherwise by 
"vagueness of conception"."" 
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The year 1890 was a full one for Macrossan. Up to August he 
was shouldering a very heavy ministerial responsibility. Then, too, 
there was the double crisis of Mcllwraith's resignation and "unholy" 
alliance with Griffith, with Macrossan, of course, having to carry 
the consequent debates for the Ministerial party. Even after the fall 
of the Government he was still busy pressing a further motion for 
northern separation"' and toiling through a weary debate on Griffith's 
alternative proposals for provincial councils. By the end of the 
session, moreover, his health had so far deteriorated for it to occasion 
no surprise when he wondered publicly whether he would live to 
attend the Federal Convention called for the following year."^ 
It is quite touching to find Griffith in 1891 returning the 
compliment of two years before and taking Macrossan, though now 
in opposition, as his co-delegate to the Federal Council. There the 
last four months of bitter opposition counted for nought as they stood 
together to oppose a move for coloured labour in the New Hebrides. 
In March of that year Griffith again had no hesitation in insisting 
on Macrossan's attendance at the promised Federal Convention. 
As was Macrossan's wont he attended every session religiously, 
though this time he spoke hardly at all. His long overtaxed body 
was finally giving up the struggle. Day after day the papers, while 
regretting his inability to contribute to the discussion, expressed their 
anxiety at his obvious frailty. 
It seems that he was saving himself for a final effort. On 13 March 
he was the first to combat Parkes's resolution practically freezing 
the existing powers and legislative frameworks of the participating 
colonies, as also their territorial boundaries. It was all a piece, 
Macrossan suggested, with the whole mistaken concept of a narrow 
union of states. For him, federation meant the birth of a new nation 
and this could only be made possible by a true spirit of compromise 
and of actual sacrifice of existing powers and privileges. As he had 
warned the Queensland house two years before, "it will be impossible 
for us to have a Federal Parliament without the Parliaments of the 
different colonies making sacrifices of the powers they have now". 
As he had also foreseen then, "the difficulty will, therefore be not 
with the people of Australasia but with the leading men in the 
Parliaments of Australasia"."' 
On the 17th he made his last speech in support of Griffith's ideas 
on the construction of the new Senate. Clear-headed to the last, he 
brought the conference back to life after it had bogged down in 
intercolonial jealousies by hammering home again the basic idea 
which was so clear to him but which still eluded many other 
delegates. He emphasized that this was a completely new legislature 
they were erecting and that they must take care not to think of it 
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merely as a collection of large and small states. He reminded them 
of the "powerful solvent" exercised by party politics in this direction, 
a point which Deakin admits had been forgotten. The whole spirit 
of his speech continued his inspiring rallying call of the year before, 
that the new nation would consist of "first Australians and then 
Queenslanders and South Australians and Victorians"."" 
It was the last fiickering of an indomitable spirit. Quite suddenly 
he was dead. Only on the 29th did he take to his bed, and at four 
o'clock the next day he had gone, while the Brisbane Courier was 
yet assuring his countrymen that "nothing serious was apprehended". 
The dramatic suddenness of his death lent emphasis in the minds 
of his contemporaries to the already strong impression he had given 
of his devotion to the future Australia. It is also true, of course, 
that it tended to obscure his other, perhaps less admirable, qualities 
and to leave a picture in the public mind in which the far-seeing 
idealist and the patriotic statesman loomed disproportionately large 
and tended to overshadow the shrewd, bitter-tongued, and perhaps 
unscrupulous politician. 
It may be the same kind of semi-sentimentalism that has tended 
to emphasize his working-class affiliations and to picture him as 
Queensland's earliest labor politician. Once again the position 
appears to have been oversimplified. 
To try to accept Macrossan's contribution in this shape is to be 
faced immediately with a number of glaring inconsistencies. These 
inconsistencies, however, can be resolved by modifying, as we have 
seen, the original statement and by appreciating that Macrossan's 
loyalties in the ultimate appear to have been based on a region rather 
than a class and that his only real interest in the problems of labour 
was almost entirely restricted to one industry. 
To say that he was a politician whose originally liberal views 
became increasingly reactionary is only true as a kind of average. 
On the one hand he constantly retained some views in advance of 
his time. On the other, there were many issues on which he never 
at any time displayed any real liberality. In between these two 
extremes lie a number of matters on which he did not appear to 
preserve any great degree of consistency at all; which, in fact, he 
can sometimes be suspected of treating quite unscrupulously and 
from a purely tactical point of view. Some of the issues in this last 
category unfortunately could well be regarded as fundamental to 
a left-wing politician of any convictions. Thus they tend to emphasize 
the need to regard him as a radical in only a rather limited sense. 
The most striking example of this rather cavalier treatment of 
basic liberal principles is found in Macrossan's vacillations over the 
issue of payment of members of the legislature. His first election 
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address in September 1873 committed him to the support of this 
principle, and consistent with this was his support of a measure 
introduced by Macalister in the first session of 1874. It was, as we 
have noted, a theme of Macrossan's maiden speech. 
In 1876 two further abortive attempts were made in the same 
direction. We find with some surprise that Macrossan took no part 
in the debates on either occasion, although this was a period of 
considerable activity for him in the house. It will be remembered 
that this was the year in which he joined Mcllwraith on the 
Conservative benches. 
The question remained dormant until 1884. It was never seriously 
raised in the house at any time during the intervening eight years, 
for over four of which Macrossan was a senior Minister. Certainly 
he initiated no effort himself to secure this point that had seemed 
so vital to him ten years before. In 1884 Griffith, then Premier, 
introduced a Members' Expenses Bill. Now this time Macrossan 
made no explicit statement of principle but he did vote in favour 
of removing the maximum proposed limit of payment. The Bill was 
rejected by the upper house but came on again the following year 
with Macrossan in open opposition and "not a believer in any 
principle of payment of members"."^ 
As if to emphasize the inconsistency of this position with his 
original stand in 1874, he bolstered it up with exactly the same 
examples, now reversed, that he had used on the previous occasion. 
This is by no means the end of the story since, later in the same 
debate, he "admitted the principle of payment of members as having 
been passed"! 
In 1886 Griffith made his third attempt with the same Bill to 
find, no doubt to his amazement, that Macrossan was well on the 
way to completing the cycle of inconsistency by now stating that 
payment of members was "the logical outcome of universal suffrage" 
and quite shamelessly asserting that he had "never opposed it on 
principle"! Incidentally, the same Victorian situation which he had 
cited favourably in 1876 and as an example of blackest corrupdon 
in 1885, he now regarded as having worked well "for some years"."* 
Finally, in 1889, when again in office, he took an active part in 
securing the passage of a Payment of Members Bill introduced by 
the Government. One can hardly accuse him of any firm conviction 
on this subject. 
If payment of members was a working man's issue on which he 
seemed happy to swim with the political tide, there were others on 
which he did demonstrate somewhat more consistency. All matters, 
for instance, relating to mining and particularly to the working miner 
engaged his unflagging attention and he supported all constructive 
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legislation in this field, irrespective of its party origin. As a Minister 
he was responsible for mining employee legislation of a most 
advanced nature. 
The matter of coloured labour, another fundamental issue for the 
working man, illustrates very clearly the limitations of his radicalism. 
The Chinese issue, which related directly to mining, found him 
consistent to the extent of dogmatism in his opjxisition of Oriental 
immigration under any conditions. On the other two types of coloured 
labour his policy was fairly consistently "protection and expediency", 
protection of the white worker, but not to such an extent as to 
jeopardize the stability of the sugar industry in which he had a 
regional interest. 
"No Kanakas at any price" was gradually modified to read, 
"Kanakas, but only under stringent regulation", and while coolies 
were first encouraged then rejected and finally encouraged again, 
the deciding factor was usually the presence or absence of regulations 
limiUng their employment. 
He seems not to have felt the same initial repugnance for either 
coolies or Kanakas that he did for Chinese and he was hardly 
prepared to force issues on either of the former. On these questions, 
in fact, one seems to sense a transition from the warmth of his feelings 
on mining and Chinese to his comparative lack of interest in 
exclusively labour problems. 
On legislation relating to industrial conditions in industries other 
than mining, he does not seem to have had the same convictions. 
He supported Buzacott's Eight Hours Bill at the beginning of his 
career, but in 1889 he strongly opposed Griffith's Bill on the same 
question; this was in spite of his still having been prepared in 1876 
to support a second effort by C H . Buzacott, and although 
Mcllwraith himself had introduced a Bill in 1883 for which 
presumably he had Cabinet's, and so Macrossan's, support. 
Another example of this temporizing is the question of employer 
liability, which Macrossan pressed so enthusiastically in his own 
mining legislation, but to which he did not even speak when Griffith 
passed his Act of 1886 extending the principle, although he was 
actually in the house at the time. Nor did he bother to comment 
on Griffith's Trade Union Act in the same year. 
Finally, in 1890, Macrossan as Colonial Secretary passed the 
Factories and Shops Bill. In introducing it he made a remarkable 
statement for a "fiery demagogue". He said: "The principle of the 
Bill... is chiefly the protection of women and children ... the grown 
up men, to a very large extent, I consider are pretty well able to 
protect themselves nowadays. In fact, I think that protection will 
very soon be needed in some other direction.""^ 
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It is also only fair to note that, even on the questions about which 
he was most consistent, questions which were quite fundamental to 
him, he was still capable of leaving himself open to at least the 
suspicion of perverting them for party purposes. The most glaring 
examples of this are the two occasions on which his highly developed 
Sinophobia was allowed to be momentarily eclipsed at what appear 
to be peculiarly apt moments from a party point of view. It is perhaps 
worth considering them in some detail. 
In 1876 a Goldfields Act Amendment Bill was introduced by the 
Liberal Government with the object of reducing Chinese immigra-
tion, although it purported merely to be a measure to compel them 
to contribute more equitably to the colonial revenue. Macrossan 
opposed this Bill on the main ground that he considered it only a 
sham and that, secondly, it would prove impossible to collect the 
extra licence fee it envisaged. In debate he opposed a suggestion 
that miners' rights should simply be refused to Chinese, on the 
grounds that the colony was legally bound to issue them by an Act 
of 1874."* He took the same stand again the following year when 
the same Bill was reintroduced, even though he was at the same 
time vigorously supporting the Government's Immigration Regu-
lation Bill which was directed to the same end. 
One cannot help remembering that 1876 was the crucial year in 
which he was deciding his political future by moving at last into 
open opposition to the Liberals. On the other hand, it is true that, 
while opposing the Bill in principle, he did manage to carry an 
amendment securing the prohibition of the Chinese from any new 
goldfield, unless discovered by themselves, for two years."' 
The legal basis for his objection to denying miners' rights to 
Asiatics did not deter him from refusing them mining licences in 
his own Mineral Lands Act of 1882. Indeed he ultimately decided 
to extend this prohibition to miners' rights, in a piece of projected 
legislation in 1889. 
It is not possible here to argue this matter in detail, but it at least 
suggests factious inconsistency on his part. 
The second example comes some years later, but follows the same 
pattern. In 1890 the New Goldfields Act was introduced by 
Hodgkinson, the Liberal counterpart of Macrossan in the Works 
Office, in order to continue to exclude Chinese from the Russell River 
Goldfield beyond the statutory period. Macrossan, to the consterna-
tion of the house, strongly opposed this measure while still basking 
in the glory of his emphadc anti-Chinese stand at the intercolonial 
conference. Again his opposition rested on a tender regard for the 
legal rights of the Chinese. Griffith, exasperated beyond measure, 
seems to have summed up the situation fairly well when he said. 
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"While he says it is only just and proper to exclude the Chinese 
from all goldfields, yet to give the right to exclude them for a 
particular goldfield a little longer he says is grossly unjust".*" The 
colony's, if not the continent's, strongest and most outspoken 
opponent of the Chinese was allowing what seems very like a quibble 
to deter him from supporting anti-Chinese legisladon. It is difficult 
to counter the suggestion that the real reason was that his party, 
still smarting over an election defeat, was determined to attempt 
to discredit the Government and that, to this end, Macrossan was 
prepared to abandon his personal convictions. Even here, however, 
a case can be made for him, mainly on the grounds that a shrewd 
politician, as he undoubtedly was, would hardly have expected to 
gain public support for his party by running counter, as he did on 
this occasion, to what was now a very strong tide of anti-Chinese 
feeling throughout the whole colony.*' 
It is just possible then to argue that there was a legal basis for 
Macrossan's apparent inconsistency on these two occasions. In the 
same way, it is fair to add that his oscilladons on the payment of 
members issue do not, in fact, correspond very closely in time with 
the expressed views of the party to whose supposed interests we would 
postulate him to have been subverting his principles. 
The same kind of answer can be made to his opponents' charge 
that he "blew hot and cold" about northern separation. It is 
undeniable that his most obvious activities in this cause took place 
during the periods in which he was in opposition. On the other hand, 
the Liberals also accused him of over-favouring the North when he 
was a Minister. Mcllwraith too angrily testified, after his breach 
with the Conservatives, that Macrossan and Hume Black had 
betrayed an assurance that they would not raise the separation issue 
dunng the 1888 election by doing all they could to make the Ministry 
a northern one and have it declare for separation. Macrossan 
certainly made pro-separation statements during the campaign, 
claiming, incidentally, that he had a free hand on the issue. He also 
insisted that Mcllwraith had promised that one of the delegates to 
the Federal Council at Hobart would be a northerner. 
It may be a mistake to ascribe too much importance to his vagaries, 
Or to regard them as in any way excessive in a statesman who was 
also a politician. Although Griffith always accused Macrossan of 
being an opportunist, it is not surprising that another contemporary, 
W.H. Corfield, insists that it was just because he was not opportunist 
and because "he would not submit his independence of mind or 
character or principles to any person or junta" that he was not 
destined to become a popular leader of "the People"." 
If, then, we accept a rather modified version of the "democrat 
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before his time" theme and if we accept the fact also of his lifelong 
devotion to the interests of north Queensland, what else remains to 
guide our assessment of Macrossan? Let us never forget the very 
real standing of Macrossan the Australian. 
On this one question, which took him outside the realm of local 
politics, he made no compromise and aroused no accusation of bias, 
hypocrisy, or partisanship. In this man of contradictions and violent 
extremes it should not astonish us to find here a breadth of vision 
and a capacity to rise above the turbulence of colonial politics. The 
bitterest of party politicians, the most unscrupulous of parliamentary 
tacticians, he was nevertheless foremost in demonstrating the 
essential need for mutual trust, for the abandonment of intercolonial 
jealousy and for the very real sacrifice of hard-won advantages in 
order to erect the new nation. He quite clearly wore himself out 
in this cause. 
To the student of Queensland history and unfortunately perhaps 
for Macrossan's memory, his main importance must continue to rest 
in his contribution to the political development of that state. On this 
local platform he does not appear to be of impressive stature. Much 
of this is clearly due to the parallel existence of the considerably 
greater figures of Mcllwraith and Griffith, but much was due to 
himself. 
During his lifetime he seems to have made his mark not principally 
by reason of his fierce opposition to the Chinese or of his steady 
advancement of northern interests or even of his very real endeavours 
to improve the lot of the working miner, but rather by the 
untrammelled bitterness of his tongue and the weight of his debadng 
power. The very qualities that made him a successful house politician 
conspired to exclude him from any real eminence as a statesman. 
Though a capable Minister and a speaker of proven ability in 
committee, as well as in debate, he never possessed the confidence 
of his party sufficiently to attain to its leadership on any of the three 
occasions when it fell vacant during his parliamentary life. The 
advocate nature of his speeches, the bitterness of his feelings, the 
expressed strength of his insistence on his religion, above all his 
refusal to conciliate or to suffer fools gladly, ensured that his place 
was usurped by much weaker men. It is not without pathos, this 
vision of a man failing repeatedly to achieve those highest offices 
of the State for which, by talents and service alike, he could be 
regarded as well qualified. It is not impossible that Queensland was, 
on balance, the loser. 
It is a measure of the real strength of Macrossan's character that 
this failure to attain party pre-eminence was due, at least in part, 
to the public strength of his feelings on matters he regarded as 
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fundamental, convictions from which he was never swayed. To the 
end he remained a strong individualist and, like all such, to a greater 
or lesser degree he suffered for his principles. 
If we cannot subscribe to the popular view that he was guided 
either originally or at all times by a deep concern for the working 
man and for labour as a class, we can at least recognize that his 
election did point to a new era in Queensland politics. At least by 
extraction he was of the working class, he had made a place in the 
colony by his own efforts, and his entry into parliament did certainly 
bring it into contact for the first time with someone who could speak 
with the authority of experience on matters relating to the major 
industries of the North. 
Nevertheless, Macrossan's career does highlight the immature 
nature of Queensland political parties at the time. That a raw 
politician should be elected by a predominantly working-class 
constituency although deliberately refusing to commit himself to 
either party beforehand, and that he should not make his final choice 
until he had sat two sessions in the house seems remarkable enough 
today. That his choice should favour the party committed to 
furthering the interests of the only "propertied" class in the 
community is even more strange. But that at the subsequent election 
he should return in triumph, if somewhat indirectly, at the head of 
a solid bloc of members sworn to support this party, after completely 
altering the political allegiance of a third of the colony, is fantastic. 
Even more paradoxical, perhaps, is the fact that, in office under the 
same conservative party, he should carry through measures of 
advanced industrial legislation. 
Not all this apparent confusion, however, can be ascribed to the 
circumstances of the time. Much pertains again to the strength of 
Macrossan's individuality. As "Jack the Hatter" he had been a 
solitary miner, not mixing with his fellow diggers but emerging to 
organize them for their own protection, to fight their battles with 
the mining warden, to sit as their representative in parliament and 
then to throw away their support by refusing to vote for their railway. 
As "Jack the Hatter" he was feared and treated with caution by 
friend and opponent alike for two of the stormiest decades of 
Queensland's political history. He was assailed and respected, yet 
still he stood apart. 
To the last he maintained this uncompromising independence but 
the very circumstances of his passing highlight the continual paradox 
of his life. Dying alone and in a strange city he was nevertheless 
immediately surrounded by the universal respect and admiration of 
the leading men of his time, since they had just witnessed the 
unsparing devotion of his considerable talents to a worthy object. 
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5 Thomas Mcllwraith 
A Colonial Entrepreneur 
D.B. WATERSON 
There have been few instances in Australian history where a man 
whose career illuminated many facets of colonial life, continental 
development, and entrepreneurial activity has apparently dis-
appeared completely from both record and recollection. But Thomas 
Mcllwraith was such a man. Of him, like many others of his kind, 
it could be said with de Montherlant, that "it is the words they did 
not say that make the dead so heavy in their coffins".' Mcllwraith's 
memory was buried, indeed cremated; he became almost an historical 
"non-person". 
Most Australian historians have mentioned Mcllwraith only in 
connection with his impudent annexation of eastern New Guinea 
in 1883, and neglect any analysis of his business activities and the 
entrepreneurial beliefs that fuelled his personal dynamism and 
attracted significant support. The American C. Hartley Grattan, 
who alone among historians has given Mcllwraith a special mention, 
has specifically noted the reticence and the omissions but adds the 
qualification: "Remarkably few of the politicians whose careers were 
transacted wholly within the Colonial period have remained vivid, 
even in the imaginations of the 'historians'."^ This remark may be 
a valid comment on the state of Australian history-writing, but it 
will not explain satisfactorily the neglect of Mcllwraith in particular. 
One explanation is that Mcllwraith and his ilk have been 
considered as mavericks, whose careers never received the full 
sancdon of an Australian egalitarian social democracy and who were 
largely outside those "forces of progress" seen by contemporaries 
as operating in other spheres of Antipodean history. Then, too, the 
structure of colonial politics and its links with the economy, regional 
peculiarities, social differences, and financial hegemonies was still 
Thomas Mcllwraith: MLA (Warrego) 1870-71, (Maranoa) 1873-78, (Mulgrave) 
1878-86, (North Brisbane) 1888-96; Secretary for Public Works and Mines 1874; 
Premier and Colonial Treasurer 1879-82; Premier, Chief Secretary, and Colonial 
Treasurer 1888; Minister without Office 1888-89; Colonial Treasurer 1890-93; 
Premier, Chief Secretary, and Secretary for Railways 1893; Chief Secretary and 
Secretary for Railways 1893-95; Minister without Office 1895-97 
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until comparatively recently unclear, over-simplified, and unattrac-
tive. Nor had social historians even begun to lay the foundations 
for urban history, the structure of colonial power elites, and value 
analysis within each colony and region. 
Mcllwraith's public image has another unfavourable aspect. 
Bourgeois entrepreneurs of his type may offend egalitarian principles 
by displaying greed on a baronial scale, but compared with the 
political lawyer, the worthy trade unionist, and the hero of Anzac, 
such seedy and often unsuccessful adventurers seem hardly to merit 
the consideration of historians. After all, Ned Kelly made a safer 
and much more satisfactory social bandit than Thomas Mcllwraith. 
And Mcllwraith's failure did appear complete: after 1895 he was 
a disease-stricken political exile seeking peace in a West London 
maisonette, with an unrecoverable overdraft of £328,000 and his 
financial child, the Queensland National Bank, subject to the State. 
The general disposition of Australian historians has been to favour 
official society, economic development, the group, the class, and the 
organization rather than the individual and his milieu. Yet in 1891, 
the transient, consumptive, and neo-Australian Francis Adams, 
recipient of Mcllwraith's favours but certainly no naive sycophant, 
could extravagantly liken his friend to Cecil Rhodes, and even 
compose a poem about him. Few Australian politicians and even 
fewer Queensland legislators have attracted such attention: 
Mcllwraith, wrote Adams in 1892, 
is the only public man in Australia whom, by any stretch of the term, 
one could call great... he alone of his fellows has something of the element 
of the miraculous in him ... the instinct of the gambler—the insensate 
cry of "Double or quits!" ... Australia has such a man. What will local 
politics, business complications, and the savagery of the climate do with 
him, before even the larger stage of national life ... 
And again. 
The rank and file of English politicians are ... superior to the Anglo-
Australians, Anglo-Africans and Anglo-Canadian but the one or two 
finer Colonial spirits ... the men like Mcllwraith and Griffith in Australia 
or like Rhodes in South Africa—these view things with a scope and actual 
elasticity unknown to the timid myopism of lesser Britain.' 
Francis Adams's panegyric, however much it derived from his 
desperate need for a quiet and comfortable existence and however 
strongly it cut across his class sympathies, reflected a dualism not 
uncommon in colonial societies. It was certainly endemic in those 
where class consciousness in Marxist terms had neither emerged nor 
congealed and where questions of social mobility, development, race, 
and nationalism were vital components of much contemporary 
thought and action. 
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Other writers, journalists, and politicians—W.H. Traill, Carl 
Feilberg, John Macrossan {see Ch. 4), and Lord Rosebery—men 
who were neither fools nor knaves—shared such sentiments. Even 
the emerging Labor men, preferring the outright enemy to the liberal 
reformer, grudgingly admired the audacity, good humour, and 
undeviating strength of "Boodlewraith", the capitalist extraordinary 
whose actions, beliefs, and appearance made him the archetype of 
the ruthless colonial plutocrat: "Though it is needless for the 
Boomerang to say that it has never been a thick and thin admirer 
of Mcllwraith is there not abundant evidence in the history of 
Queensland that he has proved himself a statesman of larger grasp, 
keener insight, and inspired by a far wider practical spirit than his 
quondam rival Sir Samuel Griffith?"" 
Not only were such thoughts confined to the literate and the 
politically oriented. Mcllwraith's domination, with Samuel Griffith 
{see Ch. 6), of Queensland politics between 1877 and 1893 suggests 
that his beliefs, policies, personality, business activities, style, and 
character all contained elements that appeared logical and attractive 
to many colonists. Furthermore his attributes tended to be attractive 
to, and reflective of, many components of a Queensland version of 
the Antipodean psyche. Two episodes support this contention. In 
August and September 1888, in the Kitt Case, Mcllwraith de-
liberately confronted the Governor, Sir Anthony Musgrave, over the 
question of whether the Crown's representative was bound to follow 
the advice of his Ministers in cases where the prerogative of mercy 
was concerned. Although Musgrave, with some reason, believed that 
this incident was little more than a dress rehearsal for the release 
of the crew of the labour ship Hopeful, who had been found guilty 
of kidnapping and murder in 1885, he was completely out-
manoeuvred by Mcllwraith over this issue. Not only was Mcllwraith 
able to reassert his authority over his National Party, a raw and 
largely inchoate political group that was already showing signs of 
disintegration, but he completely outgeneralled Griffith on his own 
politico-legal ground. More significantly, he reinforced his recently 
successful appeal in the 1888 elections to Queensland nationalism 
(or rather chauvinism), dealt a blow to the imperial idea by his attack 
on the Governor, and shrewdly reinforced that alliance between 
nativism and populism that has so often served Queensland capital-
ists and their representatives well. The Boomerang, always am-
bivalent towards the "Jay Gould of Australia", commented in rather 
extravagant prose: "This crisis has been Mcllwraith's opportunity, 
and so far he has maintained the cause of the People, whatever may 
be his motive, with energy, with dignity and with success. And he 
tiay yet move a single step further to carve his name with that of 
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Peter Lalor upon the granite tablets of Australian History.'" 
Musgrave was easily vanquished in mind and in body—he died 
within the month. Not so the Bank of England. Three years later, 
the "autocrat of Threadneedle Street", the "High Priest of Mam-
mon", and the subtle guarantor upon whose assessment so much of 
Queensland (and Mcllwraith's) contemporary prosperity rested, 
came into conflict with those Antipodean aspirations. Empire 
realities, and labor dreams upon which the stones of the next fifty 
years were to rest. 
Mcllwraith had accused the bank of a gross breach of faith over 
the floating of a Queensland loan and the refinancing of colonial 
debentures. Given the shaky condition of Queensland's finances, the 
growing British feeling that securities were backed by depreciating 
Australian assets, and that political entrepreneurs such as 
Mcllwraith were operating on margins provided by English de-
positors, Mcllwraith's strictures were not only unwise but potendally 
dangerous. This time the Boomerang's call to stand firm was 
disregarded; Mcllwraith took a friend's advice and "ate humble pie" 
in large doses. This for a man of his temperament and attitudes 
resulted in a massive attack of political and personal indigestion.'^  
The only significant biography of a Victorian colonial en-
trepreneur is Alan Barnard's study of T.S. Mort, Visions and Profits. 
His introduction may be quoted with profit: "The boldness of his 
visions and the dynamic character of his business leadership ... 
emphasize the individuality of his career. For Mort was, above all, 
an entrepreneur of the classic mould whose business drew vitality 
from his creative drive alone, and whose innovatory function was 
apparent not one but a number of times, not in one field alone but 
in many.'" Barnard was well aware of the multitude of complex 
problems involved in considering such a personality: "the concept 
of a rational 'economic man' consistently pursuing (or acting as if 
he was consistently pursuing) profit maximation dies hard. The 
entrepreneur of real life is a complex fellow."' And it is within the 
context of such considerations that Mcllwraith's career must be 
analysed. 
Thomas Mcllwraith was born at Ayr, Scotland, on 17 May 1835, 
the son of a manufacturing plumber. Bailie John Mcllwraith, and 
his wife, Janet Howat Mcllwraith. Educated at the Ayr and 
Wallacetown Academies, he briefly studied Arts at Glasgow Univer-
sity before emigradng to Melbourne in 1854. There he joined his 
brother John, also a manufacturing plumber, but soon departed from 
the Mount Alexander diggings. Dissatisfied with his profits from 
storekeeping, or the lack of them, he joined the Railways Department 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
THOMAS McILWRAITH 123 
at Geelong in 1856 as a surveyor, becoming an £800 p.a. engineer 
in 1859 by "learning on the job" and exercising his undoubted native 
abilides. 
After working on the Geelong and Ballarat Railways, Mcllwraith 
joined Cornish and Bruce, the contractors for the Melbourne-
Bendigo railway. He ultimately became a partner and, after the 
death of the firm's principals, the senior partner. It is clear that 
Mcllwraith, after 1862, was the key individual in an organization 
responsible for such engineering feats as the Big Hill Tunnel near 
Bendigo, and that his problems with labour, materials, and the bush 
gave him not only an affinity for his new country but also a glimpse 
of its remarkable potential. He became, in essence, a colonist and 
later, on a larger scale, as Adams perceived, the experience made 
him almost a new type—a Queenslander of Scots origins.' 
With the capital acquired from the profits of railway construction, 
plus the generous settlement agreed on, after extensive litigation 
between the Victorian Government and the contractors, Mcllwraith 
invested in Maranoa pastoral properties with his old Victorian friend 
and new partner, J.C. Smyth. 
After returning to Britain in 1862, and standing unsuccessfully 
as a candidate for Sandhurst Boroughs Victoria, in 1864, Mcllwraith 
moved to Merivale, near Roma in Queensland. Here he personally 
supervised a considerable programme of pastoral improvements and 
weathered the slump of 1866. Later, in 1868-69, he purchased and 
lived at Eurella Station. In the 1870s, having shifted to Brisbane, 
he took up many further leases in the North Gregory and Kennedy 
districts and in 1875 acquired Gin Gin Station, west of Bundaberg 
(which he largely freeholded), Inkerman near Ayr, which he named 
after his birthplace, and Ayrshire Downs, afterwards noted for the 
tendency of its woolshed to ignite spontaneously during industrial 
trouble. 
In 1878 Mcllwraith engineered an amalgamation of his central 
and northern runs, as well as extensive tracts in the Northern 
Territory, with those of William Collins, William Forrest, and 
Patrick Perkins and others. Mcllwraith held one-fifth of the shares 
in this enterprise, the North Australian Pastoral Company, whose 
objective was the development of an integrated beef industry, from 
breeding to fattening and processing. His interest in promoting meat-
freezing works and the export trade was a logical extension of such 
integration.'" 
Three years later, by means of a masterly blend of force and tact, 
he merged Bell and Sons' Jimbour Station and their other properties 
with his own Maranoa and other western stations in a new 
corporation, the Darling Downs and Western Land Company. The 
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company was capitalized at £1,000,000 divided into ten thousand 
£10 shares, of which two-thirds of the shares, paid up to £6 5s Od, 
were allocated to the vendors. Mcllwraith himself held nearly eight 
hundred shares, but the business of the Company—pastoral, land 
development, and mineral exploitation—was financed by overdraft 
from the Queensland National Bank and debentures placed in 
London. But although equipped with superb properties, the company 
in its first years "through the droughts extending over the whole 
term of [its] existence, paid no dividend, made no profits, but on 
the contrary, contrived a loss in five years of over £30,000"." 
So too with another business, the Queensland Investment and 
Land Mortgage Company, formed to attract British capital to 
Queensland securities. It was this concern's failure to satisfy the 
expectations of the investors that sparked a London backlash that 
almost brought Mcllwraith down and required all his considerable 
political talents to avert. In 1892 the London directors charged 
Mcllwraith, Arthur Palmer {see Appendix) and two others with 
fraud. The Chief Justice, Charles Lilley {see Ch. 3), gave judgement 
for the plaintiffs, but an appeal reversed his judgement and he was 
forced, after pressure from Mcllwraith, to resign. Five years later 
a domestic repetition of the Queensland National Bank exposures 
dumped the final pot of pyrites at the end of the Caloundra rainbow. 
An investigation begun in 1896 revealed a degree of mismanagement 
amounting almost to corruption. Mcllwraith had debts to the bank 
of over £250,000, covered by security of only £60,700. In 1897 he 
was forced to retire from the Ministry. Earlier, in 1872, Mcllwraith 
had assiduously promoted this bank and in 1879, as one of his first 
acts as Premier, secured for it the invaluable account of the 
Queensland Government, through which all loan monies passed. In 
this way, and through his deep personal, political, financial, and 
social partnership with the dynamic, euphoric, and secretive general 
manager, E.R. Drury (who died before the 1896 investigation), 
Mcllwraith not only identified the bank with the credit and concerns 
of the colony, but attached his own rising star to both. 
Apart from potentially disastrous speculations in copper-mining, 
brewing, the Avoca sugar plantation, and Dotswood Station, 
Mcllwraith in the 1880s was more concerned to prevent his financial 
star from falling from the colonial firmament than he was to expand 
his mercantile concerns. Earlier, however, with his entry into polidcs 
as Member for Warrego in 1870, all facets of Queensland life and 
enterprise had interested him. In 1874, as Maranoa's Member, he 
entered the Cabinet as Minister for Public Works and Mines but 
resigned after governmental opposition to his grandiose proposal to 
finance a railway from Roma to the Gulf of Carpentaria by land 
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grants. He realized that the old political orders were disintegrating 
and his ambitions led to personal conflicts with William Miles and 
Arthur Macalister {see Ch. 2). But four years later he was both 
Premier and Treasurer, straddling Queensland affairs with a per-
sonal force and spasmodic "radical" dynamism that more closely 
resembled a Cooktown cyclone than the slow tide of "liberal" 
legalisms. 
Among his pyrotechnics was the personal floating of Queensland 
loans in Westminster, the negotation of special steamer contracts 
favouring Queensland mails and migrants against southern attrac-
tions and commerce, the igniting of a disruptive transcontinental 
railway rocket, and the defeat of charges in 1880-81, in the Steel 
Rails Case, that he, Mcllwraith, had a direct personal financial stake 
in "the new tempo". All this gave Queensland politics in particular, 
and indeed Australian politics in general, a flavour which, in spite 
of Labor's rise, was never recaptured until after 25 April 1915, with 
the emergence of another "big fellow", Edward Granville Theodore 
{see Ch. 11). 
Australians, addicted as they were to material progress and 
improvement and their concomitant values, were nevertheless sus-
picious of those whose hands seemed so ready to open the economic 
throttle. Convict experiences, the perennial disappointments endemic 
in pioneering life, the failure of the masses to find their own 
bonanzas, and the fluctuations of essentially dependent economies 
all fostered a sceptical attitude to entrepreneurial acrobats like 
Mcllwraith, whose objectives and values were too frequently co-
incidental with those of the electors. And the latter, lacking his flair, 
capital, and persona, withdrew a support that had always been 
conditional upon the satisfaction of their own wants. 
In November 1883, his party split by pastoral defections over the 
Transcontinental Railway, economic contradictions, and regional 
separatism, Mcllwraith was buried under a Griffith avalanche; he 
was inactive in opposition, revisiting England in 1883. He actually 
resigned from parliament in June 1886 and did not return until his 
triumphant victory over Griffith in the North Brisbane elections of 
May 1888. Premier once again, he resigned in a huff in 1889, only 
to join Griffith in the famous Coalition of 1890. As Colonial 
Treasurer he wielded the real power in the Cabinet. On Griffith's 
retirement in March 1893 he steered the colony through a banking 
crisis, when the Queensland National Bank was saved from collapse 
only by government intervention. On 27 October 1893 he resigned 
as Premier and accepted the lesser posts of Chief Secretary and 
Railways Minister. Ill health forced him to seek treatment in Europe 
in 1895 but he remained an absentee member of the administration, 
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even being offered the job of Agent-General, until the banking 
disclosures forced his final resignation on 11 December 1897.'^ 
The Scots contribution to the formation, extension, and development 
of the British Empire, particularly the colonies of white settlement, 
has been well recognized. What has not, perhaps, been sufficiently 
acknowledged, except in such specific instances as Margaret Kiddle's 
study of Victorian squatters, is the vital, indeed critical, importance 
of the Scots background. By forming the character, and providing 
the experience and education for the future crystallization of ideas, 
Ayrshire, that part of the south-west Scots lowlands where 
Mcllwraiths had lived since at least the sixteenth century, gave 
Thomas Mcllwraith a multiple legacy. Very definite notions of the 
heritage, values, and consequences of the extended family unit in 
Ayr and Stinchar society, as well as the subconscious bubblings of 
pseudo-antiquarian recollections, were combined with a modern 
sense of a struggle for position and love of place that successful 
entrepreneurial forays could and did produce. 
When he received, with his brother John, the Freedom of Ayr 
on 17 June 1884, Sir Thomas declaimed: "I am proud of the place 
1 came from. I am not only proud of the town, but I am also proud 
of the county, and proud of my native country. I know of no men 
in the world who are more cosmopolitan than Scotsmen ... although 
1 have always put aside clannishness in the colonies ... I never could 
get free altogether of pride in the county I belong to."" 
Paradoxically, this sentiment sat alongside an adherence to 
economic progress, to modernity, and to social mobility. The tragic 
Scots novelist George Douglas Brown wrote: 
Imagination may consecrate the World to a man, or it may merely be 
a visualizing faculty which sees that, as already perfect, which is lying 
in the raw material. The Scot has the lower faculty in full degree; he 
has the forecasting leap of mind to see what to make of things—more, 
sees them made and in vivid operation ... Indeed, so flushed and riotous 
can the Scottish mind become over a commercial prospect that it 
sometimes sends native caution by the board, and a man's really fine 
idea becomes an empty balloon, to carry him off to the limbo of varieties 
14 
Indisputably, however, Mcllwraith absorbed, together with a sound 
education, a dislike of cant, caste, and humbug, and a stubbornness 
and determination present in Mcllwraith blood since Covenanting 
days. Equally true, like other economically successful colonial Scots, 
he lacked that burning sense of humanity and passion against 
injustice, with a concomitant desire to refashion the social order, 
that was also present in Burns country. A man of few apparent 
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intellectual doubts, a good hater, with firm but convoluted moral 
convictions, and committed to a narrowly conceived success built 
on business enterprise, Mcllwraith indeed refiected the force of his 
ancestry.'^ 
Originally a sept of the Macdonalds of Clanranald in the Western 
Isles, the Mcllwraiths migrated to Ayrshire during the fifteenth 
century. Here, at the head of the River Stinchar, the family eked 
out a bleak farming existence on the hilly ridges and mossy slopes 
of a still wild and primitive area."' During the first decades of that 
century the Mcllwraiths commenced a westerly migration along the 
Stinchar and its tributaries that would take some families to the 
sea at Ballantrae and Girvan, others to Ayr, Greenock, and 
Dumfries, and descendants to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. 
Scotland's best-known Mcllwraith was Mathew the martyr, an 
enduring character in world literature: 
Mathew Mcllwraith, in parish of Colmonell, 
By bloody Claverhouse, I fell. 
Who did command that I should die, 
For owning Covenanted presbytery. 
My. blood a witness still doth stand. 
'Gainst all defections in this land." 
Mathew was probably the original of Walter Scott's mentally 
disturbed Habbakuk Mucklewrath, who appears, wild and terrifying 
of visage, in Old Mortality.'^ 
Strong as their Whiggish dislike of fanaticism and martyrdom 
was, and however much original passions had been smoothed by 
property and tranquillity, nineteenth century Mcllwraiths remem-
bered with pride the sufferings of their ancestors. Sir Thomas's 
notepaper for his Brisbane residence, sentimentally named 
"Auchenflower", even bore the device of a hand flourishing a 
claymore over the motto "Do or Die". 
In Ayr Burgh the Mcllwraiths slowly rose in wealth and promi-
nence. John Mcllwraith's (1778-1853) career, embracing the trans-
formation of Ayr from a rather somnolent market and ecclesiastical 
centre to a trading, mining, industrial seaport reflected the upheavals 
of the Industrial Revolution." 
Even the birth of an illegitimate son, John (1808-85), who 
subsequently became Sir Thomas's father, failed to affect the career 
of one who became a burgess, made liberal speeches "full of zeal 
and fervour" during the great Reform Bill agitations of 1831-32,™ 
and who was concerned, as director of the Ayr Academy, to "give 
[its] pupils an accurate and practical knowledge of their respective 
branches [of learning] ... by rational and substantial teaching based 
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on progressive improvement to prepare the student for the active 
business of life".-' 
John emigrated to Upper Canada in 1845 and was succeeded in 
the family business, now concerned with manufacturing plumbers' 
supplies, by his natural son. Bailie John, a kindly, straightforward, 
respectable burgess and a pillar of the Ayr Liberal Party." All three 
sons. Sir Thomas, John, and Andrew, used their father's business 
as a financial clearing-house for their British transactions and 
colonial remittances. Increasing profits from metal-working were 
invested in shipping—the Scottish Line, which subsequently became 
Mcllwraith, McEacharn, carrying migrants and manufactured 
goods to the colonies and returning with primary products.^^ 
Thomas's boyhood experiences naturally made an indelible im-
pression on his mind. The lavish celebrations marking Queen 
Victoria's coronation and the completion of numerous railway 
connections contrasted with the disease-ridden slums into which Irish 
and rural Scots labourers poured, the bloody colliers' strike of August 
1842, and the flames of the iron foundries. The Mcllwraiths in 
Thomas's boyhood, though, were part of "a happy orderly and 
respectable [people] ... attentive to religious duties, steady and 
peaceable ... although ... rather of a gay and social temperament 
... much given to hospitality ... [where] there is a natural prosperity 
to press upwards."'" 
In Victorian societies "appearance" counted for much. Behind 
Mcllwraith's ruddy, heavy, "masterful" face with its sensual lips, 
heavy chin, and piercing blue eyes, and underneath a deceptively 
hearty, obvious, and blunt manner, lay a shrewd intelligence capable 
of analysing and exploiting the passions and follies of men and of 
securing their loyalty to his person and projects." 
Francis Adams portrayed him in 1892 when Mcllwraith was fifty-
six: 
Large and gross in build he has the big heavy-set face of what they;« 
de siecle Parisians have learned to call the struggle-for-lifer. The nose 
is like the beak of the bird of prey; the large firm mouth and square 
chin, the strong clamped jaw, the marked outlines of which not even 
the too abundant fiesh and fat can hide ... He sits [in parliament] ... 
with the solid impassivity of an Indian idol cut in bronze, strong, stolid, 
heavy and puissant ...-' 
Sir William MacGregor once likened Mcllwraith's physiognomy 
and, by implication, his public manners, to those of the dugong, an 
aqualic sea-plant-browsing mammal whose habitat is the Indian 
Ocean and the eastern Queensland coast. This allusion was unfair, 
both to the inoffensive dugong, which Mcllwraith had initially tried 
to exploit for its oil and supposedly anti-rheumatic properties, and 
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to the politician, but it indicates the detestation that certain liberal 
improvers felt for the man." It is true that Mcllwraith's figure 
thickened, his auburn hair thinned, his blue eyes became more 
glaucous and his movements more ponderous as he aged and his 
disease advanced after 1889. But paradoxically, the man's bulk and 
his pontifications reinforced his political reputation for solidity and 
a Croesus-like ability to find new main leads for the colony. His 
speeches, waveringly delivered in a slow Doric burr, were stilted, 
repetitive, and rambling. Thomas Mcllwraith had few clever phrases 
or polished allusions. Yet his material, when not of Old Testament 
origin, was usually modern and apt. There was none of the brilliant 
argument, the impeccable logic, nor the beautiful literary and liberal 
conceptual framework of his rival Griffith's utterances. Instead his 
audience heard a few large proposals, delivered with steam-hammer 
force and unpredictable regularity, in a "blunt, outspoken ... brutal 
and courageous manner [where] ... matchless assurance, deep lofty 
egotism, towering assumptions, abashed and terrified ordinary 
mortals"." 
Indeed Mcllwraith seems, like most successful conservative Aus-
tralian politicians, to have recognized the usefulness of parliament 
as a publicity organ, but never to have allowed his lack of legislative 
skills to cripple his talents of force, manipulation, and withdrawal. 
Not only his committed supporters but many of his ostensibly most 
implacable enemies were eventually seduced: "How they yield 
themselves up to him. See how his Ministers count his approbation 
for anything they do. They yearn for his smile as a lover does for 
his mistresses' favour, and his nod of approval fills and thrills them 
with the most exquisite delight."" 
While his calculating use of the honours system for both private 
and political ends was certainly not unique—even if his Scots 
calculation and cynicism about titles were—Mcllwraith's intimate 
friendships and his offers of cash as well as advice to impecunious 
friends and colleagues were genuine and lasting. 
Mcllwraith was a "warm pairson" with a Celtic facility for 
switching from the serious to the frivolous in an instant, and with 
a delightful sense of the comic and the absurd. Among men he was 
fond of the glass, apparently candid, without the facile deference 
of the lower middle-class Englishman he so detested, and capable 
of genuinely attracting the affection of children. In short, he was 
a bourgeois larrikin who disconcertingly displayed many of the 
behaviour traits that marked and were subsequently believed to 
typify the Australian male of bush, bar, and battalion." 
Although his temper shortened as time marched on, few colonial 
politicians had that public sense of fun so characteristically displayed 
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at a Government House fancy dress ball on 28 May 1875: 
Admiration gave way to risibility at the first glance at a baby of startling 
proportions and exceptional powers of speech and locomotion being 
upwards of six feet high, of stalwart build, and an industrious dame. 
This was in fact ... Mcllwraith who, clad in long white garments, duly 
furnished with coral, rattle, etc., and with a neat cap on his head accepted 
the responsibilities of his extreme youth with grave discretion." 
Sam Griffith appeared as a "Queen's Counsel" and his wife was 
dressed as "Clouds". Mcllwraith's wife was abroad. 
The mercurial journalist Archibald Meston, later Protector of the 
Aborigines, was one who benefited from Mcllwraith's largesse and 
friendship during a legal conflict in 1881. He even changed political 
sides as a result, stadng that "I am just as unable to express my 
gratitude to you as my contempt for the action of Griffith ... he 
is a mean, vindictive skunk, treacherous as an Arab and [as] 
coldblooded as a Greek ... [while] you are the ablest statesman we 
have"." Or as the more realistic newspaper politico Paddy Hoolan 
pontificated: "whatever the price, it was cheerfully paid for Old Mac 
at the height of his glory was a good payer and scattered his funds 
freely and cheerfully. He paid promptly and well, good old 
Mcllwraith."" The Mcllwraith Papers confirm the existence of both 
his generosity and his patronage. Clearly Mcllwraith was capable 
ofgeneradng a devotion to his person, if not his policies, quite outside 
the bounds of Griffith's experience. 
In return, however, he expected a standard of political loyalty and 
adherence to himself and his policies which could not, particularly 
after 1889, be sustained on all fields of battle. Not only did his 
declining health affect both his judgement and his temperament, as 
his scathing public and personal attacks on William Pattison of 
Mount Morgan, his old friend Patrick Perkins, and his necessary 
ally Boyd Morehead {see Appendix) disclosed, but Queensland's 
slide into economic depression and his own desperate, if concealed, 
financial fortunes tore away the foundations of his policies. What 
he thought was only a series of unfortunate flash floods turned out 
to be an inundation of unprecedented dimensions. 
Mcllwraith's matrimonial relationships had deteriorated as his 
fortunes waxed. While in Melbourne in 1864, he married his brother 
John's sister-in-law Margaret Whannell, a small-farmer's daughter 
from Donaghdee, near Bangor in Ulster. Children were born in 1864 
(Jessie Maggie), 1866 (Mary Campbell), and 1872 (Blanche 
Margaret).'" Even before the birth of the last child, however, it was 
obvious that the marriage was in difficulties. Mcllwraith spent a 
large part of his early Queensland life living apart from his wife. 
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and finally, in 1874, he arbitrarily sent her back to his parents at 
Ayr, rather cruelly and cynically alleging that she had become an 
alcoholic. Family evidence suggests that she suffered from an acute 
urological complaint and tippled to alleviate her various pains, and 
that her death at Dumfries on 14 October 1877 was both a 
physiological and psychological consequence of disease and conjugal 
neglect." At least Mcllwraith's father recognized where some of the 
difficulties lay: "Surely it is your duty", he wrote in March 1870, 
"to let your wife know where you are and what you are doing ... 
I don't want to interfere ... but still you should think well for her 
sake and for your children's sake."" Mcllwraith seemed im-
perturbable: "On Monday last", he wrote to William (his sister's 
husband), "I got a telegram from England that my wife was dead. 
What effect this announcement may have here on my future 
movements I cannot yet foresee, as it was mostly on her account 
1 was going to England."" 
What is probable is that a buffeted "Maggie" could not keep pace, 
socially and individually, with Mcllwraith's ambitions and new 
status. His refusal to acknowledge her limitations and his insensitive 
ultimatum to remove their children from her care indicate that early 
in his marriage he came to see her as a mere business liability that 
could be written off. Nor do Mcllwraith's freebooting activities, 
which cut swathes through the filling female ranks of Queensland's 
would-be demi-monde, add up to a conventional picture of mid-
Victorian respectability on his part.'* His children received better 
treatment: expensive private schools in Edinburgh and, for Mary, 
a Brussels finishing academy. Suitable and satisfactory marriages 
to scions of the Brisbane bourgeoisie, lubricated by share settlements, 
were later arranged for the trio." 
The fact that Mcllwraith had contracted a liaison in Victoria with 
another woman, probably a Miss Findlay, may well have soured his 
first marriage from the beginning. Such arrangements were not 
unknown in the colonies, but Mcllwraith's strict public Calvinism 
contrasted rather too strongly with his private life. An illegitimate 
daughter, Isabella, was born about 1865—only a year after his 
marriage—and after "comfortable but plain upbringing" with a 
sympathetic family, married the Rev. Donald Cameron, who subse-
quently had a distinguished career in the Presbyterian Church of 
Victoria. Isabella and Donald were later reasonably treated by 
Mcllwraith and, after he retired, a considerable correspondence 
arose between the stricken entrepreneur and his ecclesiastical son-
in-law.*" 
Meanwhile Mcllwraith had made an astute yet ultimately 
agreeable and rewarding marriage of convenience, on 14 June 1879, 
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to Harriette Ann Mosman, the daughter of an Armidale pastoral 
family and descendant of Sydney merchants. Harriette was a sister-
in-law of Arthur Palmer, Mcllwraith's business associate; political 
patron and dean of Brisbane society. Sir Arthur provided Thomas 
with a respectable, if bluff, mentor, a pioneer founding father, and 
a safe social anchorage. One daughter, Leila (born 1880), resulted 
from the marriage, which was apparently a most tolerable and 
socially productive one. Not only did the Mcllwraiths and Palmers 
become intimate personally as well as politically but "Hatty" 
Mcllwraith, in spite of her dominant, rather insensitive and tough 
colonial manners, made "Auchenflower" a popular and desirable 
centre for Brisbane "society", gave Mcllwraith the domestic stability 
he so obviously required, and, when he fell ill and was disgraced, 
looked after a difficult invalid with uncomplaining devotion and 
fortitude."' 
But just as his domestic life stabilized and assisted his growing 
influence after his return to politics in 1887, his physical determina-
tion and personal instability after 1888 seriously affected some 
important relationships—relationships between the small social and 
economic elite that controlled so much of Queensland society, and 
its "big men of power". There also appears to be a close correspon-
dence between the state of his overdraft and other financial 
commitments and that of his health. Later, the strain imposed by 
the Queensland Investment and Land Mortgage Company's Su-
preme Court action and appeal, the great pastoral strikes of 1891 
and 1894, the financial crash of May 1893, and the concealed time-
bomb, hidden in the accounts of the Queensland National Bank and 
only detonated by Drury's sudden death in 1896, made ever-
accelerating demands on a physique already eroded by disease and 
the bodily wear and tear of colonial life. 
Years of roughing it on the Castlemaine goldfields and Bendigo 
railway, pastoral pioneering on Merivale Station near Dalby in the 
1860s, the effects of steamy weather in Brisbane on a corpulent body, 
the endless campaigning by tin-kettle steamer, jolting buggy, and 
horse all took their toll. Between 7 November and 19 December 1882, 
for example, Mcllwraith sailed from Brisbane to Cooktown; he 
visited the Palmer Goldfield where he received news of his 
knighthood, drove to Port Douglas, and caught the steamer to Cairns 
and Townsville. After visiting Ravenswood, Charters Towers, and 
his stations at Inkerman and Ayr, he returned to Brisbane via Bowen, 
Rockhampton, and Maryborough. And all this amid a spate of 
deputations, receptions, banquets, and inspections, let alone the 
suppliants, fools, and dignitaries that beset all politicians."^ 
Such strains, inseparable from the life of an active Queensland 
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politician, were aggravated by a malady at that time incurable and 
of unknown origin. Mcllwraith's peripheral neuritis probably re-
sulted from his excessive consumption of whisky, a not unusual 
phenomenon among men of his origin, calling, and colony. The 
disease itself, as subsequent research has disclosed, was a conse-
quence of nerve cell infection and deterioration in the hands and 
feet, following a consistent intake of alcohol, an unbalanced and 
inadequate diet, and a consequential chronic Vitamin B' and B" 
deficiency. The condition produced spasmodic but severe sensory 
pain and swelling in the feet; a wastage of limb muscles; inability 
to walk and write; and a delay in the brain's registering of sensory 
and motor responses. In addition, an enlarged liver certainly 
encouraged gastritis; and as was not uncommon, the benign and 
expensive attentions of numerous understandably ignorant doctors 
in Queensland, Britain, and Europe made the patient's temper and 
his complaint worse."^ 
Mcllwraith's disease first struck in the late 1860s during his lonely 
vigil on Merivale. It was then that an obvious respiratory infection, 
recurrent since goldfield days, placed considerable metabolic stress 
on his constitution. By the time he was in his late forties (and 
Premier) the condition was already physically obvious and organical-
ly accelerating. 
There is no evidence that Mcllwraith's brain was affected by his 
disease. What is probable, however, is that his alcoholism was 
symptomatic of an anxiety state which his authoritarian personality 
tended to conceal. During the 1860s his political and private actions 
were more noticeably marked by a mixture of irritability and 
euphoria, of affability and querulous seclusion, and of oscillation 
between periods of sharp concentration and lackadaisical inatten-
tion. Mcllwraith became subtly less able to assess situations and to 
deal with risks, particularly in his private affairs and relationships. 
It is a tribute, however, to his inherent mental stamina and devotion 
to the Queensland he believed in that he could, between 1889 and 
1893, so rouse himself as to produce that political masterstroke the 
Griffilwraith. 
It would be easy, then, to portray Mcllwraith quite simply as a 
Janus-visaged colonial representative of Victorian middle-class re-
spectability and hypocrisy, a business buccaneer who relied on his 
wealth and political influence to purchase silence and obviate any 
deleterious social consequences. Such an analysis would be both 
shallow and misleading. Marx, about the same time, remarked that 
the bourgeoisie, that dynamic, revolutionary, colonizing, civilizing 
and centralizing class, encompassed and changed all phases of human 
activity."" Sophisticated human relationships in immense new co-
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jonies of settlement tended to take second place to the mechanics 
of development, exploitation, and social and political construction. 
Mcllwraith's own ideas were neither sophisticated nor novel. What 
was unique was their scope, and his determinadon to implement them 
by both political and entrepreneurial means. Boldness and vigorous 
action on Mcllwraith's scale astonished colonists who were used to 
action but usually only in one sphere of activity at a time. The values 
of an innovating and developing capitalist grated on an immigrant 
society. But it was no accident that his heroes were the great 
entrepreneurs or, less politely, the "robber barons" of the Gilded 
Age of the United States. He cared little for privilege and even less 
for those Queensland squatters who failed to improve and diversify 
their activities. 
The American influence is clear and pervasive. He visited North 
America three times and took, as did most educated colonials, a keen 
interest in post-bellum political, economic, and technical develop-
ments. Land-grant railway expansion, the construction of com-
mercial empires, and the fostering of nativist sentiment especially 
fascinated him, as much as American political arrangements and 
their apparent corruption alternatively repelled and attracted him. 
Never a believer in Imperial Federation or Anglo-Saxon political 
amalgamation, he believed that Queensland could become, indeed 
was well on the way to becoming, not only a second California but 
a second Texas as well. Only then, when the colony had become 
strong enough to preserve its own identity and independent economy 
could and should it enter an Australian federation on the American 
model. His advocacy of tariff protection, coloured labour. New 
Guinea annexation, and railway border duties all sprang from this 
root. 
The key to expansion, settlement, and the exploitation of 
Queensland's natural resources was to be the land-grant railway. 
Mcllwraith saw the railway in American terms and with American 
optimism—it was central to the development of both colony and 
continent. Its function was both economic and symbolic: a multiplier 
of capital, settlement, and civilization whose very creation would be 
sufficient to generate that intensive development so sadly lacking 
in the Australian interior."^ The annihilation of time and space 
through the fertilization of the semi-arid pastoral country by ferrous 
alchemy would ensure continental growth. He had personally 
ovserved the scope and success of contemporary western railroads 
in the United States. His speeches were full of complimentary 
allusions to the American magnates and to their social visions, which 
few colonials grasped, let alone articulated. 
We all know that the American system of railways by land grants has 
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been an enormous success ... The great feature and great factor of our 
civilisation is the wonderful change made ... by a new extraordinary power 
of transportation in the United States—the land grant system in America. 
I pity the blindness of a man who can look ... at the crowned success 
of the system in America, and yet tell us that there is nothing there 
but a woeful set of rogues ..."" 
Sir John Macdonald's efforts in Canada to preserve national 
autonomy, guarantee that the west would be Canadian and settled, 
and that the continental integrity of the dominion could be main-
tained were also keenly observed in the Australian colonies. He and 
Huntingdon, Hill, Harriman, and Stephen all seemed more dynamic, 
successful, and attractive as nation-builders than parochial politi-
cians distorting development for political advantage and un-
imaginative civil servants in Railways and Public Works depart-
ments. American experiences confirmed Mcllwraith's belief that 
large-scale private enterprise had not been given a fair opportunity 
or trial in Queensland, that construction in advance of known 
resources and settlement on the land-grant principle would work as 
well in the Antipodes as it apparently had over the Pacific, and that 
the qualities of the individual entrepreneur would be of equal value 
and significance in both areas. Only dissimilar skills and techniques 
of persuasion and manipulation suited to the different political 
structures and climates had to be developed. These he tried to evolve. 
Railroads in contemporary America, however, were different in 
both form and function. Their huge physical scale, associated social 
and political power, and the complexity of their business enterprises 
were unknown in the Australian colonies. In the United States 
railways were seen as enterprises to attain wealth, business ex-
perience, and financial power. Mcllwraith and his land-grant circle 
conceived of them as agents, mechanical tools, for other economic 
and political purposes. 
These differences were reflected in the imagery used when 
railways were discussed and their role analysed or criticized. 
Mcllwraith saw the railway as the key to settlement even more than 
immigration and capital. Once used to pick the lock on the interior, 
railways would be subordinate to other ventures and would revert 
to mere administrative devices. But the imagery in the United States 
with its republican and individualist overtones displayed deeper 
sensibility. As Henry Adams noted in 1890: "the railway system 
seemed on the whole to satisfy the wants of society better than any 
other part of the social machine and society was content with its 
creation, for the time, and with itself for creating it.""' Railway 
entrepreneurship seemed to imply the pursuit of profit at all costs 
with a total absence of responsibility for adverse social or economic 
consequences. 
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Populists focused their attack on the railroads, perhaps confusing 
symptoms with causes. The real problems went much deeper. 
Compared with the shearers and New Unionists in Australia, with 
their wide political platforms and eventual construction of a new 
and successful radical (in American terms) political party, the 
Populists were often single-track reformers. To them railroad 
entrepreneurs were great Machiavellian oppressors, and railroads the 
focus of American moral discontent. 
The public ownership of railways in the democratically governed 
Australian colonies meant that there was no scope for railroad 
entrepreneurs on the American model of private ownership. 
Mcllwraith's transcontinental schemes were attempts to break this 
nexus. 
In the United States, as recent work demonstrated, the indirect 
influence of government on land grants, railway authorization, and 
construcdon was much stronger than nineteenth century colonial 
liberal moralists would allow.'** Still, it would be impossible to deny 
that bribery and raw conflict marked railroad construction, expan-
sion, and operadon in America in a manner foreign to Australian 
experience, although Mcllwraith's Bendigo practices certainly had 
a touch of the Union Pacific about them. The magnitude of such 
abuses had led to a strong feeling in the colonies that American 
politics were corrupt and that a specific equation existed between 
railway construction and operation and political chicanery. 
Such suspicions placed Mcllwraith in a double dilemma. This he 
characteristically at first interpreted as a sparkling opportunity. 
Outwardly determined to maintain the proprieties and to eschew 
open relationships between finance, business, and government, within 
which there appeared to be very definite conflicts of interest, he 
nevertheless realized that colonial "independence" would be most 
useful for political leverage to further entrepreneurial activity. This 
was probably the most potent force behind his "nationalist" call of 
1888 with its appeal to Brisbane and regional urban working and 
artisan grpups and the more adventurous and speculative members 
of the business community. After 1893 these populist strictures were 
increasingly used to rally wavering elements against an apparently 
militant Labor Party and to conceal the fact that Empire economics 
and domestic realities were forcing Queensland along other paths. 
Yet Mcllwraith's "American" developmental insights were, given 
his assumptions, sound. In order for an entrepreneur to succeed in 
a colony where political values were somewhat different (i.e. in terms 
of the role of railways, ownership, access to investment capital, and 
the use of parliamentary machinery), the entrepreneur himself had 
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to intervene, and redirect the mechanism so that the result would 
be an Australian variant of the American species. As it happened, 
however, this exercise produced a "sport" which an ambivalent but 
potentially hostile society tolerated and then killed in the best 
Darwinian manner."' 
The operation involved a grand transcontinental railway scheme, 
protection, territorial expansion, overseas steamship subsidies, 
massive capital inflow from Britain to native Queensland banks that 
lent generously to private capitalists, and the most rapid exploitation 
of all natural resources—pastoral, mineral, hydrological and agricul-
tural—on the largest possible scale. 
Furthermore, land policy was to be revised to encourage immigra-
tion, permanent improvements, and stable pastoralism outside the 
settled districts. Land in the colonies was Crown land, which could 
be disposed of by local legislatures. Mcllwraith often wondered 
aloud, both before his defeat was apparent and after the pastoralists 
of the Central West had stopped his great railway, that if the British 
Government had really known what was implied when it gave 
colonial legislatures sole control over this resource it might have had 
second thoughts: "That we have not made a bad use of it [the land] 
I admit, and sometimes we stand aghast at our own moderation. 
What is there to hinder our dividing up the country among ourselves, 
each man of us settling upon ourselves and his heirs forever, fertile 
lands equal in expanse to that of many a European kingdom."* The 
squatters had dreamed such dreams (and still did in Queensland), 
and had been repulsed, in essence if not in spirit. What was 
significant was that this access and its historical legacy at once 
liberated and confined Mcllwraith. His defeat on the Trans-
continental Bill of 1883, the Liberals' unsuccessful Land Act of 1884 
and their deliberate fostering of an electorally productive small-scale 
yeoman agriculture, an activity in which he had little faith, were 
all indications that most Queenslanders, when the crunch came, 
simply didn't care to change trains. 
Ultimately, the major blockage lay in the fact that, in economic 
terms, there were no real agricultural alternatives for the land 
through which the new railways would run. The sanction the State 
bestowed on a particular form of economic enterprise, squatting, 
corresponded from the first with the realities of natural resources 
and, as we have mentioned, the hope for a new form of petit-
bourgeois agriculture. Only the growing complexities of production 
finance and the market, coupled with an expanding technology, 
offered hope to the individual entrepreneur who sought to make a 
financial empire out of territorial fiefdoms. And these new fields 
were terrifyingly vulnerable to overseas price fluctuations and 
economic ups and downs. 
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Mcllwraith's aim was to be not only the catalyst but the magnet; 
not only the financier but the developer; not only the profiteer but 
the politician; not only the entrepreneur but the prototype of a new 
colonial man. The drive to translate this belief into economic and 
institutional reality finally ran into a labyrinth. Queensland lacked 
a strong industrial base and was, as we have suggested, perpetually 
dependent on British capital to enlarge what was still a rather 
primitive colonial infrastructure. In short, both government and 
private loan funds were required to bridge the gap between imports 
and exports, expenditure and development, commitments and liabil-
ities. Even more than New Zealand, Queensland demonstrated all 
the fluctuations of a dependent economy. 
But the situation in Queensland was really much more complex. 
Colonial life had produced a very few great land-owning or 
manufacturing families capable of enduring from one generation to 
another; the squatters varied from region to region, from time to 
time, and were themselves subject to all the fluctuations of overseas 
export prices and the meddling of social engineers of the liberal petit-
bourgeois and legal groups; and native enterprises such as banks and 
mortgage institutions were themselves incredibly vulnerable if the 
value of colonial securities fell and the economic and physical 
elements raged. So Mcllwraith's very enterprise, paradoxically yet 
inevitably, increased his vulnerability in virtually every area of his 
operations." 
Mcllwraith's ideas can be quite simply stated. None were original; 
there was no mystery about them." Spencerian social doctrines, a 
belief in the efficacy of unrestricted private capital as the prime 
requisite for colonial development, a simple division of humanity into 
"doers" and profit-makers and predestined hewers of wood and 
drawers of water, for whom the State had little responsibility beyond 
the enlargement of economic opportunity, were the simple corner-
stones of his political faith. 
The Government is not established for the purpose of finding labour for 
the employed or the unemployed. It is the business of life for people 
to get into that sphere where they can make their living. It is the business 
of the Government to employ the money that is granted by the people 
for their good government but not to keep them employed ... I do not 
believe in the term "working classes" because I consider that the man 
who works eight or ten hours a day has very little to do compared with 
a Minister of the Crown in Queensland." 
Underlying all was a Biblical concept of Queensland as an environ-
mental tabula rasa, upon which the real progenitor of progress, the 
entrepreneur, could and should be allowed to write as he willed: "He 
was not put down in the Garden of Eden without a penny in his 
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breeches and without even breeches. It did not cost £16. to put him 
in. He was there as a free immigrant. That part of the Bible had 
always left a very strong effect on his mind—that the best thing 
was done by man stretching out beyond the Garden of Eden ... [Here] 
there was exactly similar country before us."'" 
The novel thing was his translation of what he saw as the logical 
application of his own beliefs and impulses to the infinitely rich and 
malleable northern Australia environment. 
Yet, albeit rarely, the basic person, the man of certitude, 
righteousness, and Calvinism broke through in analysis, direction, 
and action. If careful thought and introspection were lacking, these 
were scarcely matters of censure for Antipodeans. Mcllwraith, until 
his death, was a confident man. Although as a Scot he considered 
himself to be outside conventional and ossified English social-
political responses, he suffered from none of the "breakdown of 
meanings" that afflicted his late Victorian northern metropolitan 
contemporaries. Mcllwraith, in Queensland terms, had a unique 
sense of "right and being". 
Such basic ideas and policies ultimately placed Mcllwraith in a 
series of contradictory dilemmas which even these skills and political 
strengths could not solve. Characteristically, however, he first 
interpreted the early appearance in the 1880s of major social and 
financial contradictions and disfunctions as offering unique scope 
for both novel political solutions and for further economic op-
portunities. What is signal is the success of such devices as colonial 
"nationalism", his attempt to secure a greater degree of financial 
autonomy, land-grant railways, technological innovations, protective 
tariffs, and further Kanaka immigration. His ultimate masterstroke, 
a national coalition designed to "save" the state, proved initially 
acceptable to a majority of electors six years after Mcllwraith had 
decisively failed to alter the direction of Queensland's economic and 
social development. Indeed, it is arguable that, with Griffith's 
credibility destroyed and his political usefulness over, Mcllwraith, 
if he had not been ruined by private financial manoeuvrings and 
crippled by physical degeneration, might well have survived in 
Queensland politics until federation. 
Yet while Mcllwraith in the 1890s could use the existing 
constitutional and legal apparatus, however imperfect for his purpose 
it seemed to be, he could not transcend it. He, like Griffith, became 
a prisoner of interests and personalities he had regarded as somewhat 
irrelevant and despicable. Griffith, however, escaped to the Bench, 
to the federal movement and to the new High Court. For Mcllwraith 
there was no escape, only exile and disgrace. The best he could 
achieve for the colony was partial preservation, not entrepreneurial 
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freedom; stagnation, not development; restriction, not expansion; law 
and order, not transforming "progress". Queensland in the 1890s 
became, for both old elites and new replacements alike, an economic, 
social, and political prison from which it became difficult to flee. 
Increasingly a debate emerged between those who wanted to retain 
the doctrine of equality of opportunity to acquire wealth and status 
and those who wanted, on Old World lines, a redistribution of 
existing property and the imposition of social controls that implied 
some restriction of economic expansion. 
The crises not only revealed the very real strength of these latter 
objections but also a fundamental weakness of a would-be middle 
class in a colonial setting. The latter was simply not numerically 
or economically strong enough to be able to afford and sustain a 
greater diversity and deepening of functions along the lines of a 
Mcllwraith. The action of his former allies in 1897 in rejecting his 
policies and his person, once he had ruined his health and his 
prospects in what he believed was their service as well as his own, 
indicated that such diversity was one luxury that large-scale capital 
in Queensland could no longer afford and would not, as hostile forces 
seemed to gather, tolerate or succour. 
Yet Mcllwraith's legacy, in spite of an apparent double repudia-
tion of his life and works between 1897 and 1915, and 1915 and 
1957, remained, like a potent and sportive gene, ever-living in the 
Queenly Colony. Belief in the power of improving man to transcend, 
alter, and exploit the physical environment, belief in a peculiar 
Queensland experience as a forerunner of what all Australians should 
experience—these were part of his contribution to the fabric of social 
and political thought and action. Ultimately, perhaps, his signifi-
cance must rest on the historian's assessment of a belief of many 
Queenslanders: that their interests are best served by one who can 
transcend the barriers of station and class and provide an amalgam 
of dynamic personality, populist sentiment, business enterprise, and 
political achievement. 
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6 Samuel Walker Griffith 
A Liberal Lawyer 
R.B. JOYCE 
Most nineteenth century Queensland politicians were unknown 
outside the boundaries of their colony, while their ambitions 
remained similarly circumscribed. The main exception was the 
lawyer Samuel Walker Griffith, an immigrant first from Wales to 
Australia, then from New South Wales to Queensland, a man whose 
reputation and hopes knew no such limitations. Thus Francis Adams 
in 1892 warned English readers of the Fortnightly Review that 
Griffith "may some day be the political dictator of Australia, as 
he has been of Queensland".' 
Such leading political figures almost inevitably attract the ex-
tremes of praise and censure, and Griffith earned his share of both. 
More than once he was "dragged ... in his carriage through the 
Brisbane streets in a storm of cheers", yet a favourite toast of sugar 
planters became "damn Sam Griffith".^ Adams was a bitter critic 
who claimed that as power was Griffith's only lust he feared what 
"a nature of his intense and indecisive complexity ... [would] make 
of a momentous opportunity if ... offered to him". Adams's con-
clusion was damning "If I were an Australian who loved my country 
I should tremble at the thought."^ 
It is impossible to test the soundness of Adams's apprehensions 
in the political sphere, for within a year of that article's appearance 
Griffith had permanently left politics to become chief justice, first 
of Queensland then of the High Court of Australia. Whether or not 
Griffith's legal judgements justified Adams's fears lies outside the 
scope of this chapter, which is restricted to political events in 
Queensland. Yet the dissension of those twenty years in politics 
should reveal the grounds, if any, for his warning. 
Samuel Grifnth: MLA (East Moreton) 1872-73, (Oxley) 1873-78, (North Brisbane) 
1878-93; Attorney-General 1874-78; Secretary for Public Instruction 1876-79, 
1883-85; Secretary for Public Works 1878-79; Premier and Colonial Secretary 
1883-86; Premier and Chief Secretary 1886-88; Colonial Treasurer 1887-88; 
Postmaster-General 1885; Premier, Chief Secretary, and Attorney-General 1890-93 
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Griffith was one of many lawyers who participated in politics in 
Australia. Ambition played a part in his decision to combine the 
two careers. As a brilliant student at Maitland High School and 
Sydney University Griffith realized his ability to outclass most of 
his contemporaries. Appropriately, at the ripe age of seventeen he 
was addressed by a fellow student as "the Right Hon. Sir Samuel 
Griffith B.A. K.B.".' His winning of the Mort overseas scholarship, 
although interrupting his legal articles, helped to arouse his ambi-
tions. The scholarship took him out of Australia for fourteen months 
(1865-67) to the wider cultural horizons of Europe and Britain, 
where he returned to his birthplace, Merthyr Tydfil. He would have 
had little memory of the town, for his father, an impoverished English 
Congregational preacher, had moved with his family to England, 
living in Portishead and Wiveliscombe, before leaving for Australia 
when Samuel was still only eight. The narrow horizons of this bleak 
Welsh mining town probably stimulated Samuel's desire to succeed 
elsewhere. Yet behind the drab reality of the town he saw the long 
traditions of Wales, becoming later in his life a fervent Welsh 
nationalist seeking to trace his descent back to the legendary Welsh 
rulers. 
The confines of Queensland towns, especially Ipswich but even 
the adjacent capital Brisbane, were always restricting for Griffith, 
especially after this overseas trip. He finished his articles with his 
Ipswich solicitor, Arthur Macalister {see Ch. 2), in 1867 and began 
working as a barrister in Brisbane. The smallness of the legal 
profession at that time should be emphasized: he was one of twenty-
five barristers, and of fewer than eighty solicitors in the whole colony. 
Five years later he was to enter politics. 
This decision was related to his continuing legal career as well 
as to his ambitions. He was offered in April 1870 the leading politico-
legal office, that of Attorney-General, by his fellow lawyer, the 
liberal Charles Lilley {see Ch. 3). He refused this offer, flattering 
as it may have seemed for a twenty-five-year-old lawyer, and again 
refused to stand at the 1870 and 1871 elections, but soon after, in 
April 1872, decided to stand for a by-election in East Moreton, where 
he won. His interest in legal reform was stated as a reason for 
standing, thus in his campaign speech he claimed that "no law reform 
of any value had ever been introduced ... from any person but a 
lawyer".' 
Throughout his subsequent twenty years in politics Griffith 
remained a busy lawyer, and his legal interests were always dominant 
in these two decades. He spent more time on his legal practice than 
on his parliamentary career, even when premier, and his elevation 
to the Supreme Court was not so much an end of his political career 
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as the climax to his concurrent legal achievements.'' 
Politics for all its participants was still a part-time occupation in 
Queensland in the 1870s. In Griffith's first year in parliament the 
house sat on only fifty-eight days, in 1873 only on forty-four days, 
always in the central dryer winter months (April-August), and he 
could combine his two careers without difficulty. This was especially 
easy since he concentrated on legal matters in parliament, such as 
the District Courts Amendment Act, which only legal members 
remained to debate, or the Equity Procedure Bill, which he had 
drafted. 
The interrelationship of personalities, political organizations, and 
policies of Australian pre-party politics is a much-debated question. 
Loveday and Martin's model of faction politics in New South Wales 
is persuasive but not fully tested in Queensland.' A line of division 
between squatters and town liberals (supporting small farmers) can 
be traced through to the so-called parties led by Sir Thomas 
Mcllwraith {see Ch. 5) and Griffith in the 1880s and 1890s. 
Griffith's invitation to enter the house had come from a fellow lawyer, 
and partly reflected personal friendship. But Lilley was also seeking 
stronger support against the squatters when he invited Griffith to 
stand, and political convictions helped to shape Griffith's interests. 
He had been a member of a political Reform League in 1870, having 
drawn up its constitution. It has indeed been claimed that he "came 
into Parliament with the avowed intention of destroying the political 
power of the squatters of Queensland".' 
Lilley at a public meeting held in Brisbane on 23 December 1871 
had formed the Queensland Defence League, the purpose of which 
was to resist the electoral scheme of the Premier, Arthur Palmer 
{see Appendix). His electoral redistribution Bill would have strength-
ened the position of the squatters, who were already supported by 
the Ipswich members (three from the town of Ipswich and three from 
West Moreton), as against the Brisbane liberals. 
R.T. Atkin, the Member for East Moreton, agreed to resign his 
seat if Griffith could be persuaded to stand. Atkin's decision seems 
to have been related to his awareness of his declining health for, 
although only thirty-one, he died two months after resigning. Griffith 
stood and on 12 March 1872 was requisitioned for the seat. It was 
a powerful requisition from prominent Brisbane citizens led by the 
retiring member. Both metropolitan newspapers supported him, 
represented by the signatures of T.B. Stephens, part-owner of the 
Brisbane Courier and Mayor of South Brisbane, and of James 
Cowlishaw, of the Telegraph newspaper company, and a founder 
of the Brisbane Gas Company. Other signatories were William Perry, 
of Perry Brothers; CM. Forster, partner in a firm with William 
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Brookes; George Edmonston and G.R. Fyffe, the Members for 
Brisbane; C.J. Trundle, a descendant of early settlers of Brisbane; 
T. Finney, founder of the department store of Finney Isles; J.P. Jost, 
a racing butcher; E.B. Forrest, who was in commerce; J.D. Heal, 
an alderman and ex-Mayor of Brisbane; William Hemmant, of the 
legal firm of Stewart and Hemmant—who was destined to become 
one of Griffith's staunchest friends; and J. Pratten, father of a family 
well known in Brisbane official and sporting circles. 
Griffith's manifesto to his East Moreton electors (who numbered 
one-seventh of the total population of Queensland), besides urging 
legal reforms, showed clear opposition to Palmer's policies, which 
were described as "class" legislation in favour of the squatters. 
Griffith advocated European immigration, more expenditure on 
public works (including the extension of railways—meaning the 
completion of the Ipswich-Brisbane link), the setting up of rural 
boards, and the encouragement of municipal government.' 
At the hustings of 29 March Griffith was nominated by a Scot 
named Watt, who directly attacked the squatters as against the 
farmers. Watt criticized the novelist Anthony Trollope who had 
visited Queensland the year before because of his praise for the 
squatters as the "Dukes and Duchesses of Australia".'" Robert Cribb, 
a brother of the sitting Member for Ipswich, stood as a rival to 
Griffith for the seat, although his policy was likewise against the 
squatters. Griffith was able to criticize Cribb on the grounds that 
he was a member of the family and firm of Cribb and Foote of 
Ipswich, which had mercantile interests likely to be injured by any 
advance in Brisbane's prosperity. 
On 4 April Griffith won, with 560 votes to Cribb's 342, having 
expended the fairly large sum of £120. 
Griffith served the electors of East Moreton as an opposition 
member. He spoke mainly on legal matters such as the Telegraphic 
Messages Act, which he drafted, the Legal Practitioners Bill, and 
Equity Procedure Act. He also attacked the squatters and their 
representatives. The main debate of the session was on the pros-
pective redistribution of electorates where the Opposition alleged it 
represented 69,590 people while the squatting Government repre-
sented only 48,795. A deadlock ensued in parliament with the 
Opposition refusing Supply until the Redistribution Bill was passed. 
Griffith, somewhat surprisingly considering his junior status in the 
house, was prominent in efforts urging the leaders, Palmer and 
Lilley, to compromise. Eventually agreement was reached and debate 
continued on the redistribution. Griffith urged representation of 
population, not of districts, and was largely responsible for obtaining 
a member for a new electorate, Oxley, carved out of his seat of East 
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Moreton. The Bill went through, which meant that the house was 
to be increased from thirty-two to forty-two members. 
Griffith was criticized for his prominence in parliament a news-
paper columnist complained that "Our juvenile Lycurgus was getting 
spoiled ... it's not exactly the thing for a young barrister on his first 
legs—a legislator in pen feathers—to talk in the presence of two 
silk gowns and sundry older professional men, and more experienced 
legislators, about being sorry for his professional reputation if he 
had anything to do with framing the Acts on our Statute Book"." 
Griffith was unmoved by such criticisms and was to continue his 
frank censures, remarking of one Bill that it could have been 
improved if only "the honourable member had devoted some 
attention to it".'^ 
At the election in November 1873 Griffith stood for the new Oxley 
seat. His requisition by twenty-nine electors praised his efforts for 
the "welfare of the colony generally, and the Farmers in particular"." 
His reputation was already so well established that he was elected 
unopposed, as he had confidently anticipated, telling his wife Julia 
that he had "not heard of any opponent yet".'" He helped his fellow 
members by addressing meetings in various suburbs: at Cooper's 
Plains on Monday, Boggo on Wednesday, Brookfield on Saturday, 
and Indooroopilly the following Monday. He records that he spent 
only £25 on this unopposed election. 
Griffith anficipated the fall of the Palmer Ministry after the 
elections but he told Julia that he did not "care who succeeds them".'^ 
Palmer was defeated when the house met in January 1874, where-
upon Griffith's fellow lawyer Macalister again became premier. 
Lilley, the erstwhile leader, retired from the house on 16 February, 
becoming acting judge of the Queensland Supreme Court. 
Griffith's ambition was quite apparent; even after only a few 
months in parliament he was marked as a potential leader. The house 
was still small, and few were as talented as Griffith whether in 
oratory or in logical argument. His skill was recognized by his 
appointment on 3 August 1874 as Attorney-General, an office he 
was to hold for the next five years. He easily won the election for 
Oxley made necessary by his accepting office. He had publicly stated 
his sympathy with all members of the Ministry except one, a 
difficulty which was resolved when Mcllwraith resigned from the 
Ministry in October. Griffith had been considered for the post of 
Attorney-General when the Ministry had been first formed in 
January but rejected because of his very junior position at the Bar. 
In the same Ministry Griffith was also Secretary for Public 
Instruction (from 5 June 1876 to January 1879) and briefly 
Secretary for Public Works (from 3 September 1878 to January 
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1879). He held these offices overall for fifty-three months, serving 
Premiers Macalister, George Thorn {see Appendix), and John 
Douglas {see Appendix). Soon revealing his ambition, he was to 
supersede all of these men, becoming leader of the Opposition in 
1880, and premier for the first time in 1883. 
His growing influence in the party was soon apparent—by October 
1874 he was trying to persuade C.J. Graham, an opposition member, 
to change sides. Graham, a grazier and newspaper proprietor and 
independent Member for Clermont since 1872, had been Palmer's 
Secretary for Lands. Graham's reply to Griffith's offer referred to 
"your Ministry" and Graham ended with a hope that he would be 
able to be in a ministry with Griffith some day. Contemporaries, 
as much as modern critics, realized the difficulties in distinguishing 
Queensland political parties on the grounds of principle; thus 
Graham told Griffith: 
I need not in a pte and confidential letter pretend to any scruples I do 
not feel about the simple act of joining a party I have opposed, for I 
quite fail to see in our Queensland politics anything more than a number 
of men acting together for a time. In general policy there is little 
difference between parties, and the land question, which may divide 
people by a more definite line, is so infernally difficult, that I should 
not hesitate one moment in joining (or supporting) any set of men who 
proposed any solution 1 could at all approve of But without a certainty 
that I could agree with my new colleagues on this and some other 
question, it would seem idle to join them." 
Graham was to cross sides later, working with Griffith from 1876 
to 1878 as Under-Secretary for Public Instruction. 
What Graham had referred to as the "infernally difficult" land 
question was one of Griffith's main concerns as Attorney-General. 
Graham had criticized the 1869 Land Act as a "gross mistake" since 
it gave no tenure to the pastoralists, and as no selector in his district 
"made a living out of his selection". Griffith's priorities were the 
opposite. He wanted strict enforcement of the 1868 land Act in 
favour of genuine selectors, opposing dummy selectors in the 
employment of squatters. He advised the Land Minister that strict 
enforcement of the residency clauses—requiring bona fide con-
tinuous occupancy—would prevent such abuses. Griffith kept in 
touch with those facing the same problems in the southern colonies, 
such as a Sydney barrister, J.F. Hargrave, who had been one of his 
law teachers. Griffith welcomed Lilley's judgement in a case that 
held that non-residence for six months amounted to abandonment. 
Yet as a lawyer Griffith had appeared between December 1872 
and May 1873 for a pastoralist, G.H. Davenport, arguing against 
the forfeiture of his lease for failing to cultivate or improve his land. 
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In 1874 as Attorney-General Griffith acted for the Crown against 
Davenport in an ejectment motion in the Supreme Court. The wheel 
came full circle after the Privy Council upheld Davenport's appeal 
in December 1877, for Griffith applied the legal logic of the 
judgement in favour of pastoralists, albeit with some sarcasm derived 
from political realities: 
although it is perhaps difficult, with the extrinsic sources of knowledge 
available to us in this Colony, to come to the conclusion that the 
Legislature intended to open a door for the monopolizing of land in 
agricultural reserves by agents or trustees for other persons, I think that 
the ordinary rule must be allowed, and that the intention of the 
Legislature must be gathered only from the language which it has used." 
The same ambivalence between Griffith's legal logic and his political 
position was seen in other issues. As a barrister he appeared for the 
captain of the Chrishna, who was accused of offences under the 
kidnapping act, but as Attorney-General Griffith was confident that 
the insurer of the condemned ship had no claims on the proceeds 
of the sale. He resented criticism by the Aborigines Protection 
Society of an improper trial, being as prosecutor sure that the 
accused islander understood the proceedings and evidence. Usually 
Griffith saw both sides of an issue; thus, although he introduced in 
1875 a Bill allowing Aborigines to give evidence in courts, having 
"long been strongly of opinion that ... [this was] absolutely neces-
sary", he admitted as an objection "that many persons familiar with 
the character of the aboriginal population assert that no safeguard 
can be devised to secure their speaking the truth, and that a skilful 
questioner can always elicit from them such an answer as the witness 
thinks is desired".'* This suggests a certain bias against Aborigines, 
a suggestion supported by his arguments in favour of some disabilities 
being placed on the rights of the Chinese. The Act he supported 
provided for higher payments by "African and Asiatic aliens" for 
miners' rights or business licences. He claimed that this Act was 
not inconsistent with British treaty rights. Governor Cairns was not 
convinced and reserved the Bill before giving his assent. Griffith 
resigned on this issue—"his duty as Law Adviser has now termi-
nated"—but Cairns's action was upheld by Lord Carnarvon, who 
refused to recommend royal approval on the grounds that the Act 
was extraordinary, that it might prejudice the rights of British 
subjects not residing in the colony of Queensland, and that it was 
inconsistent with treaty rights. The first objection rested on the 
difficulty of British subjects of Chinese ancestry proving their status 
as British subjects; the second on the obligations of recent British 
treaties. A revised Bill was resubmitted in 1877, omitting the need 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
150 R.B.JOYCE 
for Chinese to prove that they were British subjects and making the 
bar on those without miners' rights apply to everybody, not only to 
Asiatic and African aliens. Griffith defended the remaining dis-
criminatory provisions, of higher rates for miners' rights and business 
licences for these aliens, as being consistent with the New South 
Wales 1862 imposition of a poll tax on Chinese immigrants. The 
British Government had then realized that it could not "shut... [its] 
eyes to the exceptional nature of Chinese immigration and the vast 
moral evil which accompanies it", nor to the numbers question in 
New South Wales where the Chinese totalled 21,000, about one in 
sixteen of the whole population. Griffith argued on the lines of these 
precedents, especially as "the number of Chinese now upon the 
Palmer gold field is estimated to amount to 20,000, or more than 
one tenth of the whole population of the colony". The new Governor, 
Sir Arthur Kennedy, and Lord Carnarvon eventually accepted 
Griffith's arguments, and the Chinese Immigrants Regulation Bill 
became law." 
In his role of Secretary for Public Instruction Griffith found fewer 
clashes between his principles and his political hopes. The major 
development just before he accepted the portfolio was the passing 
of the "free compulsory and secular" Education Act of 1875, which 
operated from 1 January 1876. Lilley had been the main protagonist 
of this Act, loyally supported by Griffith. His support of the Act 
as Attorney-General was non-committal, merely showing how it 
followed the recommendation of the 1874 Royal Commission. In 
January 1876 Griffith visited Victoria and New South Wales to 
study their educational administration, and on his return drafted 
revised educational regulations for Queensland. He realized that the 
provisions of the Act making education compulsory were impossible 
to police, so these remained inoperative. As the Minister adminis-
tering the Act, Griffith became aware of the minutiae and constraints 
in Queensland education. He faced criticism from the Treasurer in 
1876 because more was being spent than had been authorized; a 
teacher had to be dismissed for falsifying his testimonials; loans were 
made to Toowoomba and Ipswich Grammar Schools, teachers were 
sacked, one for "habitual intemperance", another for "unbecoming 
behaviour" with a sixteen-year-old female pupil teacher. As chair-
man of the Board of Education Griffith visited country schools while 
on legal work, such as Rockhampton in 1875." 
In 1877 Griffith approved the submission to the Legislative 
Assembly of a Bill "to facilitate and encourage Higher Education 
and to make provision for the Establishment of a University in the 
Colony of Queensland". This Bill did not pass, but in 1878 Griffith 
inaugurated a scheme of exhibitions to universities. Up to three a 
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year were to be awarded on the results of competitive examinations. 
The first winner was T.J. Byrnes {see Ch. 7), later to be Griffith's 
political protege as Solicitor-General and briefly Premier until his 
death. Scholarships were also granted to the grammar schools, sixty 
being offered between 1877 and 1879. These had been increased to 
120 in 1884 when Griffith again took on the Education portfolio. 
Griffith was a believer in improvement by education, and in 
recognition of merit. He took personal interest in scholarship winners 
such as Byrnes, Peter MacGregor, and John Woolcock. 
Griffith was active in educational work outside parliament; he was 
elected as a subscribers' trustee for Brisbane Grammar School in 
1877, and was prominent in the university extension movement which 
began in 1893, being its president in 1898-99." 
In his four months as Secretary for Public Works Griffith seems 
to have achieved little, although perhaps making closer acquaintance 
with some of the many railway schemes of the colony. 
More significant were his intrigues within his party, which were 
to culminate in his taking over the leadership. Macalister had 
resigned in June 1876, to be succeeded as leader by George Thorn 
—a compromise leader who lasted only nine months until February 
1877. 
But the noble George, whose greatest political work, like that of Caius 
S. Gracchus, was that in which he did least, and whose legislative 
successes sink into insignificance by the side of the real grandeur of his 
extensive failure, recognizing the fact that he who would keep himself 
consistently sailing before the wind raised by the breath of applause must 
be for ever on some new tack, wisely determined not to face another 
audience as the leading heavy man." 
This severe criticism was probably written by Griffith. Certainly he 
defined the reasons for Thorn's resignation, as due to "personal 
reasons only and in consequence of the extreme pressure of official 
work in the Departments under ... [his] charge"." The terms of the 
resignation expressed hopes that the party in power would not be 
removed but reconstructed under another First Minister. Griffith 
hoped to succeed but he was not elected. Instead John Douglas, who 
was forty-nine (Griffith was thirty-two), was chosen. Douglas had 
held office in Macalister's, Lilley's, and Thorn's ministries and had 
been Agent-General in London as well. 
Griffith successfully argued on the grounds of constitutional law 
against the need for elections for ministries after this reshuffle 
between Thorn and Douglas. Another leadership crisis occurred in 
September 1878, when Griffith records in his diary that the 
"Governor refused to accede to our proposition". The Brisbane 
Telegraph claimed that "only Governor Cairns' dislike of Griffith 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
152 R.B. JOYCE 
prevented his being Premier instead of Douglas", so it seems that 
the "proposition" was a reshuffle.-^ 
The ensuing elections saw a bizarre situation, for although 
Douglas was still nominal leader, others recognized Griffith as the 
true leader of the party. He changed his electorate, moving from 
Oxley (where he had won again in 1876) to the more central two-
man North Brisbane electorate where his main opponent was Palmer. 
In his campaign Griffith stressed differences between the parties, 
alleging that his was the popular party opposing that of ownership 
and wealth. Land reform was needed to curb the continued power 
of the squatters, and black labour should be opposed to limit the 
influence of the sugar planters. Palmer's black labour views were 
openly castigated in the campaign, a man painted black being used 
in Brisbane streets to show the dangers to Queensland's society. 
Griffith polled best with 827 votes, but his fellow liberal Hockings, 
with 544 votes, (railed both Palmer with 730 and Pring with 576. 
It had not been an outstanding victory for Griffith, but at least he 
had won more support than other liberals throughout the colony. 
Mcllwraith's supporters h;id carried the day, and were soon on 21 
January 1879 to win a vote of no confidence against Douglas by 
32 10 20. 
Soon after this parliamcnlary defeat Griffith succeeded Douglas 
as leader of the liberals, and indeed Douglas was soon to leave politics 
altogether. He divulged lo the Brisbane Courier information given 
to a select commitiec despite standing orders which forbade publica-
lion before such evidence was reported to parliament. Douglas so 
aclcd because he disliked "any secretive legislative committee, except 
where very weighty public considerations and the cause of morality 
demand secrecy", and he refused to apologize even when the 
Assembly had voted that he was guilty of contempt.-~ Douglas's 
parliamentary career was effectively ended by his unwise actions. 
The removal of Douglas was not the only way in which Griffith's 
leadership of ihc parly was strengthened. He attended on 6 June 
1879 the preliminary meeting of the Liberal Association, set up as 
an extra-parliamentary body to support ihc parliamcnlary parly, and 
was elected as its first president on 13 June. This central association 
co-ordinalcd earlier regional bodies such as the South Brisbane 
Liberal Association, which had been set up in June 1875. 
Sir Thomas Mcllwraith. Premier after Douglas's defeat, realized 
ihe ilireal from (jrilTilh and on 25 June 1879 tried to buy him off 
with ihc otTer of a judgeship. Griffith declined, even when 
Mcllwraith repealed the offer. Twenly-Uvo of Griffith's followers 
sent him a petition of "satisfaction and justification", as did "friends 
and supporters of the Liberal Party" al Stanihorpc who interpreted 
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Griffith's refusal as proof of his "patriotism and disinterested loyalty 
to Liberal principles".''' On 27 August 1879 Griffith survived another 
leadership crisis, after which James Dickson {see Appendix) and 
fourteen supporters expressed their "full and undiminished con-
fidence" in him as leader. P.J. McDermott of Drayton regretted the 
"hostile criticism from an obscure section of your party"." No more 
major challenges to Griffith's leadership occurred in the thirteen 
years until his resignation in 1892. 
As he rose in Queensland politics, Griffith was becoming known 
outside the colony. After his marriage in 1870 he had regularly 
visited relatives in Maitland, and these visits invariably took him 
to Sydney where he had been made honorary member of the 
Australian and Reform Clubs. As a Queensland Minister he had 
also had occasion to visit Sydney, where he met men such as Sir 
Henry Parkes in 1875. He dined with Parkes in 1877, and in Sydney 
met with his parallel Ministers in the New South Wales house. 
Griffith realized the value of intercolonial contacts and sent copies 
of his Bills to lawyers and politicians in the other colonies. Thus 
his 1877 Judicature Bill and rules were sent to Alfred Stephen of 
New South Wales, H. Ayers, S.J. Way, and Sir James Boucaut in 
Adelaide, and J.J. Casey in Melbourne. In 1880 with Sir John 
Robertson he travelled overland by train and carriage from Sydney 
to Melbourne. This was not his first visit to Melbourne, and he was 
welcomed by the Caseys as a familiar figure; indeed Griffith's vanity 
was flattered, for Mrs Casey told him that in her album "the Prince 
and Princess of Wales are first and then follows your photograph"." 
More significant was Casey's interest in federalism. He had been 
a member of an investigating committee in 1870, and later was 
chairman of a royal commission on federal union. His realistically 
cautious, legal approach has been compared to the idealism of C.G. 
Duffy.-' Casey urged practical advance by reciprocal legislation on 
such questions as extradition, insolvency, probate, marriage, natural-
ization, and other common problems. Casey's views paralleled those 
being formed by Griffith, who as Queensland's Attorney-General 
had considered such legislation. For instance in November 1874, 
again after pressure from Victoria, from the Melbourne Chamber 
of Commerce on the Brisbane Chamber of Commerce, Griffith 
considered a "uniform law for the arrest and prosecution of 
absconders and other offenders escaping from one colony to the 
other, and for the recovery of property fraudulently obtained by such 
persons".^ " An intercolonial conference had been held in Sydney in 
February 1875 and by April Griffith had prepared a draft Bill; later 
he commented on Western Australia's draft Bill. His memorandum 
stressed that the "difficulty of inducing the Legislatures of all the 
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Australasian Colonies to act in perfect concert in the matter of the 
limited powers possessed by them for this purpose clearly [rendered] 
necessary an enactment of the Imperial Parliament".^' 
On 30 May 1877 he commented cautiously on a draft Bill sent 
from South Australia "to increase the Remedies of South Australia 
against persons in other Australasian Colonies and also to enable 
Judgments of the Courts of those Colonies to be enforced in South 
Australia"." Griffith wanted a judge of the Supreme Court in each 
case to give leave when enforcing judgements, doubting whether 
judgements of inferior courts should be enforced without this leave. 
On 5 July 1877 Griffith agreed with the Attorney-General of 
Tasmania that an intercolonial court of appeal would be useful, and 
agreed that a conference of the law officers of the colonies should 
be held. 
Griffith's part in these preliminary moves towards colonial unity 
were interrupted when his Liberals lost office. Instead of moves 
towards co-operation between colonies, he was confined to clashes 
within Queensland. He clashed constantly with opposition members, 
and notably with his rival Mcllwraith. One instance in 1880 was 
over the Torres Strait mail contract. Mcllwraith was in favour of 
a through steam service between London and Brisbane via Torres 
Strait, and strongly supported the efforts of Gray, Dawes and 
Company to secure the contract. Griffith was opposed on constitu-
tional grounds. The contract which it was desired to ratify involved 
an expenditure of £55,000 a year for eight years. Griffith thought 
the proposition was a direct violation of the eighteenth section of 
the Constitution, which made it unlawful "to originate or pass any 
vote, resolution or Bill for the appropriation of any part of the 
Consolidated Revenue which should not first have been recom-
mended by message of the Governor". Queensland's Governor 
thought the objection unimportant, deciding not to refer the matter 
to England as "it was part of a bitter political fight". Mcllwraith 
ignored Griffith's and the Opposition's attempts to defeat the 
contract, extended the date of ratification from 6 August to 12 
October, then, still refusing to take a vote, claimed that the contract 
had been ratified because parliament had failed to disapprove of it. 
Griffith telegraphed the company on 6 October: "Opposition claim-
ing represent large majority in country regarded contract contrary 
constitution." Mcllwraith responded by telling the company that he 
had the numbers, thirty-three in a house of fifty-five. Griffith's 
telegram was ignored until after 12 October when the company wrote 
a conciliatory letter which ignored the constitutional point. The 
company pointed out the "great benefit to the Colony" of the 
proposed service, and tacitly admitted Mcllwraith's assistance in 
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getting the contract through by stating that before the telegram they 
"had committed ... [themselves] to contract with eminent Clyde 
shipbuilders for several new steamers of large tonnage". The matter 
was evidence of Griffith's constitutional concern—for he probably 
agreed about the benefit to the colony—and his determination to 
fight Mcllwraith on every issue." 
An even more serious domestic Queensland crisis resulted in 
Griffith's revisiting England. This was the infamous Steel Rails Case, 
the allegation by Griffith and his followers that Mcllwraith was 
profiteering from contracts for the Queensland Government. The 
price of the rails and their freighting in Mcllwraith, McEachern 
ships were opposed. Griffith first heard of the claim in a letter written 
on 17 April 1880 by William Hemmant from London. Hemmant 
was Griffith's former colleague in Macalister's government. Hem-
mant said his letter was "in law libellous" for he was convinced that 
Mcllwraith was guilty of profiteering. He hoped Griffith would "take 
up ... [the] case, and bring ... [his] powers to bear upon the 
unravelling of the injustices". He thought Macalister, now Agent-
General, had been "weak, deplorably weak in giving way to the 
Mcllwraith influence ever since they came into office"." Mcllwraith 
had sacked a public servant, Hamilton, from the Agent-General's 
office after he drew attention to discrepancies, and Hamilton reached 
Brisbane on 21 June, when Griffith's diary reports seeing him. 
Griffith took up the case, supporting Hamilton's petition against 
Mcllwraith and against others such as Macalister, Palmer and John 
Macrossan {see Ch. 4), who also seemed to be implicated. A select 
committee was appointed by parliament to investigate the allega-
tions, the majority of which reported against Hemmant's claims. 
Griffith, Dickson, and McLean thought the allegations had been 
borne out. 
A royal commission was then set up in London, and Griffith 
interrupted his legal and political career to appear before it. He was 
to be out of Australia from December 1880 to June 1881. Met by 
Hemmant in London on 7 February, he expected the Commission 
to begin soon. Griffith's vanity, or confidence in his ability, was 
shown clearly by his frank comments to his wife "Sir Harding 
Giffard (about the best counsel in England) is to appear for Mr. 
Mcllwraith. They were not going to have him till they knew I was 
for Mr. Miles." When he knew that one of the commissioners was 
to be Gibbs, who had a C.B. and Q.C, Griffith commented, "both 
of... [these] distinctions he received I believe because he was tutor 
to the Prince of Wales. He may be a very able man, but has had 
very little legal experience"." 
The Commission first sat on 14 March, when Griffith claimed 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
156 R.B.JOYCE 
he was opposing "two of the greatest criminal lawyers in England" 
in Giffard and E. Clarke. Their objections to Griffith's appearing 
were overruled. 
After his early optimism Griffith soon became impatient with the 
Commission. He was confident after examining Macalister on 15 
March, since his "answers were so absurd that it is most charitable 
to suppose that he is imbecile". But in the same letter to his wife, 
signs of Griffith's impatience appear: "The people called refused to 
tell all the truth so I fear the enquiry will not result in discovering 
all the truth"." His reports became more laconic after this, often 
merely reporting the hours the Commission sat. On 31 March he 
repeated his earlier doubts on the end result, though with some 
compensations: "The Commission is not very satisfactory—no one 
will tell all the truth. However we have thoroughly discussed one 
part of the transaction—that about the freight", and later, "we have 
found out a great deal. On the whole the result is satisfactory". He 
was convinced that he should have come to London: "My coming 
here is absolutely necessary—otherwise the whole thing would have 
been a farce."" By this time the proceedings were reaching their 
close, though still protracted. Hemmant spoke all day on the 26th. 
He was to have been immediately followed by Giffard for Mcllwraith 
on the 27th, but this was delayed till late April, by which time 
Griffith had left for Australia. The impression is clear that he 
realized that the Commission would not support his case. Most of 
his later letters concentrate on other matters, such as visiting his 
relatives or Australians in London, or, more significantly, influential 
British politicians or administrators. Despite his criticism of British 
lawyers, Griffith was an imperialist who appreciated the importance 
of British leaders to Queensland's future. 
The London commissioners, as Griffith had expected, found for 
Mcllwraith, so in a way Griffith's journey was wasted. But he was 
welcomed home triumphantly by his supporters in Brisbane, even 
if they were unable to prevent the acceptance of the second report 
favouring Mcllwraith. Griffith's seven-hour parliamentary speech 
reviewed the whole proceedings, but the parliamentary numbers were 
against his views. His supporters remained convinced, believing that 
"Mr. Mcllwraith and a lot of them" were "a parcel of thieves" who 
had "sucked the colony for their own benefit", and that all were 
"guilty", and that Griffith's action "ought to be a terror to those 
who came after and a warning to those who would rob the colony 
if they could"." Perhaps the main result of the whole affair for 
Griffith was not a confirmation of the "disagreeableness" of 
Queensland politics, but a new insight from London of the smallness 
of the Queensland stage. 
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Mcllwraith survived the smoke of the scandal for more than two 
years, a period of constant political conflict with Griffith. A later 
major clash was in 1882 when Griffith again failed in an effort to 
defeat the Mcllwraith Government, this time over an alleged land 
scandal. Griffith claimed to have been informed that the price of 
land on the Cullin-la-Ringo run and three stations in the Springsure 
and Peak Downs district had been reduced from 20s to 10s for 
southern capitalists and that the Postmaster-General Boyd 
Morehead {see Appendix) had collected IVi per cent from the 
purchasers. A select committee was appointed but could find no 
positive proof, especially as Griffith refused to name his informant 
and Morehead refused to answer rumours as being inconsistent with 
his "honour or dignity". No evidence exists in the Griffith papers 
as to his informant, though Hemmant comments sarcastically on 
Morehead's "honour" and "dignity" as "big words!"." 
Against this background of bitter political in-fighting between 
Griffith and Mcllwraith came the purported annexation of New 
Guinea in 1883. Mcllwraith's actions had almost inevitably to be 
politically opposed by Griffith, especially because of the allegations 
that the islands would be used as recruiting areas for labourers for 
the Queensland sugar fields. Griffith, no less than Mcllwraith, 
believed that Australia should be concerned as to which European 
nations controlled the islands of the Pacific, but he was forced into 
the role of opposing Mcllwraith's moves because of the internal 
Queensland political situation. Another complication was that the 
New Guinea issue was interrelated with the moves towards feder-
ation of the Victorian politician James Service. Service was using 
Mcllwraith for "tactical reasons, with New South Wales in mind" 
when the former in July approached the other governments to attend 
a federal convention.*' Griffith's known support for federation again 
complicated his stand on the New Guinea issue. 
In the midst of these arrangements came the 1883 Queensland 
elections. Griffith addressed electors as early as 8 May. His 
campaign speech attacked Mcllwraith over New Guinea because of 
the allegations of labour recruiting, which were part of a more 
general attack on the Government for supporting "servile labourers" 
on the sugar plantations as well as cheap Asiatic labour elsewhere. 
An old Kanaka, paid by Griffith's party, was used in the campaign 
as an alleged "friend" of Mcllwraith and his followers. Griffith 
strongly condemned Mcllwraith's plans for land-grant railways, 
which were seen as a continuation of the monopolizing of the land 
by capitalists. Griffith also stood for more frequent elections, 
payment of members, and departmental reforms. Griffith visited 
other parts of the state, travelling north to Mackay in June and west 
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to Toowoomba in July before returning for the later stages of his 
North Brisbane campaign.^' On 21 August he topped the poll with 
1118 votes, followed by his colleague Brookes with 872, and his 
erstwhile leader Douglas—now opposing him—way back with 640 
votes. Griffith in September travelled to Toowoomba, Stanthorpe, 
Rockhampton, Maryborough, Bundaberg, Gladstone, and Gympie, 
with torchlight processions and champagne suppers in most places 
to celebrate the increasing victories in the various elections. The 
opposition caucus had grown from seventeen on 25 June to thirty-
one by 5 November, and soon after parliament met Mcllwraith's 
government was defeated, on 8 November, by 30 to 20. On 10 
November Griffith received the Governor's commission to form his 
government, which was sworn in on 13 November. He was easily 
re-elected for North Brisbane by 1139 votes to 190 on 20 November. 
As Premier Griffith took over the role of spokesman for external 
affairs for Queensland and soon proved his interest and influence. 
The other colonies had agreed to meet in Sydney in November, so 
only a few days after he had formally taken office Griffith had to 
leave his government. Accompanied by his two eldest children he 
sailed from Brisbane on 23 November, reaching Sydney on the 25th. 
Leaving the children with relatives, he plunged into the wider 
diplomatic world outside Queensland. Glimpses of his extended 
horizons come from his diary thus on 27 November he "called on 
Sir W. Des Voeux (Fiji). Called at Government House did not see 
Gov'". Called on Stuart. Lunched at Aust" Club. Called on Lord 
Rosebery. Went to Reform Club. Dined with Stuart at Parliament". 
On 28 November his diary records, "Giblin and Brown (Tasmania) 
called. Called on Service. At Conference all day. Saw Audley Coote 
and Sir W. des Voeux. Called on Service and others in evening".'^ 
The convention lasted until 8 December and Griffith played a 
major part. The Victorian representatives had felt slighted by New 
South Wales and were to be slighted in their resolutions, for Service's 
policy of wholesale annexation of the Pacific Islands by Britain won 
support from only New Zealand. The other colonies agreed with 
Griffith's resolutions, which rated New Guinea as far more signifi-
cant than the New Hebrides, where in any case Griffith argued in 
typically legal fashion that the agreement with France should be 
respected. Britain was urged to annex eastern New Guinea and the 
colonies agreed to help pay for the new colony, providing as much 
as the British Government thought "fair and reasonable". All the 
colonies agreed that any further foreign annexations of the islands 
south of the equator should be opposed, and resentment against the 
French sending of convicts to New Caledonia was emphasized. 
Griffith was prominent, again, in what can be seen as a further 
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gambit towards eventual federation. Service was the instigator, 
hoping to start, despite New South Wales's hostility, something that 
could develop into a closer union. Griffith moved the formation of 
a federal council similar to that supported in 1880 by Henry Parkes, 
and on the evening of 3 December his diary records, "dictated 
Federal Council Bill".^' The measure was diluted in committee, and 
on the evening of 6 December Griffith had to revise it. Under the 
Bill as carried, the council was weak, having limited legislative 
powers, no executive powers, and no revenue. Many of its powers 
were legal, partly reflecting Griffith's earlier frustration both as 
Attorney-General and as a lawyer. The Bill provided procedures for 
each Colony to operate outside its own boundaries in the serving 
of documents (processes, judgements, extradition orders), and the 
arresting of offenders on certain ships. Better known are the powers 
established in relationship to the Pacific Islands, retention of 
criminals (aimed at the French convicts escaping from New 
Caledonia), and fisheries in Australian waters beyond territorial 
limits. 
The main significance of the Federal Council for Griffith was its 
keeping him in close contact with the leaders of those colonies who 
joined it. Although New South Wales politicians were excluded he 
saw them regularly on his visits south. The next time Griffith left 
Queensland was in January 1885 when he visited Sydney, Tasmania, 
and Melbourne, besides conferring with "Service, Berry and Kerferd 
as to Federal Council Bill and New Guinea".'" He also met the New 
South Wales leaders, with others; thus on 2 February he went on 
a special train with Sir Alfred Stephen, the Duke of Manchester, 
Sir James Martin, Admiral Tryon, George Dibbs, Edmund Barton, 
and General Scratchley. Scratchley had recently been appointed 
Administrator of the new Protectorate of New Guinea, and Griffith 
was to see him in Brisbane in May 1885. In 1886 Griffith was again 
in Melbourne, where he revised the standing orders for the Federal 
Council and drafted a Civil Process Bill before going on to Hobart 
for the first meeting of the Council. Tasmania, Victoria, Western 
Australia, and Fiji were represented as well as Queensland. Service 
was elected president on Griffith's motion. Griffith spoke frequently, 
besides working on drafting for instance he says of an Enforcement 
of Judgements Bill that he "drew bill afresh".^^ Three other Acts 
were passed, two machinery ones and one allowing the service of 
civil process in other colonies. At this Council meeting Griffith met 
William MacGregor, Fiji's representative, and their friendship led 
to the recommendation for MacGregor's administratorship of New 
Guinea. 
Griffith was also involved with other colonial leaders in plans for 
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Australia's defence. Colonel French had travelled to Brisbane in June 
1884 and a party including Griffith went with him north to Cooktown 
and other ports. In April 1886 Griffith attended a naval defence 
conference in Sydney with Admiral Tryon on the Nelson, 
together with Sir Patrick Jennings (New South Wales) and Duncan 
Gillies (Victoria). Griffith also discussed the future of New Guinea 
with these intercolonial politicians. His northern trip in May 1886, 
when he travelled as far as Thursday Island and the other islands 
of Torres Strait, was partly associated with defence, besides being 
a political grand tour to demonstrate the concern of his government 
with the north. 
His major concern with external events came with his selection 
as a delegate to the 1887 Colonial Conference held in London. On 
22 December 1886 after a Cabinet meeting he recorded that he had 
"determined to go to England",^" and he left on 21 January. Although 
his part was less assertive than that of Alfred Deakin, he demon-
strated both Australian and British expansionism. The agreement 
on the future of New Guinea owed much to him, as did the choice 
of MacGregor as Administrator. He was also prominent in the 
debates on naval defence, being sure that he could persuade 
Queensland to support the planned scheme. 
After his return in June 1887 his optimism was frustrated: it 
proved difficult to persuade the Queensland parliament to accept 
the Naval Agreement Bill. External matters were sure to receive 
his attention. In January 1888 he went to the second meeting of 
the Federal Council, again held in Hobart, and was elected its 
president. As before he returned through Sydney where, besides 
seeing prominent politicians such as Parkes, Dibbs, and Bernhard 
Wise, he renewed acquaintance with prominent Australians from all 
colonics, for this was the hundredth anniversary of Phillip's landing 
in Sydney. On returning he maintained his interest in defence, 
spending Easter 1888 at Lytton camp where a simulated naval attack 
was demonstrated. 
After being defeated politically in May 1888 Griffith continued 
his interest in such matters, calling on Admiral Fairfax on 26 June 
and keeping in contact with MacGregor afier he arrived in August 
to lake up his New Guinea position. Griffith's Pacific trip—to New 
Caledonia and Fiji in July—seems to have been only a holiday after 
the strains of combining legal practice and political office. 
He still travelled south regularly, going to Sydney and Melbourne 
in January 1889. Melbourne was having a celebration—a reply to 
Sydney's 1888 celebrations, so that besides seeing local politicians 
in both cities he met in Melbourne visiting statesmen such as T. 
Playford and C.C. Kingston from South Australia. 
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Griffith remained as Queensland's representative on the Federal 
Council and went to the third Hobart conference on this southern 
trip. The meeting was typically brief, lasting from 28 January to 
4 February, with Playford of South Australia taking his turn as 
president on Griffith's motion. This was the only session in which 
South Australia was represented. Only one Act was passed, regu-
lating fisheries in waters adjacent to Western Australia. On his way 
back to Brisbane Griffith saw other politicans and dignitaries from 
other colonies. 
In Brisbane he was always consulted by visitors: for instance. Sir 
Somers Vine, a London entrepreneur, saw him in March 1889. All 
who are interested in the federation story would like to know what 
he discussed with another visitor. Sir Henry Parkes, on 22 and 23 
October 1889, for it was on the journey back to Sydney that Parkes 
made his famous Tenterfield speech. 
Griffith's extensive official southern and western trip between 
December 1889 and February 1890 took him to every colony except 
Tasmania. On his way back he attended the important 1890 
Melbourne conference from 4 to 14 February that was eventually 
to lead to federation. Intercolonial relationships had been the main 
concern of his trip and many of the politicians he had visited were 
at the Melbourne conference. Griffith on his trip had successfully 
argued against holding a meeting in 1890 of the Federal Council, 
telling his wife that his "arguments ... have prevailed, so that I shall 
be able to come home as soon as the Conference is over in Melbourne. 
Mr. Gillies puts all the blame on me".*' 
When Griffith was Premier again after August 1890 his inter-
colonial visits had even greater stature, besides which his pre-
eminence in the constitutional debates on federation increased his 
prestige. 
As Premier he took a long northern trip in Queensland between 
December 1890 and January 1891, partly to consider the defence 
of coastal towns. Soon after this trip he went south again, from 9 
January to 7 February. While in Sydney he saw Parkes, Robertson, 
and Stephen; in Melbourne he saw the Premier James Munro; then 
he went on to the fourth Federal Council meeting in Hobart, which 
had been postponed in 1890. Griffith was elected president. Only 
one Act was passed, a legal one giving recognition to all colonial 
Acts on lunacy. On his return trip he again saw Munro in Melbourne 
and was with his wife and daughter a guest at Munro's house at 
St Fillans, over the Black Spur from Healesville, for the weekend 
31 January to 2 February. This was a typical result of Griffith's 
close relationship with leading politicians. In Sydney he called as 
usual on Parkes, as well as on Lord Jersey. 
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On 25 February, soon after his return, he again went south to 
Sydney for the 1891 Federation Convention at which his leadership 
was so pronounced. Besides his nominal power as vice-president, his 
legal and constitutional skills were at their most significant in the 
drafting of the Constitution for the projected Commonwealth."* 
These wider interests were also apparent while he was in 
Queensland: for instance, on 6 July 1891 his presidential address 
at the annual meeting of the Geographical Society on the "Political 
Geography of Australia" included references to federation. On 7 July 
the Naval Defence Bill was eventually, thanks to his persistence, 
passed through parliament by 42 votes to 12. 
One external visit he thoroughly enjoyed was to New Guinea. He 
was aware of its significance to Australian defence but had also 
become involved in its administration, particularly in the plans of 
his friend Sir William MacGregor. On this trip he took his two sons; 
they travelled in the Lucinda from Bundaberg to Cooktown where 
the Merrie England took them to Yule Island, then to Kapa Kapa, 
Hula, Aroma, Samarai, East Cape, and Dobu. Griffith had the 
medical problems of the possession brought acutely to his notice, 
for the pioneer Anglican missionary Maclaurin died while he was 
on board the Merrie England on 27 December. Griffith was back 
in Brisbane on 5 January 1892."' 
Ten days later he left for the south, on 16 January reaching Sydney 
where he saw Parkes, Barton, and Stephen. He went on to Melbourne 
where he was met by Munro. He continued to Adelaide where he 
saw Kingston, Cockburn, and Boucaut. He returned to Brisbane by 
31 January, again through Melbourne and Sydney. Most of these 
journeyings had political significance, for his meetings, even on 
recreational holidays, kept him in touch with the problems of the 
other colonies. Inside Queensland he also continued to travel 
extensively, realizing the need to contact his electors and to 
understand their local difficulties. Some trips seemed like paid 
holidays—such as his visit in December 1892 with other Queensland 
politicians as well as his younger son Percy to the Torres Straits 
Islands and the Barrier Reef—yet these areas were important for 
Australian defence. During Griffith's final attendance at the Federal 
Council early in 1893, Acts were passed for garrisons in Torres Strait 
and at Thursday Island as well as in the far west at King George's 
Sound. For this meeting he left Brisbane on 18 January and as usual 
saw prominent politicians in Sydney (Dibbs) and Melbourne (De-
akin) before and after the session in Hobart from 26 January to 
3 February. Griffith had again been elected president—fittingly, for 
he had been closely involved in the Council's history. He well realized 
its inherent weaknesses, which became even more apparent in the 
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sessions after he had left politics when the meetings of 1895 and 
1897 passed no legislation. 
Throughout his long political career from 1872 to 1893 Griffith 
was therefore demonstrably an Australian statesman as well as a 
Queensland politician. His journeyings and meetings were sup-
plemented by correspondence which helped to maintain a national 
rather than a colonial horizon. 
Griffith was Premier of Queensland from 1883 to 1888, and again, 
in collaboration with his former opponent Mcllwraith, from 1890 
to 1893. His first ministry was identified as Liberal as against the 
Conservatives led by Mcllwraith. Contemporary Queenslanders 
certainly believed that the two leaders stood for different ideas, even 
if to modern eyes the differences seem less obvious. Mcllwraith 
supported a faster pace of development based on unbridled en-
couragement of the pastoral, sugar, and mining industries. Griffith 
advocated a slower rate of development which, while recognizing the 
importance of these pastoral, sugar, and mining industries to the 
Queensland economy, wished to place some check on them: agricul-
turalists and small farmers should have an opportunity to take up 
land; sugar planters should not become a privileged class akin to 
the cotton magnates of the United States of America and should 
not rely on coloured labour; mining companies should be controlled 
more by the State and should give greater benefits to their employees; 
land-grant railways should be discouraged—rather should railways 
follow settlement. More positively Griffith, supported by town 
liberals, encouraged small industries in the towns, showed a genuine 
concern for some of the underprivileged (even if neither the 
Aborigines nor the Chinese received much of his sympathy), urged 
reform in legal systems, and wanted greater governmental concern 
in health and education. One can contrast Mcllwraith's unrestrained 
ideas about developing the wealth of Queensland with parliamentary 
statements made by Griffith. "What we desire in this colony is ... 
not to see the aggregation of wealth or the aggregation of great 
estates in the hands of a few, but a general diffusion of wealth and 
property and especially a diffusion of that wealth and prosperity 
among agricultural settlers".'" 
As could be expected, most of Griffith's support came from 
Brisbane and nearby electorates, while Mcllwraith won the pastoral, 
mining, and sugar scats. Some discerned a religious contrast; Griffith 
partly through his father, a Congregational minister, tended to be 
associated with Protestant Churches, while Mcllwraith won Catholic 
votes. Yet this division was riot clear-cut and economic or social 
divisions usually look precedence over votes on sectarian lines. 
Separation was another issue on which party lines were suggested: 
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Griffith, relying so much on Brisbane and the south, was said to 
be opposed to the separation of either central or northern 
Queensland. Yet it was Griffith who was to devise a scheme for the 
tripartite division of the colony. This passed the Queensland par-
liament but was not implemented before federation, after which the 
votes of the whole colony would have been needed to approve it." 
There were differences in the basic ideas of Griffith and 
Mcllwraith. But other evidence concerning the central period 
dominated by the rival leaders suggests that parties were becoming 
closer to more modern ideas of these political institutions. Computer 
analysis of division lists in this period shows a surprisingly high level 
of party cohesion; during the ministries of each leader over 70 per 
cent of the voting was on party lines even if that level was not 
sustained for long. Caucus meetings (the word is used by Griffith 
in his diaries" in the 1880s) were held by members of both parties. 
The place of the leader was dominant; Adams's claim of "dic-
tatorship" for Griffith was related to this pre-eminent position in 
a developed political machine. Griffith had been accepted as leader 
because of his ability, and he retained his position unchallenged. He 
chose his own subordinates and expected loyal service from them. 
Complaints were made that he confided in few, yet on the other 
hand he had close political friends. The detailed letters to Griffith 
written by his ex-parliamentary colleague James Garrick while he 
was Queensland's Agent-General in London from 1884-88 suggest 
a high degree of mutual trust. Ministerial and party functions, 
dinners and picnics, often at Moreton Bay on the governmental boats, 
were other successful methods of reinforcing solidarity. Thus on 
successive days in May 1884 Griffith had a dinner party for twenty 
guests at home, and then went "with colleagues to Peel Island and 
Dunwich in Kate. Discussed Land Bill"." 
Griffith tried to master every subject, his detailed speeches 
showing the extent of his preparation. His speeches were not inspiring 
in delivery, rather were they logical presentations resembling those 
of a cautious lawyer following his brief. Most parliamentarians 
respected his debating skill, but this did not make him immune from 
strong attacks by his political opponents. Macrossan in particular 
was a regular critic, claiming partly from Griffith's ability to argue 
on both sides of an issue to have uncovered a moral twist in "Slippery 
Sam". 
Griffith's political strength lay in the application of his con-
siderable intellect to problems, rather than in passionate devotion 
to principles, in oratory, or in physical dominance. His thin 
bespectacled face, slight build (especially when compared with 
Mcllwraith's), his neat and conservative dress—these were not 
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inspiring, but his logic and detailed grasp of central issues was 
compelling. Deakin's pen picture of Griffith in 1883 is, as usual, 
apt: "the leading barrister of the colony, lean, ascetic, cold, clear, 
collected and acidulated" whose "sceptical and almost cynical 
manner" matched his "slightness of build and lack of robust 
physique."*" 
One of Griffith's greatest strengths as a politician was his detailed 
administrative work. In contrast to Mcllwraith's brief minutes on 
despatches, Griffith wrote at length after detailed study of the issues. 
He had begun this practice in his first ministerial position as 
Attorney-General in the 1870s; and his holding between 1883-88 
of the positions of Premier, Chief and Colonial Secretary, Secretary 
of Public Instruction, Colonial Treasurer and Postmaster-General 
only multiplied his minutes. His diary shows that he regularly spent 
long hours in the departments which he controlled, as well as 
frequently working on governmental business at home in the evenings 
and during weekends. As he was also a busy barrister his working 
week often exceeded eighty hours. 
Analysis of his administrative minutes supports claims that he was 
unwilling to delegate authority. Minor matters which seem to present 
no major problems nor to involve any new principle were often 
minuted by Griffith. Favourably viewed, this was a sign of his 
insistence on controlling every aspect of his policy, a quality seen 
also in his involvement in political campaigns in every electorate. 
He was in close contact with Robert Bulcock and R.P. Adams, the 
organizers of the extra-parliamentary Liberal Association, and 
acutely aware from them and his continuous travelling throughout 
Queensland of the appeal of his policies in different electorates. He 
advocated a widening of the franchise and was courting the votes 
of workers to counteract Mcllwraith's appeal lo employers, particu-
larly in primary industries. 
Griffith agreed with Bulcock's tactics of close attention to the 
electoral rolls, using every legal tactic to his own advantage. As plural 
voting was legitimate, Griffith used it to benefit his cause. A check 
of the electoral rolls for 1883 shows that his name appears on the 
rolls for four electorates: Fortitude Valley (based on his residence, 
his expensive riverside family home "Merthyr" in New Farm); North 
Brisbane (based on his Queen Street legal office); Enoggera (based 
on his freehold property, portion 657 at Redcliffe in old Racecourse 
Street), and Moreton (based on his freehold in the Parish of Warner). 
He had expanded his voting rights since entering politics, being 
enrolled only for the electorate of Brisbane in 1870, and for Brisbane 
and Enoggera in 1875. By 1892, when he was again Premier, he 
appears on the rolls for no less than six electorates, having added 
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Nundah (based on freehold at Sandgate, possibly his holiday home), 
and Townsville (based on freehold at Ross Island)." It is possible 
that he voted in all these electorates, votes which, if supported by 
those of other property-owners in his party, could have been 
important in close contests. As so often with Griffith, his legalistic 
approach, which justified these multiple votes, seems to clash with 
his principles, insofar as his policies were tending towards one man, 
one vote. Specifically his electoral reform legislation of 1885 widened 
the franchise with provisions for property or residential quali-
fications. His 1892 legislation instituting contingent (that is, optional 
preferential) voting was also aimed at purifying the rolls, but not 
at abolishing plural voting. 
The issues dividing Queensland's political parties can best be 
illustrated by some of the main legislation, particularly that in-
troduced by Griffith. On the question of the use of land, Mcllwraith's 
legislation had tended to favour the pastoralists, and the alleged land 
scandals had led to attacks by Griffith. Finally Mcllwraith's Land 
Grant Railway Bill, a grandiose scheme which would have given a 
bonus of 12,000,000 acres to its constructing syndicate, had been 
attacked and in fact defeated in parliament. In 1884 Griffith, 
through his Minister Charles Dutton partly influenced by the ideas 
of Henry George, introduced a Land Act. The Bill was intended 
to attack "greedy cormorant and sordid capitalists"." George had 
argued that the best use of capital was its being made available for 
labour on the land, not for the mere accumulation of land, hence 
the Bill stressed the need for improvements on it. The Bill also applied 
the leasing principle tg all lands; half the area leased to pastoralists 
was to be resumed by the Crown, making far more land available 
for small agricultural farms and larger grazing farms. A Land Board 
also replaced the Minister for Lands, following Griffith's stress on 
legal bodies. Somewhat ironically, Griffith in 1884 floated a 
£10,000,000 loan—largely for railway construction. 
On the question of coloured labour Mcllwraith, supported by the 
sugar planters but mindful of the criticisms of abuses of the traffic, 
had passed regulatory legislation in 1880. Griffith when in power, 
pressed by abolitionists in his party but realizing the importance of 
sugar, proceeded slowly. His 1884 Act restricted the use of labour 
even further to field work only, thus protecting white labour from 
competition. But in 1885 following the recruiting scandals, especially 
concerning the Hopeful, Griffith legislated for ending the traffic 
after 31 December 1890. Griffith also repealed Mcllwraith's plans 
for Indian immigrants as soon as he came to power. 
Greater differences lie in the reform legislation introduced by 
Griffith, such as the recognition of trade unions, the Employers' 
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Liability Act, and the Health Act. His First Offenders Probation 
Bill was a pioneer in Australia, though following New Zealand, in 
giving first offenders a suspended sentence. He introduced a Bill to 
prevent the sale of opium to Aborigines. On the question of 
contagious diseases, Griffith found himself opposed by some of the 
solid core of the old laissez-faire liberals. Griffith believed the role 
of the State should increase: "Of course we cannot stamp the disease 
out; but if we find a number of persons engaged in an unlawful 
occupation, which is likely to have the effect of spreading this disease, 
has the State not a right to say, 'We cannot stop the practice of 
your unlawful occupation but so long as you continue to practise 
it we will take care that you do not effect the ruin of the people 
of this colony'?"" The State intervened further in controlling the 
liquor trade, and more markedly in the Public Health Bill of 1884 
which, with the Immigration Act, took the State well into the field 
of public health. 
Griffith's interest in improving standards of health in Queensland, 
particularly in Brisbane, was based on both public and private 
concern. Despite their superior housing and financial advantages, 
his relatives suffered from the poor environment. His children went 
through the cycle of seemingly unavoidable diseases—measles in 
1883 and diptheria in 1884—as well as more serious ones; his father 
had typhoid in 1884. Griffith drafted the Health Bill himself and 
tried to enforce its provisions, as well as being active in organizations 
such as the Society for the Prevention of Consumption. As he grew 
older he became almost hypochondriacal about health, giving his 
friends detailed descriptions of his various ailments, especially after 
the lingering death of his eldest son in 1901. 
He was closely involved in most of the legislation of his period 
as Premier. As an example his concern in local government was 
shown by the nine Acts introduced between 1883-88. He had 
introduced a comprehensive Act in 1878 which led to the creation 
and functioning of municipal bodies controlled by the State. Later 
in 1890-91 he was to pass three more measures in this field, including 
a Valuation and Rating Act which made Queensland a pioneer in 
Australia by adopting the concept of assessing rates on the un-
improved value of land. 
A split in Griffith's Liberal Party appeared in August 1887 over 
the means of facing the growing financial crisis. J.R. Dickson {see 
Appendix) resigned as Colonial Treasurer when he objected to the 
application of a proposed land tax, which he thought pressed solely 
on one class of proprietors, the freeholders, leaving "all leaseholders, 
some of whom are virtually freeholders, under easy terms of 
acquisition,—wholly exempt". He also foreshadowed opposition to 
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Griffith's proposed Financial Districts Bill, which was related to his 
ideas of separation. Dickson's immediate demands were for an 
additional £20,000 to be raised from railway revenue, and £1,000,000 
from the sale of land. In his speech, perhaps only as a formal gesture, 
he said that he regretted leaving the Ministry in "the light of ... 
[Griffith's] great talents and abilities".*' Dickson's resignation was 
followed by that of T. MacDonald Paterson, who also claimed to 
be maintaining his loyalty to Griffith and his party. 
By September defeat was being predicted for Griffith and his 
followers. Thus MacGregor wrote, "For the sake of Queensland and 
Australia—and 1 may add of the Empire—I trust ... to see you still 
for many years Premier of Queensland, but should defeat come you 
know how to bear it".*' Others realized the difficulties from the 
resignation of members; thus Garrick said, "the great dearth of fit 
men amongst our people for office must be a perplexing trouble for 
you whenever there is need to fill a vacancy". Garrick also foresaw 
Griffith's retirement: "I fancy that I saw in your last letter a 
disposition to be tired of public life—you have had a hard time of 
it, all thru but especially of late, 1 trust however in the interests 
of the colony you will always continue in public life.""* Griffith 
reassured Garrick that he intendeo to lead the party in the coming 
election, although he had contemplated resignation in November 
1887 when he again had difficulties in getting through the naval 
defence measures. The naval question was complicated by a local 
incident over the Queensland navy involving the loyalty of Captain 
Wright. 
In the election campaign of 1888 a bitter fight developed in North 
Brisbane, where Mcllwraith opposed Griffith. The latter worked 
energetically, however. He went to Warwick on 7 and 8 February; 
drafted his address to his North Brisbane electors on 18 February, 
revised it on the 21st, then went to the mid-west from 7 to 18 March 
speaking and receiving deputations in Rockhampton, Mount 
Morgan, Emerald, Springsure, Jericho, Barcaldine, Alpha, Cler-
mont, Gladstone, and Bundaberg. He worked further on his main 
electoral speech on 3 April, and on the 5th addressed the electors 
of Brisbane North at the Exhibition grounds in the evening in what 
he described as an "immense and enthusiastic meeting"." On 16 
April he supported another politician, McMaster, at a meeting in 
Parliament Hall; on 17 April he went to Ipswich where he addressed 
an "immense meeting of Macfarlane and Barlow's"." On 21 April 
he left for Maryborough, speaking there and at Childers, Howard, 
and Torbanlea. On 24 April at Gympie after a "torchlight procession 
of 450 torchbearers" he addressed a meeting in the open air which 
he described as a "great success"." He spoke at Tiaro on 25 April. 
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On his return to Brisbane, although "very tired"," he spoke at 
Eraser's meeting in South Brisbane; on 30 April at Brookes's meeting 
at the Town Hall; and on 2 May at Caxton Street. On 3 May he 
was off again to Toowoomba, where after another torchlight 
procession he spoke at Groom and Aland's meeting; he spoke again 
in Brisbane on the following night. 
All his efforts to regain political control were in vain, for in the 
election on 5 May he ran second to Mcllwraith, who defeated him 
soundly; Brookes was also beaten. After parliament met Griffith was 
again defeated by Mcllwraith, who became premier. He was to 
resign on 30 November 1888 because of ill health, to be succeeded 
by Boyd Morehead, whose ministry was further weakened when 
Mcllwraith resigned from it on 16 September 1889. A parliamentary 
deadlock occurred in November 1889, to be settled by an interview 
between Morehead, Griffith, and Thynne. Griffith's diary on 4 
November records the occasion: "Met Morehead and settled 
deadlock"." 
All the political leaders were feeling the strain of the degenerating 
economic situation. By August 1890 Griffith was making overtures 
to join his erstwhile bitterest opponent in office. Through the 
intermediation of C H . Buzacott, the editor of the Brisbane Courier, 
the terms of the union were negotiated and Griffith became premier 
again in August 1890. So began the so-called Griffilwraith, the joint 
Ministry that was to last some thirty months until Griffith's elevation 
to the Bench in 1893. 
These months of Griffith's final political office were constantly 
overshadowed by the deepening economic crisis, which can be the 
only explanation for the changes in Griffith's attitudes. On the 
question of land and in an endeavour to gain finance he supported 
a land-grant system, opposed to his earlier views; he granted an 
extension of ten years on the immigration of Kanaka workers for 
the sugar fields, believing that in the crisis the sugar industry, facing 
severe competition from beet sugar, could only survive if its labour 
costs remained low; after the shearers' strike of 1891 he became— 
somewhat wrongly—identified with the reaction against enlarging 
the representation of labour in parliament and extending the rights 
of trade unionists. On this issue Griffith was more consistent with 
his principles: he tried to stop the Ministry from taking sides with 
either the pastoralists or the shearers, and tried to insist on the rule 
of law; his praise was for those who had defended the law, his 
criticisms not of the claims of the shearers but of what he regarded 
as their illegal methods. In social welfare legislation, lacking money, 
he could achieve very little. On his side Mcllwraith made concessions 
by his acceptance of the Naval Defence Bill, and support of the 
university. 
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A legal writer, C.L. Pannam, has called Griffith, in his attitude 
to labour, the radical Chief Justice. Theoretically the nineteenth 
century moves from classic laissez-faire liberalism to the so-called 
"new" liberalism, which had been followed by Griffith, involved 
acceptance by liberals of more State action, especially to bring about 
the removal of constraints on liberty. In applying this specifically 
to constraints on the working class, whereas earlier classic liberals 
had stressed the importance of freedom of contract controlled by 
the rule of law, newer liberals argued that workers possessed the 
right to combine and that the State should recognize this right. 
Hence liberals like Griffith were both challenging the concept of 
freedom of contract and introducing legislation to legalize trade 
unions. In his 1886 speech introducing the Trade Union Bill Griffith 
had said he was following the British example in legalizing them: 
"we know perfectly well that under existing conditions they are 
admitted, not only in Great Britain but in most civilised countries, 
to be societies of advantage to trade, and serve many useful purposes; 
and it is manifestly absurd that combinations of this kind should 
be unlawful in consequence of a rule of law established centuries 
ago."*' Likewise Griffith's gradual moves towards education for all 
recognized that workers should not be denied the vote or even 
representation in parliament. His 1887 Acts had increased the size 
of the house from fifty-five to seventy-two members, giving more 
urban seats. Hence also his measures to prevent the disenfranchise-
ment of wandering workers, and to provide from 1886 for payment 
of members' expenses. In his 1888 electoral address he had boldly 
asserted that "the great problem of this age is not how to accumulate 
wealth, but how to secure its more equitable distribution ... it is our 
duty to use every effort to prevent the creation in this new land of 
such terrible inequalities of condition as are found in Europe, and 
even in the United States of America."" After Griffith's defeat in 
this 1888 election Labor gained its first representation in the 
Queensland parliament when Thomas Glassey won a by-election. 
Griffith became Glassey's mentor in the house, and Glassey sup-
ported Griffith's opposition party. Perhaps Griffith's support of labor 
was an effort to regain political power. If this was so, he went to 
extremes in his writings. On 17 December 1888 the radical news-
paper Boomerang carried his article called "Wealth and Want", 
especially written for its editor, William Lane. In this article he 
attacked the 
"sweating" system which is only a following out of the principle of 
unrestricted competition lo its natural and logical conclusion, [and 
which] .shows that sometimes the price charged to the producer for his 
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food is so high that he cannot pay for enough to keep him alive—and 
so he dies, and the weakest goes to the wall. 
Is such competition really free? is it any more free than any other 
competition of the weak against the strong? ... When the possessor of 
raw material has been strong enough, he has not always gone through 
the form of giving his labourers food in the form of wages, but has merely 
provided Ihem with as much food, in the form of food, as he thought 
necessary. This was called "slavery". In what essential particulars does 
the so-called "free" competition differ from slavery? So far from being 
free, it is the complete domination of the weak by the strong.'* 
And he had also argued that one of the principal functions of 
government was "to protect the weak against the strong, and to 
secure to every man real freedom. And it is only the State, i.e. the 
community in the aggregate, that can enforce the rule of freedom"." 
Griffith's article had won immediate radical sympathy and 
support. Lane comparing his contributions to those of Marx and 
Henry George; in a private letter Lane urged Griffith to lead 
Australian radicalism: "What Pericles was to Athens and Greece 
such a leader could be to Australia and Queensland."™ Lane realized, 
however, the prejudice against Griffith as a wealthy lawyer leading 
the radicals. Glassey also praised Griffith, saying he had never 
doubted his "genuine desire to permanently lift the masses as far 
as you could by legislation", but warned him against associating with 
what he called "sham liberals"." Conservative opinion was hostile: 
Griffith's article was variously attacked as "communistic" or "out-
rageous" or as "curiously illogical" and "impractical".'- Griffith 
went further than this one article: he repeated his views in another 
form, as "The Distribution of Wealth" published in the Sydney 
Centennial Magazine in June 1889. He sent copies of this article 
to his friends in all the other colonies, and to Britain. Griffith argued 
in letters enclosing these articles that some action was essential as 
"the only hope of averting a terrible social upheaval and 
revolution"." Griffith's next step in Queensland was to seek legisla-
tion: he introduced, unsuccessfully, an eight-hour Bill, then drew up 
two Bills which he called the elementary property law of Queensland, 
and brought them before the house as a private member on 22 July 
1890. The first Bill set out a declaratory statement of natural law, 
listing fifteen first principles; the second Bill set out ways of enforcing 
these principles under Queensland law. Thus the first principle read: 
"all persons are by natural law, equally entitled to the right of life, 
and to the right of freedom for the exercise of their faculties; and 
no person has, by natural law, any rights superior to the right of 
any other person in this respect". The final principle declared "It 
is the duty of the state to make provision by positive law for securing 
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the proper distribution of the products of labour in accordance with 
the principles hereby declared".'" 
Griffith knew he had little chance of passing the legislation; a letter 
to a friend on 3 August 1890 admits this, especially as the "truths 
... declared in my Bill are practically unknown. Indeed they are for 
the most part when stated vehemently and abusively denied".'* 
The trouble he took in writing articles and drafting Bills was the 
strongest evidence of his sincere support for the rights of labour. 
Little more can be said in evidence: three weeks after his Bills had 
been read he took office with Mcllwraith, who quite clearly had 
no sympathy with such ideas. 
If the economic crisis was the reason for the union, any profit-
sharing schemes seemed misplaced, since most employers faced 
losses. In the strikes Griffith's attitudes about labour have been 
misinterpreted. He was a strong critic of the pastoralists, attacking 
their actions: "a policy of exasperation calculated to alienate the 
sympathy of impartial observers as they have gone far to alienate 
mine"; and also of the unionists, arguing that "the government will 
not assume the position of being allies of one class only".'*" 
Yet it was the Griffilwraith that prosecuted the strikers at 
Rockhampton, and Griffith praised those who enforced the law. 
Strikes were not his way to correct injustice. He said in parliament 
in 1891 that he had no sympathy with "men who endeavour to bring 
about reforms ... by crime and violence"." After the strike the 
bitterness engendered prevented any alliances between liberals and 
working-class or other radicals. The labor leaders attacked Griffith 
vigorously, both as Premier and personally, as a turn-coat. Thus Lane 
had a character in his novel The Workingman's Paradise declare 
that "Griffith is a fraud ... [with his] cant ... [about] Elementary 
Property Bills and Wealth and Want and that sort of wordy 
tommyrot".'" There is evidence after 1890, however, of Griffith's 
continued concern with labour. He gave evidence to the New South 
Wales Royal Commission on strikes in 1891, where his Queensland 
elementary property Bill was considered as an alternative to strikes, 
direct action, and consequent clashes. Griffith argued that employers 
and employees should not regard each other as hostile armies, but 
should realize that they shared common interests. As Chief Justice 
of Queensland and in the High Court he had little opportunity for 
pubUc statements or actions; insofar as he regarded himself as be-
ing bound by the words of the Constitution his judgements against 
new protection and his opposition to Higgins's arbitration powers 
cannot necessarily be taken as shown his views. 
In 1895 he gave an Australian Association for the Advancement 
of Science paper on "A plea for the study of the unconscious vital 
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processes in the life of communities". This was mainly an analysis 
of basic economic principles but it restressed his concept that it was 
the duty of government to act if "some members of the community 
suffer want or privation while others have enough"." In 1917 he 
wrote three memoranda on strikes, showing increased hostility to 
direct action, even urging that strikers should be deprived of their 
civil rights. In 1919 after retirement from the position of Chief 
Justice he restated his fundamental beliefs in an article called "The 
Social Problem". His principles were now expanded to twenty-two, 
all needing to be accepted before a social order based on "mastery" 
could be replaced by one based on "fraternity".*" Griffith died on 
9 August 1920 and no direct use was ever made of his 1919 principles, 
which he had first formulated in the 1880s. 
It was partly his frustrations with the failure to implement his 
views on labour that had made him so relieved to leave Queensland 
politics to become Chief Justice in March 1893." The portrait of 
Griffith as a Queensland politician must end at that point although 
Griffith was to become even more influential in the wider Australian 
scene. 
During his time as first Chief Justice of the High Court of 
Australia, from 1903 to 1919, every aspect of Australian develop-
ment came under his aegis. Although he had moved to Sydney, he 
retired to his home "Merthyr" in Brisbane and his sympathies 
remained with his adopted state of Queensland. The home had 
become a symbol of his rise from poverty in Wales to his wealth 
as a judge. Griffith was proud of this well-furnished house with its 
sweeping riverside grounds, and as in other matters his property-
owning clashed with his professed principles. Certainly he hoped to 
give his six children (two sons and four daughters) the best 
opportunities that his money could provide, both in education and 
in society. All his children went to private schools; his elder son 
Llewellyn was encouraged in his engineering studies, being sent to 
England to forward his career; his eldest daughter Eveline was 
married in the Anglican cathedral (indeed it has been claimed that 
Griffith joined this Church, leaving his father's Congregational 
Church, for the sake of social prestige). Eveline married T.H. Brown, 
a prosperous merchant, in 1894 and his fifth child Edith married 
George Doyle, a grazier, in 1907. Likewise the gatherings at 
"Merthyr", hostessed by Julia, were not only social occasions but 
ways of furthering both his political and legal careers. His rise in 
the various masonic orders to which he had belonged since 1865 was 
also important to his status. The same year that he became chief 
justice he became Provincial Grand Master under the Irish constitu-
tion. Griffith was a man who cherished the prestige of such positions 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
SAMUEL WALKER GRIFFITH 175 
he was ambitious for himself and his family, and he had become 
in several senses a man of property. 
Even without his important later careers, which perforce were 
largely outside of Queensland, Griffith would have been remembered 
for his achievements as a Queensland politician. Adams's warnings 
of his lust for power do less than justice to his efforts in Queensland. 
On the wider Australian scene his involvement in questions of 
imperial relations, defence, and federation had made him known 
throughout the country. In Queensland as a liberal politician both 
in opposition and in government, but particularly as Premier from 
1883 to 1888, he had achieved much for Queenslanders, both in 
developing the resources of the colony and in endeavouring to spread 
them more evenly among all groups. His second Premiership, plagued 
by economic crises, should not be allowed to obscure his earlier 
efforts. 
Certainly of all the politicians studied in this book he was 
intellectually the most able. This ability was recognized by his 
followers in an era before the modern party system further 
challenged the power of the individual leader. As a politician Griffith 
realized the skills needed to survive, and one reason for the extremes 
of praise and censure was his astuteness in defending whatever 
position was expedient. This leads to difficulties in working out the 
principles he supported. His logical legal mind worked at problems 
and it is often hard to judge the sincerity behind the principles on 
which he based his arguments; he clearly also sought property and 
prestige. Herein lie Adams's fears—if his main lust was for power, 
if he could argue, icily and logically, he could be a dictator to be 
dreaded. But he was a servant of the law, he believed in the rule 
of law, and both as a politician in Queensland and as Chief Justice 
he always worked within its framework. 
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The Man and the Legend 
ROSEMARY GILL 
Thomas Joseph Byrnes, one of the most enigmatic personalities in 
Queensland's history, was Premier for a mere five months, from April 
1898 until his death in September of that year. Yet, despite so brief 
a tenure of office, this Liberal politician inspired a wealth of 
eulogistic literature during his career and, intermittently, for a 
number of years after his premature demise. In addition, Byrnes is 
the only Queensland premier to be honoured with two memorial 
statues, and—in the distinguished company of Sir Charles Lilley 
{see Ch. 3) and T.J. Ryan {see Ch. 10)—to have a medal for 
scholarship posthumously endowed in his name. 
In many ways Thomas Byrnes's life story is a classic instance of 
"rags to riches": born in Brisbane, on 11 November 1860, he was 
the eighth child in a family of eleven, whose parents were poor Irish-
Catholic immigrants. When Thomas was about a year old the Byrnes 
moved to Humpybong, on Moreton Bay, about twenty miles north 
of Brisbane. Here his father, Patrick, practised some form of mixed 
farming on land purchased from Tom Petrie. In 1866 the family 
moved again, this time to Bowen and the company of relatives, whom 
a later writer described as "butchers and dealers in XXX [beer]".' 
Greater things were in store for young Thomas, however: a brilliant 
and diligent student, he won a succession of State and private awards 
which took him from the Bowen State Primary School to Brisbane 
Boys Grammar, and thence to the University of Melbourne where 
he obtained an Arts-Law degree. Six years after his return to 
Queensland, he became Minister for Justice in the newly formed 
coalition government of 1890.^  From then on, until his death in 1898, 
Thomas Byrnes's star seemed to be in the ascendant. 
Thomas Byrnes: MLC 1890-93; MLA (Cairns) 1893-96, (Warwick) 1896-98; 
Solicitor-General 1890-93; Auorney-Gencral 1893-98; Premier, Chief Secretary, and 
Attorney-General 1898 
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The man's native birth and humble background, his diligence and 
academic success, his political prowess and premature death—all 
these form the constant theme of the panegyrical writings that 
Byrnes inspired. This corpus of literature, together with public 
honours like the commemorative statues and medal, comprises what 
Ronald Lawson has termed the "Byrnes Legend".' The motif of the 
legend is success, the admirable success and self-betterment sup-
posedly attainable by anyone who is willing to work both honestly 
and hard. Byrnes, the legend claims, was such a person, his 
industrious study and personal integrity raising him to the highest 
office in the land. 
When testing the validity of the legend, it is interesting—and 
necessary—to see how far the most generously praised aspects of 
Byrnes's success embodied cherished beliefs and standards of the 
age. Consider, for example, the importance given to his academic 
achievements: by the late 1880s, Brisbane's previously flexible socio-
economic framework had hardened into a structure which offered 
few opportunities for social mobility. In fact, education was left as 
virtually the only means for members of the lower classes to improve 
their status in society. Secondary and tertiary scholarships were 
scarce, however, and advanced schooling was thus closed to nearly 
all except the wealthy. 
Yet, while the privileged inhabitants of Brisbane jealously guarded 
the entrance to their circles, they resented any suggestion that 
poverty existed in the colony, or that hard work in the schoolroom 
—and in the career that resulted—would not improve an individual's 
material prosperity and social standing. The "good life" was 
impossible only for dullards and slackers, for those who had neither 
the wit nor the will to take advantage of the generous opportunities 
for advancement held out by the Queensland way of life. 
Consequently, the career of Thomas Byrnes provided an ex-
emplum for those who supported the State system of education and 
argued that it did, indeed, contain a promise of self-betterment for 
the poorest, humblest pupil. Byrnes had progressed from scholarship 
to scholarship within this system and, in 1890, "proved" that lowly 
origins did not debar a man from achieving eminence in colonial 
society. This thesis, of course, ignored the exceptional nature of 
Byrnes's intellect, and set him up as a behavioural paradigm for 
colonial youth in toto. Hence the confident assertion made in a State-
sponsored publication of 1905: 
The keynote of any discourse upon social ethics in Queensland must be 
that consciousness of the equality, or potential equality, of all men which 
is the Queenslander's vantage ground in his attitude towards the world 
... every Queensland lad ... believes that he may one day be Premier 
because he has seen the poorest State school child, by his own unaided 
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exertions, bring himself through school and university to the first position 
in the land ... He sees money, honours and position the daily portion 
of his neighbours, and unless he is a clod, which the State does its best 
to prevent him being, he falls into the line, both of thought and action 
which has made his fellows great. 
The contemporary concept of progress is thus expressed in an 
imputed relationship between moral and economic affairs; an 
individual's prosperity exists in proportion to his conscientious use 
of the opportunities for advancement offered to him by society. The 
work just quoted continues thus: "Naturally, education and pro-
fessional pursuits go hand in hand, but it is the man himself and 
not his occupation which is to be weighed in the balance and approved 
or found wanting."" In the terms of the first part of the quotation, 
however, it is precisely the character and ethical calibre of a man 
which determine his place in life; by corollary, therefore, Byrnes's 
integrity increased at the same rate as his social and political 
prosperity. 
Furthermore, the success which Byrnes's intellectual endeavours 
brought him seemed to complement the existing order, rather than 
question it. As Stephenson noted in the Annals of the Brisbane 
Grammar School: "The late P.J. McDermott expressed the view that 
there would have been no Labour party had Byrnes lived. His idea 
was that Byrnes would have struck a happy medium course."^ During 
the 1880s the slow shift of Irish-Catholic loyalty towards labor had 
been determinedly fought by the Catholic conservatives of Thomas 
Mcllwraith's {see Ch. 5) party. These same men subsequently 
enjoyed an ideological Indian summer, provided by the lengthy 
regime of the coalition Government: a considerable number of 
Catholic politicians attained prominence in the Continuous Ministry 
of 1890-1903, but none in so meteoric a fashion as Thomas Byrnes, 
the manifestation of conservative Catholic success. As for 
McDermott's verdict, quoted above, one must observe that Byrnes's 
rise from obscure, Irish-Catholic origins provided a well-publicized 
refutation of Labor's claim that true social mobility was impossible 
within the established structure of Queensland society. 
Thus, the importance of Catholic sympathy in the formation of 
the legend is obvious. Nor did Byrnes's success cause him to neglect 
his faith; in Archbishop Dunne's words, he was "a good practical 
Catholic", who "never missed his Sunday Mass".' Yet how, one 
might ask, did Thomas Byrnes's inherent appeal to the Catholic 
electorate avoid alienating Protestant support? According to the 
legend, it was because of his tolerant, virtually ecumenical attitude, 
in what was predominantly an age of sectarianism: "Foes he had 
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few. His broad-minded Catholic spirit neutralised antagonism.'" A 
work published at the turn of the century is still more explicit in 
assigning a fine generosity of outlook to Byrnes: "He was as human 
as the rest of us, but free from the fatal flaw of meanness; he had 
the rare largeness of heart which creates friendship, despite the 
wildest differences of political or theological opinion."' 
In addition to this happy fusion of social and other factors in 
Byrnes's public image, the legend testifies to a charismatic charm 
of manner, complemented by a fine physical appearance. James 
Blair, later Attorney-General and then Chief Justice of Queensland, 
described him in the following terms: "A head well-formed, set firmly 
upon broad shoulders—the body frame massive and the ensemble 
commanding. Very fine, luminous and expressive eyes, set widely 
apart beneath a broad forehead, coupled with a strong musical voice 
gave him a power of compelling and holding men's attention." In 
company with the pleasant exterior went: "A very simple and 
beautiful nature. Kindly and generous, always courteous to people 
of high or low degree, he was greatly liked and respected."' 
The personal and academic integrity which, it seems, ensured 
Byrnes's success, permeate the legend. Consider, for example, the 
Brisbane Courier's obituary for the dead Premier: "In his all too 
short life Mr. Byrnes has taught us at once the possibility and value 
of high ideals in a public career ... he has shown that Government 
can be carried on without the placation of political sops, without 
chicanery, without vacillation, without meanness of motive, without 
deflection from justice."'" The fact that Thomas Byrnes's ascribed 
high principles were accompanied by brilliant youthfulness only 
added to his stature in a young country confident of its own glorious 
future: here, in Byrnes, was a leader of appropriate mettle. The man 
himself undoubtedly supported the popular belief in Australia's 
coming greatness: his review of James Brunton Stephens's poetry 
lavished particular praise upon "A Coin of Trajan in Australia", 
a poem which nicely combines national self-confidence with a 
modesty becoming in so new a nation." 
As suggested by the Brisbane Courier at the time of Byrnes's 
appointment as Solicitor-General, many Queenslanders favoured the 
selection of clever young men—especially those with the added 
qualification of Australian birth—to look after the colony's develop-
ing interests.'- His youth and colonial origin received similar public 
emphasis at the time of his appointment as leader of the Government 
in 1898: "Mr. Byrnes ... will be the youngest man who has ever held 
office as Premier in Queensland, and he will be the first native-born 
Queenslander called upon to fill that distinguished position."" 
Thomas Byrnes's untimely death was a potent contribution to the 
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legend, as witnessed by the Telegraph's obituary: "A young life, full 
of promise for great deeds, [has] ceased to be. Queensland's premier 
is dead, and now the heads of friends and foes alike are bowed in 
sorrow and sympathy. It has been given to few men to compass so 
much success within the narrow compass of 38 years."'" Such 
sentiments imply a double loss, a belief that potential greatness has 
been destroyed, as well as the greatness already attained. George 
Essex Evans's memorial poem is, likewise, both a plaint on 
implacable destiny and an assertion that Byrnes's achievements left 
a lasting impression on the destinies of Queensland and Australia: 
Calm be his sleep who lived to dare. 
Go; say a patriot slumbers there 
Whose brows were never bent to wear 
His loftiest fame. 
Yet wrote on Queensland's page a rare, 
A fadeless name.'-
Thus the legend obviously epitomized cherished contemporary 
beliefs, and indeed was deliberately cultivated as "proof' that 
unrestricted advancement was possible for every member of colonial 
society. Byrnes's success, and the legend's interpretation of it, were 
intricately bound up with ethical, religious, economic, and political 
standards of the day, standards that were themselves interlocking 
components of the late nineteenth century Queensland ethos; it has 
been shown how material progress assumed a quasi-moral veneer, 
and how this veneer, in turn, drew its substance from the integrity 
of the hard work which supposedly ensured a man's self-betterment. 
To the privileged, Byrnes "proved" that such integrity was all a man 
needed to achieve the good life. To the poor and neglected, his success 
may well have been the bright hope in their Pandora's box of chronic 
hardship. 
Yet, simply because the legend is consonant with the prejudices 
of the society that produced it, one cannot instantly dismiss the 
integrity, tolerance, and political acumen that it imputes to Thomas 
Byrnes; the only way to evaluate the historical accuracy of this 
intriguing body of material is to measure its claims against the man's 
actual political career. 
In August 1890 Byrnes became Minister for Justice, or, as the 
position was termed in his case, Solicitor-General. Thomas Byrnes's 
appointment to this, his first public office, came about through the 
intervention of Sir Samuel Griffith {see Ch. 6), leader of the nascent 
coalition government. As the Governor of Queensland, Sir Henry 
Norman informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies: "I thought 
it right to accede to the request of Sir Samuel Griffith as he 
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particularly desired to have the services of Mr. Byrnes as Solicitor 
General in his Ministry with a seat in the Legislative Council."" 
Griffith, one should note, had been a member of the Board of 
Trustees for the Brisbane Boys Grammar School during Byrnes's 
years there; presumably. Sir Samuel's initial impression of the boy's 
potential had been confirmed by the young men's excellent tertiary 
record, and his early success as a barrister. 
Byrnes was evidently a capable Minister, who punctiliously 
attended to the daily requirements of his office. The personal 
opinions he aired during the parliaments of 1890-93 reveal that he 
was deeply imbued with the materialism and nationalism of the age. 
Thus, when speaking as a politician, Byrnes consistently urged the 
adoption of measures that would help ensure Queensland's develop-
ment, prestige, and security. Energetic railway construction, for 
example, would open up the colony for further settlement and 
exploitation; as he said of the Mount Morgan Railway Bill in 1890, 
"It will be a very good thing for the Central District and, I have 
no doubt, for all Queensland as well"." Byrnes's support for the 
Pacific Islanders (Extension) Bill of 1892 also devolved upon the 
colony's social and economic stability. The Solicitor-General, like 
Griffith himself, had come to believe that a short-term continuation 
of Kanaka labour was necessary for the survival of the valuable 
Queensland sugar industry: "It is not a measure which can be 
referred to as in the slightest degree opening the door to coloured 
labour generally ... this measure ... will do good not only to the sugar 
planters, but to all the working men throughout ... Queensland."" 
Furthermore, Byrnes believed that only a united colony could be 
truly great and unassailably secure. Hence his reaction to the 
Queensland Constitution Bill, a piece of proposed legislation that 
attempted to meet the most urgent demands of the northern 
separationists, yet avoid complete division within the colony. In the 
man's own words: "The separatist tendency, which is a danger, must 
come to an end; under this Bill we shall still remain an undivided 
people in a united country, and, further, we shall be giving a practical 
lesson to other portions of Australia in the work of federation that 
will redound to our credit."" It is not surprising to learn that Thomas 
Byrnes, at this stage in his career, supported the idea of federation: 
he was, after all, the protege of Sir Samuel Griffith. One should 
realize, however, that Byrnes's espousal of the federal cause arose 
essentially from a pragmatic appraisal of Queensland's security vis-
a-vis the other colonies, and possible foreign aggression.^ 
The Solicitor-General was also involved in some extra-parlia-
mentary situations, the first of which was the shearers' strike of early 
1891. Byrnes's part in the Government's suppression of the unrest 
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was technically consonant with his ministerial office. As well as 
pronouncing on the seditious nature of speeches made by certain 
leaders of the movement,^' the Solicitor-General supplied grounds 
for criminal charges to be made; an archaic conspiracy law was 
invoked to deal with the situation, and a number of prominent 
strikers were subsequently convicted." Byrnes's action was in keeping 
with his role as an officer of the coalition Ministry, some of whose 
members saw unionism as a disruptive force in society. On a personal 
level, it emerges that Thomas Byrnes was prepared to go to any 
lengths within the law to achieve his desired purpose; one can but 
remark that it is frequently a slender line of principle that separates 
determination from ruthlessness. 
During his term as Minister, Byrnes was involved in two other 
important legal cases, the first of which was the Queensland 
Investment ... Company v. Grimley and other defendants, whose 
ranks included such public figures as Sir Thomas Mcllwraith and 
Sir Arthur Palmer {see Appendix). Byrnes led the defence to a 
victory which, in the words of St Ledger, was "largely contributed 
to by the skill, ability, pertinacity, and eloquence of [its] leading 
counsel"." 
The Robb Arbitration Case of 1892 brought Thomas Byrnes a 
further triumph, but one which subsequently reflected upon his 
professional reputation. The proceedings seemed unnecessarily pro-
tracted and both Griffith, as leading counsel, and Byrnes, as one 
of his assistants, received exceptionally large fees; the possibility of 
corruption was all too obvious for A.G. Stephens, who launched a 
particularly virulent attack against both men." Admittedly, Stephens 
was a determined opponent of the coalition, yet even the sympathetic 
St Ledger described the legal costs of the case as "enormous"." 
Similar charges bedevilled Byrnes in 1893, when the complete table 
of costs was finally placed before parliament. 
Certain weaknesses have been discovered already in the legend's 
picture of Thomas Byrnes, namely his debatable conduct during the 
strike and the public criticism excited by the Robb Arbitration Case. 
In 1891 another incident occurred that was undoubtedly an example 
of autocratic behaviour on the part of the Solicitor-General, if not 
an instance of outright sectarian bias. The other personalities directly 
involved were J. Howard Gill, then Crown Solicitor, and F.S. 
Kennedy, a would-be articled clerk and, like Byrnes, a professed 
Catholic.^' 
It had originally been intended that Kennedy should become 
articled to Howard Gill, upon paying the usual premium to the latter, 
but conditions arose which made it impossible for the Crown Solicitor 
to accept this payment. Consequently, as Howard Gill explained to 
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W. Cahill, the Under-Secretary for Justice, the arrangement with 
Kennedy was invalidated, according to accepted legal protocol. At 
this point Byrnes suddenly intervened, to insist that the Crown 
Solicitor accept Kennedy as an articled clerk, even without the 
receipt of a premium. Yet, as Howard Gill pointed out in his 
subsequent letter to Cahill, this was not a legitimate occasion for 
ministerial patronage; he, Howard Gill, granted applications for 
articles in his capacity as a solicitor of the Supreme Court, and not 
via his office in the public service. 
The Solicitor-General nevertheless virtually forced Howard Gill 
to accept Kennedy as an articled clerk. The central point of the 
Crown Solicitor's argument was completely ignored by Byrnes, who 
treated the matter as one totally encompassed by his own authority 
as Minister." One is reminded of Byrnes's use of the outdated 
conspiracy law to convict the unionists' leaders during the strike; 
the same headstrong determination to achieve his purpose is evident 
but, in Howard Gill's case, a definite breach of legal ethics resulted. 
Thomas Byrnes was appointed Attorney-General in March 1893 
and, in the subsequent general election, won the seat of Cairns which 
he held until 1896. The former post became his in a redistribution 
of offices that was brought about by the resignation of Sir Charles 
Lilley as Chief Justice; Griffith assumed this position, and the vacant 
position of attorney-general fell to Byrnes. One should note that, 
according to Bernays, Griffith "sent" Byrnes to Cairns for election 
in the same manner as Mcllwraith had "sent" his current choice 
for Attorney-General to Bowen. In Bernays's terms, Cairns was Sir 
Samuel's "pocket borough", just as Bowen was Mcllwraith's.^* 
Byrnes's own electoral policy, however, was undoubtedly calcu-
lated to win the votes of the many cane farmers in the Cairns district. 
His support for the continued employment of Kanaka labour, for 
example, had obvious appeal; island workers were seen by Byrnes 
as an unavoidable component of Queensland's development. On 
Labor's avowed intention to stop the importing of Kanakas, he 
commented that "They might just as well say they would drive all 
horses out of the country and put men in their place ... the 
employment of island labour was paving the way for the settlement 
of white people".-" 
During his campaign Byrnes virtually ignored the separation issue, 
apart from one statement of a markedly nebulous nature." Such an 
approach was obviously prudent in this part of Queensland. Oppo-
nents of separation were able to take heart from the candidate's 
refusal to commit himself to the division of the colony. Separa-
tionists, on the contrary, could interpret Byrnes's declared interest 
in northern development as tacit support for their ideals. 
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The future member's platform proved to be overwhelmingly 
popular: on election day. Cairns itself provided the largest bloc of 
support for Byrnes, who polled 156 votes, as opposed to a mere 68 
for his Labor opponent, Thomas Givens." 
During his subsequent three years in parliament, Byrnes generally 
supported the policies he had advocated at Cairns, the only outright 
change occurring in his views on separation, which were somewhat 
vague and non-committal at the time of his election. Although a 
former supporter of the Queensland Constitution Bill in 1892, 
Thomas Byrnes now became a determined opponent of all attempts 
to subdivide the colony. This volte-face was symptomatic of a process 
whereby Byrnes's political beliefs hardened into a philosophy that 
depended on something more than just the contemporary catchcry 
of "progress". Indeed, he evolved the theory for what could be 
legitimately described as a programme of government. Certainly, his 
was a goal common to the age, namely the best possible future for 
Queensland, but, in the course of action which he believed would 
attain this goal, one can appreciate a coherent interlocking of 
hitherto unrelated factors. Admittedly, these factors had been loosely 
associated via the late nineteenth century belief in progress 171^0 
progress; Byrnes, however, developed what he saw as a valid causal 
relationship between them, a relationship that seemed to him to hold 
the key to Queensland's future security. 
The Kanaka trade was a basic factor in Thomas Byrnes's 
programme. Like other men of his time, he considered it distinctly 
possible that Queensland could be overwhelmed by an influx of land-
hungry Asiatics; the only way of averting this danger was to open 
up the empty northern territories and promptly settle them with 
Europeans, related tasks in which coloured labour played a vital— 
but strictly utilitarian—role." Byrnes believed that an independent 
colony of north Queensland would swiftly come under the control 
of a Labor government, and Labor, of course, was a dedicated 
opponent of the Kanaka trade. The North, he feared, would languish 
in a limbo of under-development, once island workers were no longer 
available. In such an event, both portions of the formerly united 
colony would be an easy prey for any invader, particularly one of 
nearby, Asiatic origin." 
Such an outright disavowal of separation was hardly calculated 
to endear Byrnes to many of his northern constituents, and it may 
well have been their disaffection which persuaded him not to seek 
re-election for the seat of Cairns in 1896. He chose, instead, to stand 
for North Brisbane. Yet, by the time of the elections, a considerable 
number of Brisbane voters had been alienated by Byrnes's support 
for the unpopular Peace Preservation Bill of 1894, and the equally 
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disliked Suppression of Gambling Bill of 1895. Byrnes, however, was 
convinced that both measures would contribute to the stability— 
social and otherwise—that he believed was necessary for 
Queensland's well-being." 
In addition, by 1896, there was a growing ministerial hostility 
towards the Attorney-General. As C H . Buzacott explained the 
matter, "Byrnes' ... pecuniary position is strained, and he must make 
a large income at his profession, which would leave him little time 
or energy for unpaid parliamentary work. Plainly he does as little 
of it now as possible although a salaried Minister"." Thomas Byrnes 
was evidently not fulfilling the offices of his portfolio, let alone 
meeting the high expectations that had surrounded his initial 
appointment in 1890. 
Repeated enquiries into Byrnes's receipt of fees for the Robb 
Arbitration Case had also cast doubts upon his integrity, as did 
objections to his drastic reduction of Howard Gill's salary. It would 
seem that the Crown Solicitor's "insubordination" in the matter of 
Kennedy's articles had rankled with Byrnes to such an extent that 
he now initiated measures that prejudiced Howard Gill's livelihood." 
This unreasonable retrenchment further tarnished the Attorney-
General's reputation amongst his fellow Ministers and parlia-
mentarians. 
Early in 1896 Byrnes's unpopularity was compounded by an 
accusation that religious favouritism controlled appointments within 
the Department of Justice. The charge was widely publicized and 
indeed stimulated by the Brisbane Courier, which observed that 
"Since 1890 [the year of Byrnes's ministerial appointment] the legal 
profession has been degenerating into Rome Rule, from which, good 
Lord, deliver us"." Although official statistics subsequently dis-
proved this claim, the final damage had been done to Byrnes's 
immediate political ambitions, and he was defeated in the ensuing 
contest for North Brisbane." 
Yet, far from sealing Byrnes's political doom, this episode proved 
to be the first step toward his appointment as leader of the 
Government, in 1898. He had been nominated for North Brisbane 
by the Premier, H.M. Nelson {see Appendix), and shortly after the 
March election the Brisbane Courier commented that "Mr. Nelson 
is keenly sensitive to the rejection of the Attorney-General, whose 
candidature was rooted in his own solicitation, and may be trusted 
to do whatever can be done to save his services to the Ministry, to 
Parliament, and to the country"." 
The reason for Nelson's discomforture is clear, for the North 
Brisbane election carried great weight, and the defeat of the two 
prominent candidates there affected ministerial stability. Emotional-
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ly unsuited for the pressures of office,"" and faced with the impending 
disruption of the upper house, the Premier embarked upon an 
extraordinary course of action to ensure Byrnes's re-election: in short. 
Nelson called upon both candidates for the constituency of Warwick 
to retire from the forthcoming April election so that Thomas Byrnes 
could assume this seat uncontested."' 
The Independent candidate, T.A. Johnson, refused to stand down, 
but the odds were overwhelmingly in Byrnes's favour: the influential 
backing of Arthur Morgan {see Appendix), owner and editor of the 
Warwick Argus; the large Irish-Catholic vote in this electorate; and 
the evergreen attraction of the Attorney-General's native birth, as 
well as his ministerial prestige and persuasive oratory, all helped to 
ensure Byrnes's success at the polls. 
In the Minister's policy speech one can appreciate his adroit 
association of Queensland's interests with the local interests of his 
Warwick audience, and the interdependence he established between 
these two spheres of development. The merits of a programme of 
government-aided settlement were expounded with particular en-
thusiasm; Byrnes believed that Queensland was worthy in everything, 
save its sparse population, to form the seat of an empire and the 
capital of a federated Australia. All that the colony needed was time, 
time in which to augment its resources of manpower, ensure its 
security, and so confirm its potential as the country's foremost 
member."^ Such sentiments were a clarion call for many Queens-
landers of the time, and Thomas Byrnes was elected Member for 
Warwick with the largest majority so far cast for a candidate in 
this district."^ 
In 1897 Nelson and Byrnes represented their colony at the English 
Jubilee celebrations, both men returning to Queensland in January 
of the following year. The president of the Legislative Council, Sir 
Arthur Palmer {see Appendix) died early in April; Nelson became 
his successor and, on 13 April, Thomas Joseph Byrnes was appointed 
Premier and Chief Secretary of the colony of Queensland. Byrnes's 
public image had evidently undergone a dramatic improvement after 
his victory at Warwick, and the people of the colony held high hopes 
for his governmental leadership. According to the Melbourne 
Australasian, "There were expressions of pleasure all over 
Queensland when he was announced as duly installed. The idea that 
a young Premier suited the requirements of the time caught on. It 
promised the opening up of a new era, and probable breaking with 
a past which had grown to be monotonous"."^ 
Horace Tozer, the capable Acting Premier during Nelson's 
absence, had been posted as Agent-General in March 1898 (probably 
at Byrnes's instigation) and was thus ineligible for political office."' 
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The other members of the Continuous Ministry lacked Byrnes's 
electoral appeal—this charisma, created by factors other than his 
political programme itself—and presumably they were aware of this 
fact. Hence one realizes why the Ministers supported the appoint-
ment of their rather unpopular colleague as Premier. Indeed, it could 
be said that their desire for parliamentary survival persuaded 
Byrnes's detractors to exploit those very aspects of his public image 
which, they believed, were singularly unfounded: namely, the person-
al integrity and governmental acumen imputed to Thomas Byrnes 
by the embryonic legend. 
Byrnes's brief Premiership lasted for a little over five months, from 
13 April until 27 September, yet this short tenure of office added 
semi-heroic proportions to the legend; a lament for the destruction 
of both attained and potential greatness runs through most of the 
elegiac literature on Byrnes. Yet an examination of his actual 
performance as Premier produces a sense of anti-climax, for Byrnes 
did little more than reiterate earlier opinions and strategies that had 
sprung from his political programme. Certainly, the young man's 
career was drastically truncated by his premature death, but one 
cannot avoid an impression that virtually nothing was achieved, or 
even decided upon, during Byrnes's Premiership."' Even the then-
vital question of federation was allowed to lapse. The Queensland 
legislature's rejection of the Australasian Federation Enabling Bill 
in 1897 meant that the new Premier, and his colony, could remain 
aloof from any involvement in the federal cause. (It should be 
remembered that Byrnes, at Warwick in 1896, had declared that 
Queensland needed a further period of intensive settlement and 
growth before the colony could take its rightful place in an Australian 
Commonwealth.) 
Thomas Byrnes had to cope also with the scandal generated by 
the "British New Guinea Syndicate Affair"."' The syndicate was 
formed in 1897 for the purpose of acquiring land in New Guinea, 
on which to grow rubber and other tropical products. Its promoters 
conferred with Nelson and Byrnes when the Queensland Ministers 
were in London for the Jubilee celebrations; Nelson notified the 
Colonial Office that he was in favour of the syndicate, but Byrnes 
apparently made no comment. In March 1898, however, a Colonial 
Office Ordinance granting the syndicate concessions was forwarded 
to Queensland, where Byrnes initialled the memorandum, signifying 
approval. 
Yet, upon the scheme being attacked by the premiers of New 
South Wales and Victoria,"' Byrnes similarly turned upon the 
syndicate, and denied that he had ever been a party to the agreement. 
When Nelson's correspondence on the affair was published, the 
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section that would +iave implicated Byrnes was deleted before 
publication, at Byrnes's own request. 
The Premier's duplicity is best explained by reference to the heavy 
necessity that his political programme placed upon the continued 
presence of a Kanaka workforce in north Queensland. The Pacific 
Islanders (Extension) Bill of 1892 would expire in a mere four years 
time—and New Guinea was a tantalizingly close source of labourers 
who could so adequately succeed the Kanakas on the northern 
plantations and properties. Yet, partly becaiise of the abuses of the 
coloured labour trade, a fundamental provision of the Acts creating 
British New Guinea ruled that Papuans could not leave the colony. 
Thus, so long as Britain remained in control, Byrnes had no hope 
of tapping this potential workforce; the Governor of Queensland, 
Lord Lamington, regarded the syndicate as an assurance of Britain's 
continued authority in New Guinea, and it seems reasonable to 
assume similar sentiments on Byrnes's part. The Colonial Office 
refused to withdraw its sanction from the Ordinance, on the grounds 
of honourable commitment, but the opposition of the three colonial 
governments overrode this refusal; all that could be insisted upon 
was the payment of compensation to the syndicate. 
Consider the commitments that faced Byrnes by August 1898: 
in the normal course of events he had the numerous duties of premier 
and chief secretary, the time-consuming Justice portfolio, the 
responsibility of being the Member for Warwick, and the ostensible 
maintenance of a private legal practice. In addition he was required 
to placate the Queensland advocates of federation—as well as the 
now-allied body of northern separationists"'—and to cope with the 
powerful displeasure of the Colonial Office. The pressures of such 
a situation obviously called for great stamina and energy; Byrnes, 
it seems, possessed both and could, at least, contain the diverse 
problems raised by his many offices and liabilities. 
Then, in his fifth month of service, the totally unforeseen occurred. 
During the latter part of August, Byrnes attended a premiers' 
conference in Sydney. He caught a cold before returning to Brisbane 
on 25 August, and on 12 September was again attacked by what 
appeared to be a severe cold. Some days later measles was diagnosed, 
but the patient recovered from this malady, and was soon in a fairly 
satisfactory condition. 
Whilst still a convalescent, however, Byrnes discussed government 
matters with some colleagues on the verandah of his Yeronga home. 
Weakened by disease—and, one suspects, sheer physical exhaustion 
—the Premier caught a chill which swiftly developed into pneu-
monia, complicated by a severe cardiac condition.'^ Public distress 
was intense, with so many enquiries being made about Byrnes's 
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health that his house telephone had to be disconnected. A bicycle 
service was established between the Premier's home and the Yeronga 
railway station, and medical bulletins were regularly posted at the 
latter for the redirected enquiries, which were now made via the 
station telephone." 
Yet neither public concern, nor the best available medical care, 
could stave off his rapid deterioration: Thomas Byrnes died at home 
on 27 September 1898, a little under two months before his thirty-
eighth birthday. 
The deceased was given a State funeral, with all the pomp and 
accompaniments appropriate to one of his office and public popu-
larity. The Governor, Lord Lamington, who had opposed Byrnes in 
the Syndicate Affair, observed that "This loss has been mourned 
as a national one and has elicited the deepest public sorrow. The 
funeral was attended by greater crowds than had ever assembled 
on a similar occasion"." On top of the late Premier's ornate 
tombstone in Toowong Cemetery, a mourning female figure sur-
mounts the words, "Weep, Queensland, weep and with thy tears keep 
green the memory of thy glorious son". 
Such sentiments were undoubtedly sincere amongst the general 
public. Following Byrnes's death, the people of Queensland con-
tributed monies to a "Byrnes Memorial Fund", from which resulted 
the Byrnes Medal for scholarship. Nor was this the only long-term 
tribute paid to the dead Premier. In both Brisbane and Warwick 
a memorial statue was erected, making him the one Queensland 
leader, so far, to have been twice honoured in this manner. At the 
unveiHng of the monument in the capital, Sir Robert Philip {see Ch. 
8) claimed Byrnes as a shining example to all young endeavour: "He 
has shown that no matter how poor a boy's parents be that with 
studious industry, not only the highest position in Queensland, but 
in Australia, can be reached by him."" 
Phoenix-like, a legend had been born; through death, Thomas 
Byrnes came to symbolize the apparent validity of certain beliefs 
that were cherished by contemporary society. Byrnes, of course, was 
not the legendary paragon of personal and political virtue, and, in 
concrete terms, he achieved virtually nothing during his Premiership. 
Clearly, however, such considerations were outweighed by the 
Queensland-oriented rationale of Byrnes's policies, and by the 
glamorous yet reassuring nature of his success. Together, these two 
factors exemplified the idea of "progress" which vivified the age. 
The Premier's untimely demise gave the legend its final form: 
Queensland's champion was now safely enshrined as an heroic 
memory of what might have been, as a vision of unrealized greatness 
for both Thomas Byrnes and his native colony. 
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8 Robert Philp 
Capitalist as Politician 
G.C. BOLTON 
Robert Philp's career seems in many ways a pattern for that of the 
capitalist in politics, the Fat Man, the manipulative boodler satirized 
in the pages of the Worker and the Bulletin. His surviving 
photographs suggest a pillar of bourgeois respectability: bearded, 
decorous, a little dull, wearing the robes of the Warden of Convoca-
tion of the University of Queensland, or posed during a visit "home" 
against the background of a Scottish baronial castle. 
The outline of his career reinforces this impression. Born in 
Scotland in 1851, the year of the Great Exhibition and the mighty 
gold discoveries of New South Wales and Victoria, Philp emigrated 
to Australia with his parents in 1862, there to embark on a success 
story to delight any nineteenth century Scot. After two years of 
schooling in Brisbane he went to work for Bright Bros, shipping 
agents and merchants, with whom he stayed until 1874. The 
industrious apprentice then grasped the opportunity of moving to 
Townsville to become the junior and resident partner of Burns, Philp 
and Company. Between 1874 and 1890 the firm prospered, to become 
the commercial leviathan of north Queensland, multifarious in its 
activities. Burns, Philp were agents and provisioners for many of the 
inland sheep and cattle stations and for most of the coastal sugar 
planters. They dominated the Townsville lighter fleet and imported 
scores of Pacific Island labourers for the canefields. They invested 
in gold, silver-lead, and tin-mining propositions. They bought beche-
de-mer from trepang fishermen, and cedar from the Atherton 
Tableland timber-cutters. They pioneered Australian trade in New 
Guinea and became a force in coastal shipping. They were among 
the founders of the North Queensland Insurance Company and the 
Bank of North Queensland. They grew to be a nation-wide firm with 
Robert Philp: MLA (Musgrave) 1886-88, (Townsville) 1888-1915; Secretary for 
Mines and Public Works 1893-96, 1899-1903; Secretary for Public Instruction 
1894-95; Secretary for Railways 1895-97; Secretary for Mines 1896-99; Treasurer 
1898-99; Premier, Treasurer, and Secretary for Mines 1899-1901; Premier, Chief 
Secretary, and Secretary for Mines 1901-3; Premier, Chief Secretary, and Treasurer 
1907-8 
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headquarters in Sydney. Beyond question they were at the heart of 
capitalism in north Queensland, and Philp was the firm's local 
representative and visible presence in the district.' 
Holding such a position, how could Philp have avoided becoming 
a power in local politics? Again, the transcript of his political career 
suggests an almost effortless success. Having entered the Legislative 
Assembly in 1886 as Member for Musgrave, a short-lived constit-
uency north of Townsville, Philp transferred in 1888 to become one 
of the port's members, and was returned ten times at the head of 
the poll. By 1893 he was in the last Cabinet of Thomas Mcllwraith 
{see Ch. 5), and from then on under Hugh Nelson {see Appendix), 
Thomas Byrnes {see Ch. 7), and James Dickson {see Appendix), 
he persisted in office, the most continuous member of the Continuous 
Ministry, until after the short-lived Anderson Dawson interlude of 
December 1899 {see Appendix) his turn came as Premier. There 
he remained until September 1903, when his ministry was ousted 
by the Morgan-Browne coalition; but he stayed on in politics, 
husbanding the conservative forces in parliament, emerging briefly 
in 1907-8 for a second spell as Premier, and finally stepping back 
gracefully from the front benches in 1909 to facilitate the union of 
anti-Labor forces which many observers had long seen as inevitable. 
A few years more, and with almost equal inevitability the elder 
statesman was honoured with the K.C.M.G. and if within a few 
months he was turned out of parliament in the 1915 landslide that 
swept Labor to office, this merely anticipated his retirement a little. 
There remained a few years as a grey eminence of anti-Labor 
politics. He survived to see Townsville once more in non-Labor hands 
and the majority of E.G.Theodore {see Ch. 11) cut to paper thinness 
at the 1920 election. He himself contributed to Theodore's embar-
rassments by heading a party that visited London in 1920 to fortify 
the prejudices of the money market against lending to a socialist 
government. When he died on 17 June 1922 Philp must have seemed 
the most fortunate of men—rich, influential, prudent, almost con-
sistently successful in his undertakings. Certainly this was the view 
presented a few months later in a commissioned biography for which 
Philp himself supplied much of the background.^ 
But was he such a model of prudence and calculation as his official 
biography would suggest? To contemporaries Philp sometimes 
seemed a far less demure and discreet personality, not without 
conviviality and a distinct streak of the gambler. In 1877 his senior 
partner James Burns could be found shaking his head sagely: "I 
confess I am a little bewildered at your proneness to speculation and 
wish you would hold to the old grooves ... till time gives you more 
bottom to work on."^ Thirty years and a lifetime of politics later. 
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the Sydney Bulletin etched Philp's character thus: "Nature meant 
him for a cheerful, slipshod, shambling Bohemian—happy, out-at-
elbows, always in debt, always irresponsible, and always pursued by 
duns and bailiffs. Then accident made him a politician, and there 
seems to be no remedy for mistakes like that."" If that was all there 
was to Robert Philp, what enabled him to survive and prosper so 
egregiously? 
Few clues can be found in his family background. Like Sir John 
Forrest and a number of other Australian public men of his 
generation, Philp took some pains to equip himself with an ancient 
Scottish genealogy, claiming origins from a chamberlain to King 
David I in 1138. His immediate forbears were less exalted. His 
father, John Philp, owned a small cotton mill in Fife and a lime-
kiln at Glasgow before emigrating to Queensland. Nothing can be 
stated of his parents' influence on Robert Philp except for such 
obvious traits as a belief in self-improvement and the quest for 
material prosperity. 
Nor does his adult career offer many clues about his inner 
personality. He was a keen amateur cricketer and foot-runner, not 
unfailingly successful, but fit enough to retain a trim figure in later 
life. He joined a masonic lodge as a young man, rose high in the 
craft, and valued his membership. He enjoyed smoke socials and 
cracking little jokes, and "genial" was an adjective often employed 
of him. His emotional life was apparently without scandal or overt 
complications. His commissioned biographer recorded only the bare 
facts that he married twice, once in 1878 and again in 1890, and 
fathered two sons and five daughters. His wives were cousins, linking 
him with the Campbells, Forsyths, and other pillars of the 
Queensland Scottish mercantile community. His sons became 
pastoralists. Three of the daughters remained unmarried, but one 
of them was among Queensland's first female medical practitioners. 
Philp may have been a paternalist, but perhaps not a male chauvinist 
by the standards of his day. 
His business career is far better documented. He remembered the 
ten years of his service with Bright Bros as hard times, offering little 
scope for the young and ambitious: "The pastoral industry was not 
much in those days, there were a few stations, and shepherds got 
from £20 to £30 to go out and take the chance of being knocked 
on the head by the blacks."^ Then the Gympie gold rush of 1867-68 
saved the day. Philp's firm sent him there, and in a game of cricket 
with a visiting Brisbane side Philp cemented a friendship with James 
Burns, a brother Scot five years his senior. In 1873, following the 
even more promising gold rushes to Ravenswood and Charters 
Towers, Burns set up business at Townsville. Neither his health nor 
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his commercial vision allowed him to stay for long in the hot little 
township sprawling between Castle Hill and the uninviting Ross 
River, but Burns believed that because of its strategic advantages 
Townsville would outstrip Bowen and other potential rivals for the 
inland trade, and he sought a reliable manager who could take 
responsibility for the Townsville store while he built up wider 
connexions. Philp was approached and at first showed no interest. 
Twice he visited Townsville, and twice refused Burns's offer. But 
the Palmer gold rush was booming. Charters Towers was gaining 
ground, and the sugar industry was just beginning to recover from 
a period of recession; and when in December 1874 Burns improved 
his terms to an annual salary of £250 with use of a cottage, Philp 
could refuse no longer. 
He stayed in Townsville for a decade and a half. Once or twice 
in the early stages of his career his health suffered, and he thought 
of leaving; but before long he was totally immersed in the business 
and the community. By 1876, having contracted malaria in the newly 
opened settlement of Cairns, Burns was obliged to leave north 
Queensland more or less permanently. His role was to build up the 
firm's Sydney office, which opened for business in April 1877. He 
thought so well of Philp that he offered him a partnership, and when 
it turned out that the younger man had only £1000 of his own Burns 
advanced him another £4000, mostly in stock. 
From then on the two corresponded on the closest terms. Never 
a week went by without letters passing between them, closely co-
ordinating every aspect of the firm's business. Burns shepherded their 
Queensland interests zealously, making sure that no ship left for the 
North with empty freight-space that could be used for cargo for 
Burns, Philp. Philp busied himself energetically in Townsville, hiring 
teams, building up the firm's "mosquito fleet" of lighters, moving 
into larger premises (this was the move that evoked Burns's grumbles 
about his proneness to speculation), and getting the firm poised to 
take first advantage of the railway which was now promised to 
Charters Towers and beyond. Occasionally Burns permitted himself 
a moment of nostalgia for the tropics: "Your letters recall a sort of 
memory of night work, teams loading, and bustle in general, which 
is totally different to my business here."' But he never went back, 
and it was Philp who integrated himself into the life of Townsville 
as the settlement burst into thriving adolescence. 
The north Queensland boom lasted until the end of 1883, with 
gold, sugar, silver-lead, and a reviving pastoral industry all making 
their contribution. Philp must have been prodigiously busy in those 
years. He was the father of a young and growing family. Increasingly 
he was venturing into his own private speculations, sometimes in 
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mining—he had a flutter in the short-lived Star River silver rush 
of 1883, and later lost money in the Comet gold-mining company 
on the Palmer—and more remuneratively in sending the firm's less 
sturdy freighters across the South Pacific to ship labourers for the 
sugar plantations. He was still zealously promoting the affairs of 
Burns, Philp—by 1883 a firm with branches in almost every major 
town of north Queensland and a limited liability company with a 
steady dividend of 10 per cent and a capital of £150,000 (of which 
Philp controlled some 16 per cent). 
With all these preoccupations he still had energy to gravitate into 
the thick of Townsville politics. As the main entrepot during the 
sugar boom, Townsville naturally tended to favour the Mcllwraith 
Administration of 1879-83 with its emphasis on developmental 
policies, lavish investment, and tolerance of non-European labour. 
The local member from 1879 was the redoubtable John Murtagh 
Macrossan {see Ch. 4), Secretary for Public Works and Mines and 
Mcllwraith's strongest henchman. Defeated for his former goldfields 
constituency of Kennedy, Macrossan became Member for Townsville 
through the resignation of a compliant friend, and there built up 
a power-base which was to serve him, and Philp after him, for a 
generation. Of course a main prop of Macrossan's influence was his 
ability to promote government spending in Townsville, particularly 
on improving the deplorable harbour facilities. But his support also 
rested on a very strong degree of co-operation among the leading 
businessmen of Townsville, most of whom, including Philp, served 
from time to time on the local municipal council. Commercial rivalry 
was seldom so keen as to discourage political friendship, for as Burns 
once commented, "It is far better to have opponents who you know 
and who will not cut trade too much than to have wretched outsiders 
... coming in spoiling everything".' Burns, Philp, for instance, found 
no difficulty in negotiating with their older-established rivals, Aplin, 
Brown, and Crawshay, over the carving up of the coastal trade, and 
when in time William Aplin and William Villiers Brown entered 
the Queensland legislature they proved loyal allies to Macrossan and 
Philp. 
Sectarian jealousies may have mattered more to Philp. As a 
Presbyterian and freemason he was on record as stating early in his 
Townsville career that "one of the first things we should do now 
is to clear out the Roman Catholic element, as it dominates the 
place".' Macrossan, though Glasgow-educated like Philp, was of 
course an Irish Catholic, reputedly a "spoiled priest",' and it may 
have been his advent that provoked Philp's comment. If so, Philp 
soon changed his mind. By 1883 Burns could describe his partner 
as "Macrossan's No.l man",'" and throughout his future political 
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career Philp worked closely and harmoniously with the respectable 
Catholics of Townsville. 
To be "Macrossan's No.l man" in 1883 was no sinecure. The 
Mcllwraith Administration was crumbling, and in October-Novem-
ber 1883 went to the polls. Besides working for Macrossan in 
Townsville, Philp also largely financed the successful campaign of 
one of the candidates for Kennedy, Isidore Lissner. Lissner ran as 
an "independent Liberal", since among the gold-miners of Charters 
Towers and Ravenswood it was thought that no avowed Mcllwraith 
supporter stood a chance, but in fact he was Philp's man; this was 
only proper, since Burns, Philp had recently paid a good price for 
his store in Charters Towers although it soon turned out to be the 
only unprofitable "black sheep" among their half-dozen branch 
offices. In general, the elections went against Mcllwraith. In his 
place came the Liberals under Samuel Griffith {see Ch. 6), with 
their avowed intention of stopping the traffic in Pacific Island 
labourers. Investors' confidence was chilled, especially since there 
was already mounting evidence of over-speculation in north 
Queensland plantations at a time when world sugar prices were 
entering what was to be a twenty-year slump. As the boom petered 
out much anti-Liberal political activity was generated in Townsville, 
in which Philp took a lively part. "I notice your name in Townsville 
papers like plums in a pudding," wrote Burns in April 1884, adding 
thoughtfully, "meetings and other matters must take a lot of your 
time."" 
The firm's sense of grievance against the Griffith Government 
deepened in 1884 when two of Philp's recruiting ships in the Pacific 
Islands were impounded and crew members prosecuted for murder, 
false pretences, and other malpractices while "blackbirding". Not 
surprisingly Philp was well to the fore among those north Queens-
landers who began to talk of separation as a remedy for their ills. 
By the end of 1884 he was known to be a prominent member of 
the Townsville Separation League, and he was present at the 
convention of delegates which met at Townsville in May 1885 to 
plan a campaign for the partition of Queensland. It was not that 
he felt himself to be a brilliant orator, a fanatical partisan, or a 
seeker after high office in the new legislature of north Queensland. 
It was more that he enjoyed the sociability and the excitement of 
the separation movement. He loved to be one of the group in the 
know. 
To palliate northern discontent the Griffith Ministry created two 
new parliamentary seats. Townsville got a second member and the 
newly settled districts to its north were lumped together in an 
electorate called "Musgrave". Late in 1885 W.V.Brown was re-
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turned for the Townsville seat, and in the first week of 1886 Philp 
followed him as Member for Musgrave. Prudently he took his time 
about making his maiden speech, and when he did so it was on a 
major occasion: Macrossan's motion for the separation of north 
Queensland. With the odds heavily against him Macrossan made 
the speech of his career, and was ably backed by Hume Black, the 
Member for Mackay; but when Philp got up to speak late in the 
debate he must have been aware that he faced an unsympathetic 
majority. Still, he made a good impression. If unpolished, his speech 
was forthright and well organized. Characteristically, he quoted a 
mass of statistics, in this case with the aim of showing that the North 
had not received its fair share of public expenditure. Also character-
istically, he brought in a Scottish allusion, comparing north 
Queensland's desire for autonomy to that of his own country, 
Scotland, where there were thirty members of parliament favouring 
Home Rule "and if England does not desire a repetition of 
Bannockburn days, I think she will consent to give it to them."'^ 
The Legislative Assembly was unmoved, and Macrossan's motion 
was rejected by 9 votes to 40. 
Philp hardly spoke again during that parliamentary session, and 
was not much more vocal during 1887. Maybe he was preoccupied 
with business affairs, for in those years Burns, Philp were launching 
the Australian United Steam Navigation Company and the North 
Queensland Insurance Company, assisting in the planning of the 
Bank of North Queensland, and founding several new branches. To 
offset the plight of the sugar-growers there was good news from the 
goldfields of Charters Towers, Croydon, and the Etheridge, where 
British capitalists were suddenly pouring their investments and Philp, 
besides making speculations of his own, was involved in at least one 
major flotation on the London stock market. If these activities left 
him with little time for making speeches, he was still a conscientious 
local member. He was among a group of northerners who success-
fully persuaded the Griffith Government to change the destination 
of the Normanton railway from Cloncurry to Croydon, where Burns, 
Philp happened to have a number of irons in the fire. He spoke up 
on behalf of the new northern mining districts when a redistribution 
of electorates took place, and again proved a prolific quoter of 
statistics. As a result of this redistribution the Musgrave constituency 
ceased to exist. At the 1888 election Philp ran in tandem with 
Macrossan for Townsville, and found himself heading the poll in 
front of his veteran colleague. It was a heartening mark of the voters' 
confidence, and confirmed his appetite for politics. 
During the next two years Philp consolidated his standing as a 
backbencher. He was not a prolific or eloquent speaker, but his 
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remarks were usually sensible and to the point, and they clearly 
illustrated the major themes which were to concern his political 
career. As an importer he was a free-trader, and looked askance 
at the new Mcllwraith Government's "national tariff', which sought 
to foster Queensland industries by levying higher dufies on a range 
of imports including farm produce, machinery, and a miscellany of 
consumer goods. Speaking feelingly from his own experience, Philp 
contended that freights were a sufficient protection for the local 
manufacturer, and moved a number of specific resolutions to keep 
down the tariff on such items as oatmeal, bran and pollard, boots 
and shoes, but to raise it on luxuries such as spirits. Although entirely 
unsuccessful, he continued in other respects a staunch government 
supporter. Those two redoubtable northerners Macrossan and Hume 
Black were now in the Cabinet, and in those circumstances it was 
hard to work up a convincing sense of grievance about the neglect 
of north Queensland. For old times' sake Philp supported Macrossan 
when in 1890 he once more brought forward a motion for separation, 
but nobody was much surprised when it was again defeated. 
Meanwhile Philp clanked the parish pump vigorously. He urged 
that school inspectors and other government officials should visit the 
North more frequently. He successfully argued for the transfer of 
the northern Supreme Court from Bowen to Townsville. He kept 
a keen eye on the progress of northern railway-building, and pushed 
the claims of private enterprise to undertake those lines for which 
government funds were lacking. He showed a particular concern for 
the sugar industry, which in those years was on parlous times. For 
with the cessation of Pacific Island labour due in 1892 many of the 
large plantations were collapsing from the weight of their overdrafts, 
while the smallholders in whom Griffith had trusted as an alternative 
to the plantations were in their turn calling for the restoration of 
the traffic in Pacific Islanders. A major royal commission on the 
sugar industry in early 1889 reported by a two-to-one majority in 
favour of this move, but the Government was reluctant to implement 
its findings. In the ensuing parliamentary debate in August 1889 
Philp made the longest speech of his career to that stage, insisting 
that the industry was organizing itself more efficiently and could 
survive, and asserting a little optimistically that even working men 
in north Queensland accepted that Pacific Islanders were in no way 
competitive with white men." At other times he claimed that 
machinery would be the salvation of the sugar industry rather than 
black labour or small farmers. When Griffith coalesced with 
Mcllwraith to become premier again in 1890, Philp found it easy 
to support his expedient of importing Italian labourers, not least 
because his firm was the local agent for the scheme. Working-class 
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opposition and the chance of better wages in other industries proved 
too much for the Italians and by February 1892, to Philp's 
unconcealed relief, Griffith conceded that the import of Pacific 
Islanders would have to be resumed. 
This change of heart came too late to avert the recession which 
now touched nearly every phase of economic activity in Queensland. 
Philp's business affairs were in serious trouble by 1892. The details 
are not entirely clear, but he had over-extended himself during a 
recent real estate boom in Townsville, and his mining speculations 
in gold and silver-lead were also badly hit. Although he had benefited 
when his relatives, the Forsyths, floated the Great Cumberland mine 
on the London market, he probably burnt his fingers badly in the 
subsequent slump on the Etheridge field and it was also told of him 
that he once refused to pay £120 for a half-share in the Day Dawn 
mine at Charters Towers, preferring to invest the money in a horse 
and buggy. The Day Dawn was to yield £638,000 in dividends by 
1903—he had bought an expensive horse and buggy.'" What is 
certain is that by April 1892 he was unable to meet a debt to the 
firm of Burns, Philp of £2657, and despite a personal guarantee from 
Burns, the amount went on increasing during the following months. 
In February 1893, having ceased to hold enough shares to qualify 
as a director, Philp was obliged to retire from the board of the firm 
which bore his name. "It must have been very hard upon Mr Philp 
to lose the substance for the shadow, so to speak", commented Burns. 
"Mines, mortgaged properties and such specs are very chimerical."" 
This somewhat patronizing view of Philp's performance as a punter 
did not stop Burns from leaving his old partner on the Queensland 
board of the firm, but the two were never so close from that time 
on. It was a bad blow to Philp's self-esteem just at a moment when 
his political future was challenged by the rise of Labor in north 
Queensland. 
The years 1888 to 1891 witnessed great growth in the trade union 
movement in the North, including a vigorous republicanism at 
Charters Towers and a major confrontation between pastoralists and 
shearers. In Townsville wharf labourers, foundry hands, and railway 
workers formed the nucleus of a well-supported labor movement 
which soon contested the authority of the snug little junta of 
businessmen who ran the town hall. When Macrossan died in March 
1891 and W.V.Brown came forward for the by-election with Philp's 
backing, a challenge was thrown out by a Labor candidate. He was 
Anthony Ogden, a too-earnest young wharf labourer, Wesleyan lay 
preacher, and militant teetotaller, who shocked the bourgeoisie by 
pushing Brown remarkably close. It was an ominous portent, and 
as Labor continued to gain ground in the North, Philp cannot have 
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been confident when in 1893 the coalition Ministry, now once more 
headed by Mcllwraith, went to the polls. 
Fortunately Townsville held firm. Philp was returned with a new 
running mate, G.R.Burns, a sound brother Scot who managed the 
Townsville foundry. Elsewhere in the North seat after seat fell to 
Labor, and among the victims of the swing was Philp's protege 
Isidore Lissner, who after ten years of faithful service had just been 
appointed Minister for Mines. Mcllwraith looked among his party's 
depleted ranks for a substitute and chose Philp, who was now readier 
to accept than he might have been while his business affairs were 
more prosperous. He had recently made his peace with Mcllwraith 
by acknowledging his error in opposing the "national" tariff for fear 
of increased prices, and he had also marked himself as one of the 
more moderate advocates of northern rights; at any rate in 1892 
when Griffith brought forward a plan for dividing Queensland into 
three provinces for accounting purposes to ensure a more equitable 
spread of government expenditure, he supported the scheme as 
"better than nothing", in contradiction to Hume Black, for whom 
such palliatives did not go far enough. It was a supporter of proven 
loyalty and efficiency whom Mcllwraith appointed Minister for 
Mines and Works on 25 May 1893. 
Philp thus began the longest uninterrupted stint that any man had 
so far served in a Queensland Cabinet; he was a Minister for six 
and a half years, and but for the one-week interlude of the Dawson 
Ministry would have been able to claim a decade in office. In this 
way he was to gain a breadth of administrative experience rivalled 
by few Queensland politicians. From May 1893 to December 1899 
he was Minister for Mines. During that time he also retained the 
Public Works portfolio until May 1896 and served as Minister for 
Public Instruction from August 1894 to March 1895, as Minister 
for Railways from that date until February 1897, and as Acting 
Treasurer or Treasurer from 1897 until December 1899. This must 
have enabled him to regain any confidence shaken by his enforced 
retirement from the lead in Burns, Philp. It also no doubt encouraged 
him in a faintly proprietorial attitude towards ministerial office for, 
though not personally over-ambitious, he came to take it for granted 
that Queensland should be governed by men of his kidney. A man 
of pleasant social qualities, he liked to be surrounded by colleagues 
of compatible views and temperament, and as he rose in seniority 
within Cabinet he may have helped inadvertently to foster the air 
of easy-going cronyism which sometimes pervaded the Continuous 
Ministry. He was not corrupt, and Labor spokesmen were often 
careful to distinguish their liking for Philp the man from their 
distrust of Philp the friend of black labour and big business; but 
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it could be taken for granted that he would never act in such a way 
as to disturb the comfortable approval of his friends, never challenge 
the conventional wisdom, and as for taking a stand on an issue of 
principle, he simply lacked the imagination. 
But he was a good administrator. His most lasting achievement 
during these years was his codification of the Queensland mining 
regulations in 1898. When all allowance is made for the pressure 
arising on this issue from both management and labour, as well as 
the part played by the Under-Secretary for Mines, Philip Sellheim, 
a veteran north Queensland warden of great experience and sagacity, 
it was Philp who deserved credit for piloting the measure through 
the legislature. He spoke 170 times in defence of the Bill, and when 
some Labor members requested its withdrawal to allow of further 
consideration, he quelled them by asserting: "There are only nine 
or ten mining members who thoroughly understand the bill. Let them 
discuss it and let everybody else look on and listen to what they 
say"."' The result was to equip Queensland with the most streamlined 
and up-to-date mining legislation in Australia, a consideration which 
Philip hoped would stimulate the flow of British capital into the 
industry. Apart from tidying up a mass of existing legislation, the 
1898 Act imposed stiffer penalties on mines seeking exemption from 
the labour regulations, extended better tenure to the occupiers of 
mining homesteads, clarified the position about mining on private 
property, and allowed mining courts greater flexibility in dealing 
with companies which breached regulations. The overall effect was 
to give greater security to investors and managements at a time when 
few new gold discoveries remained to be made in Queensland and 
the future of the industry depended on the more effective exploitation 
of known resources. 
If during the remainder of Philp's lifetime mining failed to hold 
its prominent place in the Queensland economy, this could not be 
blamed on any lack of government encouragement during his term 
as Minister. Deep sinking in mines was subsidized, and a concerted 
effort made to establish schools of mines. An Act of 1894 provided 
that local committees could raise money to prime government 
spending in this area, and when no response followed, Philp fostered 
a motion in 1899 for the erection of such institutions at government 
expense. The first fruit of this policy was the establishment of the 
Charters Towers School of Mines in 1900-1901, for which Philp 
not undeservedly claimed a good deal of credit. 
His impact on railways policy was less pronounced. When he 
entered Cabinet the depression of 1893 was at its worst, and there 
was a slight revulsion against the prolific railway-building of the 
1860s with its accumulation of debt and its aftermath of too many 
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short lines serving no good economic purpose in particular. The 
Queensland public was in one of its short-lived moods of demanding 
retrenchment, and Philp soon showed himself a careful manager. 
Not only were railwaymen's salaries cut, but following disputes 
between the three Commissioners of Railways the opportunity was 
taken to reduce the number to one. Philp was careful to explain that 
this move did not expose the department to pressures of patronage: 
"It is impossible now for members of parliament to get a man into 
the railway service because they all have to go through a course 
of examination"." Perhaps; but in 1898 a Townsville alderman who 
happened to be a waterside workers official of advanced Labor views 
still thought it worth while writing Philp a fraternal letter to ensure 
that his son got a position with the Townsville locomotive department 
"Orthodox or not troubles me but little".'* Such private favours for 
constituents were not likely to expose Philp to criticism in the 
Queensland politics of his day. 
There was more controversy about his advocacy of railway 
construction by private enterprise. In his early years in parliament 
Philp had been known to sing the praises of the land-grant system, 
but once in office his enthusiasm cooled. In 1895 he brought forward 
proposals for government railways to Atherton and Georgetown, 
arguing that the money could be found without further borrowing; 
but the Legislative Council could not agree on the routes and rejected 
the legislation. 
Perhaps because of this disappointment Philp veered towards 
private enterprise once more when in 1897 the development of copper 
and silver-lead prospects in the Chillagoe district raised a demand 
for the extension of the Cairns-Mareeba railway. If Chillagoe 
produced gold, he told the Assembly, he might have hesitated, "but 
it was only copper country, and it was a pure speculation whether 
anything were made of it"." The Chillagoe Company was empowered 
to build the railway, subject only to a government right of purchase 
after fifty years; moreover it was also granted a fifty-year mining 
leasehold on favourable conditions, the right of leasing the railway 
wharf at Cairns, and permission to erect an ore-reduction works 
above Barron Falls, generating electricity from the river's flow. Such 
preferential treatment roused the unavailing wrath of Labor mem-
bers. The Worker denounced him more than once as "one of the 
most dangerous and bitter enemies of the Labour movement"; "He 
is to the Northern boodler what Dawson is to the Charters Towers 
democracy—being the godfather of black labour and the patron of 
the land-grant railway syndicate".™ It was Chillagoe more than 
anything else that fastened on Philp his reputation as a champion 
of monopoly capitalism. 
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Within his own territory Philp fended off the Labor challenge. 
There was an uneasy moment early in 1894 when, following the death 
of G.R.Burns, Anthony Ogden stood once more in the Labor interest 
for the vacant Townsville seat, and was third time lucky. Philp was 
gently patronizing about his junior colleage: "I am positive he is not 
a bad fellow but he was so puffed up with being elected a member 
of Parliament that there was no holding him".^' In the 1896 election 
he took good care to ensure that Ogden was beaten by a stalwart 
of the Townsville City Council, the master butcher W.J.Castling and 
with Philp's help old Isidore Lissner made a comeback as Member 
for the marginal seat of Cairns. When Castling retired at the 1899 
election Ogeden returned to the fray in tandem with a fellow-
watersider, Thomas Foley; but the situation was further complicated 
by an independent candidate who had formerly been one of Philp's 
local supporters. This was William Lennon, for some years Towns-
ville manager for Burns, Philp until his "bouncing and dictatorial" 
manner of demanding pay rises for senior staff led to his eventual 
resignation in order to start an agency business of his own. Philp 
instead chose as his running mate an ancient relic of pioneering days, 
Patrick Hanran, who as a small boy had watched the convict chain 
gangs when his father was supervising sergeant at Bones Hollow, 
and who as one of the first storekeepers was Mayor of Townsville 
before Philp ever set foot in the place. Hanran was not much of 
a speaker, but the Catholic vote was solidly with him. Teamed with 
Philp, he beat Lennon, Ogden, and Foley easily, and was to fight 
five more elections successfully before his retirement at the age of 
nearly eighty. 
Meanwhile Philp advanced up the ranks of Cabinet. He was 
Acting Treasurer in 1896 and lowered several customs duties, and 
again in 1897 while the Premier, Hugh Nelson was away at Queen 
Victoria's Jubilee, when he brought down a satisfyingly balanced 
budget with a revenue of £3.7 million. In 1898 Nelson yielded the 
Premiership to Byrnes, and the Treasury to Philp and in that year 
they introduced the subsidization of immigration. 
Then in September 1898 Byrnes died. Many expected that Philp, 
as the longest-serving member of Cabinet, would take his place. As 
on more than one important occasion in his career, Philp was oddly 
reluctant to take the leadership, preferring to support yet another 
product of Glasgow schooling, that smooth old stager J.R.Dickson. 
"Dickson has the honour and the abuse," wrote the Worker, "and 
Philp the power"." The Ministry's strength was a little eroded by 
the 1899 elections, and its confrontations with Labor and the 
independent Opposition were often turbulent during the ensuing 
session of parliament. There were protracted debates over federation. 
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an issue which Philp supported unenthusiastically and which gave 
him an occasion for breaking with the separation movement, 
ostensibly because it was untimely and in reality because it was by 
now too much infiltrated by Labor supporters. There was a warm 
controversy over the sending of a Queensland contingent to the Boer 
War, in which Philp upheld his British imperialist principles against 
Labor gadflies. 
Yet it was railway policy which in the end brought down the 
Government. Sensitive to accusations of corruption over the alloca-
tion of new railways, the Ministry proposed to set up a parliamentary 
standing committee to advise on all new works costing over £20,000. 
Its terms of reference did not go far enough for a number of 
backbenchers, and in a series of divisions on 22 November 1899 the 
Government's majority was reduced to one. Dickson resigned on 1 
December. Labor formed the Dawson Ministry, which within six 
days resigned after defeat. Meanwhile a back-bench revolt among 
Dickson's followers brought forward Philp's nomination for leader. 
Philp protested; he even seconded the amendment that Dickson 
should continue. By 13 votes to 15 the amendment was defeated, 
and by 23 to 15 Philp became leader. He said he bowed reluctantly 
to the wish of the party, and in some ways the statement was credible. 
The tough decisions required of a leader came hard to this easy-
going sociable man, and he felt himself to be best suited to the kind 
of dependable lieutenancy which in earlier years he had given to 
James Burns and John Macrossan. But he was not ungrateful to 
the men who persuaded him into the leadership, as appeared later. 
Philp's new Cabinet showed a minimum of change. He retained 
the Treasury and the Mines portfolio, and Dickson cheerfully 
resumed the job of Chief Secretary. Murray (Railways and Works), 
Rutledge (Attorney-General), Foxton (Home Secretary), and 
Chataway (Lands and Agriculture) kept their old positions. D.H. 
Dalrymple consented to become Minister without Portfolio, giving 
up the Public Instruction office to J.G. Drake, who until that moment 
had been the vocal and self-righteous leader of the non-Labor 
Opposition. Drake also became government leader in the Legislative 
Council, supplanting A.H. Barlow, who turned out to be less happy 
about stepping down. Philp valued stability, and the only major 
reshuffle in his ministry during its nearly four years of life came 
early in 1901, following the deaths of Dickson and Chataway, and 
Drake's departure into federal politics. Murray then went to lead 
the Legislative Council, becoming Postmaster-General and Secretary 
for Public Instruction, Dalrymple took over Agriculture and three 
new Ministers were brought in—T.B. Cribb (Treasurer in place of 
Philp, who became Chief Secretary), John Leahy (Railways and 
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Public Works), and W.B.H. O'Connell (Lands). "Bulloo" Leahy, 
a bluff, brash "numbers man", was believed to have master-minded 
the back-bench revolt against Dickson, and O'Connell was among 
the members who went into opposition over the parliamentary 
standing committee on railways. The Labor papers could not avoid 
pointing out the coincidence; but the choice evidently made for good 
teamwork. Apart from a few exchanges of portfolio no further 
alterations occurred in Philp's Cabinet, and when O'Connell died 
in 1903 no replacement was made, on the grounds of economy. 
From outside, the Philp Ministry sometimes looked like a collec-
tion of old friends, an impression reinforced by such hangers-on as 
the government whip, John Hamilton, a raffish old bachelor from 
the northern goldfields who was even reputedly provided with 
sleeping quarters in Parliament House. This was of no great concern 
to the general public, who in 1902 gave the Philp Ministry a 
satisfying mandate at the general elections; but it may have meant 
that within the Legislative Assembly there grew up a body of 
backbenchers who felt excluded from the charmed circle, and who 
began, despite all Philp's geniality, to harbour covert resentments. 
Philp himself remained the most accessible of leaders, in-
defatigable in touring the country electorates, approachable, and 
unaffectedly modest. It was widely believed that he refused a 
knighthood on the occasion of Australia's federation, and that it was 
partly to avoid any risk of the unwanted honour that he arranged 
to visit South Africa during the tour of the Duke and Duchess of 
York in May 1901—leaving Arthur Rutledge as Acting Premier to 
accept the accolade. It was certainly the case that Philp refused to 
enter federal politics, putting forward first Dickson and then Drake 
as Queensland's man in the first Commonwealth Ministry. No 
doubt his business affairs would have deterred him from taking 
part, but his reasons as reported make interesting reading: 
Mr Barton had wired three times offering him cordially a seat in the 
Cabinet, but he thought that as he had been a Minister in Queensland 
during her years of prosperity, now as they were likely to have years 
not so prosperous, it was his duty lo stay here. It was possible that, some 
day, Queensland might have to fight the Commonwealth." 
After federation Philp became a tenacious guardian of Queensland 
interests. Partly he feared that the new Federal Government would 
prove a medium for infecting Queensland with radical influences: 
as his colleague Murray said, "If I were an investor I would much 
prefer to invest in Queensland because socialism has not got such 
a hold in Queensland as in any of the other States""—but one could 
never be sure of what a federal parliament dominated by Melbourne 
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and Sydney might be up to. One of its first decisions in 1901 was 
to end the traffic in Pacific Island labourers to the Queensland 
canefields. Although the change was phased out so that the last 
labourers would not be repatriated until 1907, this presented a major 
challenge to the sugar industry, and Philp used every negotiating 
and administrative device to defer the full impact of the new policy 
and to obtain bigger tariffs and subsidies to protect the growers." 
In the process he became a stronger anti-centralist, and was 
confirmed in his stand by the adverse effect on Queensland's finances 
of the Commonwealth's takeover of customs, excise, and postal 
revenue. For finance was to be the criterion by which Philp's 
reputation stood or fell. 
Priding himself on balanced budgets, Philp had the misfortune 
to be Premier at a time when Queensland underwent a prolonged 
local recession beyond the power of any government of that day to 
avert. Already stricken by the slump of 1891 -93 and the Queensland 
National Bank scandals, the Queensland economy was drained 
further by calamities in the pastoral industry: the stock losses caused 
by cattle tick in the 1890s and the great drought that was at its 
height in 1902. Against this background Queensland under feder-
ation lost the capacity to raise its own customs and excise duties 
without having ventured as yet into the imposition of income tax. 
The full gravity of the situation was masked during 1899, partly 
because Queensland benefited from massive death and probate duties 
on the estate of the leviathan squatter James Tyson. In each of the 
three years 1899-1902 revenue stood at £4.4 million, but expenditure 
rose from £4.2 to £4.9 million over that period, mainly because of 
interest charges on the public debt and outlay on railway-building. 
When as a result of drought and federation the revenue fell to £3.4 
million in 1902, severe retrenchment had to follow. Expenditure was 
reduced to £3.8 million in 1902 and £3.7 million in 1903, but the 
upshot was that during the four years of Philp's ministry the 
Government incurred deficits totalling £1.5 million, which did 
nothing to enhance Philp's reputation for management. In those days 
financial orthodoxy set its face against deficit budgeting. 
During his first two years as Premier Philp sponsored a number 
of measures of support for Queensland's primary industries. Sugar 
was his special concern, and, besides setting up research and 
experimental stations for the industry, his government legislated for 
guarantees to mills established by growers' co-operatives, a move 
which greatly facilitated the survival of smallfarming cane-growers. 
Another useful prop for all farmers was provided in the Agricultural 
Bank, founded in 1901. 
Social welfare presented a less impressive record. In 1900 Philp 
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proposed reformed electoral laws, legislation for Aboriginal protec-
tion, the establishment of a university, early-closing legislation for 
shops, and a number of minor social reforms. More than once he 
spoke sympathetically of the plight of Queensland's Aborigines, and 
he was a longstanding advocate of a university, if only because of 
its role in scientific and technical training. But he was reluctant to 
take a strong stand when the Legislative Council blocked some of 
these initiatives. Although the Health Act and the Factories and 
Shops Act survived to reach the statute book none of the other 
proposed reforms came into being, and a private member's Bill for 
workers' compensation fared no better. 
Imbued with a philosophy of self-help and frugal government 
spending, Philp judged most welfare measures with a conventional 
businessman's laissez-faire. He found it genuinely difficult to 
understand the ethos of the trade union movement, and if he had 
not been an habitually truthful man it would be hard to credit his 
assertion that he was three or four times asked to take a portfolio 
in a Labor administration.^' During his years as Premier the Labor 
movement was continually vexed by his slowness to support such 
proposals as workers' compensation or better conditions for shearers' 
accommodation, in contrast with his eagerness to promote private 
railway concessions for mining companies. Five private lines were 
pushed through the Queensland legislature during 1900 against such 
strenuous Labor opposition that the house often sat after midnight 
and the guillotine had to be introduced for the first time in 
Queensland's parliamentary history. This was the more galling for 
Labor because the record of the Chillagoe Company, a beneficiary 
of Philp's first concession, was far from satisfactory. Its ore reserves 
turned out to have been overestimated, many of its workers were 
thrown into unemployment, and it took much activity in the 
boardrooms before the company was adequately refloated. Its earlier 
success had attracted a number of smaller concession-hunting mining 
companies, some of them of dubious merit, and although Philp was 
properly cautious in his dealings with them, the impression persisted 
that his government was over-kind to speculators. Not all the Labor 
criticisms were justified, but Philp could not claim success for his 
policy of attracting private investment to the mining fields by railway 
concessions. 
The Queensland public still supported him at the 1902 elections. 
Forty-four candidates were returned to the Legislative Assembly as 
committed or independent supporters of the Philp Government, as 
against twenty-eight Labor opponents. Confronted by the effects of 
the great drought, Philp toured the country districts extensively to 
acquaint himself with conditions, and as a result brought forward 
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legislation to extend pastoral leaseholds and allow graziers ten years 
in which to pay their arrears of rent. Retrenchment was expected 
of the State Government, and Philp duly dismissed over four hundred 
members of the civil service and moved for the reduction of 
parliamentary salaries from £300 to £250. The latter measure was 
more than Queensland politicians could bring themselves to accept; 
nor were they much keener on a plan to redistribute the seats in 
the Legislative Assembly and, as an economy measure, to reduce 
their number by about a quarter. Postponing this idea, Philp moved 
on doggedly to initiate Queensland into the hardships of income tax, 
proposing a level of 2'/2 per cent on personal income and 5 per cent 
on property; but although the measure could be defended as anti-
socialist because there was no provision for exemptions, there was 
a good deal of opposition to it before it was passed by a margin 
of one vote. 
Given these preoccupations, Philp had little time for other 
legislafion, and 1902 was a fairly barren year apart from some 
amendments to the Land Acts and an Act consolidating the 
legislation on local authorities. He certainly was not prepared to exert 
himself on behalf of such an innovation as votes for women, and 
he showed no sense of urgency over the need for electoral reform. 
Muttering grew from the young Turks on the ministerial back 
benches, some of whom had ambitions for office, while others felt 
their sectional interests to be unduly neglected. While Philp com-
manded the backing of Queensland's major newspapers and business 
interests, this unrest could be discounted. As the Government's 
financial position continued to stagnate, confidence in Philp's 
stewardship gradually waned. The Brisbane Courier, usually a 
faithful supporter of the Continuous Ministry, began to publish 
ominous editorials about the dangers of drift and inefficiency among 
Queensland's leaders. And when in August 1903 the Philp Govern-
ment brought forward a plan to buttress its finances by a widespread 
increase in stamp duties, its fate was sealed. 
Mobilizing powerful resources, the banking and commercial 
leaders of Brisbane sent a deputation to confront Philp on 31 August, 
complaining about the impact on the community of the proposed 
stamp duties and about the laxity with which existing duties were 
administered. Philp promised to abandon or modify a number of the 
objectionable proposals. 
This failed to please the Brisbane Courier: "How can a Govern-
ment displaying so complete an absence of self-respect and decision 
as we find in the political history of the last three weeks expect to 
retain the support of members?"" Led by Digby Denham {see 
Appendix), half a dozen backbenchers crossed sides over the stamp 
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duties issue, leaving Philp with the narrowest of majorities. It was 
1899 all over again. Philp tendered his resignation and Browne, the 
Labor leader, was called to form a Ministry. This time there was 
to be no repetition of the Dawson fiasco. Instead, Browne negotiated 
a coalition with the non-Labor dissidents under the Premiership of 
the Speaker, Arthur Morgan {see Appendix). Leadership in the 
Legislative Council was provided by Barlow, the same man whom 
Philp had dropped in forming his ministry four years ago. Unkindest 
cut of all, the coalition was facilitated by the willingness of one of 
Philp's oldest political associates, Alfred Cowley, to take over the 
Speakership. Philp and his friends were furious. "We are not sore 
about the Labour party beating us," said John Hamilton. "They 
fought us manfully. What we object to is being, like Lazarus, licked 
by the dogs".^' Even Philp lost his habitual good manners and in 
denouncing the "plotting and intriguing" which brought about his 
downfall spoke bitterly of Cowley—though he soon apologized. It 
was a bruising moment for a man who set so much store by personal 
loyalties. 
During its first nine months of office the Morgan Ministry took 
over many of the Philp Government's measures, but Philp had little 
heart for harassing them, even when it became apparent that some 
of the members who had deserted him were willing to return to his 
side. His lack of the killer instinct soon showed itself in the autumn 
session of 1904. Browne, the Labor leader, died and left the 
Government dependent on the highly unreliable casting vote of 
Speaker Cowley, and a motion of no confidence was duly moved 
on the Address-in-Reply. Neglecting every opportunity to nobble 
Morgan's followers, to play the game of parliamentary tactics, or 
in any way to bend the conventions of contemporary politics, Philp 
allowed the Morgan Government to stonewall the debate until the 
dramatic arrival of Browne's successor, W.S. Murphy, from his 
distant northern electorate of Croydon. Such misplaced gentle-
manliness had its due reward. 
Quixotic in his turn, Morgan followed the quaint old convention 
that a government with a narrow majority had a duty to resign, and 
Philp was sent for by Governor Chermside; but he could no longer 
be sure of sufficient party support, and had to advise Chermside 
to try the Brisbane Courier's favourite. Sir Arthur Rutledge. Older 
and less effectual than Philp, Rutledge could recruit as potential 
Cabinet Ministers only Philp himself and his close ally John Leahy, 
so that eventually the Governor had to recall Morgan and grant him 
a dissolution. 
The ensuing election was a disaster for the conservatives. Only 
seventeen of their number survived, as against twenty liberals 
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supporting Morgan, and thirty-five Labor members. Rutledge 
himself, seeking to move from Maranoa to a safe suburban seat, 
was beaten by the incumbent local member who refused to retire. 
More fortunate in Townsville's loyalty, Philp survived and without 
noticeable enthusiasm resumed the leadership of the depleted 
Opposition. 
He was the most mild and obliging of opposition leaders. He made 
only minor criticisms of the coalition's lands and financial policies, 
and in three years from 1904 his party's strongest disagreement with 
government policy arose over a measure to levy a rate on districts 
in which a newly built railway line failed to pay working expenses 
and interest charges. He supported the coalition's attempts to abolish 
plural voting, and agreed that the nominee Legislative Council stood 
in need of reform. With surprising modernity he even urged the 
appointment of a local man, his old leader Nelson, as state governor. 
The only one among the Labor ranks for whom he seemed to have 
a personal anfipathy was the volatile V.B. "Joe" Lesina, who 
denounced "members of the mercantile community" as "half-crown 
aristocrats". Philp's geniality and tolerance stopped short at for-
eigners, and he sneered more than once at Lesina's origins. For 
William Kidston {see Ch.9), on the other hand, a fellow Scot and 
the coalition's Treasurer, Philp had a good deal of praise. When 
Kidston followed Morgan as Premier in January 1906, Philp 
commented, "He may not have the amiability, but he certainly has 
much more ability than his predecessor, and I think his promises 
will be much more respected by the House"." 
No doubt his approval of Kidston was due partly to Queensland's 
improving financial situation, the result of better seasons and a 
reviving sugar industry. Nor can it have escaped Philp that strains 
were developing within the labor movement between those such as 
Kidston, George Kerr, and Peter Airey, who concentrated on 
providing efficient government of a reformist nature, and those who 
followed David Bowman in insisting on the separate ideology and 
interests of Labor. Early in 1907 Digby Denham, with his sensitive 
nose for the political weather, resigned from the Kidston Cabinet 
and went back to Philp. It became the practice of Philp and his 
followers to portray the more purist section of Labor as the 
irresponsible taskmasters of the Kidston Government, and to stress 
the common ground between themselves and the more "moderate" 
members of the coalition. Kidston was not yet to be stampeded; but 
at the 1907 elections the Philp party gained a few seats, to number 
thirty-one, as against twenty-four Kidstonites and seventeen Labor 
cross-benchers. 
Almost immediately there was a striking portent of future co-
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operation between Philp and Kidston. Among the victims of the 1907 
election was Sir Alfred Cowley, defeated by a Labor candidate who 
was none other than Philp's old employee, the bouncing William 
Lennon. A new Speaker was required, and the ensuing vote became 
a protracted test of party strengths. In the upshot the Kidston faction 
had to withdraw its candidate and threw its backing behind Philp's 
nominee, John Leahy. Still Kidston struggled during the 1907 session 
to establish his credentials as a reformer, bringing forward legislation 
to update electoral procedures, especially postal voting, and to set 
up wages boards whose authority would extend to farm labourers. 
Neither of these measures was welcome to conservative rural 
interests, and after meeting unavailing opposition from the Philp 
party in the Legislative Assembly they were rejected by the 
Legislative Council. This triggered a notable constitutional crisis. 
Kidston requested the Governor, Lord Chelmsford, to nominate 
sufficient new members to the Legislative Council to give him a 
working majority. Chelmsford refused, Kidston resigned, and Philp 
was requested to form a Ministry. By 19 November he succeeded 
in doing so, if only by including a number of close personal friends 
such as his brother-in-law J.D. Campbell, his business associate P.J. 
Leahy, and his old Townsville friend W.V. Brown. This obviously 
suggested that he was unwilling or unable to attract any deserters 
from the Kidston camp and when he confronted the Legislative 
Assembly to ask for Supply, the conduct of business was immediately 
taken from his hands by Kidston, who rammed through a motion 
of no confidence by a margin of eight votes. Philp consulted 
Chelmsford, and next day came down to the Assembly with a 
proposal for a parliamentary dissolution. He was at once attacked 
by Kidston for misleading Chelmsford, and had to stand by haplessly 
when after acrimonious debate Kidston moved the adjournment of 
the house for two days. 
On 22 November Kidston successfully proposed the approval of 
a twelve-point address to the Governor, deploring the obstructiveness 
of the Legislative Council and urging the right of the parties 
commanding a majority in the lower house to form a Ministry. The 
same evening Chelmsford replied. Although the parliament was only 
six months old, he claimed that an election was essential to test the 
feeling of the voters on the issues in question. Over the vehement 
protests of Kidston and his supporters the dissolution went through, 
and pending the election the problem of finance was resolved by the 
issue of writs under the Governor's authority to enable the Philp 
Ministry to carry on the work of government. Until 1975 most 
commentators have taken the view that Chelmsford and Philp were 
constitutionally in the wrong. In their eagerness to stem the onrush 
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of Labor legislation, they breached the convention that a Cabinet 
should be able to command a majority in the lower house for the 
purpose of raising Supply. It has now been shown that this convention 
is expendable when it is thought requisite to remove a controversial 
government. Philp's only fault, and it was a grave one, was that he 
failed to win the subsequent election. 
Not that he expected to lose. It was a hard-fought election, but 
he threw himself with gusto into the work of campaigning. He 
thought that many voters would desert the Kidston Ministry as too 
dependent on socialist Labor, and he pitched his appeal particularly 
to the farming electorates. Not only did he promise to abandon 
compulsory arbitration between farmers and their employees, but 
he spoke of repealing the taxes which hit the agriculturalist, while 
at the same time building plenty of railways for their stock and 
produce. Among city voters he looked mainly to the recently 
enfranchised women's vote, which he thought would be attracted by 
his stand on postal voting. He even had an ingenious scheme for 
reforming the Legislative Council, proposing to divide Queensland 
into electorates, to assign each of the current members of Council 
to a specific electorate, and as they died or resigned to fill the 
vacancies on a liberal franchise. This policy, set forth in a Townsville 
manifesto on the New Year's Eve of 1907, was probably the most 
comprehensive and imaginative offered by Philp in his whole political 
career; but it was no match for Kidston. 
Stung into a sense of righteous indignation by his ejection from 
office, Kidston stumped the country on the cry of "Home Rule for 
Queensland", contrasting his recent achievements with the re-
actionary and muddled policies associated with Philp in the last years 
of the Continuous Ministry. If most of the respectable press was 
against him, he was fortified by some pungent articles in the Worker 
and by the deep baying of the Sydney Bulletin, which took more 
interest in Queensland during that election than at any time before 
or since. Cartoons and articles lampooned Philp as an "old financial 
clown" who "has never in all his long career risen above the level 
of the suburban alderman".'" The effect of this satire may have been 
only marginal, but it turned out to reflect the popular mood. When 
the numbers went up in February 1908 there was a swing of six 
seats to the coalition. Philp did pick up a couple of farming 
constituencies, but both seats at Charters Towers reverted to Labor; 
P.J. Leahy was ousted at Warrego (but later successfully appealed 
against the verdict) and six metropolitan seats were lost to the 
coalition. Even at Townsville, where Philp and Hanran had been 
750 votes ahead of their Labor opponents in 1907, their majority 
fell to little more than 100. It was a decisive verdict. Impassively 
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Lord Chelmsford accepted Philp's resignation and swore in a 
renovated Kidston Ministry. 
And yet nothing had changed. Kidston still chafed at the demands 
of the Labor cross-benchers, and although there was now a coolness 
between the two leaders, Philp and his party still co-operated when 
it was thought desirable to check radical initiatives. As early as April 
1908 the Philp party's support proved essential in gaining approval 
for two privately constructed mining railways which Kidston wished 
to authorize in defiance of Labor's principle of State ownership. Six 
months later, affirming himself a lifelong believer in the two-party 
system of government, Philp brought all his followers with one 
exception to serve under Kidston's leadership. 
Philp's biographer was to make much of his patriotism and self-
abnegation in declining office for himself and in refusing to bargain 
about Kidston's terms for the merger, but in fact Kidston by now 
was very close to Philp's way of thinking in most essentials, 
particularly in favouring bold policies of economic development. 
Airey and Kerr, two of the ex-Labor members of Cabinet, were 
dropped to make room for three of Philp's followers, and several 
of Kidston's more controversial plans for reform were softened or 
abandoned. 
As for Philp, after more than twenty years of politics it was time 
to concentrate on his own business interests. More than once around 
this time he commented that he came into politics a very rich man 
and would leave very poor" and although this was an odd assertion 
in a man who in partnership with his old friends Leahy and Forsyth 
had just purchased the noted Thylungra sheep station, and who was 
eventually to die worth well over £100,000, it was probably sincerely 
meant. He took to speaking feelingly of the strain of parliamentary 
life: "It is one of the hardest jobs I ever tackled", he once said 
"Without a doubt it makes a man's life much shorter than it would 
otherwise be".'' There may have been merit in Philp's refusal to 
accept office, but his own inclinations led him in the same direction. 
By 1909 he was "Father of the House" in the Legislative 
Assembly, and in the six years that he remained there he came to 
enjoy the role. He began lo relax more and to enliven his speeches 
with funny anecdotes. When he crossed swords with Labor members 
they gave him a little more latitude because of his seniority, and 
there was often a perceptible undercurrent of banter in their 
exchanges. John Fihelly was a particular target, "The young man 
from Paddington is always chipping away about something", Philp 
once remarked, and when the young man chipped at his own past 
performance, Philp floored him with: "Why, what does the hon-
ourable member know about that? He was only a boy at that time, 
he was only in swaddling clothes"." 
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Apart from giving sage and pertinent advice on financial matters 
he was tending to leave policy-making to the younger men; he might 
sound a warning against such newfangled concepts as price-fixing, 
or applaud yet again any new proposal for building developmental 
railways, but for the most part he was seen as a model of dignified 
elder statesmanship. He enjoyed being one of the founding fathers 
of the University of Queensland, which accredited him as its 
representative to a conference of universities at Glasgow in 1912; 
he enjoyed returning to Scotland after an absence of fifty years, 
successful and prosperous; and he would not have been human if 
he had not enjoyed also the testimonial dinners and public meetings 
given him before and after the journey by his Queensland admirers. 
All the same, he may have been getting a little out of touch with 
Townsville. After Hanran's retirement at the 1909 election, the 
persevering waterside worker Foley at last secured a place as Philp's 
colleague for the seat. In 1912 the constituency was divided, and 
Foley became Member for Mundingburra, the southern part of 
Townsville where the railwaymen and lumpers mostly lived, leaving 
Townsville itself for Philp. But his grass roots there were withering. 
It may be, as his sympathetic biographer put it, that: "The workers 
of the eighties and nineties who knew and loved 'Bob' Philp had 
been swamped by a new generation that loved the 'Union Boss' 
better"." It also has to be said that it was years since Philp had 
lived in Townsville, and there may have been something in the view 
that his acceptance of a title at the beginning of 1915 finally set 
him apart from the easy-going democracy of north Queensland. In 
any case, given the magnitude of the landslide towards Labor at 
the 1915 elections, it was not surprising that Philp should have been 
one of the casualties. His successful opponent was Daniel Ryan, one 
of the numerous Ryans who cropped up in the Queensland politics 
of that period. The margin of victory was less than two hundred 
votes, but it was enough to end Philp's career as a legislator. 
But not his career as a politician. Out of parliament he developed 
into a more wily and tenacious opponent of the victorious Labor 
movement than ever he showed himself within parliament. When 
the conscription issue threatened to split Labor he had a hand in 
the negotiations which led to the resignation of John Adamson, the 
only Queensland Cabinet Minister to quit over conscription, and 
subsequently worked hard to persuade the Nationalists to find 
Adamson a place in the federal Senate. When the Labor Government 
in 1917 brought forward a referendum to secure the abolition of 
the obstructive Legislative Council, it was Philp who became the 
chairman of a Constitution Defence Committee pledged to combat 
the proposal, supported by such stalwarts from the old days as Sir 
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Alfred Cowley and P.J. Leahy. They won the battle, since the 
referendum returned a "No" vote of 179,105 to 116,196, but lost 
the campaign, as Labor was returned with an even bigger majority 
at the 1918 state election. 
When an interregnum occurred at Government House at the 
beginning of 1920, the Labor Government seized the opportunity 
of appointing one of its own supporters as lieutenant-governor 
William Lennon, sometime Townsville manager for Burns, Philp. 
Lennon at once appointed fourteen Labor supporters to the Legisla-
tive Council, the celebrated "suicide squad", and the Council 
immediately assented to a controversial amendment to the Land Act, 
removing the limit which could be set on increases in the rent on 
pastoral leaseholds. This was of course anathema to the pastoral 
lobby, with whom Philp by now had close links. The Constitutional 
Defence Committee rode again. On 9 March a numerously attended 
meeting of businessmen and pastoralists revived the committee and 
resolved to send a delegation to London comprising Philp as leader, 
Cowley, and a Brisbane lawyer, J.A. Walsh. They were to place their 
views before the Secretary of State for Colonies on three specific 
issues: the legislation on pastoral rents ("a flagrant repudiation of 
the contractual rights of a large number of Crown tenants"), the 
threat to the Legislative Council, and the appointment as soon as 
possible of a new and English governor for Queensland." 
Protest followed immediately. Theodore, the Labor Premier, was 
on the point of visiting London himself to float government loans, 
and the delegation was criticized as an attempt to hamper him. Philp 
and his colleagues issued a statement denying that they meant either 
to injure Queensland's financial prospects or to invoke imperial 
interference in Queensland politics; but the three issues which 
concerned them involved questions of Empire-wide importance: "The 
delegation does not represent any political party. It goes to England 
in support of a petition to His Majesty the King, concerning the 
passing of a repudiatory and confiscatory measure which, if allowed 
to pass unchallenged, may form a dangerous precedent in other 
portions of the Empire".'* 
Honest Peter Airey found this disingenuous, and wrote that the 
Philp mission might tarnish Queensland's self-government to which 
the Brisbane Courier replied unctuously: "is it not fitting that a 
delegation ... should be in England not to pursue party political 
purposes, not to pray for British intervention, but to controvert the 
partisan statements which will be made to buttress up the plea for 
more money?"" 
Seen from this perspective the Philp mission was largely a success. 
Downing Street behaved with great discretion, and refused to 
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intervene overtly. The Legislative Council went to its doom, and 
although the appointment of a British governor. Sir Matthew 
Nathan, was claimed as "the seal of success" for the Philp mission, 
there was never the slightest evidence to suggest that the British 
Government ever intended otherwise. Where Philp and his colleagues 
scored their greatest success was in holding a series of press 
interviews and business lunches which fortified the London money 
market in its prejudice against lending to a controversial Labor 
government. Theodore, rebuffed in his attempt to find finance for 
new projects and brought almost to defeat at the 1920 state election, 
was obliged to modify a number of his more radical ideas, and 
eventually in 1924 agreed to limit the extent to which pastoral rents 
might be raised.'' Labor spokesmen abused the Philp mission as the 
"stinking fish" delegation, and Lennon as Lieutenant-Governor read 
a strong denunciation of it in his Speech from the Throne; but once 
again Philp had successfully marshalled the forces of conservatism 
in their attempts to curb what they saw as the rash intemperance 
of Labor. 
This was the last major episode of Philp's public life, and it invites 
questions about a man to whose honesty and straightforwardness 
all opinions testified. How without insincerity could Philp have 
thought that his London mission fell outside the category of party 
politics? The same paradox suggests itself over the 1907-8 crisis: 
how could a man so conciliatory, so obedient to the rules of the 
parliamentary game, have consented to defy constitutional conven-
tion as it was then understood and, despite his usual reluctance to 
take leadership, to stand up to a bitterly hostile election campaign 
on the issue? Is it too preposterous to suggest that Philp, despite 
his professed faith in the two-party system, believed somewhere in 
his mind that Labor governments were an aberration, not really 
entitled to hold power, and that just as mediaeval churchmen 
believed there was no keeping faith with heretics, Philp and many 
other conservatives like him believed that the normal political 
conventions should not apply to socialists? 
Philp was a speculator, a man who under a free market system 
found himself enabled to prosper and to recover from adversity when 
his fortunes touched a low point. He belonged to an early order of 
capitalism which seldom saw itself as requiring systematic govern-
ment intervention. "From the public point of view," he once said, 
"the Government that offers itself to be leaned against is the precise 
reverse of a blessing." He never recognized that the government 
railways which he so zealously promoted, the manipulation of 
pastoral rents, and concessions to the Chillagoe Company and other 
investors were in themselves forms of government intervention 
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imbued with a specific political philosophy. The politician who lacked 
the imagination as a young man to see anything wrong with 
trafficking in Pacific Islanders, and who as an old man could not 
understand why the Brisbane tramwaymen persisted in wanting to 
wear their union badges, simply had not the capacity to expand his 
personal kindliness and geniality into a social conscience. Com-
fortable among his cronies, he lent himself to the advantageous 
manoeuvres of the moment, and never thought through the long-
term implications of his political actions. 
He died on a winter Saturday morning, 17 June 1922. Obituary 
tributes followed apace, honouring him as a pioneer of commerce, 
a gentleman in all his dealings, a man beloved even by his political 
opponents. His well-attended funeral attested his Scottish back-
ground: a sprig of white heather lay on the coffin, a piper played 
a lament. The Brisbane Courier even published a rather bad poem 
in his honour. But it was left to his old enemy the Bulletin to write 
his epitaph: "We had no idea how good a man he was till we found 
out how rotten subsequent men could be"." Half a century of 
Queensland history has elapsed since then, but the verdict can stand 
unchallenged. 
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A Tenacious Reformer 
D.J. MURPHY 
The twenty years between the emergence of colonial Labor parties 
in 1890 and the election of the Commonwealth Labor Government 
of Andrew Fisher in 1910 were the years of transition in Australian 
politics. From a mild liberal versus conservative basis, interwoven 
with theories of protection versus free trade and with urban-rural 
confiicts, Australian politics, by 1910, were clearly a matter of Labor 
versus a coalition of non-Labor and, more usually, anti-Labor parties. 
There had been a brief, though highly productive, period in the first 
decade of the twentieth century when Labor and Liberal parties had 
combined in loose parliamentary alliances against their nineteenth 
century conservative opponents to push through much useful reform 
legislafion. At the close of the 1880s liberalism had been the great 
reforming ideology in Queensland. By 1910 it had declined as a force 
for reform, and had been overtaken by the social democracy of the 
new Labor Party. This situation was not unique to Queensland; it 
had parallels in other Australian states and in the Commonwealth. 
The same type of change was being manifested in Britain. 
There was nothing inevitable about the changes that took place 
in Queensland in those twenty years. If, as Sidney Hook notes in 
his study The Hero in History, "men make history only when they 
have purposes", then one must look for the man or men who had 
those purposes and who therefore made history. One man, William 
Kidston, stands out in the political history of Queensland in the first 
decade of the twentieth century and it was he, more than any other 
single person, who influenced its course at that time. Circumstances 
certainly favoured Kidston. The death of the young Premier T. J. 
Byrnes {see Ch.7) in 1898 had robbed the Ministerial party of its 
most able leader; the late 1890s and the early twentieth century were 
William Kidston: MLA (Rockhampton) 1896-1911, Treasurer and Postmaster-
General 1899; Treasurer, 1903-6; Premier, Chief Secretary, and Treasurer 1906-7; 
Premier and Chief Secretary 1908-11 
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periods when reforms were sought, and Kidston was a reformer; in 
the years immediately after federation, the state's finances de-
teriorated to such an extent that a man of great ability was sought 
to set those finances right again. Kidston was such a man and next 
to Edward Theodore {see Ch. l l ) , he probably remains the state's 
most competent treasurer. Nevertheless, even with all these 
favourable opportunities a lesser man, without Kidston's political 
ability and intense desire to provide certain reforms, might well have 
proved inadequate or been inclined to withdraw from the immense 
problem confronting him. 
William Kidston was born in Falkirk, Scotland, on 27 August 
1849, the third son of Richard Kidston, an irondresser in the Falkirk 
ironworks. At the age of thirteen William left school and was 
apprenticed to an ironmoulder. On becoming a journeyman, he 
worked in foundries at Falkirk, Glasgow, and Alloa. While he was 
working at Alloa, he enrolled to study chemistry at the technical 
school which had been established as a part of the South Kensington 
Institution. Here, studying on his own (he was the only student in 
the chemistry course), he completed his examinations successfully 
and obtained his certificate in chemistry. To further his studies, he 
returned to Glasgow to work as an ironmoulder in winter and attend 
the Andersonian College in summer. Kidston seems to have been 
a scholar of both diligence and intelligence. He was offered an 
appointment as a chemist with a large English ironworks, a position 
which carried a larger salary than he could hope to earn as a 
tradesman. For some reason that he did not later explain, he turned 
this offer down and returned to work as an ironmoulder. In 1874 
he married Margaret Scott of Falkirk. They were to have five sons 
and one daughter.' 
The life of an ironmoulder was something that Kidston did not 
prize. He seems to have disliked the environment of industrialization 
and was ambitious for something better for himself and his family. 
In 1882 he emigrated to New South Wales aboard the Cotopaxi. 
However, after nine months in Sydney he was not impressed with 
the New South Wales capital and in 1883 he took his wife and family 
to the young Queensland colony and the port town of Rockhampton. 
Kidston's introduction to Queensland was not inspiring. If we can 
read into his later criticisms of the colony's migration procedures 
something of the problems of his own arrival, it would seem that 
he was "dumped on the [wharf] at ... Rockhampton ... and left to 
shift for [himself]".' He had left the heat and smell of the iron trade 
for good, however, and established himself in Rockhampton as a 
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bookseller and stationer. It did not take him long to merge into the 
freer colonial society and become involved in its politics. He had 
been a staunch supporter of Gladstone, Home Rule for Ireland, and 
the Liberal Party in Britain; in Queensland he supported Samuel 
Griffith, {see Ch.6) the colonial liberals, and the establishment of 
a separate state for central Queensland. He continued his support 
for Irish Home Rule and chaired John Dillon's meeting in Rock-
hampton in 1889. 
Trade unions had begun to emerge in Queensland in the late 1880s 
and were legalized by the Trade Union Act of 1886, which followed 
closely the format of the 1871 British Act. In June 1889 the Brisbane 
unions led by Mat Reid, Gilbert Casey, Albert Hinchcliffe, Charles 
Seymour, and Thomas Glassey, the sole Labor representative in the 
Queensland parliament, formed the ALF (Australian Labour Feder-
ation), which was to combine both political and industrial goals and 
organization. It wanted to go beyond the limits set by the colonial 
liberals and build a new political party based on trade unions, social 
democratic ideals, and pragmatic reforms. In March 1890 the ALF 
produced its first copies of a new monthly newspaper called the 
Worker, edited by the crusading journalist William Lane. By June 
1890 district councils of the ALF had been founded at Gympie, 
Maryborough, Bundaberg, Townsville, Charters Towers, and Rock-
hampton, and in December the ALF executive met in Blackall to 
draw up the plans for a political Labor Party. In Rockhampton a 
new political organization emerged alongside the ALF called the 
Workers Political Association, of which Kidston was not only a 
member but also a driving force. 
In the maritime strike, which lasted from August to October 1890, 
the Queensland unions had been badly beaten. Consequently they 
were in a weakened position when the pastoralists pulled the shearers 
into a second strike in February 1891. While Hinchcliffe tried to 
negotiate a settlement with Thomas Mcllwraith {see Ch.5), then 
Acting Premier and still a leading member of the Pastoralists' 
Association, batches of colonial infantry and artillery regiments 
began arriving in Rockhampton to be used against the striking 
shearers. In his years as Premier, Kidston was to be accused of 
conceit and despotism. He was certainly a man of great inner 
strength, which was demonstrated in the 1891 strikes. He was then 
a sergeant in the local militia regiment and accepted a court martial 
and dismissal from the regiment rather than be enrolled as a special 
constable against the strikers. 
The strike not only divided towns like Rockhampton, it also divided 
the ALF, where there was a major debate about whether or not a 
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general strike should be called. Those who favoured the syndicalist 
theories of the general strike included Lane and Casey, while the 
more practical Hinchcliffe, Reid, and Glassey urged caution. 
Kidston, though firmly convinced of the moral right of the striking 
shearers, was opposed to the general strike as a tactic for achieving 
union goals. His faith was in the new workers' party, which could 
take the battle into parliament and change the laws that allowed 
colonial governments to side with the employers and use the military 
and special constables as strike-breakers. To the shearers and bush 
workers, smarting under the injustice of being harassed by an 1825 
Act of George IV which had been repealed in Britain but not in 
Queensland, he held out the hope of the Labor Party. "The Ballot 
is the thing", he said, and sent a poem to the Worker under that 
title, to be sung to the rebel Irish tune "The Wearin' of the Green". 
The fourth verse reflected well Kidston's political philosophy: 
But keep your heads and tempers, boys. Your time will 
come again. 
Remember that your breath has made, and can wwmake 
these men. 
When they've to face the ballot-box, it's mighty small 
they'll sing. 
These men who'd drag us backward to the time when 
George was king. 
It's mighty small they'll sing, my boys it's 
mighty small they'll sing, 
The.se men who'd drag us backward to the 
time when George was king.' 
Kidston was forty-two when he wrote these verses. He was not a 
young radical nor a syndicalist, but a mature thinker whose 
experiences of working conditions in Scotland and Queensland had 
convinced him that reform, not revolution, was necessary and was, 
indeed, the only course open to Labor. What was required was a 
well-organized association which would incorporate all progressive 
reformers. Throughout 1891 the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin 
was to carry frequent reports of Kidston's organizing workers' 
political associations in and near Rockhampton, defending the 
strikers and addressing public meetings on electoral reform, govern-
ment finance, and legislation. He had in fact become the principal 
Labor figure in Rockhampton and adjacent central Queensland. 
When the four Labor parliamentarians, elected by June 1892, asked 
Hinchcliffe to call a convention of all Labor associations to formulate 
a policy for the 1893 election, Kidston was the logical choice as the 
Rockhampton representative. He also represented the Mt Morgan 
and Clermont WPOs (Workers Political Organizations) at the 
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convention. Another Scottish immigrant, Andrew Fisher, repre-
sented the Gympie WPO. 
The ALF platform of 1891 reflected the practical reforms needed 
and demanded by Queensland workers. The convention of 1892 
polished this existing platform and adopted Kidston's proposals for 
electoral reform: one man, one vote; special provisions for those 
whose occupations necessitated a constant change of residence; and, 
finally, six months resident in the colony to be the qualification for 
the franchise. To accommodate Kidston's strong central Queensland 
separationist feelings, the convention agreed that "as regards local 
questions, including that of separation in Central and Northern 
Queensland, local organisations are free to determine their own 
course of action". There were only twenty-four representatives at 
the convention and Kidston together with Reid and Billy Demaine 
from Maryborough dominated the debates." 
For the May 1893 elections, the Rockhampton Workers Political 
Association endorsed its president, James Larcombe senior, and 
Kidston. Opposing them were George Curtis, the leader of the central 
Queensland separation movement, then at the height of its influence 
in Rockhampton, and Archibald Archer of Gracemere Station, one 
of the most prominent figures in Rockhampton for over twenty years 
and also a leading separationist. In this election Kidston had two 
political goals: electoral reform and central Queensland separation. 
He had therefore two centres of loyalty, one to the Labor Party which 
held such promise as a vehicle for reform, and the other to a ten-
year-old feeling that central Queensland should receive its own 
"Home Rule" and be made a separate colony. The separationists' 
cause had reached its peak in Rockhampton, in particular, and in 
central Queensland, in general, in 1893.^ Recognizing this, Kidston 
proposed to Curtis that they should form a central Queensland party 
to press for special consideration for the centre, as the Darling Downs 
and the northern members seemed to have done for their respective 
areas. Curtis declined. Though he was the leading separationist in 
Rockhampton, where the movement was centred, Curtis was also 
a real estate agent, a coriservative in politics, and one who found 
objectionable Kidston's support for Labor and the strikers. 
Both Kidston and Larcombe were beaten in 1893 and Kidston 
undoubtedly pondered on the Worker's claim that 30,411 men had 
been disfranchised prior to the poll.' The size of the Labor vote 
throughout the central electorates reduced the pastoralists' support 
for separation. They did not want a new colony created that would 
be governed by the Labor Party. In Rockhampton, however, the 
separation movement maintained its support and Separation Conven-
tions were held there in 1893 and 1894. 
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When the 1896 election approached, Kidston was still troubled 
by his two loyalties. He held tenaciously to the view that Queensland 
was too large to be governed as one colony and should be divided 
into three separate self-governing colonies, a feeling still widely voiced 
in Rockhampton. There was a problem, too, with the Labor Party. 
While its members in parliament had applied themselves to the 
enormous task confronting them and had proposed motions for 
important legislation (to bring about conciliation and arbitration; 
one man, one vote; and workmen's compensation), the central party 
organization outside parliament had fallen on hard times. The initial 
enthusiasm and financial support evident in 1893 had waned after 
the election and the CPE (Central Political Executive), appointed 
at the 1892 convention, had also ceased to function. Though a new 
central executive was constituted in 1895, its influence was really 
confined to Brisbane and local Labor organizations were left to select 
their own candidates and conduct their own elections. Kidston chose 
to run alone for the dual-member seat of Rockhampton. Not only 
did he run without a second Labor candidate, but he also ran as 
a "Democrat" rather than as an endorsed Labor man, and until the 
last weeks of the election, was running as the second Separationist 
with Curtis. 
Kidston had worked hard between 1893 and 1896 to ensure 
election at his second attempt. Though his bookselling business 
suffered as a result of his 1893 candidature, his conscious moderation 
soon recovered the ground lost as he assumed the role of the 
progressive reformer and the liberal democrat who was outside mere 
inter-party fights. In Rockhampton John Blair, the editor of the 
Morning Bulletin, supported liberal reforms and central Queensland 
separation. With his assistance, between 1893 and 1896 Kidston was 
able lo build a coalition of liberal reformers, the Labor party, 
separationists. and some local businessmen. 
A canvassing committee whose secretary, W. Allen, was one of 
the leading separationists, collected eight hundred signatures in 1896 
requesting Kidston to stand for parliament. In accepting this 
"spontaneous" request Kidston said: 
The one hope of progress in Queensland at present lay in the union of 
Labour men and Liberals of all shades of opinion for the purpose of 
turning out of power the do-nothing government ... and puttmg in their 
place a progressive government that would not only give the people 
something like honest administration of the laws they had, but would 
effect such reforms as were ripe for settlement. 
This was the essential Kidston seeking an alliance of Labor and 
Liberal politicians against the Conservative Government and looking 
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for honest, efficient government and practical reforms. Such a 
coalition was difficult to achieve in 1896. Charles Powers, the leader 
of the Liberal rump in the Opposition, had indicated at Maryborough 
that he would not be seeking re-election. He would not join the 
Ministry of Hugh Nelson {see Appendix) nor could he come to any 
arrangement with Glassey and the Labor Party on a common 
platform and a division of seats to be contested. He was therefore 
leaving politics. Kidston expressed his disappointment. Such an 
alliance would have been the key to removing the Conservatives. 
The campaign in Rockhampton in 1896 revealed the Kidston who 
was to dominate Queensland politics ten years later. His ideas and 
ideals had been formed and were not to change in that period, nor 
were his tactics. He was a man with his own ideas, determined, 
certain that the cause he was following was the best for him 
personally and for the wider reforms he ultimately sought to achieve. 
Skilfully manoeuvring to a position between liberalism and social 
democracy, he was never to tie himself wholly to one political cause 
or to one political organization. He was endorsed by the local Labor 
organization, now called the Rockhampton Democratic League, but 
refused to submit his name for further endorsement to the Labor 
CPE in Brisbane. In the context of Rockhampton politics in 1896, 
he fully understood what he was doing. Archer was not standing 
again, and in his place the mayor, Hugh Fiddess, stood on the same 
ticket as Curtis. In the anti-Brisbane political atmosphere, Kidston 
had to be a Rockhampton man first and a Labor man second, 
something that numbers of provincial Labor politicians since Kidston 
have continued to do. Kidston spelled out clearly where his loyalty 
lay in 1896. 
It must be clearly understood that if I am returned for Rockhampton, 
I do not recognize the authority of any party or person in Brisbane or 
out of it, excepting the electors of Rockhampton. I think one set of 
masters is enough. I am willing to co-operate with every friend of reform 
and I quite recognize the need of working well together; but if elected 
the only authority I can, as a Democrat, recognize is the authority of 
my constilutuents.' 
Despite this fence-sitting, Kidston regarded himself as a candidate 
representing Labor and was accepted as such in and about Rock-
hampton. "I have signed the Labour platform for the Labour 
platform is my platform", he told a Rockhampton audience three 
weeks before the poll.' His "Labour platform" was that formulated 
for the 1893 election. It was a platform of specific, practical reforms 
that he espoused, not the platform of "Socialism in our time" that 
blazed forth from the editorials of the Worker. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
WILLIAM KIDSTON 229 
Kidston was no socialist ideologue. In fact such notions were 
outside his concept of practical politics. However, since the issue 
of socialism was constantly raised by Labor's political opponents, 
Kidston was forced to say where he stood on the question. 
The essential lesson, from a general consideration of the whole subject, 
is that society is not a piece of mechanism that can be taken to pieces 
and reconstructed again at will, but an organism in which changes, 
whether quick or slow, must be in accordance with, and must be the 
result of, general growth. 
His advice to those who were seeking to achieve wide sweeping 
reforms and who saw socialist theory as the basis of this was: "Do 
not aim at reconstructing society all at once, but attack certain 
specific evils, and even if the reforms you may effect be small, it 
will be something and you will have the consciousness of building 
at least one little stone into the great structure of human progress." 
For Queensland in 1896, he thought "it might be better if we had 
less talk of socialism and more concentration of effort on the 
accomplishment of needed and possible reforms". He saw 
Queensland politics divided into two clear parties the Ministerial 
party "that wanted to exploit Queensland" and the Democratic 
party. "Whether they called themselves Labor or Liberal," he said, 
"if they were on the side of progress they belonged to the Democratic 
party.'"" 
Kidston's coalition of separationists, liberals, Labor, and, during 
the election, Irish Home Rulers, paid off. He headed the poll in 
Rockhampton by more than two hundred votes. Curtis was returned 
as the second member. Practical politics, Kidston soon found, were 
much more difficult than he had envisaged. He was impatient for 
results; he saw his coalition of progressives as being attainable and 
he saw the removal of the conservative "continuous government" 
as being possible once this coalition was formed. But there were 
barriers in his way that he could not easily remove. Glassey was 
a poor leader of the PLP (Parliamentary Labor Party) and there 
was little cohesion between his ideas and those of the ALF leaders 
outside parliament. The standing orders of parliament iniUally 
restricted Kidston and he was forced to master the rules governing 
parliamentary procedure. Finally, he found that forming an alliance 
with the Liberal members of the Opposition was very much more 
difficult than it had seemed in Rockhampton. "The nearer you get 
to the centre of political life," he told an interviewer from the 
Rockhampton People's Newspaper four months after his election, 
"the more conspicuous become the insincerities and double motives 
that seem to rule a large number of those engaged in it."" Regarding 
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his Labor colleagues, he found that "intellectually, they have nothing 
to fear from comparison with their opponents", but they too were 
subject to the same conflicting pressures "So many secondary 
motives are operating like so many cross-currents that it becomes 
extremely difficult for men to follow a straight and simple course 
even when they desire it." 
His impatience was evident in his first months in parliament. 
Though only a backbencher, he moved an amendment to the formal 
Address-in-Reply motion to the Governor's speech asking for the 
vote "for every citizen in Queensland". A month later he sought, 
unsuccessfully, to have referendums conducted in the centre and the 
north of the state on separation. The Brisbane Courier's parlia-
mentary roundsman noted: "Mr. Kidston's ability and ambition are 
both beyond dispute, and if he were only content to hasten slowly 
he would be more likely to make a mark in Parliament."'^ Kidston 
had come to parliament to achieve reforms; he did not have the time 
to hasten slowly. The major lesson he quickly learned was the great 
difference in politics between holding power as part of a government 
and being in opposition without power. Kidston rejected the proposi-
tion of Mat Reid that Labor should sit on the cross benches and 
not aspire for office. He held to his thesis of an alliance of 
progressives, but he soon appreciated that he would have to convince 
his parliamentary colleagues of this and possibly also the Labor 
organization outside parliament, and he accepted also that he would 
have to draw off dissident members of the Ministerial party. Kidston 
did not believe that Byrnes was the great liberal reform leader— 
in fact he held him to be a conservative and was to reject the "Byrnes 
Legend" in the Legislative Assembly after the young Premier's 
death. Kidston had more faith in his own reforming ability and his 
ability to built a coalition of reform. 
An important step was taken at the 1898 Labor-in-Politics 
Convention, where it was agreed that three Labor delegates should 
meet with three representatives of the Progressive Reform League, 
the loose extra-parliamentary body behind the Liberal oppositionists, 
to discuss an alliance for the 1899 election. Significantly, Kidston 
was chosen as one of the three Labor delegates along with Glassey 
and Anderson Dawson {see Appendix), a former miner and news-
paper editor who had been elected for Charters Towers in 1893. 
There were two problems: the Labor Party's insistence on main-
taining its platform in full and the question of who would lead the 
alliance. Kidston attempted to solve the first of these by proposing 
that, while the Labor Party retained its own platform, the specific 
policy issues on which to fight the election would be decided by a 
vote at a joint party meeting. There was agreement on this point, 
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but the negotiations broke down when Glassey insisted that he would 
have to lead the alliance. J. G. Drake, the Liberal leader, objected 
and, while Kidston tried to overcome the impasse by proposing a 
joint leadership, the alliance was officially dropped. Kidston and 
Dawson continued private negotiation with the Liberal remnant to 
try to avoid electoral clashes." 
Despite the refusal of the Queensland parliament to divide the 
state into three colonies and despite the rejection by the Colonial 
Office in London of petitions seeking a new central Queensland 
colony, there lingered a hope in Rockhampton that federation and 
a central Australian government might still achieve this goal. This 
last hope was shattered by clause 124 in the proposed Commonwealth 
Constitution, which left the power to create new states with the 
existing state parliaments. In Rockhampton Curtis continued to hold 
a strong local following on separation and in 1899 Kidston again 
refused to have a Labor candidate run with him. Both Hinchcliffe 
and Reid accepted that the peculiarities of Rockhampton politics 
made this necessary if Labor was to hold one of the two Rock-
hampton seats. 
Both Kidston and Curtis were returned to parliament. However, 
in the overall election the two opposition parties had little effect on 
the Ministerial party, which was again easily returned to office. Its 
new leader, J.R. Dickson {see Appendix), who had been called on 
to form a government after the death of Byrnes in 1898, was 
experiencing trouble with dissident members of his party who had 
not been given portfolios. Dawson replaced Glassey as parliamentary 
leader and William Browne, a former miner from Croydon, was 
elected deputy leader; Kidston was moved up to the parliamentary 
executive. 
The major issue facing the new parliament was federation. For 
Kidston there were three factors involved: the effect federation would 
have on the central separation issue; its influence on Queensland's 
industries; and whether or not the Queensland referendum on 
federation would be on a democratic basis, i.e. adult franchise. 
Kidston was and remained a strong federalist, but did not approve 
the terms of union in the Constitution for the Commonwealth of 
Australia. In the end he was strongly to oppose federation for 
Queensland, believing that, while it would assist the primary export 
industries with additional tariff-free markets, the removal of inter-
colonial tariffs would adversely affect Queensland's commerce and 
its manufacturing industries. In the debates on the Federafion 
Enabling Bill he tried to insert an amendment that would provide 
for white adult male suffrage in the referendum. There were then 
46,000 white adult males out of 138,000 in Queensland ineligible 
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to vote.'" If the one man, one vote principle could be introduced for 
this referendum, he argued, it could be applied to Queensland 
elections. Several government members crossed the floor, but 
Kidston's amendment was lost by 34 votes to 30." His attempt to 
have the Government conduct a referendum on the separation issue 
in conjunction with the federation referendum was also defeated. 
In central Queensland there was a substantial vote in favour of 
federafion in all electorates bar Rockhampton, where there was an 
overall "No" majority of 470 in a poll of 3170. It is not sufficient 
to see this as a vote against federation by a small manufacturing 
centre." Certainly, Brisbane, Toowoomba, Rockhampton, and Ip-
swich voted against federation and were the four largest manufac-
turing centres. However, Bundaberg, Townsville, and Maryborough 
were not far behind the last three towns mentioned and all voted 
for federation." Moreover they were ports, like Rockhampton, and 
could expect to increase their trade after federation, while Townsville 
was also the centre of a separationist movement. Kidston's standing 
in Rockhampton, his opposition to federation, and the support he 
received from Blair in the Morning Bulletin appear to have been 
decisive in the Rockhampton vote. 
It was at the end of 1899 that Kidston obtained his first brief 
taste of office. A majority of the Ministerial party wanted Dickson 
replaced as Premier by the Townsville businessman Robert Philp 
{see Ch.8). A procedural motion by Dawson during the debate on 
the Railway Standing Committee Bill was defeated by only 33 votes 
to 32 with one Labor member, Dinny Keogh of Rosewood, voting 
with the Government. Dickson resigned and advised the Lieutenant-
Governor, Samuel Griffith, to send for Dawson. The three questions 
raised by this sudden fall of the Continuous Government were: 
whether Labor should try to form a minority government, or build 
an alliance of Labor, Liberal, and dissident Ministerial members, 
or reject any notion of trying to govern at all. The second argument 
was the one supported by both Kidston and Dawson. They were keen 
that Labor should be seen as being willing to govern and not being 
merely a party of opposition. In the end, however, as it became 
obvious that there was not sufficient Liberal and dissident Min-
isterialist support for an alliance that could command a majority 
on the floor of the house, Dawson was forced to form a minority 
government." As the Labor spokesman on financial matters, Kidston 
was chosen by Dawson as Treasurer and Postmaster-General. 
His taste of office was indeed brief. Once the former Min-
isterialists had resolved their differences and elected Philp as their 
leader, the Dawson Government was defeated on the floor of the 
house. Kidston had answered one question as Treasurer. His very 
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brief period in this office taught him two lessons. He learnt that 
the state was bankrupt even though it was still only halfway through 
the financial year and that the Treasurer had been covering up this 
fact by using £500,000 of depositors' money belonging to the 
Government Savings Bank, without any authority from the par-
liament. Secondly, he learnt that it was possible to form an alliance 
of Labor, Liberal, and dissident Ministerialist members if the right 
opportunity presented itself. Henceforth his resolve was to propose 
such an alliance whenever possible and entice opportunists and 
dissidents away from the Philp Government. In summing up the 
members of the Labor caucus in January 1899, Hinchcliffe had 
labelled Kidston "the most tenacious"." It was a shrewd judgement. 
The new federal parliament attracted most of Queensland's best 
politicians. Kidston, however, had no desire to strike out anew. He 
was fifty-one years old, a strong part of his life revolved about his 
wife and family in Rockhampton, and he was content to fulfil his 
ambitions in the state parliament. Moreover the departure of Dawson 
and Fisher left him the strongest force inside his own party, although 
Browne, his senior in parliamentary service, was elected Labor 
leader. Nor was there anyone comparable to him in the Ministerial 
party and the expression "a giant among pygmies" was well used 
to describe Kidston's new place in the Queensland parliament. 
However, despite his normally robust health, the continuing pressure 
of politics was having its effect, and he was forced to miss the 1901 
Labor-in-Politics Convention. To recuperate, he took a boat trip back 
to Scotland, returning for the 1902 election. 
By all the normal canons of politics, Philp's government should 
have done badly at the 1902 election. Drought had continued in the 
west, the sugar crop was bad, unemployment was increasing, 
Queensland had received £600,000 less revenue from Commonwealth 
customs than it had collected itself before federation, and the general 
financial administration of the state was poor. What assisted Philp 
was the absence from the rolls of those seeking work and the 
generally poor calibre of the opposition campaign. Philp's party won 
forty of the seventy-two seats and seemed safe for a further three 
years. However, political fortunes can change quickly and this was 
to be made clear in 1903. Eighteen months after the election, Philp 
was to find himself on the opposition benches, with Kidston Treasurer 
of the state. 
Separation was still talked of in Rockhampton, but politically it 
carried little weight by 1902 when Kidston dropped Curtis as his 
running mate and had two Labor members, himself and Ken Grant, 
a telegraph operator, returned for the Rockhampton electorate. 
While Kidston's central Queensland party had come to nothing, a 
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group of eight members representing Darling Downs electorates had 
established a non-party group before the 1902 election. It was 
referred to as the "Darling Downs bunch" and consisted of six 
Ministerial and two opposition members who were reacting against 
the dominance of the "continuous government" by Brisbane 
merchants and commercial interests. Its nominal leader was Arthur 
Morgan {see Appendix), owner and editor of the Warwick Argus 
and Speaker in the Legislative Assembly between May 1899 and 
December 1901.^" 
Like Dickson, Philp was troubled by those members of his party 
who had hoped for but failed to receive portfolios in the new 
Government. There was a noticeable slackness in the attendance of 
government members in the house and throughout the last months 
of 1902 Philp was having increasing problems holding his party 
together. Apart from these there were two other factors causing such 
problems in the government party that they brought about its 
downfall. Both were areas in which Kidston had a personal and vital 
interest. 
Though adult franchise had been provided for Commonwealth 
elections in 1902, Queensland's electoral laws were still basically 
those passed in 1885. Plural voting continued to apply; women were 
not permitted to vote; and an elector claiming a vote on residence 
qualifications had to have been in residence at his electoral address 
for two months in the seven preceding an election. This last provision 
disfranchised itinerant workers or those unemployed who were 
seeking work in other parts of the state. The 1901 census had shown 
that there were 28,694 adult males not on the electoral rolls.^' Philp 
was not receptive to the rumblings for electoral reform even within 
his own party. 
The second factor causing dissension within Philp's party was the 
state's financial decline. Though he had handed over the Treasury 
to the Ipswich retailer and merchant banker Thomas Cribb in 
February 1901, Philp continued to be held responsible for the state's 
deficit of £1 million at the end of 1902. State revenue then was £3.5 
million. Interest payments on loans during 1902 amounted to 43 per 
cent of expenditure, while in the first quarter of 1903, 51 per cent 
of revenue had to be set aside for interest on loans. With two of 
the state's leading businessmen at the helm, Queensland was entering 
into bankruptcy. Philp proposed an income tax, which was really 
a poll tax, as a means of overcoming the deficit. 
One of the factors which clearly distinguish the mediocre political 
leader from the great is the latter's ability to see a particular political 
situation emerging and to grasp the opportunity to direct events along 
a path of his choosing. This was Kidston's role at the beginning of 
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1903. Philp's government was tottering. The quesfion was how it 
could be made to fall. Given the state of the parties in the Legislative 
Assembly, a no-confidence motion was unlikely to bring the Govern-
ment down, and in any case such a motion, even if successfully 
directed at the Premier, would be likely to produce a second 
government like that of Dawson, which again would be defeated once 
the Ministerialists had resolved their problems. Kidston sought 
something stronger, something with a more permanent basis for 
holding office once Philp had been removed. 
Moderation was the key to Kidston's plans. He intended to produce 
a moderate centre coalition that would attract and hold Labor 
support by promising electoral reform, workers' compensation, and 
the introduction of certain labour laws. It would attract and hold 
Liberal support through electoral reform and an efficient adminis-
tration of State finances. In addition, he was aware that there were 
dissident Ministerialists like Digby Denham {see Appendix), a 
successful grain and produce merchant, and Andrew Barlow, a 
banker and former government leader in the Council, who were 
prepared to desert Philp and enter into negotiations with Kidston 
in return for portfolios in any moderate coalition government. Such 
was the diminishing support for Philp that the Brisbane Courier, 
the arch-defender of conservatism in Queensland, abandoned the 
Government and supported its replacement. The Courier's editor was 
not altogether altruistic. His father-in-law was Sir Arthur Rutledge, 
Philp's Attorney-General, and in an inverted piece of nepotism, the 
editor desired to replace Philp with Rutledge as the parliamentary 
leader of the state's conservatives. 
Although he was only the deputy leader of the PLP, Kidston was 
the architect of the plot which brought down the Philp Government. 
Addressing a favourable public meeting in Rockhampton in January 
1903, he called publicly for an alliance of progressives to oust the 
Continuous Government. He was, he said, a reformer who desired 
to obtain office to effect reforms. Browne indicated his support for 
Kidston at a meeting in Fortitude Valley where he said that Labor 
was prepared to co-operate with any group in parliament that would 
assist in introducing even one of the reforms sought by Labor.^ ^ There 
was some criticism of Kidston's speech in the Worker and some 
unflattering references to his placing expediency before principles, 
but this was not to deter him from his course. 
Kidston knew his own ability and certainly saw himself as a man 
of destiny, but in 1903 he was too shrewd to jeopardize the success 
of his plans by proposing a Labor leader for his moderate alliance. 
The problem was to find a leader who was both untainted by 
association with Philp and who would be acceptable to the Labor 
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and the non-Labor members interested in the coalition. Arthur 
Morgan was seen as such a man. He was by no means a brilliant 
politician, but was sound and in many respects the archetype 
nineteenth century Queensland Liberal. Bruce Knox in his thesis on 
Morgan described him in these terms: 
Morgan belonged very much to the society which he had known all his 
life and he had no wish to see it fundamentally changed; he could never 
sanction attacks on property such as the Labour Party would have him 
make, and if there were evils within this society based on property he 
sought to remedy them by State action, but not in such a fashion as 
to change the social structure ... The evil was that the majority of the 
people were not as well off as the minority and it seemed to him possible 
that political power was being used unfairly, to maintain this state of 
affairs." 
Morgan, though repelled by much of the Labor Party platform, was 
in favour of electoral reform and as far back as 1895 had advocated 
the abolition of plural voting.^" 
An important factor in Morgan's acceptance of the position as 
coalition leader was his own high regard for Kidston. In January 
1903, when Kidston had first proposed publicly his alliance of 
progressives, Morgan wrote in the Warwick Argus: 
Mr. Kidston is a man of strong intellectual capacity, holding well defined 
democratic views, which he has the ability to express and the will and 
the courage to enforce ... Shrewd, clear sighted and far-seeing, he [has] 
proved himself the possessor of many of the qualities which are essential 
to successful leadership. '^ 
The months following Kidston's Rockhampton speech and its 
acceptance by Morgan were months of intrigue, with Denham, the 
parliament's political chameleon, acting as the go-between for 
Kidston and Browne on one side and the Liberals and dissident 
Ministerialists on the other. There was, according to the Courier's 
roundsman, "unrest that seethes from Point Danger to Cape York". 
Looking back after thirty years, one of Kidston's close personal 
and political friends, Thomas O'Sullivan, a Brisbane barrister who 
was to be appointed to the Legislative Council as government leader 
when the coalition was formed, recalled Kidston as the "underground 
engineer" of the coalition. He wrote: 
Kidston realised that the stage had been reached when mere denunciation 
of other parties would carry his party nowhere, and that there were many 
outside of the party who believed in some of the Labour planks and were 
disposed to assist in placing them on the Statute Book. He thought that 
assistance could be obtained without any sacrifice of principle. When 
this opportunity presented itself to form an alliance he seized it without 
hesitation.-' 
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The plot was set; it remained for the right opportunity to present 
itself for the coup. In attempting to stem the feeling against him, 
Philp promised a very mild Workmen's Compensation Bill and an 
Adult Suffrage Bill when the Legislative Assembly resumed. The 
latter had so many provisions as to make for no real advances. 
Browne moved a no-confidence amendment to the Address-in-Reply, 
which was defeated by 38 votes to 30. A matter of more fundamental 
political substance was required to turn Philp out. This presented 
itself in the debate on the Stamp Duties Act, which proposed to re-
enact and extend the operation of the Act passed two years before 
and tax all bank deposits. It was not a Bill of burning importance 
to Labor members, but certainly one that roused the men of 
commerce on the Ministerial benches. E.B. Forrest, a Brisbane 
merchant and company director who had crossed the floor to bring 
down the Dickson Government in 1899, again indicated that he 
would vote against Philp's government on this Bill. 
Kidston eagerly entered the debate and made a fine speech on 
government finance and the need for moderation in extracting more 
taxes. Four government members were drawn to the opposition side 
of the house and the Bill was carried by only 33 votes to 31. With 
three Labor members absent, Philp accepted the vote as a tacit 
defeat; he resigned and recommended that the Governor send for 
Browne, the leader of the Opposition." It was not expected that 
Browne, any more than Dawson before him, would be able to form 
a workable government. Now Kidston's work in the previous months 
paid off. Browne suggested that the Governor send, not for Rutledge, 
Philp's successor, but for Morgan, an unusual proposal considering 
that Morgan was neither a Minister nor leader of a political party 
in the Legislative Assembly, but the Speaker. 
It was not a difficult task for Morgan to form a government. His 
being Premier and the offer of the Lands portfolio to Joshua Thomas 
Bell of Dalby, brought in the "Darling Downs bunch"; James Blair, 
a young Ipswich barrister and a member of the Liberal opposition 
group, brought in the Liberals with his acceptance of the Attorney-
General's portfolio; offers of ministries to Denham and Barlow added 
the dissident Ministerialists from Brisbane, and with Kidston and 
Browne bringing the Labor Party in, the coalition was complete. 
Labor, however, retained its separate identity and elected Peter Airey 
as its own parliamentary leader. It continued to hold separate caucus 
meetings as well as attend coalition party meetings. The Continuous 
Government had been ousted, replaced by a new government called 
the "Morgan-Browne coalition" in which the strongest Cabinet 
Minister was the Treasurer, William Kidston. 
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Kidston was finally in a position where he could introduce the 
reforms he had advocated during the previous ten years. His seven 
years in parliament had changed him in many ways. He was now 
plumper in build, he wore spectacles, and his well-kept beard had 
traces of grey showing through. Gone was the uncertainty that 
marked his earlier speeches in parliament. Confident, with the 
experience of the previous seven years and his own knowledge of 
his superiority over most of his colleagues, he now spoke clearly and 
fluently. Despite his success, however, he was to remain essentially 
a family man who was not gregarious but who preferred to spend 
his spare time reading from his extensive library of English literature. 
It was this devotion to literature along with his confidence in the 
correctness of his own political ideas that his contemporaries recalled 
most. Kidston was determined to be his own master and made it 
clear that he did not have to lean on his public servants for advice. 
Indeed it soon became evident that Morgan looked to Kidston for 
guidance, and not vice versa. His goal was to balance the state's 
budget and to use state power to provide new labour laws and welfare 
services, to develop new agricultural areas, and to absorb the 
unemployed through increasing economic development. However, 
the major problem facing him was the state's financial position, 
which showed a deficit of £600,000 for the two previous years and 
an accumulated deficit of £1.5 million. 
Kidston was the first full-time Treasurer. Though he continued 
to live at Rockhampton, he did not have any outside business or 
law practice to take his time, and he was able to devote his full 
energies to his office. There were to be no "pork barrel" politics 
with Kidston. He quickly demonstrated that he would spend State 
funds only in areas where there had been adequate planning and 
where there would be a clear return to the state. He appointed an 
efficiency board to eliminate political supernumeraries in the public 
service and to suggest ways of providing greater efficiency in 
government departments. However, he saw value in committing 
State funds to provide work for groups of unemployed men clearing 
government-owned scrub land (which Kidston later sold) and 
building new roads. To reduce the imbalance between revenue and 
expenditure, local authorities which had not paid their debts to the 
State Government for several years were forced to make restitution. 
On the softer side he had a Bill passed through the Legislative 
Assembly removing income tax on incomes up to £52 a year. The 
Legislative Council rejected the Bill on the grounds of equality of 
sacrifice. Kidston stopped further borrowing in London until the 
state's financial stability was restored and interest payments ceased 
to absorb such a large proportion of revenue. This was to take until 
1909. 
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Despite Kidston's early success in righting the state's finances, 
the coalition remained a tenuous affair relying on the goodwill 
towards Morgan and on the moderation and efficiency of Kidston 
himself. Several of the dissidents who had deserted Philp drifted back 
when they found that there were not enough portfolios to go around. 
The strongest card of the coalition's opponents was the numerical 
strength of the Labor Party within the joint coalition parties, though 
not within the Cabinet. Labor, to the men of property and commerce, 
represented a diabolical Jacobin force that was bent on introducing 
"equality" into the state. The coalition's opponents played on this 
fear early and often. To prevent further coalition defections Kidston 
strove to emphasize both the moderation of his party's demands and 
the need for those reforms which he judged had wide support. 
Browne died in April 1904 and was replaced in the Cabinet as 
the second Labor Minister by Peter Airey, a former schoolteacher 
who was to become one of Kidston's closest friends. The coalition 
became known as the "Morgan-Kidston government". Kidston 
provided for the appointment of Hinchcliffe and two other Labor 
nominees to the Legislative Council, the first such appointments ever. 
Both he and Morgan determined that the coalition would push 
forward in 1904 with its reform programmes. These included 
electoral reform, workers' compensation, a financial agreement with 
the Queensland National Bank, encouragement of the dairying 
industry, and changes in the land laws and those relating to local 
authorities. Rutledge indicated that the Opposition would try to stop 
only the Bill relating to electoral reform, which provided for one 
adult, one vote, and for a redistribution of electorates." 
The defections back to Rutledge and Philp and the death of 
Browne had left the Assembly evenly divided, thirty-five votes each 
side, with the Speaker, Alfred Cowley, having more in common with 
Philp than with Morgan or Kidston. William Murphy, editor and 
proprietor of the Croydon Mining News, had won the by-election 
for Browne's electorate, but could not be in Brisbane when the 
Assembly resumed early in June. In the meantime, Philp and 
Rutledge approached Morgan and offered him any ministry in a new 
government if he also would defect. Morgan refused. On 7 June 
James Cribb, a half-brother of the former Treasurer Thomas Cribb, 
moved an amendment to the Address-in-Reply which, if carried, 
would have been a censure on the Government. Murphy held the 
key to the result and government members stonewalled for two 
weeks, waiting for him to arrive from Croydon. At about the same 
time the Russian general Kuropatkin was marching to relieve Port 
Arthur during the Russo-Japanese war. Murphy's arrival in Brisbane 
in time to save the Government by one vote earned him the nickname 
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of "Kuropatkin" Murphy. Morgan and Kidston accepted that they 
could not continue to govern in such circumstances and sought a 
dissolution of the Assembly. This was refused. Rutledge tried to form 
a government and failed and an election was called. 
It was to be a short campaign. Although Kidston denied that there 
was any formal compact between the two coalition parties, the 
prospect of achieving electoral reform was too strong to allow any 
overt competition. In the end eleven Labor candidates and five 
Morganites were elected unopposed. The election proved a triumph 
for Kidston. Labor returned thirty-four members, three short of an 
absolute majority, Morganites numbered twenty-five, and the Op-
positionists only seventeen. Rutledge lost his own seat and Philp was 
restored as leader of the Opposition. The soundness of Kidston's 
judgement that reform was sought by the electors was reflected in 
the Governor's despatch to the Colonial Office after the election: 
"The vote in favour of the Social movement associated with Labour 
Politics has grown and the present situation in Queensland is only 
the natural reaction due to the leaven of the agitation for Social 
Reform which is in evidence everywhere in the civilized world."" 
As leader of the larger party in the coalition, Kidston could 
rightfully have claimed the position of Premier and at least half the 
portfolios for his party. He chose to do neither. Until electoral reform 
had been achieved, Labor's electoral base remained weak. Moreover 
Kidston felt that a judicious alliance with the Morganites was a safer 
path to reform than Labor's attempting to push ahead alone. 
There was much "sorting out" of Commonwealth-state relations 
during the first decade of the twentieth century and Kidston was 
to be at the centre of this. The Colonial Office records in London 
show him taking leading roles in the question of Commonwealth and 
state priorities in the imperial honours system, the conclusion of the 
Anglo-Japanese Treaty of 1894 with its relation to Queensland, the 
deportation of the Kanakas, and the question of where authority lay 
in allowing foreign armed forces to land. Despite Kidston's attempt 
to retain a separate state identity for Queensland in foreign and 
imperial affairs, the British Government had made its position clear 
by April 1903: "So far as foreign matters are concerned, the people 
of Australia form one political community for which the Government 
of the Commonwealth alone can speak and for everything affecting 
external states or communities which takes place within its bound-
aries, that Government is responsible."'" 
Kidston was a reformer of determination. He quickly introduced 
changes in the income tax structure that lifted the level of exemption 
to £100 a year and increased the tax on those in the upper income 
brackets. He concluded an agreement with the Queensland National 
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Bank under which it paid £86,000 a year off its debt, a sum to be 
used to create employment through public works. The Governor's 
salary was reduced, as were those of public servants (who were not 
allowed to form trade unions until 1916), but these salaries were 
to be made up if the Government achieved a surplus. Airey 
introduced the Elections Act Amendment Bill, which provided votes 
for women, abolished plural voting, and introduced postal voting. 
It was rejected by the Council but under the threat of swamping, 
the upper house allowed the Bill through when it was presented a 
second time in January 1905. Labor and Kidston had achieved their 
first and one of their most important reforms. 
Through his own extensive reading, Kidston had equipped himself 
to handle the problems of the Treasury. His immediate goal was 
to remove the deficit accumulated by his predecessors and to fund 
public works out of current revenue, as far as possible, while the 
huge loan interest bill was reduced. There had been a reduction of 
£556,379 in government expenditure in his first twelve months in 
office. He was pleased that, with the improvement in the Queensland 
economy that had occurred at the time that he was coming into the 
Treasury, he had a deficit of only £35,000 in his 1904 budget. While 
this was satisfactory under the accepted wisdom of budgeting, 
Kidston had other ideas about how governments should use their 
financial powers and was ahead of his contemporaries as to the 
significance of government budgeting. He told the parliament on 6 
October 1904: 
It is of course evident that so large a diminution in the expenditure of 
public money must have a very appreciable effect upon the condition 
of trade and commerce. It would be better if we could restrict the 
expenditure of public money during times of general prosperity and 
increase it when the inevitable period of depression came, but un-
fortunately, human nature is not so constituted and Governments and 
Parliaments are very human. 
A major problem that he faced as Treasurer was not merely the 
reduction in revenue caused by the loss of customs and excise duties 
to the Commonwealth at federation, but also the year-by-year 
uncertainty as to what amount the Commonwealth treasury would 
be paying back to Queensland out of the three-quarters of customs 
and excise revenue returnable to the states under Section 87 of the 
Constitution (the Braddon clause). Before federation, Queensland 
had been a high-tariff colony which had borrowed heavily and used 
its customs revenue to pay the interest bills. But in six separate years, 
between 1901 and 1910 when the Braddon clause operated, 
Queensland received less than her three-quarters share. In fact, over 
the nine-year period, Queensland fared worst of all the states in the 
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customs and excise revenue returned to them." 
Kidston was to complain bitterly of the losses Queensland had 
suffered through federation and the impossibility of accurate bud-
geting when the Commonwealth subsidies lessened for a period but 
were highly inaccurate in the matter of promises and actual receipts. 
In 1904, when he was anticipating the receipt of £740,000 from the 
Commonwealth compared with £810,000 in the previous years and 
£905,000 in the year prior to that, he told the parliament that 
"Queensland has a right to expect that the understanding on which 
she joined the Commonwealth will be honourably kept and that no 
interpretation of the mere letter of the Constitution will be taken 
advantage of to destroy her financial stability and independence". 
At a succession of premiers' conferences with the Federal Govern-
ment, he sought a new Commonwealth-state relationship whereby 
the Commonwealth would take over the states' debts, retain all 
customs and excise duties itself, and make fixed annual per capita 
payments back to the states. This would guarantee that the state 
and Commonwealth treasuries would remain independent of each 
other and fulfil their separate roles in the federation. In a lengthy 
report to the Legislative Assembly on the "Financial Results of 
Federation", he said: 
The system under which we are now working is inherently bad and if 
permitted to remain unchanged, will undermine in State ministries all 
healthy sense of responsibility and ultimately destroy the financial 
stability of the State ... Despite the compensation of the sugar bounty, 
Queensland has paid a heavier price for federation than any other State 
in the Commonwealth." 
Such statements, coming from one who was acknowledged in the 
parliament as being particularly astute in financial matters, inspired 
talk of secession from the Commonwealth. Kidston rebuked them. 
He did not seek a breaking up of the union, but a "consummation 
of the federation", a phrase he often used, by a more rational 
financial relationship between the Commonwealth Government and 
the states than was possible under the Braddon clause. Both sides, 
he emphasized, had to know what money they would need and receive 
on a continuing basis. To Thomas Plunkett, the Member for Albert, 
who proposed secession motions in the Legislative Assembly in 1906 
and 1907, Kidston replied: 
When a State like Queensland enters into a union of this kind she must 
necessarily accept a number of inconvenient consequences until the new 
machinery gets into proper and easy working order ... 1 think it is a 
desirable thing that the Australian States should be combined under one 
governing authority. 1 have always thought that and I think it now." 
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This is to run ahead of events, since in 1905 the continued existence 
of the coalition, after electoral reform had been achieved, posed 
problems for both the Labor and non-Labor members. Kidston was 
at the centre of this problem. For Labor, there was concern that 
he might find the fruits of office too tempting, provide limited 
reforms, and steer the party away from its longer-term goals. On 
the other hand the non-Labor members feared how far Kidston might 
go with reforms that would alter significantly the economic, political, 
and social distribution of power in the state. What was clear to both 
groups was that Kidston was his own man and would pursue his 
own cause. 
As Kidston's power base was in the Labor Party, it was there that 
he had to guarantee support for his strategies unless, of course, he 
chose to form his own political party. In 1905 Labor ideas were 
dominated by three men: Albert Hinchcliffe, the shrewd wire-pulling 
secretary of the ALF and the Labor Party, and manager of the 
Worker; Mat Reid, a clear-thinking, capable organizer who saw 
himself as the guardian of the party's socialist principals; and Henry 
Boote, a scientific socialist who, as editor, had rebuilt the Worker 
into a powerful weekly paper. Internal Labor politics between 1905 
and 1907 were to be a contest between these three strongwilled men 
and the equally strongwilled and stubborn Kidston to determine the 
course the Labor Party would follow in Queensland politics. 
This was not to be a simple contest; indeed the calibre of the men 
and their common commitment to reform complicated the matter. 
In February 1905 the Worker, the mouthpiece of the Hinchcliffe-
Reid-Boote triumvirate, was full of praise for the reforms achieved 
by the coalition: "The Government are finding work for many who 
need it and are doing it on a system at once fairer to the men and 
more honest to the country than anything previously attempted in 
this State." However, a month later, again in reference to the 
coalition, it emphasized the "principles versus expediency" 
dichotomy that Kidston's conduct since 1896 had raised: "The path 
of Expediency is always a tempting one for the politician. It is smooth 
and level and there are places of refreshment en route. The path 
of Principle, on the other hand, is rugged and uninviting ... yet only 
along the unhospitable road can we reach the goal of our desires." 
Boote was troubled, unsure whether Kidston was concerned with 
principles or expediency. In December 1905, however, he wrote in 
the Worker: "Intellectually he [Kidston] is worth a busload of some 
of the men who represent us and as a politician he is probably 
animated by the best intentions in the world." Perhaps Kidston's 
fellow countryman Keir Hardie supplied the answer that Kidston 
himself would have given: "A great principle may be so overlain 
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by dogmatic interpretations as to be unrecognizable; nay, the dogma 
may in the course of time come to be considered of greater 
importance than the principle itself."'" In essence, both Kidston and 
those who were to become his political opponents within the Labor 
Party were right. Great reforms require two sets of people: the 
discontented thinkers for whom proposed reforms are never suffi-
cient, and the practical reformers who shape particular pieces of 
reform and, having seen these through their teething period, 
contemplate the next practical steps. Though the two may be in the 
same polifical party, they will ever be in dispute. 
The Labor-in-Politics Convenfion in May 1905 brought the 
problem of the coalition into the open. To Kidston, politics remained 
a matter of practical and possible reforms. He was little concerned 
with philosophical speculation or with theoretical objectives or with 
high-sounding statements of principle that ran counter to the realities 
of Queensland politics as he saw them as Treasurer in 1905. At his 
first convention in 1892 he had argued for practical goals related 
to the needs of Queensland's farmers and workers. Consequently 
when the 1905 convention adopted as the Labor Party's objective, 
"Securing the full results of their industry to the wealth producers 
by the collective ownership of the means of production, distribution 
and exchange ... ", Kidston found himself in total opposition to his 
party. This was exacerbated when the convention adopted as policy 
"the immediate stoppage of further sales of Crown Lands"." This 
had been an area where Kidston had provided work for the 
unemployed in clearing the land and had used the revenue from the 
sale of this land to balance the state's finances. 
Kidston was concerned not only with the practical impossibility 
of achieving the new objective, but with the influence this could have 
on Morgan and the coalition partners. In the Warwick Argus 
Morgan had voiced his concern at the tenor of the convention and 
warned that the Liberals would have to look closely at the continued 
existence of the coalition. "It behoves the Morgan Government to 
look to the connection now" he wrote. An assault aimed at breaking 
up the coalition was carried out on Warwick, a week after the 
convention by Joe Lesina, the Labor Member for Clermont and an 
opponent of Kidston in the caucus. To a well-attended meeting in 
the Warwick Town Hall, Lesina said: "Now that the coalition had 
performed the function for which it was created, the Labour Party 
... must say goodbye to Mr Morgan unless he was prepared to go 
further, and an endeavour should be made to get the reins of power 
into the hands of a purely Labour Government."" 
Kidston was not one to accept political defeat with equanimity. 
Still holding a majority following within the Labor caucus, he and 
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the parliamentary leader, George Kerr, drafted a statement calling 
for a new convention to recommit the objective and the plank on 
Crown land sales. This was released to all newspapers. It clearly 
indicated Kidston's political philosophy. 
The introduction of such impracticable elements is likely to have a two 
fold evil effect. It will infallibly drive away from the Party many of those 
who have been our earnest co-workers for years. It will also tend to 
prevent the Parliamentary Labour Party from co-operating with any 
other political party for purposes of progressive legislation. 
Now it must be evident to anyone who has studied Australian politics 
for the last ten years that the many gains of Labour in the legislative 
arena have been won largely by a system of prudent alliances. These 
alliances are only possible so long as the counsels of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party are guided by moderation and sound sense. ... 
In our opinion the mass of the people are not in sympathy with the 
extreme ideas favoured by the Convention, and any attempt to force such 
ideas suddenly on the community must inevitably end in calamity and 
failure." 
The publication of the statement widened the gulf between Kidston 
and the Labor Party and the lack of responses by local branches 
for a new convention indicated the lessening of his influence within 
the party. 
It is evident that Kidston had impressed others outside Queensland 
with his ability. Lord Northcote, the Governor-General, wrote of 
him favourably in his private correspondence with the Colonial 
Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain. Perhaps the first public assessment 
of his worth came from Alfred Deakin in his anonymous articles 
in the London Morning Post. In his article published on 4 March 
1905, Deakin wrote: "Of all the difficulties of the Labour Party in 
Australia, the greatest is that of finding men fit to undertake the 
responsibilities of administration ... Mr. Kidston, alone, though not 
a leader, has done as well as his predecessors in the Treasury." 
Deakin was to continue this praise of Kidston, not merely for his 
administrative ability, but later for his grasp of the problems inherent 
in the Braddon clause of the Commonwealth Constitution. He had, 
wrote Deakin in a Morning Post article of 6 November 1906, "shown 
the shrewdest appreciation of his position and that of his fellow State 
Ministers". Deakin was able to study Kidston in other areas of 
politics also. He thought that Kidston had shown a great deal of 
common sense in his handling of the deportation of Queensland 
Kanakas, but had "received scant appreciation for the businesslike 
manner in which [Kidston] took up [his] share of the obligation". 
By 1909, Deakin had characterized Kidston's political actions as 
"thorough". This was a view shared by Sir Charles Lucas of the 
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British Colonial Office, who had been sent to study Australian affairs 
in October 1909. Lucas found Kidston "beyond question a strong 
man ... growing in statesmanship and ... the best in Queensland". 
He noted that he was strong for states' rights and was the only 
premier to encourage Lucas to talk privately with senior public 
servants in preference to political leaders." 
By the end of 1905 the strain of keeping the coalition together 
was beginning to tell on both Kidston and Morgan. Kidston was 
reported as being ill or away from the Treasury on numerous 
occasions during 1905. Morgan sought relief from these strains and 
when Hugh Nelson, the President of the Legislative Council, died 
on 1 January 1906, Morgan willingly had himself appointed to that 
position. In Bruce Knox's words, it "provided an escape from a 
political scene which was becoming more and more foreign to him, 
and in which he suffered considerable disillusionment"." 
Kidston was the obvious choice to succeed Morgan as premier 
but he proposed Denham, not out of modesty, but as a means of 
guaranteeing that those former Philpites who had stayed with the 
coalition would not wander back to their own fold. The Cabinet 
members, however, overruled Kidston and chose him as the new 
Premier. He continued to hold the Treasury. One of his first tasks 
as Premier was to recommend the appointment of a lieutenant-
governor to replace Nelson. Kidston wanted Morgan to receive the 
appointment, but the Governor, Lord Chelmsford, demurred about 
appointing one who had so recently been involved directly in local 
politics. He preferred the Chief Justice, Sir Pope Cooper. Kidston 
vigorously opposed Cooper, not merely on the grounds of a possible 
disagreement between the judicature and the executive, but more 
importantly because he saw Cooper as being temperamentally 
unsuitable to exercise the Governor's role and lacking the political 
experience needed for it. The position was left unfilled until Kidston's 
advice was accepted in 1909 and Morgan appointed, by which time 
the British Colonial Office had swung around to agreeing with 
Kidston's judgement of Cooper. 
Kidston's determination to be his own master left him as a premier 
without the full support of his own party inside and outside 
parliament. Throughout 1906 he was to move himself further away 
from the Labor Party and towards his own party, based on support 
for him personally and for his policies. In making five new 
appointments to the Legislative Council, he nominated only one 
Labor supporter, and by the end of 1906 he was examining whether 
his own record in government was a sufficient base for a new centre 
party. During 1905 the first Workers Compensation Act and a 
Shearers' and Sugar Workers' Accommodation Act had been passed. 
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Through three Acts relating to land and agriculture, additional farms 
had been opened for settlement. In the Agricultural Holdings Act 
special financial assistance had been provided for new farmers to 
meet a range of needs from travelling expenses to purchase of stock 
and implements. In 1906, he passed legislation conferring on women 
the right to practice as barristers and solicitors. 
Kidston, however, was the first Queensland premier since Griffith 
to find himself constantly at war with the upper house. His first 
Income Tax Amendment Bill had been rejected in the upper house; 
a Land Monopoly Tax Bill designed to break up the largest stations 
that were suitable for closer settlement had been rejected by the 
Council, as were Bills to guarantee that the proceeds from the sale 
of Crown lands went into a special trust fund. In 1906 the Council 
had rejected a Trades Disputes Bill which would have provided a 
labour law in Queensland giving similar protection for trade unions 
as that recently introduced into Britain. The Council had also 
rejected an amendment to the Factories and Shops Act which would 
have established a Wages Board in Queensland. 
Like most of his contemporaries, Kidston believed that Queensland 
had unlimited potential development. However, unlike many of his 
political colleagues, he rejected the notion that this potential should 
be realized by constant and heavy borrowing overseas. He told the 
Assembly that he wanted "a boom in railway construction, without 
any excessive risk to the general taxpayer"."* A combination of these 
two ideals brought him to support the building of private railway 
lines, to which the Labor Party, mindful of the scandals of private 
railway construction in the United States, was totally opposed. It 
was also the underlying reason for his passing the Railway Guarantee 
Act in 1906 under which new lines constructed in the state had to 
pay their working expenses plus 3 per cent of their capital cost each 
year. Those farmers who benefited from a new line through their 
districts were required to make up the difference if the line did not 
draw the amount of revenue required. It was not a popular Act but, 
given the railway debt, one that Kidston insisted upon. At the end 
of his first three years as Treasurer he could point with some pride 
to his achievements. Where Philp had accumulated a deficit of £1.5 
million, Kidston could show that while revenue had remained about 
the same each year, he had accumulated a surplus of almost 
£130,000. To his parliamentary colleagues, however, "Wullie" 
Kidston's pride was beginning to be a bit too evident. 
At the federal elections in December 1906, the Labor vote in 
Queensland fell by 13 per cent and all three Senate seats went to 
the Anti-Socialist Party."' Kidston interpreted this as a sign that his 
financial policies, his continued sales of Crown land, and his rejection 
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of his party's socialist objective were favoured by the electors. He 
now decided to break completely from the Labor Party and to form 
his own party, whose candidates and parliamentarians would sign 
a pledge binding themselves to Kidston personally and not to the 
platform and rules of any other party. A further factor hast-^ning 
this decision was that Denham, as ever the political chameleon, and 
calculating that Kidston's problems with the Labor Party meant the 
end of his dominance of Queensland politics, had deserted Kidston 
and defected back to Philp. 
Rockhampton was chosen by Kidston as the place to announce 
his split with the Labor Party and unfold his own "gang forrit" policy 
for the elections in May 1907. This was a broad programme which 
included old age pensions, social welfare, workers' compensation 
under state insurance, land settlement, new railways, education 
reform, and the removal of the veto power from the Legislative 
Council."^ It was an appealing platform for a wide range of voters. 
All but fourteen members of the Labor Party declared themselves 
followers of Kidston, and Queensland politics became a three-party 
contest with divisions resembling those in the federal parliament. 
Between 1907 and 1909, Queensland electors were to vote on three 
separate occasions to try to resolve the three-party dilemma. In May 
1907 Kidston won twenty-four seats, Labor eighteen, and the 
Philpites twenty-nine. Under its new leader, David Bowman, Labor 
moved to the cross benches, but agreed to keep Kidston in office 
so long as his legislative programme did not conflict with Labor 
principles. Kidston, however, continued to regard Bowman as his 
natural ally and Philp as his natural opponent and still spoke of the 
"Progressive party"—that combination of Labor members and 
reform-minded Liberals. 
Kidston had reached the top of his political career by being a hard 
and astute politician. It was inevitable that he should make personal 
and political enemies on the way up, yet the contemporary criticisms 
that he was conceited, autocratic, and self-centred demonstrate 
rather the fear and respect in which he was held. It appeared to 
Bernays, an astute observer of politicians at work, that when Kidston 
was premier, "there was only room for one man on the sidewalk 
in George Street and that man was William Kidston"."' A journalist 
with the Brisbane Sunday Mail, writing thirty years after Kidston's 
retirement, recalled that Kidston's greatest asset had been his 
imperturbability, which was the despair of "back bench snipers". 
On the other hand, he remembered Kidston as "the most autocratic 
democrat that has ever sat in the Queensland parliament ... He could 
say no with an inexorable finality so it would stay through all hell"."" 
Although there were members of the Labor Party who hated 
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Kidston for deserting and wrecking his former party, they respected 
him for his personal strength and resolution. During 1907 and 1908 
an uneasy relationship continued between Kidston and the members 
of the PLP. He needed them to survive in office; they needed Kidston 
in order to get reform legislation passed. However, Kidston's attempt 
to bring the two parties into an alliance was bound to fail. Kidston 
had his goals but Labor also had goals, and in the rough and ready 
democracy that characterizes Labor parties, there was no place for 
a man of destiny who saw himself as being above the party. 
The Legislative Council, rather than the fact that there were 
almost equal parties in the Legislative Assembly, was Kidston's 
major problem in 1907. That chamber, whose members were 
nominated for life, was determined that it would block any 
progressive legislation that would interfere with the social, economic, 
or political power that private, large-scale capitalism enjoyed in 
Queensland. It was the bulwark against the excesses of democracy. 
Kidston's confrontation with the Council had begun in 1906 and 
revived late in 1907 when a Wages Boards Bill was rejected. 
Queensland, at that time, was the only state without either a 
conciliation and arbitration court or a wages board system. The 
Council's rejection was based on the opposition from the farming 
representatives within Kidston's own party. It was only when Kidston 
threatened to resign as leader that these members agreed to support 
the Bill."^  Kidston's tactic against the Council was to seek an alliance 
with the Labor Party on the basis of their joint opposition to the 
Council. He wrote to Bowman: 
The Conservative Party ... have found a last hope in the Legislative 
Council and from that entrenchment continue to thwart the wishes and 
aspirations of the people of Queensland .... We are forced to ask ourselves 
whether we are willing to permit the political prejudices of a few nominees 
to continue to override the wishes of the elected representatives of the 
people. This has become the most impwrtant question in Queensland 
politics, and on its satisfactory solution rests the hope of democratic 
progress in Queensland." 
The battle against the Legislative Council on such a matter as the 
institution of wages boards was certainly fundamental to any notions 
of democratic government in the state. However, it was a measure 
of the distrust with which the Labor members now regarded Kidston 
that on this issue, which involved the first plank of Labor's fighting 
platform, the members of the PLP refused to join him in an alliance, 
but merely promised him continued support against Philp. 
Conflicts between the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative 
Council produced periods of intense political unrest in Queensland. 
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It is not coincidental that the periods when there were reforming 
premiers were also periods of conflict between the two houses. 
Kidston shared with Griffith, T.J. Ryan {see Ch.lO), and Theodore 
the honour of tackling the problem of the upper house. In the impasse 
reached through the Council's rejection of the Wages Boards Bill, 
the essential right of the popularly elected lower house to govern 
was called into question. Kidston approached the Governor, Lord 
Chelmsford, and asked that he appoint sufficient new legislative 
councillors to have the Wages Boards Bill passed. Chelmsford 
refused and defended his refusal in a despatch to the Secretary of 
State for Colonies in March 1908 
If Mr. Kidston had had a united party behind him I think I might have 
been justified in acceding to this request, but in the circumstances it 
would have been possible that on the day following my acceptance of 
his advice the Labour Party might have thrown over their support and 
I could have found myself in the position of having taken an irremediable 
constitutional step on the advice of the defeated leader of one-third of 
the House."' 
Chelmsford's defence of himself was quite unconvincing. On this 
issue of the Wages Boards Bill and the other Bills rejected by the 
Council, Kidston had the clear support of the Labor members and 
therefore a significant majority of the Legislative Assembly. 
Moreover he had recently returned from a general election in which 
both he and Bowman had campaigned on common areas of reform 
such as the Wages Boards Bill. 
Since Chelmsford was not prepared to provide Kidston with the 
constitutional support necessary to govern, Kidston now challenged 
the Governor to provide a different, workable ministry. He resigned 
and Chelmsford commissioned Philp to form a government. How-
ever, before he resigned, Kidston made it clear that he rejected 
Philip's right to govern and the Assembly passed a motion of Kidston: 
"That this House is not in favour of a change of His Excellency's 
advisers.""' An impasse of a different kind had now been reached 
as the Legislative Assembly itself ceased to be able to pass 
government motions. Kidston, the only person who could command 
majority support in the Assembly, sat sternly on the opposition front 
benches refusing to allow Philp to govern or to adjourn the house. 
It was only a personal appeal from Chelmsford which included the 
threat of the Governor's resignation, that persuaded him, grudgingly, 
to grant Philp the latter favour. Philp clearly could not govern but' 
instead of withdrawing his commission, Chelmsford granted him a 
dissolution which allowed Philp to campaign with the tactical 
advantage of still being Premier. Deakin's comments on 
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Chelmsford's actions, published in the Morning Post on 21 March 
1908, have a lasting significance: 
Why he should have chosen to sally forth at this juncture is not 
understood, but any Governor who deserts the safe path of constitutional 
procedure knows the risk he runs. In this case, the sum total of his exploit 
is the creation of a precedent which all his fellow Governors have 
promptly recorded as one not to be followed under any temptation. 
Chelmsford had made a further constitutional blunder."' He had 
granted Philp a dissolution before the Assembly had passed the 
necessary Supply Bill. When the Assembly resumed, Philp an-
nounced that a dissolution had been granted, and then sought Supply 
until after the election. In one of his best parliamentary speeches 
ever, Kidston analysed the grave breach of constitutional practice 
by Philp and Chelmsford: 
Probably never before under the same circumstances did any minority 
in this House advise His Excellency to defer the opinion of this House, 
and to take supply whether the House voted it or not and carry on the 
affairs of the country for two or three months against the wishes of the 
majority of this Chamber ... No person has a right to spend a penny 
of it [Supply] until the House gives authority to spend it." 
Chelmsford plaintively cabled the Secretary of State for Colonies 
in London: 
Kidston refuses Supply and condemns dissolution. Shall I press dissolu-
tion? Important constitutional question at stake. I am strongly of opinion 
that electors should decide even though only six months from last election. 
Subject to advice, is it not in my discretion to grant dissolution whether 
Supply is granted or not?" 
The Colonial Office replied "Dissolution in your discretion after 
advice from your Ministers which I understand you have received 
but authorities in this direction are against the granting of a 
dissolution before Supply voted except under exceptional 
circumstances."" 
He had clearly presented the Colonial Office with an embarrasing 
precedent. His telegram was sent to the constitutional authorities 
inside the Colonial Office for comment and advice. A.B. Keith 
minuted the file: 
This is purely a local quarrel... The rule could therefore be that he should 
have accepted the ministerial advice of the late premier Mr. Kidston 
on the principle seen in the similar despatch in New Zealand on 26 
September 1892. On the whole I consider Lord Chelmsford had better 
be advised to do so now, while being told that the matter is one for his 
discretion. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
256 D.J. MURPHY 
In a second opinion, F. Hopgood wrote: 
It is not so much a question of the Governor's discretion, as whether 
he might reconsider the previous exercise of his discretion in view of what 
has happened in the Assembly. It was rather a strong measure to accept 
the advice to dissolve after the lapse of only six months since the last 
general election ... I arrive therefore at the same conclusion as Keith 
viz. that the Governor should ask Mr. Philp to resign on the grounds 
that he has failed to obtain supply and should send for W. Kidston and 
give him such a number of Legislative Councillors as may be agreed 
upon, at the same time telling him that he will give every succeeding 
Prime Minister enough Legislative Councillors to carry out his measures. 
A third minute on the file was even stronger and coincided with 
the views of Kidston and Deakin: 
I think the only safe course is for the Governor to act on the advice 
of his Prime Minister ... The dangerous decision will arise if the Governor 
... does not act on ministerial advice. 
If supply is refused they must not expect illegal grants of money to be 
made unless it is perfectly clear (and is promised by both parties) that 
an act of indemnity will be passed. 
At the end of December these opinions were read by Sir Charles 
Lucas, who provided his own comment: "There is—though Lord 
Chelmsford hardly realises it—a fundamental difference between 
our views on these matters and his." It was agreed that the Colonial 
Office should write a non-committal letter thanking Chelmsford for 
his full analysis. Privately, they thought his handling of the affair 
quite wrong." 
On Friday, 22 November, when the Assembly resumed, it refused 
to vote Philp the necessary Supply and sent a strongly worded 
address, moved by Kidston, to Chelmsford, censuring him for 
granting a dissolution when Kidston commanded a majority in the 
Assembly which had not been challenged. 
Chelmsford's reply was to use his prerogative as Governor to 
dissolve parliament and to authorize Supply until after the election. 
The issue in this campaign seemed simple—"Home Rule for 
Queensland", with Kidston and Labor in opposition to Philp and 
Chelmsford. It may not, in fact, have been uppermost in electors' 
minds. Kidston lost votes in the farming areas where the wages 
boards were not popular, but gained heavily in the larger provincial 
centres and was returned as Premier. Labor was the only party to 
gam seats and, if one wanted to feel that such constitutional questions 
could be settled by a simple vote, it was clear from the combined 
Kidston-Labor vote that Chelmsford had been answered. However, 
It IS safer, as Deakin argued, to have governors abide by long-
standing rules and conventions. ^ 
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Clipping the powers of the upper house clearly had to be among 
the first pieces of legislation for Kidston to consider after the election. 
Adapting those sections of the Commonwealth Constitution dealing 
with deadlocks between the houses, James Blair, the Attorney-
General, provided the legislation which it was hoped would overcome 
future Legislative Council obstruction. An amendment to the 
Constitution Act repealed the two-thirds majority required for 
amending the Queensland Constitution, while the Parliamentary 
Bills Referendum Act provided that Bills rejected by the Council 
in two consecutive sessions could be put to a referendum and, if 
passed, would automatically become law. A chastened Legislative 
Council, fearful of being swamped by Kidstonites and Labor 
members, allowed the two Bills through. Kidston had provided his 
second major piece of electoral and constitutional reform. 
While Kidston's concentration had been on finance, relations with 
the Commonwealth Government, the uncertainty of the three-party 
system in the Legislative Assembly, and the problems posed for 
democratic government by the Legislative Council, others had their 
own different priorities. One of the strongest pressure groups was 
the Bible in State Schools League, which sought to have Bible-
reading made a compulsory part of State school education. It was 
one of those areas of politics that the normal politician, uncertain 
of the undercurrents, wished to avoid. On two occasions, in 1906 
and 1907, a Bill had been introduced into the house to provide for 
a state referendum on the subject. The first had been passed by the 
casting vote of the Speaker and the second had not gone beyond 
the first reading stage. Labor members were totally opposed to what 
they regarded as an attempt to impose religion on children. In 
matters of conscience, they argued, even the majority should not 
be allowed to impose its views. 
By 1908 Kidston had come to accept that the best way out of 
the problem, which had been raised as an issue at the three previous 
elections, was in fact to submit the question to a referendum. His 
own reasons for this were consistent with his general political 
philosophy. He told the parliament on 31 March: 
The question before the House is not a question as to whether the State 
shall teach religion in the State schools. If that were the question, I myself 
should vote against the Bill ... The Bible in States Schools League who 
have asked for this referendum know quite well that I myself, if the 
referendum is taken, will vote "No". 
But so far as practical politics are concerned, we do not know any 
limits to the right of the majority, and there are no Hmits to their power 
unless you can convince the majority that they ought not to exercise their 
power in any particular way. 
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To Kidston, the issue in the referendum on Bible-reading was not 
greatly different fiom the issue in the election he had recently fought. 
"1 am not opening any doors," he argued, "I am simply claiming 
what I claimed lately—that the people of Queensland have the right 
to be masters of their own house." Rule by the majority, determined 
at honestly conducted elections which would faithfully indicate who 
constituted the majority, was his definition of parliamentary de-
mocracy. There was no place for interference from appointed 
governors or for tricks in the electoral system that would place a 
minority in control. The Referendum Bill was carried and the 
referendum was passed during the 1910 federal elecfion. 
After clipping the powers of the Legislative Council, Kidston now 
revealed that command of tactics that had carried him through from 
opposition backbencher to premier. With Labor support, he pushed 
through parliament the laws regarding the Council, amended the 
Elections Act, and provided an Old Age Pension Act and the Wages 
Boards Act. Once that legislation had passed, he dumped the Labor 
Party and proceeded to legislate for private railways, which Philp 
supported but which Labor opposed. However, the strain of keeping 
on top of such a parliament was too much and Kidston once more 
took a voyage to Scotland and England to try to recover his health. 
It was while he was there that he discussed the return of Queensland 
to the London money market. 
On his return to Queensland, Kidston swiftly resolved the problem 
of having three parties in the Assembly. He offered to fuse his party 
with that of Philp provided that he (Kidston) remained leader of 
the new party and that his Rockhampton programme of 1907 was 
adopted by Philp as the new party's platform. Having experienced 
the impotence of opposition, Philp's party eagerly embraced their 
opponent of twelve years. Denham came back into the Cabinet, 
bringing two other Philpites with him. But seven Kidstonites who 
had previously been in the Labor caucus refused to join the fusion 
and moved to the cross benches. Peter Airey, the Treasurer, and 
George Kerr, the Minister for Railways and Public Works, also 
refused to be a part of the new conservative party and left the 
Ministry for the cross benches. A wrangle with Blair over a judgeship 
removed another Kidston Minister. Only O'Sullivan remained as a 
loyal supporter in the Cabinet. 
There was distress among many that Kidston had chosen to link 
himself with his former arch-enemy. A disillusioned contemporary 
summed up the new Kidston: 
He could adapt his views without the least trouble to suit any exieencv 
From being a somewhat rabid Labor man, he drifted into Dem(S;ratic 
waters and finally perished on the shoals of Toryism. He rose by cursing 
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Philp and died embracing him. He ruined a powerful middle party and 
made the name of Kidstonite stink in the nostrils of every good 
democrat.'" 
Bowman could not speak of Kidston in terms other than those of 
complete contempt at this final act of apostasy in joining forces with 
Philp. Other Labor front-benchers were saddened that Kidston could 
have deserted the cause of reform and embraced his own bitterest 
opponent. George Ryland, a longstanding friend of Andrew Fisher, 
summed up this view: 
We were prepared to assist you—as we expressed through our leader 
—in everything that was in the Rockhampton Programme that would 
not be against our platform as a Labour party ... Where was the necessity 
to call in Philp and others to assist [you]? You have passed by good 
men and taken in inferior men altogether for the work you want done." 
Labor criticism did not perturb the imperturbable Kidston. He would 
be master of his own destiny. 
I have given the Labour Party a great deal of what they wanted, my 
only reward has been abuse, and to tell the truth I am getting a little 
tired of that abuse ... 1 have done with them ... I have never regretted 
the change that took place in 1905, when it became no longer possible 
for me to be a member of the Labour party and I do not think I am 
likely to regret it." 
When the former Kidstonites voted with Labor, Kidston had a 
majority of only one on the floor of the house. Having successfully 
held his narrow majority until the new financial agreement with the 
Commonwealth had been settled, Kidston advised the Lieutenant-
Governor, Sir Arthur Morgan, to dissolve the Legislative Assembly. 
A third election in three years was called in October 1909. Kidston 
once more exhibited his dominance over his opponents by winning 
forty-one of the seventy-two seats. With the state's finances again 
in a healthy condition, Queensland returned to borrowing on the 
London market and began a major expansion of railways. A Bill 
to establish a university was passed and Kidston was awarded an 
honorary Doctorate in Laws. Though such awards are usually 
considered only as honorary, Kidston adopted the title and hence-
forth became known publicly as "Dr Kidston". He did not, however, 
seek the knighthood normally offered to non-Labor premiers. 
Kidston could look back on his services to the state with some 
pride and satisfaction. There had been budget surpluses in every year 
since 1904. In 1910 1,951,170 acres were purchased for 2720 new 
farms, compared with 218,483 acres for 929 farms in 1903; where 
124,710 acres had become available for closer settlement in 1901, 
437,496 acres were opened in 1910. By 1911, 1152 miles of new 
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railway lines would have been built since Kidston became treasurer, 
giving Queensland 3867 miles of railways, the longest system of any 
of the states. These were profitable lines, bringing in £2.7 million 
in revenue in 1911 and having a ratio of working expenses to gross 
profits of 57.25 per cent, the lowest in Australia, and in contrast 
with the 69.9 per cent ratio in 1902-3. In retrospect it is probably 
fortunate that Kidston's major railway project, the Great Western 
Railway, was not built. The Great Western Railway was to have 
run 1289 miles from Hungerford on the New South Wales border 
to Camooweal on the Northern Territory border. It was a project 
that had long fascinated Queensland politicians and, following what 
could only be termed a perfunctory survey of the route by one of 
the surveyors of the Railway Department in 1909, a Bill to borrow 
money to build the line was passed through the state parliament in 
1910. It was expected to cost at least £l 2 million, and would certainly 
have affected the Queensland public debt. By 1910-11, the per-
centage of revenue committed to the public debt had been reduced 
from the calamitous 51 per cent of early 1903 to a respectable 31 
per cent, which made it equal to the average for all the states. 
Of more significance to Kidston was his success with the other 
premiers and the federal government over Commonwealth-state 
financial relations once the initial operation of the Braddon clause 
ceased in 1910. In 1907, when a Bill was introduced into the federal 
parliament to amend the Constitution to give all the customs and 
excise revenue to the Commonwealth, Kidston wrote urgently to the 
other premiers to meet in an emergency conference to oppose the 
Bill. The Victorian Premier, Thomas Bent, had taken similar steps, 
but by telegram. The Bill was defeated in the Senate. Kidston 
supported entirely the two constitutional referendums in 1910, which 
proposed that the Commonwealth take over the states' debts and 
return a fixed per capita payment to the states in place of three-
quarters of the customs and excise duties. He felt that thirty-six 
shillings per head would be needed by the states, but that thirty 
shillings would be reasonable. He was, however, prepared to go below 
this to entice the Commonwealth to accept the principle of the fixed 
per capita formula. The first referendum on states' debts was carried 
by big majorities, but that on per capita payments was defeated, 
largely through the votes of New South Wales and Victoria. 
However, Fisher passed legislation to provide the twenty-five shill-
ings per head agreed on at the 1909 premiers' conference. 
Kidston s final service to the state was appropriately in the area 
of electoral reform. He had given Queensland "one adult, one vote" 
now he democratized that further by providing "one vote, one value" 
There were seventy-two members in the Legislative Assembly fifty 
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representing single-member constituencies and twenty-two repre-
senting dual-member electorates. These were basically the same 
electorates as had been laid down in the 1887 Electoral Districts 
Act. Following the example of the Commonwealth parliament, 
Kidston determined that there should be seventy-two single-member 
electorates, based on one adult, one vote, with a single electorate 
quota for the state and an allowance of one-fifth above or below 
the quota when the electoral commissioners thought this necessary. 
In a state where gerrymandering of electoral boundaries has been 
applied by three premiers since World War II, it is important to 
emphasize the democratic principle that Kidston's Act contained, 
and that "one vote, one value" in Queensland was possible over sixty 
years ago. 
The fusion with Philp's party increased Kidston's leadership 
problems as he faced pressure for more representation of the Philp 
section in the Cabinet. He was now a lonely figure in the Govern-
ment, his loneliness exacerbated by the death of his wife in July 
1910. All political leaders need security and support and Kidston's 
wife had supplied these in his most troubled days as Premier. When 
his friend Blair of the Morning Bulletin died in 1911, Kidston lost 
his second most important prop. There seemed little point in 
continuing the battle as Premier and Kidston left politics to take 
up the presidency of the Land Court in February 1911. 
Having retired from the Premiership, Kidston relinquished all 
active participation in politics. However, his successor Denham lost 
the government in 1915, and when the Liberal Party found itself 
confronting a confident and successful T.J. Ryan in 1916 and 1917, 
there were urgent pleas for Kidston to come out of retirement and 
again lead the non-Labor forces. He declined all such offers and 
remained on the Land Court until his seventieth birthday, 27 August 
1919, when he retired from office. He lived with his son John at 
Coorparoo where he died on 25 October 1919. His body was taken 
back to Rockhampton for the State funeral. 
Kidston remains something of a forgotten figure in Queensland 
politics despite his having been one of the state's outstanding political 
leaders. He was the principal reformer in the period between Griffith 
and Ryan and secured major advances, in the face of Legislative 
Council opposition. He was certainly self-assured and perhaps 
conceited, but his ability was well above that of his colleagues. In 
national terms his ideas were in line with those of Alfred Deakin, 
and his reforms in Queensland and his method of political action 
mark him out as a similar political tactician to Deakin in that 
transitional period of Australian politics which preceded the Labor 
versus anti-Labor division. 
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Big and Broadminded 
D.J. MURPHY 
On 1 June 1915 the first Queensland Labor government with a clear 
majority in the Legislative Assembly was sworn in. In the Cabinet 
of eight, only three had links with the early Labor party of the 1890s. 
These were a former shearer, William Hamilton, who had been 
imprisoned in St Helena for three years for his part in the 1891 
shearers' strike; David Bowman, a union organizer for the Australian 
Labour Federation in that strike; and Herbert Hardacre, who was 
the only remaining member of the Labor parliamentarians elected 
in 1893. The remaining five Cabinet Ministers—Thomas Ryan, 
Edward Theodore {see Ch. 11) William Lennon, John Hunter, and 
John Adamson—had joined the Labor Party in the first decade of 
the twentieth century, and only Theodore had a distinctively trade 
union background. 
It was this government which was to lay the foundations of the 
Labor rule in Queensland that was to last until the 1957 split, broken 
only by the three years in office of the Country-National Government 
of the depression; it was this government that was to pass the major 
reforms in labour laws and provide a new deal for primary producers; 
and it was this government that demonstrated clearly the value to 
the farmers and the urban and rural workers of a distinctively labour-
oriented party in office. 
At no time did the Labor Party in Queensland ever aspire to be 
purely a trade union party. From its foundation prior to the maritime 
strike in 1890, it saw itself as a reforming party based on urban 
and rural trade unions and including those farmers and non-unionists 
who supported its programmes and who were prepared to work with 
trade unionists in seeking a society which provided a more equitable 
sharing of wealth and which also had goals higher than the pursuit 
Thomas Ryan: MLA (Barcoo) 1909-19; Secretary for Mines 1915; Premier, Chief 
Secretary, and Attorney-General 1 June 1915-22 October 1919 
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of material possessions. By 1904, when the first Comirionwealth 
Labor Government was formed under J.C. Watson and when Labor 
in Queensland entered into a coalition with a group of dissident 
Liberals, it was possible for the party to attract the support of 
competent men who lacked a trade union or rural working-class 
background but who belonged to the liberal reforming tradition. 
Their success in moving quickly to the leadership of the PLP 
(Parliamentary Labor Party) was due to their essential commitment 
to reform and also to their political capabilities. 
Of the liberal radical reformers who emerged among the Labor 
leaders when William Kidston {see Ch. 9) resigned from parliament 
in 1911, none was to prove as capable as Thomas Joseph Ryan. 
Indeed, in any assessment of Queensland premiers, Ryan might well 
be named the most outstanding. He deserves, at least, to be bracketed 
with the most capable political leaders in Queensland's history. 
Although he was not quite thirty-nine years old when he became 
premier in June 1915, Ryan had a knowledge of Queensland politics 
and law that has been equalled by few other politicians before or 
since. Despite his middle-class, non-trade union background, he had 
won the loyalty of the political and industrial labor movement and 
consequently was not to be troubled with rivals in caucus or, indeed, 
throughout his seven years as leader of the Labor Party in 
Queensland, by any major dispute with trade union leaders. In his 
three years as leader of the Opposition between 1912 and 1915, he 
developed into a most skilful parliamentary tactician, dividing and 
finally ousting his Liberal Party opponents at the 1915 election. 
Ryan was not a Queenslander by birth. He was the son of Timothy 
Ryan, an illiterate Irish farm labourer who had arrived in Victoria 
in 1860 and had supported himself by building stone fences in the 
Geelong area. Timothy Ryan married Jane Cullen in 1866 and in 
1870 took up 200 acres at Boothapool, ten miles from Port Fairy 
in western Victoria. Here on 1 July 1876 Thomas Joseph, the fifth 
of six children, was born. His mother died seven years later and 
responsibility for the family devolved on the eldest daughter Mary, 
then only eleven. Timothy Ryan took a keen interest in local and 
Victorian politics and each child in turn had a duty of reading the 
newspaper to him each night. He, however, was not active in politics 
and remained a quiet, modest farmer whose main ambition was to 
see his children settled in the farming community. 
Tom Ryan was early recognized as having above-average scho-
lastic ability and at the end of 1889 obtained a scholarship which 
he took out at St Francis Xavier College in the Melbourne%..hiirb 
of Kew. The 1890depression affected the Ryan family as", did manv 
other farmers in the western district, and Ryan left Xavier to become 
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a pupil teacher at the South Melbourne College. Nevertheless he 
continued his studies and matriculated to Melbourne University at 
the beginning of 1895. He completed his Bachelor of Arts degree 
in 1897 and his Law degree in 1899. During 1898 he had been classics 
master at the Church Grammar School, Launceston, Tasmania; in 
1899 he moved to Queensland's Maryborough Grammar School, 
where he was to teach classics until the end of 1900, when he accepted 
the post of second master at the Rockhampton Grammar School. 
In December 1901 he was admitted to the Queensland Bar. 
The Melbourne environment of the 1890s was one where, despite 
the influences of the depression, a particularly significant form of 
liberalism was the dominant political philosophy. It was a liberalism 
which gave a considerable role to the State as an instrument of 
reform and which argued for some redistribution of wealth, for the 
protection of the weaker members in the community, for fair and 
reasonable wages to all workers, and for protection of Australian 
industry to maintain employment for Australian workers. Victorian 
liberals were also among the leaders of those Australian nationalists 
who sought a federation of the Australian colonies to form a united 
Australian nation. Ryan absorbed both of these influences and 
continued to exhibit and develop them throughout his political 
career. Further, he absorbed the nationalist creed of a White 
Australia and remained a fervent advocate of this to his death. 
Whereas in the second half of the twentieth century one would not 
equate liberal radicalism and reform with such a belief, it was 
possible to do so in the first years of the century. 
At Maryborough and again at Rockhampton, Ryan soon exhibited 
a capacity to analyse and speak publicly on political questions. His 
interests were essentially national rather than local in orientation, 
a characteristic to be expected in one who had worked and studied 
in three different colonies in those years when federation was being 
most strongly debated. Ryan's strong political interests were in the 
constitutional field; which included not merely the making and 
interpreting of the law, but also the broader issues of franchise 
(where he argued for equal voting rights for women); reforming the 
law to make it more accessible to the common man; the initiative 
and referendum; and the right of people to govern themselves through 
fairly conducted elections. Though certainly not an unsociable 
person, he spent much of his spare time reading British, American, 
and Australian law reports, and those journals that reported on 
political and constitutional issues. He was naturally inclined to the 
practical questions and not deeply concerned with matters of 
philosophy, metaphysical speculation or theoretical politics. As a 
politician Ryan was to be concerned with practical reforms and he 
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saw the power of the State as being a most important tool in achieving 
them. 
Ryan's continuing attraction to Deakin's brand of reforming 
liberalism caused him to join the Rockhampton Political Association 
and to nominate for Capricornia as a supporter of Deakin and 
protection at the 1903 federal election. It soon became apparent 
through the campaign that Ryan's political philosophies were more 
closely aligned with those of the Labor Party than of Deakin. He 
rejected the attacks on the Labor Party's socialism and was rated 
by the Rockhampton Morning Bulletin as "a friend of the [Labor] 
family". He was, however, an unsuccessful candidate. 
In his decision to join the Labor Party early in 1904, Ryan was 
assisted by two influential Labor members, William Kidston and J.C. 
Kerr, editor of the weekly Labor paper the Critic. The Labor Party 
was sensitive about lawyers or "intellectuals" joining its ranks. It 
saw these people as joining essentially for their own political 
ambitions rather than for any conscious desire to promote equality, 
reform, or better use of government power. Henry Boote, then editor 
of the Queensland Worker, and an extremely influential figure in 
labor circles, issued constant warnings about the ambitious polifician 
who "may be observed insidiously worming his way into the 
confidence of the organisation".' He hoped to prevent the "would 
be Labor candidate, who seeks not to serve the movement but to 
make the movement serve him" from being allowed to take the first 
step along the road to his perfidious ambitions. "Give us plain, 
honest, capable and sober men", said Boote, "and we shall be 
content."^ 
Loyalty to the party and a willingness to join with rank and file 
members in the mundane jobs were the qualities first sought from 
a new party member. Ryan was to learn this quickly and soon 
established himself as a leading Labor spokesman in Rockhampton. 
This was not surprising. He had an abundance of natural charm; 
he was an assiduous student of politics; he could reduce a complex 
legal or political issue to simple terms; and, with his size (he was 
SIX feet tall) and commanding presence, he early exhibited the 
qualities needed for success in politics. 
,.vf ^^r^ l "? ' ' ' ^ ' "^"* ' " ^^^ Labor Party had been hastened by the 
h i To* .u ' "^ L^^"" P" '"^ minister, J.C. Watson, in leading 
C o i ^ l o n J uu^'^^!,'!"'^ "^*^  moderation in the first years of the 
fhe orsJandin^/" '^ ^^ '^^ "^"'"P'^ °f ^^^^'^n, who had become 
dix) to the new c l l " : ? a ; h " n . ^ " ' ' ' " ' " ^ ( . . . Appen-
cutfing himself off f r o r t h e L a L ? p i ' r ' " f ' " ' ^^ ' - ^^'^ston, by 
ine Labor Party, also provided Ryan with 
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a central idea in all his later actions as a Queensland and Australian 
Labor leader. This was that unity of the political and industrial labor 
movements was the only sound basis on which significant reforms 
could rest. At the 1919 federal election when Ryan had been made 
the national campaign director and when the Labor Party was being 
torn apart by factions wanting revolution. One Big Unionism, Irish 
Home Rule, pacificism, and a host of other issues. Bob Ross, one 
of the most able labor journalists ever produced in Australia, wrote 
a special article called "Wanted—A Labor Armistice. A Plan for 
Solidarity"; in it he said: 
Whether we be for the One Big Unionism of the AWU [Australian 
Workers Union]; or the WIU [Workers Industrial Union] or WIIU 
[Workers International Industrial Union]; whether we be for a "break-
away" or reigning officialdom, or against both the SLP [Socialist Labor 
Party] or ASP [Australasian Socialist Party]—whatever we be for 
within, let us, I beg be united against the foe without. I put it to the 
movement that, unless we "close up the ranks", we are diddled, damned 
and done for at the federal election—and thus, beyond too.' 
The words might almost have been written by Ryan, and had 
Kidston's place not been filled very quickly by a team of very capable 
Labor politicians, the Labor Party in Queensland would also have 
been "diddled, damned and done for" for some considerable time. 
In 1916, when Ryan held the Labor Party in Queensland solidly 
together despite the divisiveness of the conscription issue, he was 
well aware of the consequences for his party and his reform 
programme of a second split such as that over Kidston. 
Despite his high personal regard for Kidston, Ryan remained 
firmly with the Labor Party during the Kidston split and stood 
against the Kidstonite candiate at the 1907 election, when Kidston 
had broken away and formed his own party. Again he was defeated, 
but in 1909 two opportunities offered themselves for his entering 
parliament. He won the Rockhampton nomination for Capricornia 
but stepped down from the final party plebiscite to allow William 
Higgs to have the Labor nomination. Part of Ryan's reason for 
dropping out was that the members of the AWU in central western 
Queensland wanted him to stand for the electorate of Barcoo at the 
1909 state elections. 
In central Queensland Ryan's reputation as a barrister was very 
high. Among his successful cases had been several on behalf of the 
trade unions. Ryan's strength in the eyes of the local unionists was 
not merely his complete mastery of labour laws, particularly those 
relating to workers' compensation, but also his capacity to reduce 
complex legal questions to simple arguments that the ordinary 
unionists could understand. Ryan's dictum was that words should 
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be used that would not only be understood, but which could not be 
misunderstood. He preached this advice to Labor conferences for 
more than ten years and practised it himself throughout his political 
and legal career. At the International Socialist Conference at 
Amsterdam in April 1919, when a motion concerning the League 
of Nations was being framed, Ryan warned the other thirty-three 
delegates: 
I know—and you know—that any resolution that may be passed here 
will be the subject of mis-representation. As representatives of Labor 
we know it is one of the common tactics of Labor's opponents to use 
mis-representation. Therefore 1 think our resolution should be as brief 
and plain as possible and be confined to things upon which we can all 
agree—I think the resolution should be in language which not only can 
be understood but cannot be misunderstood." 
It was this capacity for simplicity in argument, assiduous work, and 
attention to detail, combined with an easy manner, that commended 
Ryan to the unionists and Labor party members in central 
Queensland and, in the PLP, to his political colleagues. His having 
two university degrees, far from being a disadvantage, made his 
supporters proud that such a man was fighting on their side. 
On 2 October 1909 Ryan was elected to the Legislative Assembly 
as the Member for Barcoo. There was a strange coincidence in this. 
Though Thomas Glassey had been the first Labor member of 
parliament in Queensland in 1888, and had been joined by John 
Hoolan in 1891, the first man to be elected with the official 
endorsement of the Labor Party in Queensland was one Thomas 
Joseph Ryan, a shearer and union secretary. That had been in 1892. 
Ryan the shearer had been refused re-endorsement by the CPE 
(Central Political Executive) in 1893 and Barcoo was then won by 
George Kerr, a blacksmith. Kerr had been leader of the PLP between 
1904 and 1907 but had defected with Kidston and, after 1908, sat 
as an independent member. When Ryan defeated him easily in 1909, 
a second T.J. Ryan sat in the Queensland parliament for the seat 
of Barcoo. 
Ryan had little difficulty in settling into his role as a member 
ol parliament. He knew Queensland laws well from his practical 
n n S ' ^ " " ° '^^^''"g with them in the courts; he had already been 
exe^.tfvt ^ -7"'"^ T'^^ '" ^^^ P '^^ ty and was nominated for an 
S A m T r f c ^ ' r " ' " . ' ' ' ' "^"^ ^ * '^-'"= he remained an assiduous reader 
havlnga ve"; tafe . : ?"' '",^ 5"*'^'^ '^S^' ^"^ Political journals and, 
In the^pace of one "^' ' ° " ' ^ ^ T ' ^ ^'^ ^™« »« ^he law and politics, 
a new SckLncher to ha^of " n " " ' " * ' l^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^e status of 
Between 1909 aid ,912 R v / n J ^ M - T ' ^ f u " ^ ' ^ " ^^^^ ^^^cutive. V ana iyi2 Ryan established himself as a formidable 
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Opponent of the Government. He attended parliament regularly, 
often just to sit and watch and listen to his Labor colleagues and 
to the government Ministers and backbenchers across the floor of 
the house. The parliamentary reporter of the Brisbane Courier 
remarked after Ryan's first nine months in the Legislative Assembly: 
"Mr Ryan had adopted a method in the House which commends 
itself to both sides. He does not speak too often, he does not speak 
at unnecessary length, he abjures small personalities and he does 
not launch into heroics on unheroic themes."' 
He was fortunate in that many of the Bills brought before the 
house in the first year of the 1909-12 parliament were ones where 
his specialized knowledge provided him with the opportunities to 
debate on more than equal terms with Ministers. Furthermore the 
leader of the PLP, David Bowman, a stolid ex-trade-union leader, 
though admired and respected for his sincerity, integrity, and general 
personality, was far from a match for Kidston and was further 
disadvantaged by a chronic illness. For most of the period the PLP 
was led by William Lennon, a former banker and manager for Burns, 
Philp, who held the northern sugar seat of Herbert. Lennon had been 
elected to parliament in 1907 but, though a competent parlia-
mentarian, he did not have the capacity to debate the same range 
of Bills as Ryan. 
While Ryan concentrated on the legislation and forms of par-
liament, he did not neglect his own electorate, nor his own power 
base as a politician. He travelled through Barcoo during the recesses, 
met deputations from local chambers of commerce and school 
committees, and, appreciating the value to a politician of a 
favourable press, he bought the Rockhampton Daily Record in 1910. 
Though the Daily Record after 1910 could be listed among the 
growing number of Labor papers in the state, it was never brashly 
pro-Labor nor did it become a mere propagandist journal for Ryan. 
It still retained the format of a central Queensland daily paper 
reporting the news. Later, when it began to lose money, Thomas 
Purcell, probably then the largest cattle-owner in western 
Queensland, bought the Record from Ryan but allowed him to retain 
his voice in editorial policy. 
In 1910 Andrew Fisher became the first prime minister to have 
a majority in both houses of the federal parliament. In the exciting 
three years that followed, the Labor Government set about introduc-
ing wide-ranging social and economic reforms. One of the reforms 
most strenuously sought was designed to give the Australian 
Government power over monopolies and labour questions. In the two 
referendums of 1911 and 1913, Ryan threw himself enthusiastically 
into the campaigns. Ryan was no "states' rights" politician, nor did 
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he believe that federal politics were outside the concern of state 
members. Greater reforms could be achieved in Australia through 
one Commonwealth parliament, where Labor had a chance to obtain 
a majority in both houses, than could be won in six state parliaments 
hampered as they were by Legislative Councils. At the 1911 
referendum, when addressing a meeting at Allenstown in central 
Queensland, Ryan gave his clear opinion on why state members of 
parliament should be out supporting the referendum to give greater 
powers to the Commonwealth parliament. 
It was necessary that members of the State Parliament should come 
forward and give their views on the referenda proposals, as the cry of 
"Home Rule" for the States had been raised and if anybody should deal 
with the force of that argument, it should be the members of the State 
Parliament. The [referendum] proposals, in my opinion would not 
interfere with home rule in Queensland. At all events, it would not 
interfere with the powers of the State Parliament more than was 
neces.sary for the welfare of the people." 
One of the principal reasons for Ryan's supporting so strongly the 
1911 and 1913 referendums was his belief in the need to control 
and regulate monopolies, which he and other Labor leaders saw as 
being one of the major causes in the rise in living costs. Further, 
Ryan appreciated the challenge that monopolies posed to the 
democratic ideal and to the labor movement. A strong part of his 
political philosophy consisted of opposition to monopolies. Yet he 
appreciated how little the six governments could do to regulate 
monopolies even in their own areas, particularly when many were 
based overseas and others were interstate in character. In 1911 and 
again in 1913 he spelled out this need for the Commonwealth to 
have the power to control and regulate monopolies. 
The very thing they wanted was lo protect Australia against corporations 
and monopolies. The State Parliaments already had the powers ... but 
only within their own territorial limits. Corporations always spread their 
icntacles all over the country and unless they (the people] gave power 
[to Ihc Commonwealth parliament] to deal uniformly with them they 
could not deal effectively with them at all. 
i L h r " ' ^ r ^"^^'•a''an nationalist first, the need for the Common-
rrf^r,.H?>. T^r^ '"^ '^a^^ gi-eater power over matters which 
not one Lh ^'^^'^'^"^^••alian people was paramount. Yet he was 
Aoa.n in i Q l T f ' Tl i '" ^^^^^"'"ental power for its own sake. 
pS;a"m;:t wo i d t a l l v wUh^'"^ this attitude: "The federal 
would be injurioust ' t^^'p'eo^e oTZs^r n r r f \ T ' ' r - " ' " ' 
going to be a nation, and f kn^ ow "[ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' r ^ Z 
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it by clothing its national Parliament with national powers." 
In 1911 Queensland voted strongly against the referendum 
proposals. But in 1913, by which time Ryan had become leader of 
the PLP, there was a clear majority of over twenty thousand in 
favour. 
Ryan had little difficulty, despite his middle-class background, 
in mixing easily with the former unionists and gaining their support 
and respect. Though John Hunter, a former storekeeper from 
Maranoa, remained his closest friend and ally, Ryan was soon to 
establish a friendship and working partner-ship with the rugged ex-
miner and union official Edward Theodore. This was to win Labor 
the 1915 election and to provide the most outstanding period of Labor 
government in Queensland. 
Labor had hopes of winning the 1912 election. Its grass roots party 
organization had improved immensely; a full-time secretary, Lewis 
McDonald, had been appointed; unions were growing in strength and 
affiliating with the Labor Party; and with the infusion of new 
members at the 1908 elections the PLP had quickly regained the 
inifiative in Queensland politics. A contributing factor was that the 
new Liberal Premier, Digby Denham {see Appendix), who had 
replaced Kidston in 1911, had floundered over the introduction of 
a Liquor Bill and had brought on a confrontation between his 
government in the Legislative Assembly and his allies in the 
Legislative Council. 
The Brisbane General Strike of January 1912 temporarily set back 
the fortunes of political Labor in Queensland. Denham, with the 
willing connivance of the Queensland Governor, Sir William 
MacGregor, successfully conducted a quick "law and order" election 
campaign that reacted against Labor in its traditional areas of 
support—the non-metropolitan electorates—though in Brisbane the 
open brutality of the police on "Black Friday" and the partisanship 
of the Liberal Government produced support for Labor.' Of perhaps 
more importance was the fact that Ryan emerged as the leading 
political spokesman for the unions and as the outstanding Labor 
figure in the state. After the election, when Bowman again took ill, 
the PLP quickly elected Ryan as its new leader and Theodore as 
deputy leader. One of the most brilliant political leadership combina-
tions in Australian history had now been formed. 
Labor easily won the 1915 election. It won it through a combina-
tion of Ryan's ability as a tactician, the well-planned campaign of 
Theodore, John Fihelly, and William McCormack {see Ch. 12), and 
the bumbling and fumbling of Denham and his Liberal government. 
Labor's broad appeal was to farmers and workers. Its decisive 
solutions to the problems of the sugar industry and the breaking 
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of the stranglehold which the CSR (Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company) held over growers and their employees found support in 
the previously non-Labor sugar seats. Queensland has always been 
a more decentralized state than any other in Australia. There have 
been more electors associated with rural and provincial city in-
dustries than there have been with secondary industries in the 
metropolitan area. The Labor Party in Queensland had long 
appreciated that it represented the hopes for reform not merely 
among Brisbane and provincial city employees, but also among those 
farmers strongly against monopolies such as the CSR or against city-
based merchants and middle-men. Ryan and Theodore had a ready 
understanding of and sympathy for the former two groups. In the 
days before politicians had public images created by press officers 
and advertising agents Ryan, through his own personal appeal and 
through a study of the relevant problems, was able to win to the 
Labor side substantial numbers of small farmers, parficularly those 
in the sugar industry. 
By 1915 the Liberals had been divided into town and country 
factions. The town faction supported the American meat trust and 
the continued operation of a favoured economic elite; the country 
faction supported the rich wheat farmers of the Darling Downs, the 
more prosperous dairy and mixed farmers, the sugar millers, and 
the richer sugar farmers. For the the first time Labor gained strength 
in the Brisbane metropolitan area, while at the same time an alliance 
was forged by Ryan and Theodore between the Labor Party and 
smaller farmers, especially sugar farmers; this was to be maintained 
until the 1957 split. 
Despite myths to the contrary. Labor parties are most successful 
when they have strong political leaders who translate the broad 
reforming aspirations of the rank and file members into practical 
political schemes. Ryan soon demonstrated that he wanted the Labor 
Party to follow a particular radical and rational reform programme 
that was practicable. When he had been elected leader of the PLP, 
Ryan replaced Bowman on the CPE and was elected president of 
that body, a move giving him power not only in the political but 
^^AA '" ^^^ administrative section of the party. In his presidential 
address to the 1913 Labor-in-Politics Convention, the supreme 
policy-making body of the Labor Party in Queensland, Ryan outlined 
Clearly his philosophy of the political Labor movement and the planks 
mh^r nilt \ ' ' " ' ^ i* ' °"J '^ ^^'^ ''' ^'^'^toral platform.' There was no 
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labourer—which distinguished the Labor convention and the Labor 
Party from other political groups. The duty of the convention, he 
said, was to formulate a platform and a programme best calculated 
to promote the interests of Queensland, of Australia, and of the 
Empire. 
Ryan's conception of the Labor Party was clearly not one based 
on class nor concerned solely with the status of the manual worker 
or the trade unionist. Yet he had earlier expressed in parliament 
his view on the correctness of the union-party link: "If the use of 
strike funds is legitimate for keeping a strike going, surely it is also 
legitimate for unions to spend their funds to constitutionally bring 
about what they desire—to send men to Parliament to advocate what 
is in their interests and thereby bring about results that were 
heretofore brought about by strikes."' He conceived the Labor Party 
as representing mainly that group in Queensland society which did 
not own large areas of land nor control large sections of capital. 
There was a natural alliance, in Ryan's view, between primary 
producers and wage-earners. The provision of land, the breaking up 
of big holdings to allow for increased farming, and providing for 
immigration and water conservation were all questions of importance 
to all classes in the community and therefore of importance to the 
Labor Party. Turning to the major problem of wage-earners, high 
living costs, Ryan was to argue here, and again at the 1913 
referendum, that these were due to the operations of trusts and 
combines, middle-men and monopolists, who stood between the 
producer and the consumer. He saw the solution lying in either the 
Commonwealth Government's being given power at a referendum 
to regulate monopolies or in the State Government's establishing 
competitive State enterprises and using its power to "grapple with 
price rings". 
When Labor won government in Queensland in May 1915, 
Australia was being sucked further into the great and bloody war 
in western Europe. Ryan had thoroughly supported Australia's 
involvement in the war and accepted the Allied goal of a total defeat 
of Germany, this being the only way to prevent further such wars. 
But while he accepted this position in 1915, he was not prepared 
to take the path recommended by his political opponents and refrain 
from introducing radical reforms until after the war. There were 
no indications that the pastoralists, the CSR, the meat companies, 
or other big capitalist enterprises were going to enter into a truce 
during the war. Indeed, this was far from the case. Shortly after 
war was declared in 1914, Denham had called a meeting of meat 
company representatives to devise the best means of providing meat 
for the British forces. His faith in the integrity of the companies' 
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representatives was shattered as he perceived that their primary aim 
was to secure profits as large as possible. Despite their public 
statements, patriotism was well down their list of priorities. Denham 
wrote to Sir Thomas Robinson, the Queensland Agent-General m 
London, "I could realise that there was no disposition to help in 
the least degree, on the contrary ... they were all out to make money 
... they intended to score the fullest thing they could under the 
circumstances."'" Ryan was soon to find that despite the turn that 
the war had taken, the meat companies, the CSR, the pastoralists, 
and their political allies confinued to put their profit-making first 
and the war effort second. 
His principal problem, however, was not to be the war but the 
nominated Legislative Council. Composed predominatly of men of 
property and commerce appointed by previous conservative govern-
ments, the Council had only five representatives who could be classed 
as supporting Labor, out of its nominal forty-five members. It saw 
its role primarily as protecting the interests of property, wealth, and 
conservatism. Ryan appreciated that it could not be ignored, as some 
members of his caucus had deluded themselves into believing. Its 
abolition, as provided in the Labor platform, would not be easy and 
the Government would have to learn to live with it as Labor 
governments were doing in the other states. It was most unlikely 
that the new Governor, Sir Hamilton Goold-Adams, would agree 
to swamping the Council with Labor nominees. 
However, by September 1917 Ryan had gained the Governor's 
confidence and respect through discussing matters of state with him, 
and Goold-Adams agreed to appoint thirteen new Labor members 
who would not swamp the upper house but would at least guarantee 
the Government a quorum in the absence of large numbers of non-
government members, a not infrequent occurrence. In the meantime 
Ryan was forced to handle the upper house with tact and avoid an 
early head-on collision that would cause the members of the Council 
to adopt an implacable stand of opposition to all the Government's 
economic, industrial, and rural legislation. 
Though Ryan's four years as Premier were probably the most 
remarkable four years of government in Queensland, he was 
fortunate in having, in Theodore, Hunter, William Lennon, and John 
Fihelly, Ministers who were both reliable and very capable. Further, 
he inherited from Denham several public officials who appreciated 
his qualities as a premier and were to serve him well Four of these 
should be mentioned. Sir Thomas Robinson, Agent-General in 
London had been the manager of several large mercantile firms in 
Queensland. Charles Ross had been appointed Imperial Meat Officer 
by Denham m February 1915; he had been a meat company 
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representative for fifteen years and later general manager of the 
Queensland Meat Export Company. He soon joined Robinson in the 
unlikely role of assisting a Labor government to break the power 
of the meat export companies and to ensure that there were sufficient 
supplies of cheap meat for the Allied troops and for the people of 
Queensland. The two other public servants who gave Ryan strength 
were Peter McDermott, Under-Secretary in the Chief Secretary's 
office since 1904, and Thomas McCawley, a man with a brilliant 
legal mind and who had been Crown Solicitor since 1910. 
McDermott found in Ryan a man of similar temperament, religion, 
and interests, and a close personal friendship grew between the two. 
McCawley, an admirer of the Victorian radical liberal and High 
Court judge Henry Higgins, was a master at getting through to the 
heart of a legal problem. It was McCawley on whose briefs and legal 
advice Ryan leant during the first two years of his government and 
on whom Cabinet relied in drafting its contentious industrial 
legislation. 
Though Ryan held the two portfolios of Premier and Attorney-
General, he was able to keep an overall view of what the Government 
was doing by having Fihelly as Assistant Minister for Justice and 
McCawley as Crown Solicitor. The most important pieces of 
legislation, outside the financial and labour areas, which he left to 
Theodore, were often introduced into the parliament by Ryan 
himself. He was not merely the first among equals in the Cabinet, 
but projected his own reforming ideas into the legislature. Indeed 
there was no field where he did not fully understand what each 
Minister was attempting to achieve. Consequently it was not 
uncommon, when the opposition launched an attack on government 
legislation, for Ryan to provide the one reply for all his Ministers. 
By having Hunter do many of the ministerial chores of the Premier's 
Department, Ryan was free to concentrate on supervising overall 
government legislation and political tactics. 
While he was always clearly the leader, Ryan was conscious of 
the importance of never appearing to be the domineering force in 
the caucus or Cabinet. He spoke little at the caucus meetings, trying 
to ensure that the resolutions reflected the broad caucus views. He 
was careful not to be seen to impose his opinions on his colleagues 
but it is clear from the caucus minutes that, when he felt that a 
particular line should be taken, he would ensure that this was put 
forcibly. Ryan's refusing to take a dogmatic stand in the early 
discussion of important issues caused some of his colleagues, 
principally McCormack, to see him as indecisive. Yet this was far 
from the case. "There are rocks ahead" was his favourite response 
to those who wanted instant decisions and instant results. Ryan liked 
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to weigh all the factors in a case before coming to a decision. But 
having reached that decision he would argue strongly and logically 
for its acceptance. 
During Ryan's first term as Premier there were a large number 
of contentious items for the caucus to discuss. Among the more 
important were: legislation to establish cane prices boards and ensure 
fair returns for growers and fair wages for sugar workers; rising food 
prices; conscription; and the obstructions of the Legislative Council, 
particularly to the establishment of the conciliation and arbitration 
system and a compulsory workers' compensation scheme based on 
a State Government Insurance Office. Perhaps the two issues that 
caused Ryan to exert his greatest influence in caucus were the 
abolition of the Legislative Council and conscription. 
There was no disagreement about the future of the Legislative 
Council. That chamber was, as Ryan had remarked in 1908, "an 
excrescence on the Constitution", and had no reason at all for 
existing. The problem was: how could it be abolished? There were 
two schools of thought evenly dividing the caucus. One argued for 
abolition by swamping, the other for abolition by a referendum. Ryan 
was not committed to either argument but saw the dangers and 
problems inherent in each; some of these his Cabinet and parlia-
mentary colleagues failed to see. Through several caucus meetings 
the issue was debated. Ryan preferred appointing Labor members 
to the Council until such time as the party held a majority there. 
The Governor, in whose power the appointments lay, had made it 
clear that he would not swamp the upper house with Labor nominees, 
but he did accept Ryan's agrument for greater government represen-
tation there. However, the caucus, initially, demanded a popular 
referendum decision, which the members felt would "abolish the 
incubus" in one clear cut. Ryan accepted their decision. There were 
times when he would walk ahead as a leader and others when he 
would walk alongside his colleagues. The caucus having made the 
decision, it was Ryan's role to plan the tactics for implementing it. 
In 1916 Ryan was uneasy about the conscription issue. All the 
nations in the war had adopted conscription to raise their forces. 
Australia alone had a volunteer army. While he was in Britain, early 
in 1916, Ryan had discussed conscription with Andrew Fisher, the 
former prime minister who was then High Commissioner in London. 
He had discussed the question with Sir John Simon, the British 
Liberal leader of the anti-conscriptionists, and also with General 
Birdwood, Commander of the Australian Imperial Force, when Ryan 
had visited the Australian soldiers in France. To Ryan conscription 
was not a simple black and white issue. He wanted the Australian 
people and his caucus to think it over rationally and to consider the 
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consequences of foisting conscription on Australia. Fisher had said 
that any attempt to enforce conscription in Queensland would lead 
to open revolt."The divisiveness of conscription throughout Australia 
and its possible splitting of the Labor Party were uppermost in the 
mind of Ryan, the patriot and supporter of the war effort, and of 
Ryan the Labor leader, conscious that a split Labor Party could not 
push ahead with its reform programme. Ryan therefore exerted his 
influence in caucus to delay taking any decision on conscription that 
would irrevocably divide the labor movement and the people of 
Queensland. However, as with the referendum on the Legislative 
Council, once the Labor Party and the caucus had decisively entered 
upon a course, Ryan accepted that decision and set about implement-
ing it in the most logical fashion. 
But on the Legislative Council issue Ryan was to make a grave 
tactical error, which possibly cost the Labor Party the abolition 
referendum. Once the caucus had made up its mind, Cabinet decided 
that the abolition referendum would be held on the same day as 
the 1917 federal election. The CPE had protested against this 
decision, arguing that Ryan's electoral capabilities would be divided 
between campaigning against Hughes and against the Council. It 
was only after Ryan personally addressed the CPE that it agreed, 
unwillingly, to participate in the official campaign. Again Ryan 
found himself having to argue the validity of his legislation, this time 
the abolition referendum, through the Supreme Court and the High 
Court. In a hectic final week before the election and the referendum, 
he had to race to Sydney to argue before the High Court his right 
under Parliamentary Bills Referendum Act to hold the abolition 
referendum. The Supreme Court had said it was illegal; the High 
Court gave its permission to hold the referendum and later agreed 
with Ryan's legal arguments. But valuable time had been lost, the 
Council had seemingly been given special legal standing by the 
Queensland Supreme Court, and confusion reigned on polling day. 
In the final figures 179,105 had voted against abolition of the Council 
and 116,196 for. There was strong criticism within the Labor Party 
at the Cabinet's handling of the referendum, but strangely none of 
this was directed at Ryan. 
In the first conscription referendum, although he was the only 
Australian premier to stand out against conscription, Ryan did not 
try to play a major part. His role was keeping together his own party 
and government in the face of the conscriptionist forces—news-
papers, sectarian propagandists, commercial and big business lead-
ers, and conservative politicians—who were bent on destroying Ryan 
and his government, not merely because of his stand on conscription, 
but because of his challenge to the Legislative Council and the 
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reforms his government had pushed through. 
Between the 1916 and 1917 conscription referendums, Ryan had 
become the socialist ogre so far as Australia's daily conservative 
newspapers and local and foreign capitalists were concerned. He had 
attempted to abolish the Legislative Council by referendum in May 
1917; he had passed legislation establishing boards to decide the price 
of sugar cane to the growers and had effectively removed the 
stranglehold of the CSR and big millers over the sugar industry; 
he had established a State monopoly on compulsory workers' 
compensation which was cheaper for employers and cut the powerful 
insurance offices out of this lucrative business; he had interfered with 
the rights of business by establishing the Arbitration Court presided 
over by McCawley, who was granting preference in employment to 
unionists; he had allowed public servants to form unions and plead 
their case before the Arbitration Court; he had successfully con-
fronted the meat companies both with legislation and in the High 
Court and had guaranteed meat at cheap prices to the British 
Government for the troops and to the people in Queensland; he had 
begun a series of State business enterprises that were seen to 
challenge directly the power of those who had previously ruled 
Queensland's economic and political life. 
While these were considered heinous crimes in themselves, Ryan 
was clearly prepared to go further. He wished to introduce the 
initiative and referendum to provide the people with their own power 
to make laws; he had given women the right to stand for parliament 
and wanted voting rights for eighteen-year-olds; with Ryan's bless-
ing, Theodore was forging new labour-capital relations by removing 
the masters and servants' constraints of the nineteenth century. Ryan 
set up a royal commission and submitted a Bill to parliament for 
a State iron and steel works, and Ryan and McCawley had been 
evolving plans for a State legal service to complement Ryan's Public 
Curator's Office. Ryan had used conciliation to settle a difficult 
strike of railwaymen in north Queensland without resorting to "the 
mailed fist" which Hughes was attempting to use at the same fime 
to end a strike in the maritime industries in eastern Australia. In 
the midst of these industrial troubles, Ryan had audaciously 
attempted to break the power of the shipping companies by 
establishing a State shipping line to get cargo moving again along 
the eastern coast. Ryan was a builder, who saw the role of 
government in active and positive, not passive and negative, terms. 
While conservatives and capitalists confinued to fume at'Ryan's 
transgressions, in October 1917, even before the second conscripfion 
referendum, the rage of the Brisbane Courier's editor against the 
Premier took a new and strange turn. Apart from blasting him in 
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its headlines and leaders, the editor began to interpolate his own 
remarks in reports of interviews with Ryan or in statements made 
by Ryan: 
The Premier was interviewed in his offices at Parliament House last night 
... he said [he] had ... a telegram from Mackay ... that a shipping company 
was bringing a shipment of bags but [the sugar mill] would not employ 
wharf lumpers to unload them and [had] asked the mill hands to unload 
the bags intimating that [it] would close the mill if they refused. "That," 
said Mr. Ryan "is a very convincing piece of evidence that the companies 
are entirely responsible for the present hold up of trade on the coast." 
(Bosh! It is merely evidence that the employers sickened at last at the 
continual hold-ups of trade on the coast, at the instance of unprincipled 
unionism, have determined to end the hold-ups in the only effective way 
—Ed. "B.C.") "It is obvious they are determined not to employ members 
of the union, even though the men are willing to offer their services ... 
I do not know how long the public will stand this sort of thing, or will 
tolerate the attitude of the Legislative Council in refusing to grant to 
the Government the necessary powers to put an end to the intolerable 
situation." (The situation is intolerable because Mr. Ryan's masters have 
chosen to make it so. He wishes to retain power in the hands of the 
unions to create these intolerable situations whenever they choose. The 
public will stand behind the Legislative Council when it defeats his object 
—Ed. "B.C.").'^ 
Ryan's remarks on Hughes's proclamation to stop him carrying out 
his plans for a State shipping line earned seven interpolations and 
concluded: "Mr Ryan emphasised the point that the Queensland 
Government was not concerned with the original cause of the trouble 
nor with its merits or demerits (Ha, ha—Ed.) The Government was 
concerned only with the restoration of interstate trade (Ha, ha, again 
—Ed.)"" 
In the f)oisoned atmosphere of Australia in 1917, sectarianism was 
a weapon used by those favouring conscription to try to isolate the 
anti-conscriptionists. Ryan, Fihelly, and Archbishop Mannix in 
Melbourne were painted as Catholic saboteurs, arch-fiends in league 
with the Germans and under the control of the anarchical IWW 
(Industrial Workers of the World), or Sinn Fein revolutionaries. The 
British Government received a regular flow of reports of Irish-
Catholic perfidy from the Governor-General, Sir Ronald Munro 
Ferguson. But despite the efforts of the ultra-Protestant conscrip-
tionists to divide Australia into two camps, with Protestants, 
loyalists, and conscriptionists on one side and Catholics, disloyalists, 
and anti-conscriptionsists on the other, the mud would not stick. 
Ryan and a number of other Labor leaders remained confirmed 
loyalists to the Allied war aims, but were definite anti-conscrip-
tionists. Nevertheless, when the second conscription referendum 
began at the end of 1917, Ryan became the central target of the 
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sectarianists' and conscriptionists' campaign. Because of the absence 
of any other comparable anti-conscription leader, he willingly 
stepped in to assume that leadership. It was the events of November 
1917 that effectively changed Ryan's status from that of state leader 
to that of a national political figure in Australia. 
Hughes had brought in a system of censorship that was meant 
to "gag" the anti-conscriptionists to such a degree that even pro-
conscription daily newspapers like the Brisbane Courier were to 
protest.'" Worse still were the inconsistencies of the regulation. The 
Daily Standard, the Brisbane Labor evening newspaper, was pre-
vented by the censors from reprinting material that had already been 
printed in the pro-conscription evening newspaper, the Telegraph. 
The major clash of the whole campaign came when the censors 
refused to allow any newspapers in Queensland to print part of a 
speech that Ryan made on 19 November, even though the Brisbane 
Courier of that date had printed the same argument in the report 
of an interview with Ryan on the day before. Ryan's offending speech 
was based on reports by Senator George Pearce, the Minister for 
Defence, and General J.G. Legge concerning the number of enlist-
ments, the number of men who had gone overseas, the number 
discharged for medical and other reasons, and the number required 
to maintain the five Australian divisions in France. On this basis 
there should have been, in Ryan's calculation, between 100,000 and 
120,000 men available for reinforcements. Littleton Groom, the 
assistant Minister for defence, accepted that there were 100,000 men 
available for reinforcements.'* The censor's report of Ryan's speech 
not only cut out this argument but made Ryan appear to be 
supporting conscription. The censor refused to budge on requests to 
have the original speech correctly reported. 
Ryan was always a constitutionalist who upheld the law. He 
agreed therefore, by means of the laws governing parliament, to have 
printed in Hansard those portions of his speech that had been cut 
out by the censor. What he did not know was that Theodore, 
McCormack, and Fihelly proposed to include in the same Hansard 
the text of two anti-conscription pamphlets that had been hacked 
to pieces by the censors, and to have the censored parts of these 
and Ryan's speeches brought up in heavy type. Nor did Ryan know 
that Theodore and McCormack, as Speaker, proposed to have 
additional copies of Hansard printed and circulated through the 
state. Arriving in Brisbane at this time, Hughes challenged Theodore 
to repeat his anti-conscription pamphlets outside parliament and he 
"would have him in 48 hours". Most of the newspapers reported 
this as a challenge to Ryan, not Theodore. Ryan accepted and on 
the night of 28 November, repeated his speech to a crowd of 
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thousands in Albert Square and in the Centennial Hall. He and 
Theodore were prosecuted but the case was dismissed by the 
magistrate. 
Australia's conservatives had accepted the right of Labor to be 
represented in parliament. What they found impossible to accept was 
that Labor should pass legislation which would lessen the economic 
power of big pastoral and other companies, or would distribute 
political power more evenly throughout the community. In using the 
constitutional power of parliament and the courts to confront the 
whole capitalist and conservative edifice, Ryan represented a real 
threat. The Melbourne Argus, the principal spokesman for Austral-
ian capitalism, gave vent to the spleen felt against Ryan after his 
successful confrontation with Hughes: "Almost any outbreak may 
be expected from the Ryan Ministry in Queensland and it-is almost 
incredible that it should have descended so low as to have entered 
into the paltry and contemptible conspiracy with Germans and other 
disloyalists against the authority of the Commonwealth Defence 
department."" Munro Ferguson reported to Bonar Law, the Colonial 
Secretary in London, that Ryan and Mannix were the most 
dangerous influences in Australia." 
The remarkable and unique occurrence of a prime minister 
charging a state premier with conspiracy made other news of the 
referendum pale by comparison. All Australia was stirred by a 
political conflict that had no precedent or parallel. Thanks to 
Hughes, Ryan had become the outstanding figure among the anti-
conscriptionists and the de facto leader. To satiate readers' demands, 
every small piece of news relating to the raid on the Queensland 
Government Printer's office, the Prime Minister's challenge, or 
Ryan's reply was syndicated throughout the nation's press. Since the 
1914 election and certainly since the retirement of Fisher, Hughes 
had been the outstanding personality in Australian politics, outstrip-
ping Holman, but to readers of the daily newspapers in 1917 there 
was little doubt that in Ryan, Hughes was confronted by an equally 
strong and formidable opponent. 
At few other times in Australia's history have opinions been so 
deeply held and so violently expressed as during November and 
December 1917. The aim of the propagandists from each side was 
to show that lies were the basis of the other's case. Ryan was not 
lacking in political nous nor in his ability to mark up political points 
but Hughes, with the advantage of a complete daily newspaper 
service behind him, was able to score over his Queensland opponent. 
Nowhere was this demonstrated better than in the "Warwick Egg 
Incident", where in the space of thirteen minutes a small Queensland 
country town on the railway line linking Brisbane and Sydney 
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achieved national notoriety and confirmed in the minds of conscrip-
tionists the existence of the disloyal, Sinn Fein, anti-conscnption, 
and revolutionary alliance of which Ryan, it was argued, was the 
head." 
In response to numerous requests Ryan went to Sydney for the 
conclusion of the anti-conscription campaign. By now, war-weariness 
and straight-out opposition to the war were becoming more apparent. 
What the effect of these might be after a "Yes" or "No" vote was 
taken was uncertain but, sensing their growing appeal, Ryan made 
his message at each station the need for opposing lawlessness and 
maintaining the loyalty of Australia to the Allied cause. In Sydney 
he was met by the biggest crowd of the whole campaign. A triumphal 
procession of brass bands, returned soldiers, and anti-conscriptionists 
bore him through the streets like a conquering Roman general. The 
conscriptionist Sydney Morning Herald said it was reminiscent of 
the historic days of the visit of the American fleet or the inauguration 
of the Commonwealth. It reported more than a hundred thousand 
people lining the streets, while Ryan's arch-opponent, the Argus, 
quoted the police as saying that the number approached two hundred 
thousand. Having cheered Ryan through the streets, the crowd 
flocked to the Domain where from the several platforms erected 
there, Ryan delivered a short speech. Few probably heard it. At that 
stage this mattered little. 
When Hughes arrived in Sydney two days latter, soldiers were 
given leave and allowed to wear their uniforms to stage a counter-
welcome for the Prime Minister. 
So the polling day arrived and a "No" majority of 72,000 in 1916 
became a "No" majority of 116,588 in 1917. 
Ryan had become the hero of the trade unions and the Labor 
Party throughout Australia. The call from then on was for him to 
leave Queensland politics and enter the House of Representatives, 
where it was expected that he would revive the ailing parliamentary 
party and lead Labor back to the position it had achieved under 
Fisher, with a return to its radical reforming role. 
It is far more difficult to be a successful leader of the Labor Party 
than of any other Australian political party. There is more basic 
equality in the Labor parties, the leaders are subject to much greater 
scrutiny, and there is constant pressure to introduce and to maintain 
a pristine Labor purity. In times of crisis, these problems reflect 
themselves in calls for more trade union control and more socialist 
guidance and also in a suspicion of the motives of political leaders. 
But where the events of 1914-17 had made many trade union leaders 
and rank and file Labor supporters suspicious of Labor's political 
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leaders throughout Australia, there was never any doubt regarding 
Ryan's adherence to Labor philosophy or his intention of pushing 
ahead with radical reforms. 
The vital test for Ryan the radical, Ryan the small farmers' 
champion, and Ryan the constitutionalist was to be the 1918 election 
in Queensland. While Queensland parliamentary democracy was 
being mocked by the presence of a nominated upper house, elections 
for the Legislative Assembly were conducted on the principle of 
equal-sized electorates, i.e. one vote, one value, the principle Kidston 
had bequeathed to Queensland in 1910. The age of the gerry-
manderers had not yet arrived. 
In the previous two and a half years, Ryan's government had 
reached the high point of political action by the labor movement 
and had demonstrated the capacity of a Labor Government to effect 
social and economic changes if the parliamentary party was led by 
men of intelligence, vision, and determination. For this one period 
at least, the capabilities of the men leading the parliamentary Labor 
movement were able to match its aspirations. In intervening in the 
economic life of the state to protect the interests of wage-earners 
and primary producers, through establishing the State Produce 
Agency and in trying to bring the "natural allies"—the producers 
and consumers—closer together, and in attempting to give the people 
a greater voice in government, local and state, it had shown that 
parliamentary means could achieve in Australia what many socialists 
had preached could only come about through revolution. At the same 
time, the necessity for a healthy and profitable private sector was 
not forgotten. Both Ryan and Theodore kept trade and commerce 
functioning and, despite the problem posed by Hughes and the state's 
big business enterprises, recognized that a necessary part of govern-
ment was providing employment through private enterprise, and thus 
raising living standards. 
Any uncertainties that Ryan may have had about the election 
disappeared as he was greeted by large, receptive audiences on his 
state-wide election tour. His speeches seemed to improve as he 
became more confident of winning. Interjections were handled with 
wit that did not interrupt the flow of his argument. His opponents 
in the Nationalist Party, unable to match his leadership, squabbled 
among themselves. In Ryan's own electorate of Barcoo, there was 
never any doubt about the result. A meefing held in Barcaldine by 
his Nationalist opponent ended with three cheers for Ryan. As the 
results were posted during the Saturday night on special boards 
outside the Daily Standard office, it was clear that Ryan had won 
and won convincingly. It seemed, early in the night, that Labor might 
even win fifty-one of the seventy-two seats, though when the final 
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results were posted a week later, it had won only forty-eight—an 
increase of three on the 1915 result—its percentage of the valid vote 
showing an increase from 52.06 per cent to 53.68 per cent. This 
remains the highest percentage of the formal vote obtained by Labor 
at any Queensland elecfion." In the metropolitan area it lost four 
seats and had its valid vote there reduced from 55 per cent to 50 
per cent of the formal vote, while in the non-metropolitan area it 
had won seven new seats. Clearly the policy of legislating for the 
rural areas had paid off. 
Despite the Nationalist weakness, the election result was essential-
ly a personal triumph for Ryan. Invitations came in for him to visit 
the southern states and speak for Labor there. There began also an 
increasing demand for Ryan to leave state politics and enter into 
the broader, more important sphere of federal politics. At the same 
time, with his impressive victories in the High Court, there were 
many of his legal friends who hoped that he would step down from 
politics to take a position on the Supreme Court Bench. 
It was in some respects paradoxical that this unrepentant 
Deakinite liberal should now be a figure of adulation to the rank 
and file of the labor movement and the confidant and friend not 
only of Labor's industrial and political leaders but also their 
opponents. To many Queensland Nationalist members he was simply 
Tom Ryan; in spite of their great differences in politics, he confided 
in the opposition leader E.H. Macartney, a dour northern Irishman; 
he provided Macartney with a private secretary paid by the 
Government, the first time that had been done in Queensland. 
Despite the bitterness engendered in the conscription split, Ryan and 
William Holman, the former New South Wales Labor leader, 
remained close friends and corresponded regularly on political 
questions; Brigadier Lee, commander of the No. 1 military district 
in 1915, together with his successor, remained Ryan's personal 
friends despite the Premier's stand on conscription; even Canon 
Garland, a conscriptionist and arch-Protestant, could write pleas-
antly to Ryan in 1918, thanking him for seeing his son at the Front. 
A big, urbane, and friendly man, Ryan was equally at ease with 
graziers, businessmen, professional men, shearers, miners, and 
railwaymen and could claim close personal friends among all of them. 
Deputations coming away empty-handed felt that their case had 
received a fair hearing; the members might even be bearing friendly 
cigars given them by the Premier. Militant unionists trusted him 
as a Labor Minister. Employers also knew him as a man whose word 
could be relied on and who stood by the policy of arbitration; his 
desire was always to see industrial disputes resolved quickly and 
amicably. 
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Much of Ryan's time during 1918 was taken up with national 
questions. He emerged as the key Labor representative at the 
conference called by the Governor-General in April 1918 to discuss 
recruiting; he had continuing problems with Hughes who, at the 
behest of the CSR, was trying to upset the legislation on the sugar 
industry, and in June he was off to Perth to attend one of the most 
crucial federal conferences in Labor Party history. The 1918 
conference could have split the party disastrously on the issues of 
the war, recruiting, and proposals for a peace settlement. That it 
did not was due to the good sense of the delegates and to the influence 
of Ryan and others, behind the scenes, who piloted through 
resolutions which could be accepted by people of diverse opinions 
represented at the conference. 
It was during 1918 that Ryan again took up the challenge against 
the Legislative Council. Despite the accepted conventions that the 
power over money Bills resided solely with the lower house of 
parliament, despite the ruling from the non-Labor Chairman of 
Committees—W.F. Taylor—that the Council could not amend 
money Bills, and despite a Privy Council decision of 1886 regarding 
the prerogative of the Legislative Assembly on money Bills, the 
Legislative Council had continued to amend the Income Tax and 
Land Tax Bills to prevent their political and social allies being forced 
to bear a higher share of taxation. After an unsuccessful conference 
with representatives of the Council, Ryan made it clear that he would 
have no further obstruction. A.G.C. Hawthorn, a former Liberal 
treasurer and now one of the leaders of the non-Labor majority in 
the Council, warned his colleagues against further thwarting Ryan 
on this question: "We are now faced with the position to give in", 
said Hawthorn, "or insist on our amendment ... thereby running the 
risk which we have been threatened with of [Labor] reinforcements 
being introduced into this House ... and the future effectiveness of 
this side of the House will be absolutely gone."^° 
Ryan was not one to make idle threats regarding the Council's 
future. Al the 1918 election the future of the Council had been made 
an issue by the Nationalists, the Brisbane Courier and the non-Labor 
councillors. Recognizing these facts and the truth of Hawthorn's 
warning, the Council did not insist on its amendments to either of 
the two Bills. However, plans were already being drawn up for a 
further attempt to remove the Council. Ryan had met with the 
Governor to try to seek more Labor appointments. The Governor 
refused and when Ryan made a further unsuccessful request for more 
Labor councillors, after his return from Perth, the caucus decided 
that a new referendum would be held on the abolition of the Council. 
On this occasion there was to be included in the abolition Bill 
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provision for an advisory committee of members from both sides of 
the house to scutinize all Bills before they went to the Governor 
for assent. 
Ryan was not to have hisr second opportunity to confront the 
Council directly at a referendum. Following the ending of the war 
in November 1918, he prepared to go to England once more to fight 
the Mooraberrie Case before the Privy Council, and if possible the 
case regarding McCawley's eligibility to sit on the Supreme Court 
and be president of the Arbitration Court. (The Mooraberrie Case, 
Duncan v. Theodore, had originated in 1916 when the United 
Pastoralists and Grazing Farmers Association of Queensland 
challenged the legislation under which Queensland was supplying 
cheap meat to Britain for the war.) Quite apart from the political 
importance of the cases, he was very much in need of a rest, having 
become so worn out by the strain of the continued fighting in the 
previous three and a half years as to be seriously considering retiring 
from politics and going to the Supreme Court. 
A round of farewell dinners was given by the PLP, the Queensland 
Irish Association, the BIG (Brisbane Industrial Council), Labor 
servicemen, the Australian Comrades of War League, and a special 
citizens' committee headed by the Lord Mayor of Brisbane. In 
Sydney and Melbourne labor organizations wanted him to address 
meetings before he left but such was the pace of politics that he 
replied to one lifelong friend, Parker Moloney, the former Labor 
Member for Indi, "Really, I can never see 48 hours ahead of me".^ ' 
One of the reasons that seemed to be behind the southern invitations 
was the press speculation about when, not if, Ryan would enter 
federal politics. 
At each dinner Ryan was praised, and he returned the compliment 
by delivering what appeared to be a well-prepared speech (though 
based on only a few notes) having some specific point that he wanted 
to make to that group. The reasons for Ryan's success as a political 
Labor leader and his popularity with the rank and file were speh 
out by Theodore, the man who had been able to study Ryan closely 
for ten years. At the PLP's farewell dinner Theodore said: 
Whatever failures the Party had encountered or whatever mistakes had 
been made certainly could not be attributed to the leadership. Mr. Ryan 
had the great facility of being able to keep the party united. The resuh 
was that the Labor Party in Queensland had been and still was probably 
the most united party in the Labor movement anywhere. This was largely 
the result of Mr. Ryan's great tact and ability in handling his team.'' 
A fortnight later Ryan was farewelled by the mainly anti-war and 
largely militant, anti-arbitration delegates of the BIG. In returning 
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thanks, Ryan indicated where he stood ideologically in 1918: 
When the Labor Party's objective was achieved viz, the production, 
distribution and exchange of all wealth for the benefit of the whole 
community, arbitration courts, price fixing boards and other palliatives 
would be unnecessary and cease to exist. In the meantime however they 
should work and progress along the lines laid down in the principles and 
methods which at the present time were accepted by the workers 
generally." 
To the audience of businessmen and community leaders at the Lord 
Mayor's dinner he presented a different side, that of the Australian 
statesman wanting to bury the bitterness of the past and proceed 
with the economic development of the nation. This included preserv-
ing a White Australia policy. In the former case, he spoke of the 
changes needed in the system of government before Australia could 
develop as rapidly as she must: "We may have to give more power 
to the central authority and at the same time have more local 
autonomy—two things which are not inconsistent."" In a later 
speech he expanded this by explaining that he envisaged the creation 
of more states, providing decentralization of power as the broader 
powers were given to the central government. For his second point 
Ryan provided no explanation—none was needed. White Australia 
was an accepted article of political faith which he did not challenge. 
Soon after his arrival in England, Ryan had discussed the 
availability of loan money with the governor of the Bank of England. 
Robinson had also arranged for a deputation from financial institu-
tions interested in investing in Queensland to interview Ryan 
regarding his government's much-publicized legislation. The urbane 
Ryan in person was undoubtedly the best means of allaying the fears 
of investors and of assuring them that Queensland was no Bolshevik 
nor IWW state where investments were in danger. 
Before he could discuss these financial agreements or appear 
before the Privy Council, Ryan and his wife caught the dreaded 
infiuenza. For several days they lay in the Hotel Cecil, their doctors 
and nurses expecting their death at any hour. Friends and associates 
in Queensland became worried as no word arrived from Mrs Ryan, 
whose reputation for absolute reliability in attending to correspon-
dence was widely known. The silence was ominous. It was not until 
the third week of March, four weeks after becoming infected, that 
they were able to take a cottage for a week at a southern beach 
resort to recover. With Ryan's history of bronchial and nasal 
infections, the influenza probably left some permanent respiratory 
weakness. 
At the beginning of April when he had sufficiently recovered. 
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Ryan once more confronted his political opponents in the Moora-
berrie Case. To win that would be to demonstrate that the 
Government had the right to govern and that, provided it did so 
within the law, it could be challenged only at the ballot box and 
not hounded through the courts by those with money to pay high 
legal costs. In addition, success in overthrowing the judgement of 
the High Court in this case would place Ryan among the leading 
constitutional barristers in Australia. Sir William Webb, later Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Queensland and a judge of the High 
Court, was with Ryan at the Privy Council in 1919. Webb was then 
Crown Solicitor of Queensland. In 1921 he wrote that at the close 
of the Mooraberrie Case Lord T)unedin and Lord Shaw came down 
from the board table to the barristers' bench to congratulate Ryan 
on the clarity of his argument. It was during this visit to London 
that Ryan was elected an honorary bencher of Gray's Inn, which, 
Webb notes, was "a compliment paid only to lawyers of undoubted 
distinction"." 
When the Privy Council gave its decision in the Mooraberrie Case 
in favour of Ryan and the Queensland Government, Ryan had only 
just returned from visiting Australian soldiers still in Europe. In 
delivering the judgement Lord Haldane had said: 
The question is not one of property or prerogative, but of Ministerial 
administration which was confided in the present instance to the 
discretion of the same set of Ministers under both acts. No court of law 
can interfere with that discretion if no provision enacted by the 
Legislature is infringed. Ministers are responsible for the exercise of their 
functions to the Crown and Parliament only, and cannot be controlled 
by any outside authority if they do nothing illegal." 
Lord Haldane's words reflected Ryan's own initial judgement of the 
powers vested in Cabinet. He commented: "The most satisfactory 
point of the judgement was the decision that the bona fides of the 
Executive could not be challenged in the Queensland court. This 
should effectively prevent any further attempt to transfer contests 
as to the bona fides of the Executive from the constituencies to the 
Court." 
Ryan had hoped to have the Privy Council hear the McCawley 
Case also while he was in England as it revolved about a similar 
point concerning the power of the executive. However, delays in 
having the necessary information sent to London prevented its early 
hearing and Sir John Simon was briefed to conduct the case for 
the Queensland Government at the beginning of 1920. When the 
McCawley Case was finally heard by the Privy Council it was again 
to prove a triumph for Ryan's understanding of the law. 
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After F.H. Maughan, K.C., had addressed the judges on behalf 
of the respondents, the British Solicitor-General intervened on behalf 
of the British Government to indicate that it intended that the self-
governing states and colonies of the Empire should have full power 
in their own legislatures. Sir John Simon was not called to address 
the Council. The Lord Chancellor's judgement might easily have 
been written by Ryan. Lord Birkenhead said that the minority 
opinions of Isaacs and Rich in the earlier High Court decision were 
in complete concurrence with those of the Privy Council. McCawley 
had the necessary legal qualifications and, what was constitutionally 
more important, the Australian legislatures were free to work out 
their own constitutional salvation. Since the Queensland legislature 
was fully entitled to vary the conditions and tenure of a judicial post, 
that section of the Industrial Arbitration Act under which McCawley 
had been elevated to the position of a Supreme Court judge was 
not ultra vires.^'' In constitutional law, the case was of far greater 
significance than the appointment of a judge to the Arbitration 
Court. Sir Owen Dixon, a legal contemporary of Ryan, and who 
was to become a judge of the High Court of Australia and later 
Chief Justice, was to write that the Privy Council judgement in the 
McCawley Case established "a universal proposition that a colonial 
legislature may disregard any attempted limitation upon its own 
legislative powers".'* 
Before he had left Queensland at the beginning of 1919, Ryan 
had been seriously considering retirement from politics. There were 
ample precedents, set by Lilley {see Ch. 3), Griffith {see Ch. 6), 
Barton, Isaacs, and Higgins, for a leading barrister-politician to 
resign from active politics to go to the Bench. Ryan was tired 
physically and mentally from the strain of almost four years as 
Premier in circumstances that no other political leader in the state 
had ever had to face. Apart from Hughes, of the nation's political 
leaders Ryan had had the most rugged period of office; because of 
the war, his attempt to curb the power of Australian capitalism in 
Queensland, and his lone opposition to conscription, he had made 
bitter enemies of almost all the national press. Ryan was essentially 
a friendly man who preferred consensus and rational agreement to 
rancour, yet each morning for four years he had awakened to find 
himself abused, libelled, misrepresented, or accused of being a 
traitor; a stooge of the IWW, a tool of the Sinn Fein, or a friend 
of Germany. The human spirit, even in so strong a character as Ryan, 
has limits to the strain it can bear continuously, and at the end of 
1918 Ryan was nearing that limit. He was beginning to show this 
in small ways; whereas earlier in his political life he had had little 
need of reminders about papers, meetings, or people, by the end of 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
JSO DJ. MURPHY 
the war he had constant need for reminders and for his secretaries 
to keep notes on what he had to do each day. He was fortunate 
in having an astute and capable wife who took much on herself, 
including the answering of the large personal mail he received. The 
consideration he had already given to retiring from active political 
life was renewed after his near-death in the influenza epidemic. 
When, therefore, Ryan left England in May 1919, he had almost 
completed his assessment of his future and was about to rule in favour 
of retiring. 
When he arrived in Melbourne a huge crowd had gathered to 
welcome him. Asked whether it was possible or probable that he 
would enter federal politics, he said simply: "I cannot discuss that." 
But the spontaneity and size of the welcome by those who made 
up the grass roots of the labor movement and the electorate had 
some effect on his inner debate about his political future. Ryan was 
a man easily moved to emotion despite his firm outward control, 
but, beyond this, he took his role as a Labor Party and political 
leader seriously and was unwilling, when pressed, to let down his 
supporters or his own group. By contrast with this positive stimu-
lation to his remaining in politics, there was a strong negative one, 
in the Australian newspapers' commentaries concerning his visit to 
Britain and to the International Socialist Conferences. These he had 
been able to study on the journey across from Fremantle to 
Melbourne. Before leaving Melbourne, Ryan attended a special 
function at the Celtic Club. Thesniff of battle revived some of Ryan's 
old fire as he replied to the press criticism of his visit to England 
and the policies of the Queensland Government, and he delivered 
the judgement on his immediate political future: 
I seriously'thought when I returned to Australia that I would retire from 
politics as I felt I could make a better living in another sphere. That 
was my inclination, but when I got to Australia and found that the press 
would not leave me alone while I was away—some "tripey" stuff 
appeared in the Argus this morning—I made up my mind not to retire 
from politics. I have found that the great body of the Australian public 
would stand with a man when he was willing to fight, particularly for 
a good cause. That has been my experience in the past and I hope it 
will be in the future." 
The welcome to Ryan and his wife on their return to Queensland 
was unsurpassed in the state's history. Leaving Central Station with 
an escort of several hundred soldiers carrying lighted torches, Ryan 
passed along streets jammed with thousands of cheering spectators. 
At Parliament House he delivered a fighting speech which gave new 
heart to his supporters. However, it was clear that the greater needs 
of the federal parliament would demand Ryan's leaving state politics 
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for a higher challenge. While he endeavoured to sort out the problems 
of industrial disputes, particularly a very dangerous strike in 
Townsville, others were devising methods to have Ryan become the 
new federal Labor leader. Ryan had made it abundantly clear that 
he required a clear call from the federal PLP or from the state 
executives before he would enter federal politics. The clear call came 
in October 1919, when a special federal conference took the plunge 
and passed a resolution asking Ryan to leave Queensland politics 
and enter federal politics and also to be the campaign director. The 
federal conference had not taken such a step before; it has not taken 
such a step since. 
Despite Ryan's abilities, the sheer lack of cohesion and quality 
in the federal PLP made his chances of winning government 
impossible. After a hectic campaign, in which he visited every state 
except Western Australia, at his own expense. Labor was again 
defeated. The sectarian weapon was used to a degree unparalleled 
in any other federal election.^" In the federal parliament as the new 
Member for West Sydney, Ryan desperately tried to weave some 
unity of purpose into the federal PLP. However, he was not the same 
Ryan who had entered Queensland politics ten years before. Those 
four years as Premier had destroyed his health and his capacity to 
work long hours on the details of federal laws. He had moreover 
been involved in a costly law suit against the Argus; this he eventually 
won, but later was involved in a second libel suit against the Hobart 
Mercury. 
On 4 June 1921 Ryan's longstanding friend Jim Page died. He 
had been the Labor Member for the federal seat of Maranoa since 
1901. When the parliamentary session ended in July, Ryan left for 
Maranoa. Though he was suffering from a heavy cold and was 
physically exhausted, Ryan insisted on taking the train journey of 
two thousand miles to assist in the by-election campaign. Despite 
attempts to have him go into hospital, Ryan kept on; after addressing 
a meeting at Blackall, he left by train for Barcaldine, where he finally 
collapsed, was placed in hospital, and died on Monday morning, I 
August. 
In spite of the war and opposition from the Legislative Council and 
its social and economic allies, Ryan's achievements in Queensland 
politics and in the law were significant. Yet the man had also made 
his mark among his contemporaries as a humanitarian, a reformer, 
a friend, and a great parliamentarian. 
After his death money was subscribed for an imposing statue 
outside the Executive Building and for a medal for the candidate 
obtaining the highest pass in the State scholarship examination each 
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year. In the Queensland State Archives there are bound in two 
volumes over seven hundred letters written to Mrs Ryan and the 
Labor Party from a range of people and organizations in the weeks 
after Ryan's death; these provide a ready assessment of his status 
among contemporaries. The letters are from unions, business houses, 
politicians, schools, banks, Labor Party branches, religious organiza-
tions, journalists, community organizations, overseas political fig-
ures, shire councils—and so the list goes on. The language is usually 
emotional and, fifty years later, might be considered extravagant. 
Perhaps the best contemporary estimate was that provided by C.A. 
Bernays, clerk of the Queensland parliament during Ryan's ten years 
there, and historian of the fir^t sixty years of Queensland politics. 
Bernays wrote to Lily Ryan: 
There is hardly any field where one may study human nature with such 
precise results as in the parliamentary arena, and apart altogether from 
politics, my humble estimate of him was that among all the men who 
have come and gone in the years that I have served in Parliament, he 
stood pre-eminent as a leader; as an earnest exponent of the faith that 
was in him, and as a generous, big-hearted fighter. How few public men 
can say with truth that they are the personal friends of their political 
enemies!. That characteristic in itself stamps a man as broad minded, 
and big, and out of the common. 
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Ideal and Reality 
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Few Australian politicians have raised the ire of their political 
opponents and indeed the ire of certain of their political allies as 
did Edward Granville Theodore. Between 1915 and 1925 Theodore, 
as the Treasurer and then Premier of Queensland, earned the 
nickname of "Red Ted" and confronted the state's longstanding 
power groups. He was the architect of the most advanced labour 
laws and laws favouring primary producers that any government in 
Australia had introduced before World War II. In 1931 his economic 
arguments to resolve the unemployment debacle of the depression 
shocked his orthodox political opponents. 
There were other aspects of his career that were equally important 
and equally fascinating. Theodore was the "universal man", succeed-
ing as a trade unionist, politician, financier, mining and newspaper 
magnate, and as one of the leading civilian administrators during 
World War II. As well, he had a breadth of reading in literature, 
science, technology, history, and economics that few contemporaries 
matched. There were in effect two careers that Theodore pursued, 
both spectacular. The first began when he worked as a miner for 
wages, and this phase ended with his defeat as the Australian 
Treasurer and Member for Dalley in the 1931 federal elections. The 
second career, which was also concerned with mining, involved him 
in the top echelon of Australian newspaper ownership; this had begun 
while he was still a politician. It was this involvement in mining 
shares, which had its murky side, that was to be responsible in part 
for the destruction of his political career. 
In turning his tremendous energy and abilities to business and 
away from politics, Theodore did so with a sense of disillusionment 
Edward Theodore: MLA (Woothakata) 1909-12, (Chillagoe) :912-25; Treasurer 
and Secretary for Public Works, 1915-19; Premier and Chief Secretary 1919-25; 
Secretary for Public Lands 1920; Treasurer and Secretary for Public Works 1922; 
Treasurer 1919-20, 1922-25 
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with the workers whose battles he had fought for nearly twenty-
five years, but more so with those political Labor leaders who had 
deserted the workers in their hour of greatest need. On 27 December, 
eight days after the 1931 federal election which ended his period 
in politics, he wrote to Henry Boote, editor of the Australian Worker: 
The many expressions of sympathy I have received from all States 
indicate that I have friends if not in Dalley at any rate elsewhere. The 
people are fickle and irresponsible. They reward the political treachery 
of Lyons, Fenton, McGrath, Price, Gabb and Guy (what a crop of rats 
this time) and they turn out Parker Moloney, Cunningham, Brennan, 
Chifiey ... whose defeat leaves the Labour Party poor indeed. I have been 
long enough in politics to attach no importance to unexpected election 
upheavals—the tables will turn again soon. The loss, probably permanent 
loss in some cases, of good men is a serious matter to the Labour 
movement.' 
Ten days before his forty-seventh birthday, then, Theodore's political 
career was over. At that age many men are merely beginning such 
a career. Theodore should have been Australia's prime minister 
during the depression. He alone of the Scullin Cabinet had the 
intellectual calibre, the hard political experience, the physical 
strength, and the grasp of financial management which could have 
put a greater number of urban and rural workers and farmers back 
to work. 
Throughout Theodore's political career his goal was the provision 
of a job for every person able and willing to work, whether as an 
independent primary producer, as a miner, prospecting and gouging 
for himself, or as a rural or urban employee. In 1919 he was to 
express this forcibly as "the right to work". It was basic to his early 
endeavours as a union organizer; it was central to his legislation as 
Minister for Public Works, Treasurer, and Premier. He was fully 
in agreement with Ryan's programmes for assisting farmers, particu-
larly sugar farmers, to become prosperous independent producers 
who, in turn, would be able to pay good wages and provide reasonable 
accommodation for their employees. When Theodore supported the 
reduction of the Queensland basic wage by the Arbitration Court 
during the post-war recession, he brought down on himself the ire 
of his own party and its affiliated unions. His defence was that, in 
a period of high unemployment and falling prices, the State 
Government could absorb more unemployed workers on the lower 
basic wage. Again, when he committed the state to the purchase 
and operation of the Mungana mines and the Chillagoe smelters, 
his central purpose was to keep jobs for the men who were being 
forced to leave the district. The creation of jobs was the principal 
factor behind his opening up of the Dawson, Upper Burnett, and 
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Callide areas for agricultural settlement. Not to appreciate this is 
to miss the importance of Theodore's contribution to Queensland 
politics—and a significant factor in his involvement in the Mungana 
affair. 
Theodore himself would not suffer the insecurity his parents had 
endured. Very .early in his working life he determined this. At the 
same time, as he moved about Australia looking for work and saw 
new farmers struggling to make ends meet, he appreciated that 
others, without his natural intelligence and ability, would not be able 
to give themselves the same guarantees. Consequently stronger 
organizations like trade unions, the Labor Party, state and Common-
wealth governments would have to be mobilized to use their greater 
resources to guarantee work in safe environments, at fair and 
reasonable wages or profits, for those who could work. These ideals 
in time were to be tempered by the realities of government financial 
limitations, overseas market prices, and continuing unemployment. 
The man who was to be the central figure of the depression of the 
early 1930s was a boy of six when the previous great depression had 
struck in the early 1890s. Edward Granville Theodore was born at 
Port Adelaide on 29 December 1884, the second eldest of six 
children. His father, Basil Theodore, was a Rumanian migrant whose 
own father had been a bishop in the Greek Orthodox Church. 
Edward's mother, Annie Tanner, who had been the daughter of an 
Irish mother and an English father, had come to Australia in 1881 
to work with her stepbrother on his farm in Western Australia. Basil 
and Annie Theodore were married in 1882 and moved to Port 
Adelaide. The future Queensland premier had a background and 
heritage which, when combined with his own experiences in four 
Australian states before entering politics, gave him a broad vision 
of politics and, above all, a commitment to Australian nationalism 
rather than to narrow states' rights or to British imperialism. 
Basil Theodore worked as a wharf labourer and tug boat operator 
in Port Adelaide and was a minor labour organizer among the 
maritime workers in the port. Like so many other Australians of 
his day, he felt the appeal of the life of a yeoman farmer and took 
up a selection just outside Adelaide. Again, like so many Australians, 
he discovered the harsh difference between the ideal and the reality 
of farming small selections in colonial Australia and supplemented 
his income by continuing to work in Adelaide, and also by pros-
pecting. His son Edward, having left school at the age of twelve, 
followed his elder brother Stephenson to the Western Australian 
goldfields when he turned sixteen. Two years later, in 1902 the two 
Theodore brothers moved to Broken Hill, where they remained for 
over four years.' 
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There was an intensity about life in Broken Hill in the first decade 
of this century. It took its unionism seriously; it took a serious interest 
in Labor politics, and it was serious about the business of extracting 
and treating ore. In July 1903 a Democratic Club, later to be called 
a Social Democratic Club, was founded in Broken Hill and provided 
weekly lectures at the Trades Hall on a range of subjects. More 
importantly, by 1904 the club had prospered so that a library was 
established to complement the educative work of the Barrier Truth, 
edited in Theodore's last year by R.S. (Bob) Ross. The year 1904 
had seen the first celebrafion of May Day in Broken Hill and this 
was followed in 1905 by the election of W.J. Wise, secretary of the 
Amalgamated Miners Association, as the first Labor Mayor of 
Broken Hill.' The spirit of unionism was strong, as was the 
organization. Thanks to the strength of the union, a man with some 
skill in mine working and a willingness to suffer the dust, the poor 
accommodation, and the hard work could earn high wages. By the 
time the Theodores arrived in Broken Hill it was the union that 
provided the prospects for making reasonable money. The days of 
the prospector striking it rich on new fields newly opened to the 
ambitious speculator had passed. To quote the historian of Broken 
Hill, Geoffrey Blainey: "The average man had no real hope of rising 
by his own individual efforts. The only hope for a higher standard 
of living lay in collective action through the union."" 
Theodore's ambitions went beyond being an average worker or 
even a mine manager in someone else's mine. In 1906 he set out 
for north Queensland, where there still seemed to be opportunities 
for the small man. The mining fields in north Queensland had 
similarities to those at Broken Hill, but there were sharp differences. 
The dust, lack of water, and the ubiquitous galvanized iron were 
the same, but there was an almost total absence of any union activity. 
This had been one of the outstanding aspects of the Queensland 
mining centres that the English socialist agitator, Tom Mann, had 
noted on his visit to Queensland early in 1905.^ There had been 
attempts to form unions among the mine workers' but there seemed 
to be no one with the experience and ability to organize a union 
that could confront John Moffat, the Chillagoe Company, or mine 
managers. 
When Theodore came to Queensland there was a growing number 
of labour, union, and "democratic" newspapers. The premier journal, 
the Worker, edited by Henry Boote, had been giving full reports 
of the revival of unionism in Queensland throughout 1906. This 
revival had centred on the establishment of general workers' unions 
embracing skilled and unskilled labour. Theodore had begun work 
in Queensland by prospecting but, being unsuccessful in this, he 
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obtained a job as a miner at the Vulcan tin mine at Irvinebank, 
the largest and most settled of the mining towns on the Atherton 
Tableland. In mid-1907 a fall in the price of copper from £100 to 
£60 a ton was followed by falls in the price of tin. To hold their 
level of profits, the mine managers reacted by cutting wages and 
attempting to extract more work out of the men. A series of 
unco-ordinated strikes failed, but the ground was now laid for the 
development of a union of all workers on the field at Irvinebank 
and in the adjacent mines. 
Theodore was only twenty-two when he formed his new union, 
the AWA (Amalgamated Workers Association) at Irvinebank in 
September 1907. Old John Moffat, the patriarchal figure who had 
founded and developed the Irvinebank field and a score of other 
mines, is reputed to have told the young Theodore to "go away and 
be a sensible fellow" when he brought his first log of claims from 
the men.' If Moffat was not impressed at the end of 1907 he must 
have been by early 1908 when Theodore had branches of the AWA 
at Herberton and Stannary Hills and had also drawn in the general 
workers unions at O.K. and Mungana. At the conference of these 
six branches of the AWA in April 1908, Theodore made clear his 
intentions of providing "a scheme for the complete amalgamation 
of all existing unions in the north, under one constitution and under 
one controlling body".' Having been elected organizer, he set out 
on a three months tour of the mining fields to organize all the mine 
workers into the AWA. To complement his own drive, intelligence, 
and organizing ability, Theodore was joined by another miner, 
William McCormack {see Ch. 12). 
At the first annual conference of the AWA in 1909, Theodore 
retained his role as organizer while McCormack became the general 
secretary. The platform of the AWA was brief and practical, 
reflecting the immediate needs of mining employees in north 
Queensland: a minimum wage; a 44-hour week; state control and 
regulation of conditions of employment; removal of alien (non-white) 
labour from the north; better inspection of the mines, and, finally, 
a demand seemingly more relevant to the 1880s than to the 1900s, 
that the union be officially recognized by employers as the nego-
tiating body.' In addition there was a recognition that labor by itself 
or through unionism could not institute these reforms, but must have 
a political voice. The AWA affiliated with the CPE (Central Political 
Executive) of the Labor Party and with the ALF (Australian Labour 
Federation). 
The role which Theodore and McCormack proposed for the union 
was straightforward. It would endeavour firstly to provide protection 
for all workers in north Queensland—miners, railway navvies, sugar 
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workers, labourers—and secondly, it would attempt to negotiate 
directly with employers and, in the absence of a system of conciliation 
and arbitration, it would direct strike action. Although the AWA 
developed the reputation of being a "fighting union", meaning that 
it would stand up to employers and strike if necessary, Theodore 
was never convinced that this was the best course of action. He 
preferred conciliation and negotiation and through his experience 
in the AWA and his observation of Mr Justice Higgins in the 
Commonwealth Arbitration Court, he was to come to the conclusion 
that a state court of conciliation and arbitration, with considerably 
wider powers than those Higgins held, was likely to be a more 
successful way of solving bitter clashes between employers and 
unions than strikes and lockouts. 
Long strikes caused tremendous physical hardship to the men 
involved and to their wives and families. Theodore had first-hand 
experience of this in the middle of 1908 during a three-month strike 
that he organized and led among the railway navvies brought to the 
north to complete the railway line for the Chillagoe Company to 
the Etheridge field. Theodore had not sought a confrontation with 
the construction company nor with the Queensland Government, but 
the men were entitled to reject a proposed wage reduction and to 
have an increase from 8s to 9s a day. Furthermore their living 
conditions were certainly not appropriate to "the normal needs of 
the average employee, regarded as a human being living in a civilised 
community"—Higgins's dictum. 
Theodore's case, which he outlined in regular reports to the 
Worker, was simple. The men's claims were just; the company was 
not prepared to concede these; there was no system of arbitration 
to which the men could appeal; therefore they had no recourse but 
to strike. Financial assistance was provided by other unionists in 
north Queensland and through donations sent to the Worker in 
Brisbane. But the key figure holding the strikers together was the 
twenty-four-year-old organizer who signed his reports "Ed. Theo-
dore". When the strike was called off in late September, with the 
AWA having won a notable victory for the navvies, Theodore and 
the other AWA officials received fulsome praise from the ALF 
organizer Charlie Collins, from Dave Bowman, and from the veteran 
of the Jondaryan, maritime, and shearers' strikes, Albert Hinchcliffe. 
It was a logical step for Theodore to move from union organizer 
and miner to union organizer and Labor politician. In October 1909 
he won the mining seat of Woothakata from Mick Woods, a 
Kidstonite. Two months later he married Esther Mahoney, whom 
he had met when she was visiting Chillagoe. They were to have two 
sons and two daughters. 
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Theodore's new occupation as a Labor politician did not diminish 
his role or zeal as a union organizer and administrator. In February 
1910 he was elected vice-president of the ALF. Between 1910 and 
1913, he and McCormack were confinually involved in amalgamat-
ing unions with the AWA. Theodore and McCormack were "mates" 
in the full Australian sense of the word. They were to stick together 
politically and financially and McCormack seems to have been the 
one to remember his mate Theodore when the former involved 
himself in dealing profitably in mining shares. 
The young Theodore who took his place in the Queensland 
parliament in 1909 was, in retrospect, a sharp contrast to the 
Theodore who left the parliament as Premier in 1925. He was solidly 
built, with short black hair parted on the right-hand side. His features 
were clear-cut, with full lips and a chin that jutted forward. He was 
untidy in appearance and a poor speaker. Like so many of his 
contemporaries, he directed his attention to remedying these defi-
ciencies. He took speech lessons for eighteen months'"; he lived near 
Parliament House and made good use of the parliamentary library 
and, most importantly, he sat, watched, listened, and learned from 
his colleagues and his opponents. He already knew Dave Bowman 
well and, like T.J. Ryan {see Ch. 10), learned much from him. He 
would not remain a backbencher for long. C.A. Bernays, the clerk 
of the parliament, recalled Theodore's first speech as having "the 
element of force and the will to succeed"." 
Theodore seems to have taken some time to establish a good 
relationship with Ryan. He had a normal Australian worker's 
suspicion of lawyers and university graduates. He was not en-
thusiastic about the establishment of a university in Queensland 
when the Legislative Assembly debated the Bill in 1909. Theodore 
had come into parliament to fight for practical reforms for workers 
and farmers, not to provide further advances for the privileged few. 
It was a combination of Ryan's genial personality and his common-
sense approach to the need for practical reforms in the laws relating 
to labour that broke down Theodore's initial suspicion. On the other 
hand, it soon became evident from the depth of Theodore's speeches 
that he had come to value knowledge and education. 
His first term in parliament was divided between his union affairs 
and his efforts to become a professional politician. He was elected 
president of the second Queensland Trade and Labour Union 
Congress in 1911, the largest assembly of union delegates that had 
so far been held in Queensland. The congress met during the lengthy 
sugar strike when the AWA under Theodore, its president, and 
McCormack, its secretary, again recorded a notable victory. The 
right of unions to exist was still not universally conceded in 1911 
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and conceded even less was the unionists' right to band together for 
political goals. In seeking the legitimization of unions, Theodore told 
the Legislative Assembly: 
Trade unions are perfectly legitimate associations. In their essence they 
are associations of workers banded together primarily with the object 
of mutually assisting each other to secure more favourable conditions 
of employment. That is their fundamental object, and they endeavour 
to attain that aim directly by the method of collective bargaining as 
between employers and employed, or indirectly through the advocacy 
of their representatives in Parliament." 
The growth and increasing strength of unions in Queensland was 
basic to the extension of the Brisbane tramway strike of January 
1912 into a general strike. Unfortunately the most astute union 
leader, Theodore, and the most astute union administrator, Mc-
Cormack, were at the AWA Conference in Townsville when the 
general strike was called. As a result of the post-mortem debate on 
the failure of the 1912 strike, Theodore decided that the future for 
strong unionism lay in amalgamating all unions into one big union. 
He quickly moved towards the amalgamation of the AWA with the 
pastoral-based AWU (Australian Workers Union) and other rural 
unions to form a new Australian Workers Union, which gained 
control of the ALF's considerable assets: the new three-storey 
Worker building in Elizabeth Street and the Worker printery. 
The coldness and clarity in decision-making which contemporaries 
remember about Theodore was evident in his role in the amalgama-
tion and strengthening of the union movement. It was also becoming 
evident to his political colleagues. Theodore was clear in his mind 
that major reforms in working conditions, accommodation, provision 
of employment, the settlement of disputes between labour and 
management, and the provision of a reasonable standard of living 
and profitably for farmers opening up new selections could come 
most quickly through strong, capable, and intelligent Labor govern-
ments. After two years of working with Ryan, Theodore concluded 
that Ryan was the politician most able to lead the type of Labor 
government he sought. He proposed that Ryan should become an 
additional deputy leader with Lennon for the 1912 election. The PLP 
(Parliamentary Labor Party) demurred about such a step." How-
ever, when the new caucus met in July, after losing the election, 
Theodore resumed his planning. Ryan defeated Lennon for the 
deputy leadership, and the caucus elected Theodore as whip. Two 
months later when Bowman retired on account of his continuing 
illness and Ryan became the leader, Theodore defeated Lennon for 
the deputy leadership and McCormack replaced his friend as whip. 
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Far from allowing his political career to reduce his influence in 
trade union affairs, Theodore increased this in the years between 
1912 and 1915. In June 1913, when the Queensland branch of the 
new AWU met in the Brisbane Trades Hall, Theodore was elected 
its first president and was to hold that position unfil 1916. Unions 
to Theodore were a part of politics and their goals could not be 
divorced from politics. Moreover he strongly believed that unions 
would achieve much-needed social and economic protection and 
industrial reforms more quickly and efficiently through Labor 
governments than they would through bargaining with employers 
and non-Labor governments. Theodore seemed to be convinced that 
this could not be achieved if the major administrative power was 
in the hands of the unionists themselves. He believed in rank and 
file participation in making policy, but in central control of the 
administration of the union, union funds, and union action. In 
summing up the success of the AWA in 1913 he was to say: "The 
less autonomy and the more power in the hands of a central body, 
the greater was the general success."'" His own judgement of how 
unions and strikes should be conducted had proved successful. 
Theodore's confidence in himself and his desire to take personal 
charge of important political and industrial matters were means to 
greater ends. "Why should they [the workers] not look with 
enjoyment upon the pictures painted by great masters," he asked 
the Queensland parliament, "or why should they not enjoy the works 
of the great poets, and why not follow with attention and interest 
the discoveries and investigations of scientists in the realms of 
geology, biology, metaphysics and all those sciences which are of 
so much interest?"'^ 
In order to provide even the first steps to this new society, three 
things had to be done. The union movement had to be organized 
and strengthened; Labor Party programmes had to be worked out 
in specific practicable forms and Labor had to win government in 
Queensland. The first of these, Theodore, McCormack, and others 
were providing. To achieve the second, Theodore and Ryan estab-
lished a platform committee within the PLP, whose proposals the 
1913 convention adopted as the basis for the 1915 election. While 
Ryan delegated various front-bench members to become virtual 
"shadow Ministers", a special campaign committee was elected, with 
Harry Coyne as chairman and Theodore and his protege John Fihelly 
as joint secretaries, to prepare the propaganda material. By combin-
ing his power as deputy leader, president of the AWU, chairman 
of the Board of Trustees of the Worker and joint secretary of the 
campaign committee. Theodore was able to ensure that the principal 
forces of the labor movement were co-ordinated for the winning of 
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Denham {see Appendix), to have public works started to absorb the 
unemployed. After the elections, and with John Adamson, Minister 
for Railways, Theodore had been drawing up plans for increased 
railway construction, which would enable more men to be placed 
on the land as farmers and would provide work for the unemployed 
in building the lines. 
In his first months as Minister for Public Works, Theodore 
established a new department of Labour and appointed as the 
director W. R. (Jack) Crampton, then secretary of the Australasian 
Meat Industry Employees Union and one of the most oustanding 
labour organizers in Queensland. In drafting his labour legislation 
Theodore, like Ryan, was to find the young Crown Solicitor Thomas 
McCawley an invaluable ally. McCawley was a social reformer who 
saw the law as being a potential instrument of reform, rather than 
remaining an instrument of conservatism and reaction against 
reform. To this partnership Theodore contributed the ideas and 
experience, while McCawley contributed a meticulous knowledge of 
the law and an amazing capacity for draftmanship. When the Court 
of Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration was formed in 1916 
McCawley became the first president. Ryan had argued for his 
remaining Crown Solicitor, but Theodore won." 
While the Bill to establish the Conciliation and Arbitration Court 
was being drafted and then debated in parliament, Theodore had 
passed the first of his new labour laws, based on his experiences 
as a union leader. A Labour Exchange Act established state 
employment bureaux similar to those established thirty years later 
by the Commonwealth Government. Both employers needing labour 
and employees needing work could register. A new Workers Accom-
modation Act extended the original Act, passed by the Morgan-
Kidston Government, to workers engaged on railway, tramway, meat 
industry, sugar, and other construction works. Standards of accom-
modation were laid down and accommodation was to be provided 
for the workers free of cost. Acts regulating the inspection of 
machinery and scaffolding laid down basic standards for the safety 
of those having to tend machinery and erect scaffolding. Again these 
were practical labour reforms which emerged from the Labor 
platform and from the practical experiences of Theodore and 
Crampton. 
Queensland trade unions had been governed by the original 1886 
Act, by an Act establishing wages boards in 1908, and by the 1912 
Industrial Peace Act. This last Act severely restricted the right to 
strike, while the 1906 Heggie v. Brisbane Shipwrights' Provident 
Union case, which followed the principles of the Taff Vale Case, 
under which a union could be sued in tort in its own name and 
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judgement could be obtained against its property, left trade unions 
open to destruction. Furthermore the judgement in the Osborne Case 
in England in 1909 and the decision of the Registrar of Friendly 
Societies in Queensland in 1911 to refuse to approve certain rules 
of the AWA meant that the political role of Queensland unions was 
severely restricted." (These rules provided for the union to contribute 
to a political party and to have political goals.) In 1911 Theodore 
had protested against the Registrar's decision and had asked the 
Denham Government to amend "the law relating to trade unions 
so that the unjust disabilities which now operate against these bodies 
may be removed".^" In 1915, with McCawley's assistance, he was 
able to do just that in the most advanced Trade Union Act of any 
state. The Act embodied the principles of the English Trades 
Disputes Act of 1906, which gave protection to trade unions against 
the consequences of criminal conspiracy. It further removed any 
obstruction to unions supporting political causes or placing political 
levies on their members. It allowed for peaceful picketing and 
abolished the constraints placed on workers in unions under the old 
Masters and Servants Act.^' 
Ryan, Fihelly, and McCawley drafted the Workers Compensation 
Bill. Fihelly introduced the Bill, which provided new concepts in a 
schedule of payments for injuries, an increase in the rate of 
compensation, the ending of litigation between employees and 
employers over compensation payments, compensation for injury 
incurred going to and from work, at the place of employment, or 
on an employer's business, and compulsory state insurance. 
Theodore made two attempts before successfully passing the 
Industrial Arbitration Act in 1916. This was a piece of legislation 
on which he placed great value. In 1912 he had said: "Men who 
are dissatisfied and have come to the conclusion that the ordinary 
methods of improving their conditions or securing redress of griev-
ances are not suitable to the occasion have to resort to other means, 
even to violence."" He had hoped that the new Industrial Concilia-
tion and Arbitration Court would not only improve wage and working 
conditions, but also provide for redress of grievances. In September 
1915 he moved the second reading of the Industrial Arbitration Bill 
in one of the best and clearest speeches delivered in that session. 
The Bill, though similar to that establishing the Commonwealth 
Conciliation and Arbitration Court, went much further than earlier 
Arbitration Bills in Australia. Theodore envisaged a system whereby 
unions would be recognized as an integral and essential part of any 
arbitration system; where an Arbitration Court, whose president 
would have the status of a Supreme Court judge, would consider 
factors such as cost of living, size of families, and hours of work 
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in making awards; where conciliation would play a major role, with 
conciliation committees empowered to enter premises and examine 
pay-sheets and other documents; where government employees could 
form industrial unions; and where a judge could grant preference 
to unionists in any industry if he thought it was required. To many 
unions this last point was the most vital in the Bill and Theodore 
went to great lengths to explain clearly that the Bill itself did not 
provide for preference to unionists, but merely gave the Arbitration 
Court judge such power. The 1912 Industrial Peace Act had 
specifically prohibited such preferences. 
Most opposition speakers complimented Theodore on the thor-
oughness of his speech but expressed complete opposition to prefer-
ence being given to unionists in employment and to any alteration 
to the Industrial Peace Act, which they claimed had provided for 
peace and harmony between employers and employees. Not surpris-
ingly, Theodore's clear statement on preference to unionists was 
continually misrepresented and major amendments were proposed 
by the Opposition to eliminate this clause. The Liberals were worried 
that the granting of preference in employment would build up the 
power and finances of the unions and, consequently, the Labor Party 
with which more unions were becoming affiliated. Theodore was 
adamant that the clause should stay. It was, he said, "one of the 
vital principles of the Bill". 
The preference clause was deleted by the Legislative Council, 
whose non-Labor members took no notice of Ryan's contention, nor 
that of the former Liberal Attorney-General, O'Sullivan, during the 
debates, that granting of preference would be up to the Arbitration 
Court whether it was in the Act or not. The Industrial Arbitration 
Bill was to be passed in 1916, without its preference clause, but in 
a case involving the Mt Morgan Mining Company in 1917, both 
McCawley the president and Macnaughton, the second judge of the 
court, held that the court had the power to grant preference if it 
thought this would assist industrial harmony. By continuing to 
appoint presidents sympathetic to the working man, Theodore's 
successors made the Industrial Court a vehicle of some social and 
economic reform. The new Act also allowed public servants to form 
their own unions and approach the Industrial Court for reasonable 
wages and working conditions. In this, it incorporated into 
Queensland labour laws the reform that Fisher had introduced into 
the Commonwealth labour laws in 1911. 
Two other labour laws passed in this first parliament need to be 
mentioned here to indicate the nature of Theodore's goals. In 
amending the Factories and Shops Act in 1916, Theodore laid down 
new minimum standards for working conditions throughout 
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Queensland. The new laws related to the provision and standard of 
conveniences, the work area required for each employee, ventilation, 
the provision of separate eating accommodation, and the requirement 
that no employee could be asked to work continuously for five hours 
without a meal break of at least half an hour. Henceforth furniture 
was to be labelled "European labour only", "Chinese labour", or 
"European and other labour". The Wages Act finally passed in 1918 
guaranteed the worker his payment in money and not in "truck" 
provisions from his employer. Where a garnish was placed on a 
worker's wage it could be only on that part over £2—the basic wage 
needed for a man to keep his family in frugal comfort. 
In 1915 the Federal Labor Government had committed itself to 
introducing a further referendum to give it power over prices and 
labour. William Holman, the New South Wales Labor Premier who 
had been in opposition to the 1911 and 1913 referendums, found 
a strong ally in Theodore in 1915. When the Interstate Conference 
of the Labor Party, in May 1915, decided to hold the constitutional 
referendum, Theodore's reaction was similar to that of Holman. 
Accepting that Ryan would support the referendum, Theodore began 
to marshall his support within the Cabinet, the caucus, and the Labor 
Party itself to oppose the holding of the referendum. 
In his rise to union leadership, and to the positions of deputy leader 
of the PLP and deputy Premier, Theodore had displayed great 
political skill and acumen. He was to demonstrate these qualities 
again during the second half of 1915. The Labor papers throughout 
1915 had constantly pointed to the need for a referendum. Fisher 
in July had promised that "nothing short of an earthquake ... would 
prevent the proposals being submitted to the people"." At the end 
of June Theodore circulated a document of seven foolscap pages to 
members of the Queensland Cabinet.^" Using arguments that were 
worded simply but which were very persuasive, he said that the 
constitutional amendment was so specific that it would give the 
Commonwealth power not only over all disputes in Queensland, large 
and small, but also over "the whole sphere of industrial activity and 
legislation, whether such activity or legislation affects the interests 
of two states or is confined solely to the interests of one". He listed 
fifteen areas affecting labour that could come within Commonwealth 
control if the referendum were carried. But it was his concluding 
paragraph that summed up his fears: 
For a state Labour Government to honour its pledges with regard to 
the industrial section of its platform, it must apply its intelligence and 
energies for years to the task. New legislation must be passed; new 
departments must be established; staffs of offices organised; agencies 
opened throughout the country; insurance schemes adopted; systems 
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devised for the election by the workers of inspectors; and the forces and 
finances of the state employed to build up and make perfect the industrial 
system for which the platform stands; and any or all of these efforts 
may be rendered worthless immediately afterwards by an Act of the 
Commonwealth Parliament or by a casually introduced clause in a 
Federal Arbitration Court Award. 
Theodore's document was not a states' rights plea. At no time in 
his political career did he descend to such paltriness. He was 
concerned that a whole range of labour legislation that would 
radically raise the status and conditions of workers could be upset 
by a non-Labor federal government or by awards of the federal 
Arbitration Court. 
The caucus minutes show that in early July there was division 
in the federal PLP about the referendum. A letter from the Brisbane 
branch of the AWU, the only union to write directly to the federal 
PLP on the referendum, was referred to the federal PLP executive 
and then to the central executive of the AWU for consideration. 
Theodore was still president of the AWU in Queensland. By August 
he seems to have convinced Ryan of the validity of his objections. 
The latter was having second thoughts himself about the success of 
the referendum and had discussed alternative proposals with Holman 
in September. There was still enthusiasm in the ALP rank and file 
for the referendum, but by the beginning of November Theodore 
had secured a narrow majority in the caucus to pass an equivocal 
motion which effectively withdrew Queensland parliamentary sup-
port from the referendum. The referendum was abandoned by the 
new Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, early in November. It was left 
to Ryan to win over the CPE to the stand taken. 
Theodore soon acquired a reputation on both sides of the 
Legislative Assembly for his competence in handling financial 
matters. This reputation came in part from his ability to explain 
complicated economic programmes in simple terms, using notes, not 
written speeches, and going back over a point when this seemed not 
to have been understood by the house. It also came from his attention 
to detail in planning his budgets, in which estimated and actual 
expenditures coincided closely, in sharp contrast with the budgets 
after Kidston left the Treasury. Theodore was a reformer who saw 
the use of government financial policy as one of the principal means 
of social reform and increased economic development. His first 
budget in October 1915 revealed much of his philosophy in this area. 
The Treasury papers in the Queensland State Archives also reveal 
that "Ed. Theodore", the miner and union organizer, had now 
become "Edward G. Theodore", the Treasurer. 
The railway age was at its peak in Queensland around the time 
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that Theodore was Treasurer. He saw the railway as one of the great 
instruments for assisting closer settlement and agricultural develop-
ment—the dream of the nation of independent farmers, the paradise 
of the small man. Queensland had land in abundance and plenty 
of water if sufficient dams were constructed. Moreover it was in 
agriculture, particularly sugar and perhaps cotton, that she could 
compete with southern states, not in manufacturing. The initial 
problem Theodore faced was the absence of any provision for the 
arrangement of loan funds by the previous Liberal Government. 
While he accepted the need for caution during the war in the 
expenditure of loan funds, he also "realised the serious effect upon 
our industries and progress which would result from too chaotic a 
slackening of developmental works"." Unlike many in the Labor 
Party, Theodore did not believe that revenue should be the main 
source of developmental funds. The El Dorado syndrome of unlimited 
"development" beloved of Queensland politicians before and after 
Theodore was well expressed in this first budget: "The unwisdom 
of allowing land and railway policy to mark time and thus neglect 
the preparation that must be made to meet the aftermath of the 
war was too obvious to be ignored ... It would be short sighted and 
unstatesmanlike to adopt any policy which would have the effect 
of hampering progress or curtailing production."" 
Theodore saw the Government's role as vital in this progress. 
While the result would be independent farmers and miners and 
reasonably paid, properly accommodated construction employees, 
who would otherwise be without a job, the Government's role would 
be more than that of the entrepreneur putting up the money. 
Theodore wanted to see government ownership and control of the 
private financial institutions of banking and insurance through 
competing state enterprises in which requirements of lower profits 
would, in time, force the existing private institutions to lower their 
charges or go out of business. Government banking and insurance 
offices would, he felt, be more secure, and more generous to small 
borrowers. The State Government Insurance Office and the 
Queensland Government Savings Bank were the practical mani-
festations of these goals.* He further saw advantage to the people 
* The Insurance Act of 1916 authorized the State Government Insurance Office 
to carry on all forms of insurance and regulated the insurance industry in the 
state. The Queensland Government Savings Bank was formed through the 
amalgamation of the Government Savings Bank, the Agricultural Bank, and the 
Workers' Dwelling Board. In 1920 the assets and business of this bank were 
transferred to the Commonwealth Bank with the state receiving considerable 
continuing Tinancial assistance through the transfer. A separate Agricultural Bank 
was re-established in 1923. Private savings banks in Queensland, after the 1923 
Act, could be conducted only with government approval and were subject to 
government regulations on matters like interest rates and investing in government 
securities. 
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of the state in the establishment of government business undertakings 
in those areas where the Government was a major purchaser. Coal 
for railways and timber for workers' dwellings, for example, pin-
pointed the need for State coalmines and sawmills. Where private 
enterprise was providing a business service that was either exploiting 
the public or was not efficient or healthy, Theodore saw it as 
necessary for the State to move in and establish enterprise in that 
area. The establishment, between 1915 and 1920, of the State fish 
supply, the hotel at Babinda in north Queensland, the butcher shops 
and stafions, the cold store and cannery, and the purchase of the 
Chillagoe mines and smelters all reflected Theodore's concept of an 
entrepreneurial role for the state government. 
His ideas on state development did not stop, however at the 
provision of a particular economic infrastructure. Theodore's first 
budget provided for an additional expenditure of £480,000 in a 
budget of £7,680,000. While half of this was for the improvement 
of railway services, the greatest part of the remainder went on 
improving the salaries of the lowest paid government employees, and 
on education and welfare assistance. This involved budgeting for a 
deficit of £370,000, which he proposed to offset by increasing some 
income tax and company tax and by instituting a land tax on freehold 
land valued at more than £300 (Queensland had remained the only 
state without a land tax). The pattern set in 1915 was one that 
Theodore followed in subsequent budgets: additional funds were 
allocated for State business undertakings, for the opening of land 
for closer settlement, and for education, welfare assistance, and the 
improvement in wages of lower paid public servants, teachers and 
police. The additional costs of of these were to be met by selective 
increases in taxation from profitable companies, and individuals on 
higher incomes, and by adjustments to land taxes. In this he was 
to run up against the opposition of the non-Labor majority in the 
Legislative Council, a problem that was not to be resolved undl that 
body was abolished. 
Theodore maintained his interest in mining and, in the decision 
of the Government in 1915 to buy out the troubled Chillagoe 
Company so as to provide copper for Allied munitions, Theodore's 
advice was decisive. Ryan was keen on the notion of State run 
enterprises and in his estimation an efficiently run State business 
undertaking would be a source of income to the Government as well 
as a valuable check on the operation of private enterprise. Theodore, 
on the other hand, knew the area intimately; he knew the jobs that 
would be maintained by reopening the mines and the smelters, and 
he reflected that north Queensland ethos of unlimited development 
in the north if only southern capital and southern governments (and 
this included the one in Brisbane) could be made to see the light. 
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In January 1916 Theodore resigned as president of the AWU in 
Queensland. He was to maintain his membership in and affection 
for the union he had played such a major role in building. (Among 
his private papers are his AWU and AWA membership tickets going 
back to the first he received.) He was also to retain close contacts 
with the AWU officials and when later divisions occurred in the 
trade union movement and in the Labor Party, Theodore was always 
identified as an AWU man. His close union contacts and his known 
capacity for organization made him the logical choice for the position 
of chairman of the Anti-Conscription Campaign Committee in 1916. 
His opposition to conscription was simple. It was against the principles 
of democracy; it would destroy the unity of the Australian people; 
it would destroy the trade unionism that he had worked so 
assiduously to build. There was no emotionalism in Theodore's anti-
conscription campaign. He had his arguments, he explained them 
simply and logically and, like Ryan, he made his appeal to reason 
and rationality. Though he was afterwards to brand Theodore a 
reactionary, the militant Ernie Lane, also a member of the 
committee, recalled that Theodore had organized a most competent 
campaign in Queensland in 1916. 
When Hughes put the question of conscription to a second 
referendum in 1917, it was again Theodore who put the case for 
the unions against conscription. Ryan was to dominate the campaign 
against Hughes in 1917, but the Prime Minister and his censors were 
not as concerned with Ryan's public speeches as with two pamphlets 
written by Theodore and entitled Conscription, the Death of 
Unionism and Conscription, An Appeal to Reason, Facts Fairly 
Stated. In the former, Theodore had said: 
To admit the case for military compulsion gives away the case entirely 
against industrial compulsion. Conscription places military law above 
civil law. The conscription machine can,and undoubtedly will, be used 
to paralyse the biggest efforts of organised labour. Trade unions may 
exist in name, but their power is gone once conscription is established. 
The real reason for the adoption of conscription in Australia by the union-
hating "Win-the-war" Government is not for military purposes, but in 
order to destroy the power of unionism. 
In the poisoned atmosphere of 1917, following the long industrial 
disputes in eastern Australia and the attempts by Hughes, the 
Nationalist Party, and big employers to break the trade unions, there 
was more than enough evidence to give validity to Theodore's 
argument. The sentences quoted and eleven other paragraphs had 
been struck out by the censor. Earlier newspaper reports had given 
additional validity to Theodore's theme, as he pointed out further 
in the pamphlet: 
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these problems fell on Theodore. On the QCE (Queensland Central 
Executive) he tried to resolve the problem of the IWWites and force 
them into either supporting the Labor Government and its pro-
gramme or getting right out of the party. Theodore had no objection 
to those who held more radical or militant views than himself What 
he would not accept was their right to assume that this gave them 
a special insight into working-class needs and a special right to 
criticize the Labor Government, publicly, for its not being a 
revolutionary party preaching the overthrow of capitalism. It was 
this factor which produced a chasm between Theodore and George 
Rymer, the syndicalist editor of the ARU (Australian Railways 
Union) journal, the Advocate, and president of that union. 
Despite Theodore's appeals to unionists for unity in the labor 
ranks, in an atmosphere poisoned by the divisions and bloody 
sacrifices of the war it was difficult for workers to be other than 
bitter about the Labor Government when unemployment increased 
monthly. Theodore, as always, placed a high premium on keeping 
men in work. As Treasurer in 1918, he had set aside £130,000 to 
keep men employed in north Queensland during the slack. At the 
end of that year he had again set in motion temporary work on the 
railways to employ a thousand men. Still the number of unemployed 
rose but, despite his capable handling of state finances, Theodore 
could not continue to find the money to keep placing men on the 
government payroll. As the pressure of being both Treasurer and 
Acting Premier during Ryan's absence caused him to spend more 
and more time at work and as criticism mounted against him from 
within some of the unions, but more particularly within the ARU, 
he began to lose some of his earlier patience. In exasperation, he 
answered the call for more jobs: "There were some people in the 
Labour movement who had queer ideas on how Labour should 
finance the country and its works. They seemed to think a Labour 
Government should be able to create endless sums of money by some 
magic means and that the government could turn a handle and create 
money."'" 
There had to be some means of overcoming the unemployment 
problem other than by financing new public works. Theodore was 
a party to legislative proposals such as the Agricultural Production 
Act, which was designed to assist small farmers in their early days 
on the land by providing direct cash advances for the purchase of 
livestock or silos. But what of the urban and rural worker who wanted 
to work yet could find no work? In August 1919 he introduced the 
Unemployed Workers Bill, which was, in his words, "the first 
practical attempt [in Australia] to deal with the problem of 
unemployment in any adequate manner". Under the Bill an Un-
employment Council would be established consisting of the Minister 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
EDWARD GRANVILLE THEODORE 315 
for Works, the director of labour, a judge of the Arbitration Court, 
a representative of the unions, and a representative of employers. 
Additional employment would be provided through relief work on 
government and local authority projects and large private businesses 
would be required to provide additional employment or to invest 
money in some state developmental works. For the first time there 
was to be the provision of unemployment insurance.'' 
His reform proposals on unemployment once again incurred the 
total opposition of the state's conservatives, particularly those in the 
Legislafive Council. The Council rejected the Bill, thus adding 
another substantial reason for its own abolition. The attitude of the 
Legislative Council in this and other matters relating to Theodore 
was indicative of the fundamental battle that was being fought 
between organized labour and organized capital inside the 
Queensland parliament. Successive budgets which sought a more 
equal distribution of taxes had been emasculated. The problems of 
obtaining loan money to carry out state developmental works were 
exacerbated after the war when Theodore sought loan funds from 
the Commonwealth, in Melbourne, and in London. 
The financial problems that Theodore faced had been caused by 
the Labor Government's intention to abolish the Legislative Council, 
to take over at face value the British-owned Brisbane Tramway 
Company before its franchise ran out, to amend the Land Act so 
that pastoral companies would have to pay rents comparable to those 
paid by selectors (the rate was 16s then per square mile for graziers 
and 59s per square mile for selectors), and to amend the Succession 
and Probate Duties Act. To the large British investors and to the 
large Australian companies in Melbourne which had big pastoral 
investments in Queensland, these were examples of Labor repudia-
tion and confiscation. When Ryan was in England in 1919, Theodore 
attended the premiers' conference called to have the Commonwealth 
act as the sole borrower for the states, and was unsuccessful in his 
attempt to obtain additional loan money from the Commonwealth. 
He cabled Ryan in London informing him that he would need £2 
million to £3 million by June and asking the Premier to try to obtain 
this in London." It was apparent that the rich diet of confiscation, 
repudiation, and socialism being fed to English investors from 
Australia would make Ryan's job extremely difficult. It was to be 
December 1919 before Queensland obtained a £2 million loan. 
Following Ryan's resignation as Premier, the caucus elected the 
thirty-four-year-old Theodore as its new leader. He defeated Fihelly 
by 37 votes to 4. On 22 October 1919 Theodore was sworn in as 
Premier, Chief Secretary, vice-president of the Executive Council 
and Treasurer. Though he was to hand over the Treasury to Fihelly 
in March 1920, he took this portfolio back in February 1922 and 
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held it until his retirement from the Premiership in February 1925. 
In real terms, however, he was to retain effective control of major 
financial matters throughout his Premiership. 
Theodore's period as Premier was to be as eventful and turbulent 
as that of Ryan. He had a complete grasp of the problems facing 
the state; though he was not a lawyer, he understood the law fully 
and could discuss legal issues confidently with his advisers;" he was 
moreover a tough and skilled administrator who worked hard at the 
job before him. 
It is evident from discussions with those public servants who served 
with Theodore or who listened to stories of his administration, that 
Theodore was both admired- and respected by the senior public 
servants who worked with him. Many regarded him as the most able 
premier Queensland has had, with a complete grasp of public finance, 
public law, and administration. Theodore knew what he wanted to 
do; he knew what was financially possible and therefore what he 
as a treasurer and then premier could do. As the ideal and reality 
of politics do not always coincide, it was often his role to explain 
to Labor colleagues why programmes of reform which he had sought 
as a young union leader were not possible in the early 1920s or even 
in the foreseeable future. Increasingly, however, it was his way of 
making known these facts that riled his parliamentary and union 
colleagues rather than the existence of the facts themselves. The 
public Theodore lacked that urbanity and compassion which had put 
Ryan on such a high pedestal even among the most militant of trade 
unionists seeking something beyond the reforms of a Labor govern-
ment. 
Theodore was not a naturally gregarious person and the pressures 
of work at a time of increasing unemployment and the ever-present 
problems of loan-raising left him little time for social meetings apart 
from contact with his immediate political colleagues. Combined with 
these factors were the financial losses of the State enterprises and 
the need to keep an eye all the time on some of the IWW 
sympathizers among the unions, who could wreck the whole Labor 
Government. He acquired a reputation for aloofness that was partly 
the result of his own nature, partly the result of the quantity of work 
facing him, but also the result of his own view that he held the reins 
of government, he understood the problems, and he was the one 
capable of providing the solutions. In any case, he preferred to read 
one of the books from his extensive Brisbane library than to pass 
the time over a glass of beer. His AWU friends in the PLP kept 
him aware of what the unions and the caucus were doing. Jim 
Larcombe, a contemporary in the Cabinet, provides a different 
picture of Theodore as Premier: "To the 'outsider' he often seemed 
cold, aloof and unfriendly. [Yet] he got on well with his Cabinet 
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and revealed to his colleagues many traits of friendship and mateship 
which those who did not know him intimately did not know he 
possessed."" Had he appeared outwardly more friendly, had he been 
less of the perfectionist, had he been less direct in his statements 
to deputations from unions and investors, Theodore's later political 
career might have been more successful. However, he was tagged 
as being aloof and autocratic, a description that can prove disastrous 
for a Labor leader. 
In January 1920 Theodore announced that he would go to London 
himself to try to sort out the problem of raising adequate finance 
for the post-war expansion in railways and farming. By creating such 
development he hoped to avert the post-war depression and, at the 
same time, to increase the state's wealth. This began a conflict 
between Theodore and the state's conservative interests and between 
him and sections among British investors, a conflict that was not 
to be resolved until 1924. A delegation of three—Sir Robert Philp 
{see Ch. 8), Sir Alfred Cowley (Chairman of Directors of the Bank 
of Queensland), and J.A. Walsh, a solicitor on the executive of the 
National Party—was quickly formed to precede Theodore to Lon-
don. They planned to protest against the Labor Government's 
appointment of William Lennon, a former Labor Minister, as 
Lieutenant-Governor, and against the appointment of Labor nomi-
nees to the Legislative Council. (By contrast there had been no 
similar protest when Arthur Morgan [see Appendix], a former 
Liberal Premier, was appointed as Lieutenant-Governor in 1909 and 
again in 1914.) They intended to try to have the Land Act 
Amendment Act disallowed and to try to discredit the Government 
and Theodore so that loan funds would be refused. It was called 
the "stinking fish" delegation in labor newspapers, but it was to be 
a successful delegation. Theodore's desire to appoint an Australian-
born governor was rejected by the Colonial Office as being out of 
step with imperial feeling. Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, felt 
that only when several states and the Commonwealth wanted 
Australian-born governors would there be reason for not appointing 
British governors. More importantly, Theodore was informed that 
until he would agree to repeal the Land Act Amendment Act, he 
would not obtain loan funds in London. The minute of Lord Milner 
in the Colonial Office file on the Land Act Amendment Bill is 
interesting and worth recalling in full in view of the later debate 
inside Queensland: 
I have seen Mr. Theodore several times. He is in a chastened form of 
mind owing to the very unfriendly reception in his attempt to raise more 
money for Queensland ... He is unable to put up any tolerable defence 
of Clause 3 [which was regarded as breaking the contract on land leases]. 
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1 believe he would like to get out of an untenable position and I rather 
think he will try either by amending legislation or administratively to 
suppress or modify the offending Clause. I think it would be a great 
tactical error to disallow the Act and enable him to get out of his 
difficulties under the smokescreen of a constitutional controversy." 
Theodore did not back down, but outlined the problem in a cable 
to Fihelly, the Acting Premier and Treasurer, with the clear intention 
of this being made public in Queensland: 
1 had numerous conferences with the representative of the companies 
financially interested in Queensland and also met the committee of the 
London Stock Exchange. At the conferences I was given to understand 
that financiers could not assist Queensland loans unless the Government 
would agree drastically to modify its policy generally and would 
specifically (i) withdraw the Pastoral Rents Act unconditionally (ii) 
Abandon the Unemployed Workers Bill (iii) Modify the recent Tramway 
Act to suit the Brisbane Tramways Co. (iv) Modify the Insurance 
Legislation (v) Amend the provisions of the Succession Duties Act to 
meet the wishes of English Companies." 
When the orthodox sources of loans were not able to provide the 
finance, Theodore turned to the unorthodox. In the early 1920s that 
meant the New York market, where Theodore raised loans in 1921 
and 1922. He was the first Australian premier to raise government 
loans there. By 1924 when he again prepared to go to London to 
arrange the conversion of a £13 million loan then maturing, there 
was some consensus that the battle started in 1920 had to be stopped 
for the financial good of the state. New York loans carried much 
higher interest charges. Theodore had not repealed any of the 
legislation demanded by the London interests, but he agreed that 
pastoral rents would not be increased after May 1924. The 
pastoralists could apply for reductions by the Land Court, which 
had been the instrument used for raising the rents back in 1920. 
For his previous sins, Theodore was given a loan at SVi per cent 
instead of at the 5VA per cent he had sought, which contrasted even 
more with a New South Wales conversion at 5 per cent. For those 
union leaders who regarded themselves as representing the militant 
socialist viewpoint, Theodore, in agreeing not to increase further 
pastoral rents, had "met his masters". V. Gordon Childe wrote: 
Mr Theodore's capitulation is only the formal acknowledgement of 
defeat. The capitalist class have proved the efficacy against mere 
constitutionalism of that direct action which Mr Theodore himself had 
once long ago preached to the workers when organising the unskilled 
navvies and lumberers of the north. The "responsibilities of office" turned 
him against that doctrine, but its application has reduced his Cabinet 
and himself to the position of a subservient managing committee for the 
bourgeoisie." 
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A fairer assessment would be that the reality of politics had become 
stronger in Theodore than the ideal. London loans were cheaper than 
New York loans. Without loan funds there would be an even smaller 
economic cake to divide, with consequently worse results for those 
already on the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. 
Childe's attitude to Theodore, which has a reflection of that of 
numerous people on the left of the labor movement, stemmed from 
a disillusion with the slowness of the constitutional reforms to which 
the Labor Party was committed. In an atmosphere where there were 
considerable discussions of the glories of the workers' state in Russia, 
where revolution, syndicalism, the OBU (One Big Union) movement, 
and Marxism had taken a strong hold in a part of the trade union 
movement, it was difficult not to accept that Theodore had backed 
down to the money power of London. By then also the wide labour 
reforms that Theodore had achieved were buried in the marginal 
ideological debate about how a Labor government should act, even 
in times of major economic problems. 
When Theodore took over from Ryan as Premier in October 1919, 
the political and economic tide was turning against Labor. A by-
election in the state seat of Maranoa in December 1919 had seen 
the Labor candidate lose a seat held by the party since 1907. In 
the federal elections, also held in December, the Queensland Labor 
vote had dropped 2 per cent from the 1917 federal figure and 7 
per cent from the 1918 state election result. Industrial disputes 
increased through 1919 and 1920 and the earlier Townsville 
meatworkers' strike of 1919 had provided some ugly reports of gun 
shops being raided and shots being exchanged between police and 
unionists. Unemployment rose, and it was against this background 
and Theodore's failure to secure the London loan in 1920 that he 
called an election in October 1920, six months before the due date. 
He was returned as Premier with Ryan's majority of twenty-four 
reduced to four. 
Nevertheless, Theodore's period as Premier was to see the 
completion of the legislation, begun during Ryan's Premiership, 
which provided Queensland with some of the most democratic laws 
of any of the Australian states. Two Bills, however, introduced during 
Ryan's Premiership but rejected by the upper house, and on which 
Ryan had strong views, were not proceeded with by Theodore. These 
were to give eighteen-year-old persons the vote and to provide the 
initiative and referendum. One other Bill to provide adult franchise 
in local government elections was passed in 1920. Queensland 
remained the only state to have passed this law until New South 
Wales passed similar legislation in 1940. It was to be 1921 before 
a Bill foreshadowed by Ryan in 1918, which made for the compulsory 
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retirement of judges at seventy, was passed through the parliament. 
Labor had no reason to feel satisfied that the decisions of the 
Supreme Court on vital government legislation had been either fair 
or sound in law." Three judges in their mid-seventies were im-
mediately retired on pensions of £1000 a year. Their replacements 
reflected no political bias. McCawley, the new Chief Justice, was 
highly regarded by both sides of politics for his scrupulous fairness 
on the Industrial Court. Jameson came to the Supreme Court from 
the District Court, now abolished, as did Thomas O'Sullivan, 
Kidston's Attorney-General. The only new appointee was James 
Blair, also previously a non-Labor Attorney-General. 
While these were most significant pieces of legislation, Theodore's 
abolition of the Legislative Council was the most important item 
of constitutional legislation that he was to pass. Given the number 
of times on which the Council had rejected or amended Theodore's 
income tax proposals, and other legislation for which he had been 
responsible, there was no reason to expect that he would have been 
any more sympathetic than Ryan to the continued existence of the 
upper house. When the matter had been first debated by the caucus 
in December 1915, Theodore had opposed any suggestion of 
additional appointments being made to the Council. He wanted that 
chamber to be abolished in a clear referendum vote; however, the 
conduct of the 1917 referendum and its defeat had changed his mind 
somewhat about how to remove this obstacle to reform. 
It was normal for the Government to appoint a lieutenant-governor 
for the period between the departure of one governor and the arrival 
of his successor, usually a period of up to twelve months. Sir 
Hamilton Goold-Adams left Queensland at the end of 1919. William 
Lennon, then Speaker of the Legislative Assembly, was appointed 
Lieutenant-Governor in January 1920 on Goold-Adams's strong 
recommendation. He appointed fourteen new members to the 
Council, which provided the Government with a majority there for 
the first time. In February the Council again rejected Theodore's 
income tax proposals and the amendment to the Land Act to provide 
for the reassessment of pastoral rent by the Land Courts. Two weeks 
later the new appointees arrived in the Council and the Bills were 
passed. Theodore was then about to depart for London on the loan 
negotiations. He did not want any further obstrucfions to his 
negotiations than those that the Philp, Cowley, Walsh delegation 
was already creating. After a special caucus meeting he issued a 
carefully worded statement to the newspapers: 
The additional members have been appointed to prevent the Government 
measures from being unceremoniously fiung out by the Council. The 
Government will not take advantage of its new strength in the Council 
to abolish that Chamber. At any rate until it gets a fresh mandate from 
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the people. That could be either by making the abolition the principal 
issue at an election or by way of another referendum." 
The future of the Council was a central issue in the 1920 election. 
The Nationalist and Country parties in their election campaign, 
which had been heavily financed from outside Queensland, almost 
toppled "Red Ted's" government, but not quite. However, when the 
parliament resumed on 9 August 1921, there were rumours that two 
Labor members were going to defect to the other side. Such 
defections would have brought the Government down. Before the 
new parliament opened, James Christian Peterson, who had won the 
former Liberal seat of Normanby in the swing to Labor in 1915, 
defected to the Country Party. This left Theodore with a working 
majority of one—two when the Speaker voted. 
Both opposition parties sniffed certain electoral victory if the 
Government could be brought down early in its life. They were even 
prepared to go beyond the accepted conventions of parliamentary 
practice, and refused pairs to sick Government members in crucial 
divisions. On one occasion, in 1921, the opposition leader promised 
a government member a pair and then refused to honour it."" 
However, the Labor majority now present in the Legislative Council 
loomed as a problem for any future non-Labor government wishing 
to repeal the Ryan and Theodore legislation. The Country Party, 
the majority party in the opposition coalition, wanted the Legislative 
Council abolished and replaced by an elective house chosen, not on 
adult suffrage, but on a property franchise similar to that of Victoria. 
If this was not possible, the Country Party wanted the whole upper 
house abolished. Their Nationalist colleagues wanted the appointed 
Legislative Council replaced by one elected on adult franchise with 
three members coming from each federal electorate. 
Theodore had informed Sir Matthew Nathan, the new Governor, 
of his intention to abolish the Council, before the parliamentary 
session began. He had set the Justice Department to look at the 
problem of royal assent to a Bill abolishing the upper house and 
found that there was no longer any problem here. He knew from 
his discussions with the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Milner, in 
1920, that the Colonial Office regarded this as a local political issue 
which did not affect imperial matters in any way. To avoid the 
problems Kidston had faced over the -Legislative Council in 1907, 
Theodore had cultivated Nathan, publicly praising his ability and 
his work, and rejecting opposition and newspaper claims that 
Nathan had been associated with Theodore's unsuccessful loans 
voyage to London. 
On Monday, 24 October, Theodore introduced the Constitution 
Act Amendment Bill into the Legislative Assembly. His principal 
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argument was against the need for an upper house of any kind. One 
that duplicated the composition of the lower house would be 
superfluous, while one that obstructed the working of a consfitu-
tionally elected lower house would be destructive of parliamentary 
democracy. He defined this concept: "What we want in a democratic 
community is a system which will give a ready, free and direct 
expression of the will of the people. That can only be got by having 
frequent appeals to the people, the appeals not less frequent than 
once in three years at the most." The Abolition Bill was passed 
through the lower house by 51 votes to 15 with some opposition 
support. It then went through the upper house. When the Bill was 
to be sent to London, Nathan's only comment was: "Generally, 1 
am unable to say that there is evidence of any strong or widespread 
feeling in the country against this assent being given." Despite 
protests from some non-Labor members of the Council and from 
Philp's Constitution Defence Committee, the abolition was constitu-
tionally valid. Ryan's earlier High Court case and the recent decision 
in the McCawley Case in Privy Council had decided that. The 
Secretary of State for Colonies wrote to Nathan: "I cannot but 
regard the matter with which the Bill deals as essentially one for 
determination locally.""' There is no evidence to suggest that 
Queensland has suffered from the absence of a second chamber. 
Abolishing the Legislative Council did not solve Theodore's 
problem of trying to govern with so small a majority. No other 
member of his party defected, though Bernays noted that "another 
member went nearly half-way over, and like the lost dog in the 
football field returned to that side of the ring from which the loudest 
whistle came"."^ The National and Country parties tried other 
schemes. A vote of no confidence in the Government was to be moved 
on Tuesday, 15 August. However the Opposition's case was de-
stroyed when it was revealed in the Monday's press that an attempt 
had been made by two journalists, Sleeman and Connolly, to bribe 
the Labor Member for Toowoomba, Frank Brennan, to vote with 
the Opposition in the no-confidence motion. Brennan was offered 
£3500 in bonds and cash. 
In the newly formed Country parties, there were sections which 
believed that a new agricultural party based on rural Labor members 
and Country Party members could be formed. Theodore's strained 
relations with some of the militant union leaders suggested to these 
Country Party sections that Theodore might back such a party. There 
was talk that other Labor members besides Brennan had been offered 
bribes to cross the floor."' Theodore had disucssed these bribes with 
a doubting Nathan before the debate; however, when the no-
confidence debate commenced, Theodore stunned the house by 
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revealing that he had been approached by E.T. Garbutt, the president 
of the Northern Division of the Country Party, and W.F.R. Boyce, 
the secretary of the Primary Producers Union, to leave the Labor 
Party and head a new coalition party of National, Country Party, 
and certain Labor parliamentarians. Theodore read to the Assembly 
the transcript of the conversations taken by stenographers secreted 
behind a screen during the interviews."" In a Brisbane Telegraph 
interview on 17 August, Garbutt said he noticed that Theodore had 
seemed to speak loudly during the interviews. The revelation 
provided Theodore with the grounds for a blistering attack on his 
opponents such as the parliament did not often witness. Gone was 
the fumbling young union leader of 1909 in need of speech lessons. 
This was the hardened professional politician who concluded: 
"Whilst we are able to command a majority in this House, even 
if it is only on the casting vote of the Speaker, we shall remain here 
to keep out of office a party who, at the behest of boodlers outside, 
are doing their best to corrupt the public life of this state.""^ Assisting 
a very ill McCormack into his seat in the house, Theodore moved 
that the question be put. The no-confidence motion was lost 35-36."*" 
A fortnight earlier, the opposition parties had taken advantage 
of the absence of McCormack and Dave Gledson through illness 
and had defeated the Government on a closure motion on an 
amendment to the Agricultural Education Bill. It had been a planned 
move with pairs being refused for the two sick government members 
and had involved bringing two sick opposition members into the 
house when a division was being taken. Theodore had Gledson 
brought into the chamber on a stretcher so that he was physically 
present when a special adjournment motion was carried on the 
casting vote of the Speaker."' Theodore had been educated in a tough 
political school where there were no second prizes given to losers. 
He again revealed his strength of purpose here. Taking an idea of 
Jim Larcombe, he introduced the Legislative Assembly Act Amend-
ment Bill to provide for proxy votes for members who were absent 
through illness. The casting votes of the Speaker and the Chairman 
of Committees were required to force through each clause and each 
reading of the Bill. 
The Nationalists, the Country Party, Governor Nathan, and the 
constitutional authority A.B. Keith"' were all outraged at Theodore's 
action. Theodore saw the issue in a different light. His opponents 
had used their influence with English investors and their financially 
powerful associates, as well as using bribery and a refusal of 
parliamentary pairs, to try to bring his government down. A second 
major crisis was averted only when Theodore insisted that the 
unwilling Governor carry out his constitutional responsibilities and 
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assent to the Bill."' Theodore had won through, and during the 
remainder of the session exercised 121 proxy votes on behalf of sick 
members of his government. It was, to say the least, an unusual piece 
of legislation and was more an index of the Premier's frustration 
with his opponents inside and outside parliament than an indication 
of Theodore's concept of parliamentary government. Theodore did 
not belong to the Queensland race of gerrymanderers. He believed 
strongly in parliamentary democracy, the sovereignty of the people, 
and the conventions that had grown up in the British parliamentary 
system. At the Labor-in-Politics Convention in 1923, when the 
abolition of optional preferential voting in state elections was moved, 
Theodore opposed such a policy: "If they started to interfere with 
existing legislation to dish the other party, they might have if said 
that they were not straight and honest... They ought not to represent 
seats unless their men got a majority in the electorate. Why should 
they get in by a trick?"^" 
A redistribution of electoral boundaries took place in 1921, using 
the principle of one vote, one value, and the procedures laid down 
in Kidston's 1910 Electoral Districts Act. One new metropolitan seat 
was created and three rural seats abolished. While the redistribution 
marginally favoured the Government, it was the division among the 
opposition parties that assisted Theodore in the 1923 election. The 
cohesion of these parties had been tight while there was the prospect 
of defeating Theodore at the 1920 election or in the subsequent 
parliamentary manoeuvres, but once Theodore had clearly won the 
battle, the opposition parties divided; though the Labor vote did not 
increase substantially at the 1923 election, it rose enough in marginal 
seats to return Theodore with a comfortable majority of fourteen. 
In spite of the criticism levelled at him by some militant union 
leaders, notably George Rymer of the ARU, Theodore had remained 
a radical reformer and during his Premiership significant labour 
legislation continued to be passed. The problem of housing was 
tackled through the Fair Rents Act, amendments to the Savings 
Bank Act, and through the Workers Homes Act. There were 
amendments to the Safety and Accommodation Acts and after the 
Government obtained its majority in the upper house a Profiteering 
Prevention Act was passed, the efficacy of which was reduced by 
the High Court judgement in the McArthur Case.*' However, it was 
to be the joint problems of a reduced basic wage, continuing 
unemployment, and the demands for a 44-hour week that were to 
press most heavily with Theodore during his term of office and earn 
him a degree of enmity among some of his party members. 
When Theodore had created the arbitration system in Queensland, 
he had provided for a minimum wage "not less than is sufficient 
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to maintain a well-conducted employee of average health, strength 
and competence, and his wife and a family of three children in a 
fair and average standard of comfort"." 
In February 1921 the court had fixed the basic wage at £4 5s 
Od (10s extra was paid in north Queensland). This was 12s 6d higher 
than the Commonwealth basic wage for Brisbane. When McCawley 
again reviewed the cost of living at the end of 1921 he found that 
it had dropped by 11.9 per cent in the previous twelve months. 
Accordingly, in February 1922, the basic wage was reduced by 5s 
a week to £4, or a drop of 5.3 per cent. The reduction in the cost 
of living had been accompanied by a drop in production and an 
increase in unemployment. The Government was facing a deficit of 
£800,000 in a budget of around £9 million. It had begun to cut back 
spending in 1920 by retrenching non-permanent staff in government 
employment, particularly in the railways. 
There were already tensions that had built up between the largest 
single union in the railways—the ARU—and the Government 
through the 1917 and 1919 strikes in north Queensland. Had 
Theodore in 1921 tried to be more conciliatory towards the railway 
unions' representatives over the problem of retrenching their mem-
bers, he might have obtained some sympathy in the problems that 
he, as Premier, faced in trying to overcome the broader unemploy-
ment problem. But Theodore was blunt and outwardly unsym-
pathetic, especially when confronted by union leaders such as George 
Rymer who were constant critics and were suspected of having IWW 
sympathies. Where Ryan had given union and other deputationists 
the impression that he understood their case and would try to grant 
some concessions, Theodore's approach was brutally frank and 
consequently he gave little hope. The report of a deputation to 
Theodore from a number of railway unions towards the end of 1920 
illustrates the point. The deputation wanted the Government to keep 
the non-permanent men at work. Theodore replied: 
It is not for the Government to make proposals to the unions represented 
here. It is not for the unions to come along and say they did not accept 
the Government's decision, nor can they offer any advice, as they have 
not been called in to prescribe. This is not the position. The Government 
has given a decision and must adhere to it, at any rate until the 
Government themselves decide to vary or to modify that decision.-' 
He then outlined the financial problems which caused the retrench-
ments. Rymer refiected the frustration of his union with this 
approach: 
They had now been told that the permanent men were all right, but they 
in the room had regard for the men who were always at the bottom of 
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the scale. What were they doing for them? If they could not get work 
they would starve and that was a responsibility that rested with the 
Government, not with the delegates here. They had come here with that 
object, and they found themselves discussing debentures and 
investments.-" 
Rymer's solution lay in the formation of the Workers' Industrial 
Union of Australia—the OBU—in socialism, and in the abolition 
of the capitalist system. For Theodore, this did not represent political 
reality. 
For working men and women, however, the reality was an 
unemployment level of around 11 per cent. They wanted work, not 
lectures on government problems. When a special meeting was 
convened by the QCE of the Labor Party to discuss unemployment, 
Theodore attended and addressed the meeting. He did not hold out 
much hope for improvement in employment if additional funds had 
to be provided by the Government. The meeting asked him to issue 
his own currency or to have the Federal Government issue £5 million 
for public works to absorb the unemployed. Neither was possible 
in 1921, though there was a certain irony in Theodore's coming to 
a similar conclusion ten years later when he was again confronted 
with unemployment. What was to be done? 
Despite the charges that he had lost touch with the working class, 
the central feature of Theodore's political career was his goal of 
providing work for all those capable of and willing to work. In order 
to keep men employed in government jobs, negotiations were held 
with twenty-nine unions covering government employees to have 
wages voluntarily reduced so that the funds saved could be devoted 
to preventing further retrenchments. In addition, Theodore had 
drafted a Bill for child endownment payments to be related to a 
worker's earnings and to be financed out of the savings in wage 
payments. The unions understandably refused to accept wage 
reductions and the Arbitration Court was approached to reduce 
public service wages by 5s a week. When the court granted this, 
a Bill was passed through parliament to cut 5 per cent off the salaries 
of those public servants receiving £300 a year or more who were 
outside the normal awards. Politicians were among those whose 
salaries were cut by this Act. Despite the wider justification claimed 
for these reductions, there was a general reaction among unions 
against the Government and against Theodore. Even his faithful ally 
the Worker was forced to reflect the disappointment felt among 
Labor supporters: "We must feel deeply that a Labour Government 
should, for any cause whatever, attempt to bring about a reduction 
in the wages of any section of the toilers."" Protests and deputations 
to Theodore to restore the 5s a week went from the QCE and the 
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Trades and Labor Council, but with no success. 
William Forgan Smith {see Ch. 14), as Minister assisting Theo-
dore in the Public Works portfolio, reintroduced and secured the 
passage of the Unemployed Workers Insurance Bill in 1922. The 
new Act provided for an Unemployment Council, free rail passes 
for workers seeking employment, technical instruction for a worker 
if he had lost his job through a lack of technical knowledge, and 
relief work for local authority areas. Most importantly, a worker 
could claim a sustenance allowance for himself and family after 
fourteen days of registration as unemployed at the labour exchange. 
It was logical for the wage reduction issue to be referred to the 
Labor-in-Politics Convention which met at Emu Park, near Rock-
hampton, in March 1923. This was the supreme body of the Labor 
Party in Queensland, the decisions of which, in theory, had to be 
obeyed by Labor parliamentarians, affiliated unions, and rank and 
file members. The 1923 convention was cast in the mould of the 
"honest trade unionist" versus "scheming politician" thesis of Labor 
politics. Rymer and Moroney from the ARU epitomized the "honest 
trade unionists" and Theodore and McCormack the "scheming 
politicians". The first challenge, concerning the retention of concilia-
tion and arbitration, was directed at Theodore, who had promised 
the workers great things through an Arbitration Court which had 
now reduced the workers' wages. Theodore did not speak in the long 
debate, but left the defence of arbitration to McCormack and Forgan 
Smith among his Ministers and to those union secretaries and 
officials who were not impressed by the results of direct action. 
Arbitration was maintained in the Labor platform by 43 votes to 
26. 
A stronger challenge came when Syd Bryan, then secretary of 
the Electrical Trades Union, and Harold Hartley, the Member for 
Fitzroy, moved for the convention to order the Government to restore 
the basic wage to £4 5s Od. Theodore was now fighting for his 
political life just as surely as he had been through the bribery, the 
proxy, and the no-confidence manoeuvres in parliament. To pass this 
motion, he said, would destroy the whole arbitration process. The 
Government would be usurping the lawful role of the Arbitration 
Court and not one extra man would be employed as a result. It would 
hamper the efforts being made to improve the economic position of 
the state which alone could provide for higher wages and overcome 
unemployment. All his eloquence and the force of McCormack's 
arguments on the real value of the reduced wages managed to defeat 
the motion, but by only two votes. Theodore had survived again. 
In two subsequent confrontations with Rymer and Moroney on 
their opposition to politicians being elected to the QCE and on the 
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question of the power of the QCE to instruct the parliamentary party 
on legislation, Theodore had easy wins. He could afford to be 
magnanimous and accept the convention's decision that the Govern-
ment should legislate for a 44-hour week. The timing of its 
introduction was left to the parliamentary party. Success came to 
him in another part of the convention, when he moved: "That no 
further granting to Queenslanders of Imperial honours, more espe-
cially those which confer titles upon recipients, be a part of the 
Fighting Platform." This was not to be rescinded by the Labor Party 
in Queensland. 
Following his success at the convention and before his opponents 
inside his party could publicly continue their campaign, Theodore 
had brought on the state election and secured an increased majority. 
He gave no indication of when he would introduce the 44-hour week. 
Again it fell to the ARU delegates on the QCE and the Trades and 
Labor Council to take the initiative in pressing the Government to 
act as they thought a Labor government should.^'' Theodore was never 
one to back away from a fight even with the unionists he knew so 
well, and accepted an invitation to address the Trades and Labor 
Council delegates on the matter. As on the basic wage issue, he 
argued that the state could not afford the loss of hours of production 
and that it was up to the unions to prepare a case for the Arbitration 
Court which lawfully had the responsibility for determining hours 
of work. Like William Kidston {see Ch. 9) before him and Vincent 
Gair {see Appendix) after him, Theodore had the problem of 
matching his responsibilities to his party with the responsibilities he 
held as a premier of the state. Theodore's problem was different 
from that of Kidston and Gair. He remained loyal to his party and, 
more importantly, to the goals that his party had set. In the Labour 
Magazine of September 1923 he put the issue in these terms: 
Since coming into power the Queensland Labour Party has been 
compelled to concern itself in the main with reforms and curative 
measures while doing its best to prepare the way for a more rapid, but 
nevertheless gradual, progress towards reconstruction for the future. 
It is true that in carrying out this practical policy capitalism has not 
been abolished, nor has a celestial paradise been established on earth. 
But ... there is [now] less ruthless exploitation and profiteering, less 
poverty and misery among the workers and a fairer distribution of 
prosperity. 
Others in the party wanted a faster pace in instituting reforms and 
Theodore found that he was not the only union leader who had 
learned the art of canvassing votes. While he was away in London 
in early 1924, backbenchers and Cabinet Ministers were canvassed, 
and probably threatened with reprisals in the next pre-selection 
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plebiscites, regarding the 44-hour week and the restoration of the 
basic wage. When the caucus met before the new session of 
parliament, a motion to restore the 5 per cent salary reduction for 
public servants and to legislate for a 44-hour week was carried. 
Theodore quickly consulted his Cabinet colleagues and they and the 
Premier resigned and left the meeting. The caucus voted Charlie 
Collins, a former AWA organizer, into the leadership of the party 
with old John Payne as his deputy. Theodore returned and promised 
his full support for the new leader. Then the problems began. There 
were more informal than formal votes cast for the new Ministry and 
after about three hours of futility, it was suggested that Theodore 
and the Cabinet reconsider their decisions. A compromise was 
reached. Theodore and the Cabinet duly returned to their portfolios 
and a Bill for the 44-hour week was later introduced and passed." 
It was to take a strike in the railways in 1925, after Theodore had 
resigned as Premier, to restore the 5 per cent cuts to government 
employees. The child endownment scheme was discarded. 
To return to the problems of unemployment in 1920, Queensland's 
economy was much more concerned with primary industries than 
with secondary. Indeed secondary industry in the state had been 
closely tied to the processing of primary produce.** There had been 
schemes for closer settlement by previous Queensland governments 
but none had matched the scope proposed by Theodore. Like Ryan, 
he believed that the future of Queensland lay in agricultural 
development and closer settlement and that it was the responsibility 
of the Labor Party to provide the infrastructure, finance, and 
marketing assistance to make this possible for large numbers of 
settlers. This, he felt, would be a major step in providing additional 
employment. 
Ryan had been concerned to provide for the orderly marketing 
of primary produce and the guaranteeing of reasonable prices for 
agricultural goods in his passing of the State Produce Agency Act 
in 1917 and in the Acts relating to sugar. In his first three years 
as Premier, Theodore rapidly advanced this pattern. The Wheat Pool 
Act of 1920 established the Wheat Board and a Cheese Pool was 
established in 1921. A state cannery was built; a cold store was 
constructed at Hamilton on the Brisbane River to hold perishable 
exports; a Committee of Direction for marketing fruit was estab-
lished and a consolidating Act was passed to set up a new 
Agricultural Bank which, while rationalizing finance for agricultural 
development, also liberalized this considerably. With the passing of 
the Irrigation Act in 1922, the Queensland Government entered 
directly into water storage and conservation. 
All of this had been complemented by the passing of the Main 
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Roads Act in 1920, which established the Main Roads Board under 
J.R. Kemp. Through this board, government grants were made to 
local authorities to cover half the cost of road construction. These 
main roads were to act as feeders to the railways and reduce the 
cost of transportation to the primary producers. The last link in the 
north coast railway line between Townsville and Rockhampton was 
completed in 1924. It was through this and other lines that 
considerable subsidies were provided for primary producers. 
Larcombe, the Minister for Railways, noted that railway concessions 
between 1922 and 1924 to the cattle, sheep, and dairying industry 
amounted to £240,000, £64,000, and £20,000 respectively." Herein 
lay part of Theodore's financial problem. 
The laying down of this infrastructure was part of the programme 
that Theodore and his Ministers had for the state's agricultural 
development. However, Theodore had a more ambitious programme, 
which he outlined in a speech at Laidley in February 1922: 
Agriculture as an industry must be made a remunerative industry to those 
engaged in it. The industry must be greatly extended for only in that 
way can an additional population be absorbed and it is only by increasing 
the population that we can reduce our per capita financial burdens. The 
conditions of life of all country dwellers must be made more attractive 
than at the present time. 
An agricultural policy, to be effective, must include proposals dealing 
with all the following topics. These would constitute some of the leading 
planks of an agricultural programme, (i) co-operation, (ii) pools, (iii) 
advisory boards for the different sections of the agricultural industry, 
(iv) agricultural education, (v) main roads, (vi) extension of social 
amenities to rural life, (vii) opening land for settlement, (viii) representa-
tion abroad to promote trade for primary products.*" 
Having outlined his proposals, Theodore set about implementing 
them. After consultation with various groups of primary producers, 
the Government passed the Primary Producers Organization Act, 
which established a Council of Agriculture. This provided for local 
producers' associations and district councils which would carry the 
view of the primary producers directly to the Council of Agriculture 
and to the Department of Agriculture and Stock. Complementing 
this broad organization of primary producers was an extension of 
the successful pooling system through the establishment of marketing 
boards representing growers of specific agricultural commodities. An 
Agricultural Education Act was also passed in 1922. During 
Theodore's Premiership and after, there were several important 
amendments made to his overall scheme, but it remained the basis 
on which Queensland's agriculture developed and which gave 
primary producers a dominant voice in the conduct of their own 
industry. 
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Theodore's goal in this ambitious programme was to increase 
availability of land for farming, to increase the value and volume 
of goods produced in the state, and to use this as a basis for absorbing 
the unemployed; in time, this would reduce the heavy dependence 
on overseas loans, which were providing much of the finance for the 
development. Using the 1922 Irrigation Act, irrigation schemes were 
started on the Dawson River where it was intended that up to eight 
thousand farmers would be settled. However, a totally inadequate 
survey, unsuitable soil, distance from markets, and the lack of 
farming qualifications by many of the settlers meant that the scheme 
was a gigantic failure. By 1928 only a hundred people had settled 
around the township of Theodore, the central town of the Dawson 
settlement. A similar, though not quite so drastic, result was obtained 
in the upper Burnett and Callide scheme for closer agricultural 
settlement." In the sugar area, Theodore's programmes were to have 
greater success. In the face of opposition from private mill owners, 
Theodore constructed a large government-owned sugar mill at Tully, 
which was later handed over to the growers as a co-operative mill." 
The provision of the mill opened up further cane land to new farmers 
in north Queensland. 
Overall Theodore's hopes for closer settlement were not fulfilled. 
His emphasis on building agriculture as the major source of export 
income, at the expense of wool, was not to prove a success. 
Nevertheless in any evaluation of the 1920s, his agricultural policies, 
like his labour policies, set him apart as a premier of ideas and great 
drive. A recent assessment of Queensland primary industries in the 
1920s sets Theodore's proposals in their context. 
The Queensland Government in the 1920s was the only Australian 
government to tackle the problems facing the agricultural producers and 
it is undoubtedly the case that agriculture in Queensland would have 
suffered a serious decline had it not been for the determination of the 
Government, no matter what deficiencies existed in the methods used, 
to assist in every possible manner." 
In July 1924 Theodore nominated for Labor pre-selection for the 
federal seat of Herbert. His opponent in the plebiscite was Myles 
Ferricks, whom Theodore defeated by a two to one majority. On 
25 February 1925 he resigned as Premier and leader of the Labor 
Party, but held his seat in the Queensland parliament until Septem-
ber. There was no federal conference motion asking Theodore to 
change from state to federal politics. He had to find his own seat 
and the one he chose, the north Queensland seat of Herbert, had 
been held by F.W. Bamford for Labor between 1901 and 1917 and 
retained by Bamford as a Nationalist after 1917. Herbert began 
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south of Mackay; it included the coastal areas east of the range and 
most of Cape York. Bamford was retiring at the 1925 election and 
it seemed certain that Theodore would win the seat. 
Theodore had been a member of the Queensland parliament for 
sixteen years, a Minister for ten, and Premier for just over four years. 
He was still only forty. When Bernays wrote his book Queensland 
—Our Seventh Political Decade, 1920-1930, he had none of the 
high regard for the Labor Party that he had exhibited in writing 
Queensland Politics During Sixty (1859-1919) Years. He certainly 
did not hold Theodore in the same reverence as he did Ryan, yet 
he could still accept the contribution Theodore had made to 
Queensland politics: 
He had, as admitted on all hands, done good work for his party. His 
outstanding ability had come to be recognised by all classes. He knew 
what he wanted, and generally speaking, he accomplished his purpose 
often in the face of very strenuous opposition from his own party ... 
Kidston shammed strength Theodore possessed it ... Members of 
Parliament might well be pardoned for acquiring the vice of vanity if 
they were all as successful as Edward Granville Theodore." 
Theodore's problem in his period as Premier was his unwillingness 
to display the patience that he had shown as a rising union official 
and as Treasurer and Minister for Public Works. Admittedly the 
circumstances were different after 1920. Those members of the 
Labor Party and of the trade unions who believed that a workers' 
revolution was imminent and that Theodore with his reforms was 
merely postponing the inevitable, were living in a different world 
from Theodore. In the real world of capitalism that Theodore knew, 
he had achieved more for the workers and farmers in Queensland 
in his ten years of office than any other person. This knowledge gave 
him the inward satisfaction that unfortunately manifested itself as 
arrogance and contempt for opponents. 
When he retired from the Premiership Theodore contributed an 
article, "Australian Labor Government After Ten Years", to an 
American journal, the Current History Magazine. He was not 
modest about the achievements of those ten years, but the article 
is probably more useful as a guide to his political ideas. The Labor 
Party's objective, he wrote, was "the replacement of capitalist 
institutions now used for the exploitation of human labor". How was 
this objective to be achieved? Theodore's answer reflected his faith 
in parliaments, even if they were slow: 
As we become better understood we gain strength, opposed as we are 
to anything but constituional change and taking no other steps towards 
reform than the vote of the elector. We are opposed to force because 
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we know that change by force can only be maintained by force. We know 
that the necessary reconstruction of society can be secured in permanent 
and stable fashion only by the people's will. We know that unless our 
arguments appeal to reason and our methods give confidence by their 
deliberation our results will be temporary and unsubstantial." 
Theodore's decision to resign from state politics and attempt to enter 
federal politics was understandable. In 1924 the federal PLP was 
just about at its lowest ebb ever. The expulsion of W.G. Higgs from 
the party in 1920, the death of Ryan in 1921 and that of Tudor 
in 1922, and the expulsion of J.H. Catts in 1922 had left the 
uninspiring Matt Charlton as leader and the erratic Frank Anstey 
as deputy leader. There was little prospect of Labor regaining either 
the federal government or its role as the party of initiative unless 
the calibre of federal politicians and federal leaders improved 
dramatically. The other factor of importance was that, after his first 
three years as Queensland Treasurer, Theodore had come round to 
the view that major reforms in Australia could best be achieved by 
a Commonwealth Labor government, not by state governments. By 
1919 he was a stronger Australian nationalist, who recognized the 
restrictions placed on Labor and reform by the Australian Constitu-
tion. In 1924 he was clearly the outstanding political Labor leader 
in Australia, whose abilities were needed more in federal politics 
than in Queensland. 
At three successive federal conferences in 1919, 1921, and 1924, 
Theodore had demonstrated his political calibre to interstate dele-
gates. The conferences in 1919 and 1921 were deeply involved in 
the question of the goal of Labor in politics. Theodore accepted that 
Labor needed a clear, overall objective which could be easily 
understood and which reflected the broad goals of the Labor Party 
as it had evolved in the previous thirty years. At the 1919 conference 
he proposed, as an objective: 
(a) Emancipation of human labour from all forms of exploitation and 
the obtaining for all workers the full reward for their toil. 
(b) The development in Australia of an enlightened and self reliant 
community. 
(c) The maintenance of peace between nations by the establishment of 
an international tribunal with adequate powers to hear and settle 
disputes." 
He later amended this by adding, between (a) and (b), "by the 
democratic control of all agencies of production, distribution and 
exchange". The conference accepted his objectives with "the main-
tenance of a White Australia" added and "collective ownership" 
inserted before the words "democratic control" in his extra clause. 
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By the time of the 1921 conference in Brisbane, the membership 
of the federal conference had changed considerably, as had the 
demand for a more ideologically based party, committed to theo-
retically socialist objectives, not to the reforms of the previous years. 
W.J. Riordan, president of the AWU in Queensland, moved for a 
new objective: "That the socialisation of industry, production, 
distribution and exchange be the objective of the Australian Labor 
Party." Theodore was the first to speak in opposition. His principal 
ground was the absence of any clear idea of what the term 
"socialisation" meant. "It was very essential in the interests of the 
Movement", he said, "that they should have an objecfive that 
everyone knew the meaning of ... No two delegates would agree as 
to what socialisation of industry meant."" As the debate proceeded, 
it was evident that this last point was very valid. Despite its historic 
nature, the whole socialization objective debate was quite fuzzy. 
Theodore became angry as he tried to bring the conference back 
to the realities of Australia in 1921 and to the realities of the Labor 
Party as an organization that had to govern within certain constitu-
tional limits. 
Scullin's motion calling for "The establishment of an elective 
Supreme Economic Council by all nationalised industries", which 
in a hazy fashion was to operate parallel to the existing parliaments, 
but which "would take the place of Parliament for all quesfions of 
industry" had Theodore on his feet again demanding that the 
delegates argue in terms relevant to indigenous Australian Labor. 
The trouble with the Conference was quite a number of delegates had 
their minds saturated with ideals and dogmas that did not belong to 
Australia ... Delegates enamoured with the proletariat in Russia and the 
sentiments of the IWW had come along there and translated their ideas 
into motions which found their place on the agenda paper ... The Labor 
Party did not want Communism ... Importing these revolutionary 
proposals into the movement would not lead to its progression, but to 
its destruction." 
On the question of the objective, Theodore lost in 1921. At the 1924 
conference there were more important matters than the objective 
to be debated. 
Theodore was to carry his opposition to the IWW and the 
Communist Party into the 1924 federal conference where, having 
moved, successfully, "That no member of the Communist Party shall 
be eligible to become a member of the Australian Labor Party", 
he then sat on the sub-committee which framed the rules preventing 
the Communist Party affiliating with the Labor Party or individual 
members of the Communist Party joining the Labor Party. Back 
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at the QCE meeting in Brisbane, in February 1925, he piloted 
through the resolution embodying the federal conference decision, 
which would specifically exclude communists from the Queensland 
branch of the Labor Party. When a local branch wrote to the QCE, 
five months later, asking for a definition of a communist, it was 
Theodore who coldly framed the answer: "any person who refused 
to sign the pledge drawn up by the QCE declaring that he is not 
a member of the Communist Party is not eligible to become or remain 
a member of an ALP branch and ... all branches must submit the 
pledge to their members."" 
It was not only on the matter of party objectives that Theodore 
played a leading role in the federal conferences. Indeed it was 
probably his place as the most experienced Labor politician, when 
matters of administration arose, that led to his being marked out 
as a coming federal leader. By 1919 Theodore wanted the Australian 
Constitution amended to provide unlimited legislative power for the 
Commonwealth pariiament; authority for the Commonwealth par-
liament to reconstruct state boundaries; and recognition of the High 
Court as the final court of appeal. His reasons for arguing for this 
refiected a complete change from the views he had expressed when 
opposing the 1915 referendum. Now he argued: 
The existing system as to distribution of powers between the Common-
wealth and the States were wholly inadequate. Governments seeking to 
do good for the people were hamstrung because of lack of sufficient 
constitutional power ... A sincere Government controlling the whole of 
Australia was in a much better position when clothed with adequate 
powers than State Governments whose methods might be haphazard.™ 
That was his view in 1919 even before he became premier and 
certainly before he decided to change to federal politics. 
At these conferences, Theodore again showed his appreciation of 
the importance of the financial side of government and the reforms 
that could be effected here. In 1921, when arguing against the lack 
of clarity in the socialization objective, he urged more precise forms 
of control of capitalist exploitation, principally through the nation-
alization of banking. Theodore saw the nationalization of the major 
tertiary services as being necessary to prevent exploitation. His 
nationalization philosophies did not extend beyond this to farms, 
mines, and businesses: in these areas, he felt. State enterprises had 
a place as competitors only. "The best method [of political action] 
they could have at the present time", he told the 1921 conference, 
"was the [government] control of services such as posts and 
telegraphs, railways, banking and insurance." 
Nationalization of banking seemed far away when he attended 
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the 1924 conference. However, he had definite proposals on how the 
Commonwealth Bank should be used. It is interesting to note the 
comparison between Premier Theodore's proposals for the Common-
wealth Bank in 1924 and those of Federal Treasurer Theodore in 
1931. In 1924 he successfully argued that: "The Commonwealth 
Bank [should] be developed on the lines of a central reserve bank, 
while retaining its ordinary and savings bank functions. Its operation 
[should] be extended to give greater assistance to the primary (and 
other) industries of the country. The Commonwealth Bank [should] 
remain in the matter of policy, free from association or agreement 
with the private banks"." This became Labor policy. 
Labor was sure that Theodore would win the Herbert seat in 1925 
—so sure, in fact, that he was induced to lead the federal election 
campaign throughout Queensland rather than concentrate wholly on 
winning Herbert. His opponent, Dr Lewis Nott, was the mayor of 
Mackay. He came from a sugar family and had a distinguished war 
record. Unlike Theodore, he was able to devote all his time to the 
Herbert election and received considerable support from both the 
Nationalists and the Country Party. Although the Nationalists 
publicly accepted that Theodore did not have any sympathy for the 
Communist Party, the election itself was fought on the issue of 
communism and industrial disputes, and the non-Labor side was 
assisted by strikes on the Cairns waterfront a fortnight before the 
elections. On polling day Theodore increased the overall Labor vote 
by 1.6 per cent to 49.70 per cent of the valid votes, but lost ground 
in Nott's home town of Mackay and in the traditionally strong Labor 
areas of Innisfail and Bowen. Nott won Herbert by only 268 votes." 
Had Theodore been able to spend more time in Herbert and if his 
opponent had been only slightly less appealing, he might well have 
scraped home. However, he did not and his loss in 1925 was to have 
a considerable bearing on the course of Australian federal politics. 
Although he was to be the campaign director for the 1926 state 
election, after his defeat in Herbert, Theodore's Queensland political 
career seemed to have come to an end. But not quite. Mining is 
a speculative industry where the high profits go to the successful 
investor, not to the working miner. Somewhere about 1918 Theodore 
began speculating in north Queensland mines. He knew the industry, 
he knew the risks, and he knew the possible profits. His investments 
in mining do not seem to have been large at this stage. He was more 
concerned about the employment available if the mines and smelters 
in the Chillagoe area could be reopened. The evidence of certain 
geologists suggested that there was sufficient payable ore there and 
that it would be a profitable venture to conduct as a State enterprise. 
In 1918, after two years of wrangling with the Legislative Council, 
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the Chillagoe mines and railways had been bought by the Queensland 
Government. In March 1922 the Government had also bought the 
nearby Mungana mines—the Girofla and the Lady Jane—for 
£40,000. 
During the by-election for Theodore's seat of Chillagoe, rumours 
had started to circulate about Cabinet Ministers having shares in 
the now unsuccessful Mungana mines before these had been sold 
to the state (for details of these charges see Ch. 12). McCormack, 
then the Premier, was the main target. However, while Theodore 
had been involved in these mines, he had also been given five hundred 
shares in Mt Isa by Randolph Bedford and had bought more shares 
himself as the field began to boom. At this time the Cabinet was 
considering a report on building a railway from Mt Isa to a coastal 
port." Throughout 1926, 1927, and 1928, McCormack defended 
himself in parliament, at the Labor-in-Politics Convention, and in 
public meetings, against charges of corruption or using his position 
as a Cabinet Minister to traffic in mining shares. Throughout he 
defended his mate Theodore. In May 1929 Labor lost office in 
Queensland and a Country-Nationalist government under A.E. 
Moore {see Ch. 13) was sworn in. In October, Theodore, having 
survived a royal commission in 1928 into payments made to find 
him a federal seat," was the Member for Dalley in the federal 
parliament and deputy leader of the federal PLP. He was then 
campaigning in the federal election caused by the fall of the Bruce-
Page Government. As he concluded the campaign that was to bring 
the Scullin Government into office, information about his Mt Isa 
share dealings was being given to the Queensland parliament, 
information which showed that both he and McCormack had grossly 
understated their interests in Mt Isa. 
The Royal Commission established by Moore into the sale of the 
Mungana mines to the Queensland Government had all the overtones 
of a political act aimed at Theodore, now the Federal Treasurer. 
Both Moore and Neil Macgroarty, the Nationalist Attorney-
General, were determined to undo Theodore's labour laws and it was 
Macgroarty's pre-election boast that he would "ringbark the Arbi-
tration Court". Credence was given to this belief by the choice of 
the Royal Commissioner. Moore would not accept any of the 
Queensland Supreme Court judges for the position, not even James 
Blair, the Chief Justice. Instead he chose J.L. Campbell, a recently 
retired New South Wales judge. Theodore seems to have regarded 
it as both unwise and unnecessary to appear before the Royal 
Commission. Seven years later the Canberra journalist Warren 
Denning recalled: "The Royal Commission had never quite been 
taken seriously in Canberra. If anybody worried about it at all, it 
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was merely to think that at worst it might provide a nine days' 
sensation and then be forgotten."" 
On Friday, 4 July 1930, Theodore was five days off delivering 
his first federal budget. Two days before, it had been announced 
that he would be Acting Prime Minister when Scullin left for 
England on 25 August. That Friday was to see the beginning of the 
destruction of Theodore's political career. It was on that day that 
Campbell's report was presented to the Queensland Cabinet and 
released to the press. While it accused the respondents of fraud and 
dishonesty in having the State buy the Mungana mines for £40,000, 
one sentence alone need be quoted to show how Theodore was 
damned, politically, by the report: 
Mr. Theodore was a party from the beginning to the design to bring 
about the sale to the state of a mine that everyone concerned knew, or 
ought to have known, had no absolute, and probably no relative value 
remotely approaching the price which it was intended the State should 
be induced to pay for it." 
Theodore resigned as Treasurer. "It will only be for two months", 
he told his private secretary." He went to Brisbane to seek an 
opportunity to clear his name. But it was to be almost twelve months 
before the Queensland Cabinet agreed to proceed against Theodore 
and the others found guilty by the Royal Commission, on a civil 
charge of conspiracy. The case opened on 22 July 1931 before Sir 
James Blair and a jury of four {see Ch. 12 for details of the trial). 
At the conclusion of the trial, Blair put twenty-five quesfions to the 
jury. His own summary indicated that he did not think that Theodore 
and McCormack were quilty of fraud or dishonesty in selUng the 
Mungana mines for £40,000". So far as Theodore was concerned 
the jury's answers contradicted the principal findings of the Royal 
Commission. 
Q.l I (a) Did the defendants or any and which of them, on or prior to 
December 16, 1920, unlawfully combine and conspire together 
to bring about by unlawful means the purchase for and on behalf 
of our Lord the King of the Lady Jane and Girofla mines for 
the sum of £40,000? No. 
(b)Was the said sum of £40,000 a price in excess of the fair and 
reasonable value of the said mines? No. 
(c)Did the defendants, or any and which of them, then know the 
sum of £40,000 was a price in excess of the fair and reasonable 
value of the said mines? No. 
Q.l6 (a)Did the defendant Theodore, for and on behalf of our Lord 
the King, approve or authorise the purchase of the Lady Jane 
and Girofia mines for and on behalf of our Lord the King? 
Yes. 
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(b)Did the defendant Theodore so approve or authorise the said 
purchase in consideration of the gift of a one-half share or 
interest in the Lady Jane and Girofla mines for himself and 
the defendant McCormack? No. 
(c)Did the defendant Theodore so approve or authorise the said 
purchase in pursuance or furthermore of the said unlwaful 
combinations or conspiracies or either of them? No. 
Q.l7 Did the defendant Theodore use any, and if any, what, unlawful 
means to bring about the purchase for and on behalf of our Lord 
the King of the said mines? No. 
Q.l8 Were the defendants McCormack and Theodore, or either and 
which of them, entitled to the beneficial interest in 4376 shares 
in Mungana Mines Limited? 
(a)On February 25, 1922? 
Yes, McCormack, but not Theodore. 
(b)On March 25, 1922? 
Yes, McCormack, but not Theodore. 
Q.21 On and prior to February 2, 1922, was the defendant Theodore 
entitled to a share or interest in 4376 shares of Mungana Mines 
Limited? No. 
Q.23 (a) Did the defendant McCormack pay to the defendant Theodore 
sums amounting to £5658/18/10 between April 1, 1922, and 
July 31, 1925? Yes. 
(b)Were such sums paid by the defendant Theodore on account 
of a share or interest held by the defendant Theodore in the 
shares in Mungana Mines Limited held for or in the name of 
the defendant McCormack? No. 
Q.25 What damages? Nil.'' 
The purchase of the Mungana mines, Theodore's personal role in 
this, why Campbell was appointed as Royal Commissioner, the 
Supreme Court case—all require more patient study before a 
definitive verdict can be given. There was an irony about Blair's final 
question "What damages?" and the jury's final answer "Nil". The 
damages had been great. In the absence of both Scullin and 
Theodore, the Federal Labor Government had fallen apart; to try 
to restore some strength to the Cabinet, even before his name was 
cleared, Scullin had to force Theodore back into the Cabinet on a 
24-19 vote with nine abstentions; Theodore had lost his ascendancy 
among his colleagues and against Jack Lang within the New South 
Wales Labor Party. In the 1931 election he lost the seat of Dalley 
to a Langite, Sol Rosevear. Ten days before his forty-seventh 
birthday, his political career ended. 
There were two areas where Theodore had acquired considerable 
knowledge as a miner, union official, and politican. These were 
mining and newspapers. He became a newspaper proprietor with 
Frank Packer and established the Women's Weekly. Linking up with 
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John Wren, who supplied the capital, he continued his career in 
mining and extended into Fiji and Western Australia. He was to 
serve as the Director of Allied Works during World War II, but 
apart from this, rejected all invitations to return to politics. 
With the end of the war Theodore returned to Fiji, though he 
maintained a home and office in Sydney. Most of his union and 
political contemporaries had died and the Theodore whom people 
knew after the war was the businessman who was held in extremely 
high regard by his personal staff, who knew little, except the legends, 
of his early career. On 9 February 1950, after an illness, he died 
in Sydney. It had been twenty-five years since he resigned as Premier 
of Queensland. 
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12 William McCormack 
Forgotten Labor Leader 
RETT KENNEDY 
William McCormack was a member of the Queensland parliament 
for eighteen years, from 1912 to 1930, a Cabinet member from 1919 
to 1929, and Premier from 1925 to 1929. He has remained a 
neglected political figure, although his contribution to public life was 
highly significant. Among the reasons for his neglect is the fact that 
he ended in ill favour with many of his own party; in addition, his 
Premiership was not marked by many notable decisions; for most 
of his public life he was in the shadow of Edward Theodore {see 
Ch. II); and he was publicly discredited by the Mungana scandal. 
But McCormack had an important career in his own right, both in 
trade union matters and political office. As a trade union official 
he was responsible for bringing a new impetus to the industrial 
movement and, with others, for establishing the Labor Party as a 
viable political force. He remoulded the nature of the office in his 
term as Speaker, and assisted Labor through its early, troublesome 
days during World War I. As a Minister he contributed to the 
rapprochement with London financiers, and piloted a number of far-
reaching rural reforms, particularly in agriculture. And, as Premier, 
he did much to cushion the impact of impending depression, although 
his methods directly secured his government's 1929 electoral defeat. 
McCormack was a central figure in Labor's first fourteen years of 
office, during which he greatly assisted in restructuring the party 
on its present-day lines. 
McCormack was born at Purnam near St Lawrence (Central 
Queensland) in 1879, the eldest of six children, to Patrick and Mary 
McCormack (nee Brennan). Although baptized a Catholic, he 
William McCormack: MLA (Cairns) 1912-30; Speaker 1915-19; Home Secretary 
1919-23; Secretary for Public Lands 1923-25; Premier, Chief Secretary, and 
Treasurer 1925-29 
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William McCormack 
Premier, 22 October 1926-21 May 1929 
(Courtesy Oxley Library) 
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attended the local State school, receiving only an elementary 
education. Little is known of his childhood, except that after working 
on the family's small grazing property, he turned to prospecting in 
the Mt Morgan district. However, when he was twenty-five years 
of age, news of the mining boom in far north Queensland captured 
his imagination. In 1904 he set out for the Chillagoe mineral field, 
optimistic that he would make good,.but decidedly unaware of the 
realities of working as a "wages man" in the tropics. 
He gained employment with the Stannary Hills Mines and 
Tramway Company. In contrast to Irvinebank and Herberton, which 
had attained a complacent and conservative life-style. Stannary Hills 
displayed that raw edge of impermanency characteristic of bawdy, 
brawling, boom settlements such as Chillagoe, Mungana, and O.K., 
which owed their reputation as much to the potency of the liquor 
and the excitement of the gambling schools as to the wealth from 
the mines. With men working underground for low wages in high 
temperatures, along poorly ventilated drives with methane traces, 
and without adequate safety regulations, it is not surprising that 
discontent rankled.' But for McCormack and his workmates there 
was no recourse to unionism, not, at least, until 1907, when a bellicose 
twenty-two-year-old, E.G. Theodore, advanced a scheme for in-
dustrial organization. As an individual, Theodore was to have a 
profound effect on McCormack's life and certainly, much of his 
career in trade unionism and politics cannot be considered in isolation 
from their close friendship. 
Theodore, McCormack, and a group of miners met in September 
1907 at Irvinebank to launch the AWA (Amalgamated Workers 
Association), destined to become, in only three years, one of the most 
infiuential unions in Queensland's history. Local conditions augured 
well for the union's success: mine managers had aroused discontent 
by cutting wages and enforcing discipline; and there also existed a 
widespread sense of betrayal over the defection of the state Labor 
member Mick Woods to the Kidston group {see Ch. 9). 
At the inaugural executive meeting, following the establishment 
of branches at Stannary Hills, O.K., Mungana, Herberton, and 
Irvinebank, McCormack became AWA vice-president and, after 
proposing its affiliation with the Labor Party to secure a politico-
industrial base, he was elected honorary secretary in July 1908.^ To 
affirm its ascendancy, McCormack and Theodore involved the union 
in the prolonged and bitter Etheridge railway dispute, successfully 
securing the strikers' demands from the Chillagoe Company. It was 
an impressive trial of strength, effectively extending the AWA's 
infiuence among railway navvies and itinerant workers.' 
Credit for the AWA's early success belongs to Theodore for his 
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energy and organizational ability, and to McCormack for his 
perspicacity in administration: their efforts, claimed the Worker, had 
moulded a fighting organization under highly centralized executive 
control." By 1909 McCormack had prepared the ground for the 
union's rapid expansion. The first conference, held in Chillagoe, 
adopted an objective that concentrated solely on practicable ends 
to the exclusion of rhetorical ideals. Drafted by McCormack and 
Theodore, each plank dealt with conditions of work, refiecting a 
determined pragmatism which was to characterize the AWA and 
which was unusual at that time when many unions professed strongly 
Utopian aims.' 
McCormack was elected general secretary at a salary of £200 per 
annum to ensure that he was "beyond the reach of victimizing mine 
managers", as he had been forced to seek alternative employment 
at Nymbool in late 1908. The decision to have a full-time adminis-
trator was timely, as in October 1909 Theodore captured the seat 
of Woothakata, affording the AWA direct parliamentary representa-
tion. However, McCormack now shouldered both administrative and 
organizational responsibilities. 
Flushed with the success of a number of favourable strike 
settlements, McCormack devised plans to expand AWA activities 
into the sugar industry, only to find himself defeated in the annual 
ballot for general secretary, a defeat attributable to his abuse of 
members in the powerful O.K. branch for their inability to maintain 
solidarity in a recent dispute.*^ No doubt he was personally dis-
appointed; but the setback was temporary, as in May 1910 he 
was reappointed by the executive when the incumbent resigned. 
McCormack's defeat did not affect his prestige: on the contrary, at 
the 1910 Laibor-in-Politics Convention he was elected to the powerful 
CPE (Central Political Executive), although he was unable to attend 
a meeting until July 1912, twenty-six months later.' 
From his Chillagoe headquarters, McCormack championed 
amalgamation proposals to incorporate rural workers, miners, sugar 
workers, railway navvies, town labourers, and smelter hands into the 
AWA. In a series of pamphlets, he attacked the parochial interests 
and attitudes of craft unions, and expatiated upon the benefits of 
continuous membership and economy of administration and the 
industrial bargaining powers of a composite body. With the Western 
Workers Association and the Australian Sugar Workers Association 
pledging support, the ALF (Australian Labor Federation), the 
mainstay of Queensland unionism, sanctioned the scheme.' The 
amalgamation conference, held in Townsville in December 1910, 
proved a personal triumph for McCormack. The highly empirical 
structure closely resembled the methods adopted by the AWA's 
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founders under the original draft constitution. Further, the objectives 
refiected the same primary concern with conditions of work, but were 
much more sophisticated, and included a new emphasis on political 
action "to secure direct representation of Labour in Parliament".' 
As a fighting machine, the AWA soon proved its strength and 
efficiency. 
McCormack reasoned that an industrial confrontation was in-
evitable, and that "to justify ourselves" the new union should force 
one of its own design. The 1911 sugar-milling season would afford 
a suitable opportunity, as widespread dissatisfaction with working 
conditions in the mills and the fields prevailed.'" It was an ambitious 
project, for the union's experience in conducting strikes was confined 
to isolated disputes. Disrupting the sugar industry from Bundaberg 
to Mossman would require sustained co-ordination, but the stakes 
were correspondingly high: the leadership of the union movement 
outside the metropolitan area. 
The strike extended over three months, and the settlement terms 
on pay, hours, bonuses, and employment conditions remain a tribute 
to the ability and strength of the AWA officials. Soon after, a 
Commonwealth royal commission into the sugar industry acknowl-
edged that their demands had been justified." Clearly, McCormack 
was equal to the task of organizing and conducting successfully a 
strike of such magnitude; further, he revelled in his role as strike 
leader, despite the exhausting hours and demands made of him. 
However, his health was seriously impaired. Working late at night 
under a hurricane lamp damaged his eyesight, necessitating spec-
tacles, while physical strain had induced a coronary condition that 
was to recur several times during his public life. Following a month's 
recuperation, his appearance was noticeably changed. His strapping 
physique had given way to a paunch, probably from lack of manual 
work over the previous two years; a receding hairline, wire-framed 
spectacles, and the removal of his moustache had altered his facial 
appearance. Nevertheless his drive and capacity for hard work 
remained, now complemented by greater experience and con-
siderably increased infiuence as the undoubted leader of the AWA. 
With the union's annual conference scheduled for February 1912, 
McCormack steered clear of industrial trouble, but acknowledged 
that "we are not likely to have a great deal of peace in the future".'^ 
The observation was prophetic; within three weeks the state was 
thrown into industrial turmoil, ostensibly over a claim by Brisbane 
tramway employees for the right to wear union badges on duty. On 
29 January 1912 the ALF countered what was considered "an attack 
on unionism" with major strike action. For the AWA this decision 
caused considerable confusion: although its members were not even 
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indirectly affected, affiliation with the ALF created a moral 
obligation to support the strike. Further, McCormack realized that 
Brisbane delegates to the Townsville conference would press for 
AWA involvement, but wisely awaited developments in the south. 
The General Strike is probably best remembered for the police 
baton charge which dispersed strikers assembled in Albert Street 
on 2 February. Although both sides suffered only minor injuries, 
"Black Friday" was magnified in Labor Party and trade union circles 
to such a degree that when exaggerated reports of violence and police 
intimidation reached Townsville, together with a proclamation 
prohibiting assemblies, the AWA conference called out its members, 
and urged all unionists throughout the north to strike. As strike 
leader, McCormack scheduled protest rallies, culminating in a clash 
with police in Flinders Street. 
In Brisbane, the first signs of defeat were emerging; alarmed at 
the prospect that the AWA's standing might be damaged, Mc-
Cormack disbanded the northern strike. To disappointed militants 
he explained that it was easy to start a strike, but to conclude it 
demanded intelligence and courage—a stand clearly demonstrating 
his realistic approach to union action. Contemptuous of the Brisbane 
strike leaders, whose intransigence was leading the ALF to a 
humiliating and crushing defeat, McCormack scorned their plans 
for continued resistance. 1 n fact, he was considering the consequences 
for the union movement and the AWA's future: the ALF had 
demonstrated its obsolescence and inability to co-ordinate the strike. 
With a leadership vacuum now created, the moment was ripe for 
the AWA to make its bid for control of the direction of trade 
unionism within the state. McCormack's advocacy that industrial 
unionism, free of craft interests, was the only effective method of 
organization clearly gave new impetus to the amalgamation move-
ment. 
In union circles McCormack was at the height of his prestige, 
acknowledged as a shrewd, capable, and successful strike leader, 
always in command, and evincing "unquestionable ability and the 
necessary verve". Ernie Lane, an AWA official, relates an incident 
in Townsville which gives an insight into McCormack's character: 
"1 was with McCormack in the strike committee rooms the first 
morning of the strike. A man with bulging eyes rushed in exclaiming 
'Mac, three cabbies are out on the cab rank—what will we do?' 'Do?' 
replied McCormack. 'Why, upset the bastards, but, don't come and 
tell me you have done it.' "" Obviously McCormack realized that 
the strikers' imagination had been fired and that their enthusiasm 
needed an outlet. At this stage of McCormack's career his intimate 
involvement with the union movement gave him an intuitive under-
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standing of union sentiment that was a great source of strength and 
infiuence. After entering politics his contacts with unionists weak-
ened and he was to engage in bitter conflicts with them as Premier. 
Believing that parliamentary reform could achieve more for 
organized labour in the long run than industrial confrontation, 
McCormack successfully contested the seat of Cairns in April 1912. 
Apart from his intentions to champion the working-class cause, 
McCormack was, like Theodore, undeniably ambitious, and a 
parliamentary seat was a logical step from his position within the 
union movement. However, his election was no easy task. As an 
outsider, he had first to defeat three local nominees in a plebiscite. 
The incumbent, John Mann, a former Labor member with a sound 
record on local issues and an independence demonstrated by his 
willingness to vote with either party, had strong support within the 
Cairns Labor organization, whereas McCormack was known only 
for his militant union activities. After a sustained campaign based 
on street meetings and union rallies, McCormack gained the seat 
by a narrow majority of seventy votes. His campaign itinerary clearly 
shows his capacity for hard work: five days a week were spent 
electioneering in Cairns, and the weekend on union business in 
Townsville, with the commuting done on overnight coastal steamers. 
It might have been expected that his resignation as general 
secretary on 5 May 1912 would mark the termination of his AWA 
activities. On the contrary, he was selected as a delegate to the 
Sydney amalgamation conference which launched the present AWU 
(Australian Workers Union), for many years the largest union in 
Australian history. In pre-conference negotiations, McCormack had 
consistently argued that a multi-purpose non-craft structure would 
be a source of strength to the labor movement, and advanced a draft 
proposal prepared by Theodore and himself. Closely incorporating 
the features of the AWA, and concerned principally with financial 
arrangements, the scheme was referred to the membership of all 
unions attending the conference prior to a firm decision on 
amalgamation in January 1913.'" 
Rank and file support for amalgamation was overwhelming but, 
in order to secure agreement, the 1913 conference had to make 
concessions on points of organization that had previously proved 
stumbling-blocks. Thus Queensland inherited the centralized AWA 
framework, but other states retained the looser AWU organization 
with its large measure of local autonomy. Nevertheless the agree-
ment was a clear-cut victory for McCormack and Theodore, whose 
efforts were acknowledged at an AWA conference soon after. 
With his health again imparled by over-work, McCormack de-
clined office in the AWU, although in 1914 he served as a vice-
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president, a far from demanding position, but one which afforded 
the AWU the benefits of his experience, and which assured 
McCormack of AWU support in Labor Party affairs. His reluctance 
to accept responsible office probably refiected a realization that one 
stage of his career was closing and that, as a politician, his future 
was concerned almost exclusively with the Labor Party. 
In parliament McCormack soon made his mark; from the outset 
he was regarded as a leading spokesman on industrial matters. His 
presentation was clear and concise, and the logical development of 
his argument confirmed his oratorical skills. However, it was his 
handling of the Industrial Peace Bill in 1912 that made his 
parliamentary reputation and gained the approbation of his col-
leagues. He did not confine his opposition to the Bill to parliament: 
using forums convened by the unions, he campaigned intensively, 
advocating additional provisions for arbitration and conciliation. 
McCormack's emphasis on arbitration seemed to be in confiict 
with his recent activities in the AWA. As general secretary he had 
stated that arbitration "was not entirely great", and had often 
sanctioned direct action. But even at the June 1912 AWA-AWU 
conference he had acknowledged the value of arbitration in industrial 
relations: at worst it gave workers an opportunity to air their 
grievances with comparative impunity. His assertion in debate on 
the Industrial Peace Bill that "no arbitration court in Australia up 
to the present has been a success" was criticism directed not at the 
principles of arbitration, but at features of Queensland legislation. 
Many of the shortcomings were remedied in the Labor Government's 
Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916, which provided for the regis-
tration of industrial unions with the court, and amalgamation by 
agreement.'" Thereafter McCormack became increasingly a staunch 
supporter of arbitration, contemptuous of militant unionists harass-
ing the Labor Government. 
He was maturing politically, finding that his aggressive and not 
too fastidious methods, successfully employed within the AWA, were 
not applicable to the parliamentary process. However, his health had 
deteriorated again, and in 1913 he undertook a sea voyage to New 
Zealand and Canada on medical advice. On his return, McCormack 
once again impressed political observers with his forceful and cogent 
denunciations of the Government's record. Sugar industry matters 
were his strong point: speaking on the Address-in-Reply, he called 
for increased government participation to secure a system relating 
cane prices to the raw sugar price, the passage of anti-monopoly 
laws to curb the powers of the Colonial Sugar Refining Company, 
and a fair system of wage determination." Tom O'Sullivan, then 
Attorney-General, later praised his speech as "the best on the other 
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side", attributable to his long experience in the AWA." 
During 1914 McCormack noticeably devoted more time to 
constituency matters, as an election was scheduled for May 1915. 
He was convinced that Labor could win, and at the July 1914 CPE 
meeting successfully pressed for creation of a campaign committee 
to concentrate on marginal seats." The 1915 Labor victory was a 
triumph: there was the added satisfaction of an increased majority 
of nearly 1600 votes in his own seat of Cairns. 
To the dismay of his admirers, McCormack was not successful 
in the party's ballot for the Ministry, but was elected as the Labor 
nominee for Speaker on the casting vote of T.J. Ryan {see Ch. 10). 
It hardly seemed a prize for a man of his standing indeed, Bernays 
described it as a "relegation"," as he had served as party whip in 
1912, and on the parliamentary executive in 1913 and 1914, in 
addition to his contribution as Campaign Committee Chairman. Far 
from being past his prime, he was only thirty-six years of age; no 
mere organizer, his "natural ability" was acknowledged by oppo-
nents, who greatly respected his debating prowess. Clearly, caucus 
preferred parliamentary experience to ability and the Ministry was 
to contain some mediocrities. True, McCormack would have found 
it difficult to muster numbers in 1915.^ ° Murphy has argued that 
Ryan manoeuvred McCormack into the Speakership to forestall 
having him enter Cabinet on Bowman's retirement, but without 
leaving him to act as a centre of disaffection among Labor 
backbenchers.^' While he could not avoid facing McCormack at 
caucus meetings, which the latter regularly attended as Speaker and 
at which he proved troublesome," Ryan did gain a powerful prop 
to the Ministry in the conduct of parliamentary business. 
It was common knowledge that McCormack had not been awarded 
the Speakership by general acclaim, a fact which the Opposition 
tried to utilize to harass the new Government. McCormack was 
nominated in the Legislative Assembly in conventional speeches 
which extolled his personal attributes and qualifications for office; 
but the Opposition leader, in a vain attempt to divide government 
members' loyalties, nominated John Huxham, McCormack's oppo-
nent in the party room. Huxham declined the nomination and, there 
being only one nominee, Ryan, without taking a vote, led Mc-
Cormack to the Speaker's chair." 
From the outset McCormack followed the pattern of earlier 
Queensland Speakers and ignored the British convention that the 
Speaker remain impartial and above party politics; significantly, he 
maintained his strong links with the party machine, serving on the 
CPE and as a delegate to Labor conferences. Clearly, his fight to 
secure the direct representation of affiliated unions within the party 
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Structure refiected his determination not to be shackled by the 
Speaker's office. McCormack had consistently pressed for direct 
union representation at the Labor-in-Politics conventions and on the 
CPE, as unions provided the bulk of party funds. He had the support 
of Theodore and Harry Coyne the former ALF president who, like 
McCormack, made no secret of their desire to consolidate AWU 
authority within the Labor Party. When the 1916 Labor-in-Politics 
Convention debated the party's constitution and rules, McCormack 
claimed that the convention "was not representative of the member-
ship of the political organizations", as "the industrial section was 
the foundation of the movement" and proposed representation of 
unions under a formula on current membership. The question was 
referred to a sub-committee with McCormack as chairman, the 
report of which was carried without amendment.^" The resultant 
reorganization of the party structure closely aligned the political 
wing with the unions and also provided for the AWU, by weight 
of numbers, to exert considerable infiuence within the machine. 
Despite McCormack's contribution at the convention, he was 
unsuccessful in the CPE ballot: it was to be the only break in twenty 
years as a delegate. 
Conscription was a burning issue in 1916-17, and for his part 
McCormack was at the front of the anti-conscription campaign. In 
caucus he urged strong opposition to the referendum proposals on 
conscription and, with Theodore, John Fihelly, and James Stopford, 
was elected to a "No Vote" campaign committee. This committee 
was enlarged following the CPE's adoption of an AWU recommen-
dation that the caucus committee combine with representatives from 
the CPE, the AWU, and the Brisbane Industrial Council to mount 
a state-wide campaign." To this new role McCormack brought the 
energy and drive which he had demonstrated in the 1911 and 1912 
strikes and the 1915 election campaign, disdaining the Speaker's 
traditional role of avoidance of political controversy. His actions, 
including leaving parliament during debates to address anti-conscrip-
tion rallies, were questioned by the Opposition, but predictably 
McCormack ruled such questions out of order. 
Notwithstanding the failure of the conscription proposals in 1916, 
Queensand politicians were required to mount a mighty effort to 
defeat a second referendum in 1917 in the face of severe censorship 
regulations. Anti-conscription speeches were censored and distorted 
in the newspapers, but under the War Precautions Regulations the 
press was forbidden to disclose such instances. McCormack was 
instrumental in making public censored reports of speeches delivered 
at the opening of the anti-conscription campaign in November 1917: 
it was a shrewd manoeuvre that altered the course of the campaign. 
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In caucus he suggested distributing copies of the speeches through 
Hansard, to highlight sections which had been censored.^' According 
to plan, Ryan and Theodore read the censored speeches to the 
parliament, and a special Hansard, No. 37, was printed in which 
censored passages appeared in heavy type; as Speaker, McCormack 
was responsible for the content of Hansard, and devised the heavy 
type format despite the Government Printer's protestations. Even 
Ryan had no knowledge of the tactics to expose the censor's omissions 
in this manner: it was the work of McCormack, Theodore, and 
Fihelly. These incidents probably contributed significantly to the 
defeat of the second referendum and in his account of the campaign, 
H.V. Evatt singled out Ryan, Theodore, McCormack, and William 
Forgan Smith {see Ch. 14) for special mention." 
Despite McCormack's prestige within the party, he clashed with 
militant unions on two important questions: arbitration and com-
pulsory military training. In July 1917, relations between the 
Government and striking unionists in Townsville were seriously 
strained over the Arbitration Court's rejection of retrospective pay 
claims. The situation called for tact and discretion, but for his part 
McCormack advocated no compromise and firm government inter-
vention, a stance foreshadowing the bitter confrontation which 
he was to provoke ten years later. In caucus he condemned the strike, 
and called on the party room to support a strong line in upholding 
principles of industrial arbitration. Had Cabinet adopted this course, 
it might have precipitated a state-wide dispute; but Ryan and 
Theodore were able to induce the collapse of the strike after first 
calHng a trade union congress to endorse a dismissal ultimatum.^* 
From this time onwards McCormack displayed a marked intolerance 
of militant union action. This seems to have resulted in part from 
a genuine commitment to the arbitration procedures of the Act of 
1916 and in part from his appreciation of the damage done to a 
Labor government's electoral standing by strikes. Perhaps he rea-
soned that support for resolute action would outweigh any loss of 
goodwill on the part of sections of the industrial movement. 
The second clash with the militants occurred following the 1918 
Federal ALP Conference in Perth. The Labor-in-Politics Convention 
in January 1918 had called for the repeal of the clauses of the 
Defence Act on compulsory military training. McCormack and other 
politicians had opposed repeal on the grounds that military service 
constituted an essential security investment." As one of the 
Queensland delegates to Perth, McCormack was expected to support 
the repeal motion, but both he and Fihelly defied convention 
instructions and opposed it, while Ryan was conveniently absent on 
the vote. Two months later, sections within the CPE attempted to 
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censure the "rebels" but failed; exercising his casting vote, William 
Demaine declared the censure motion lost.™ Significantly, the real 
issue at stake in the censure motion was the intention of militant 
union officials to impose restraints on politicians at the CPE level, 
the failure of which gave rise to increasing disharmony within the 
party. 
As Speaker, McCormack controlled the Legislative Assembly with 
a firm hand; he was intolerant with facetious questions, and strict 
in enforcing the provisions of standing orders on interjections and 
refiections on a member. Never once was his ruling challenged. 
While acknowledging his "application", "ability", and "natural 
gifts", the Opposition justly criticized his partisanship." Although 
his immediate predecessor had departed from the convention of 
impartiality, McCormack carried the process much further, and 
often blatantly prejudiced the conduct of debate, an example which 
has been followed by subsequent Speakers to the present day. There 
were many instances of McCormack passing notes to Ministers 
prompting them to take advantage of the Opposition, and of his 
arbitrarily invoking standing orders to deter sustained attacks on the 
Government. 
It is difficult to attribute any positive effect upon McCormack's 
career to the interlude as Speaker. Possibly he gained a greater 
mastery of procedure than he could have acquired either as a 
Minister or as a backbencher. More probably he was able to mature 
politically and curb his impetuosity, thus becoming more acceptable 
to that section of the party with no trade union background. 
Significantly, by retaining his connections with the party machine, 
he was able to enhance his personal infiuence by his actions and 
party service. 
By 1918 McCormack was anxious to divest himself of the 
Speakership. He lacked legal training and reverence for parlia-
mentary tradition, and he clearly desired a more active political role 
where he could use his organizational talents and experience. As 
Bernays commented in 1931: "[McCormack] was not happy [as 
Speaker], for, as he expressed it himself 'there was nothing in it'. 
Possibly he meant there was no scope in it... [He] was only a success 
so far as firmness was concerned. He was not a student of procedure 
and precedent, and like other labour Speakers had an easy job on 
account of the huge Government majority."" 
McCormack was not well disposed towards Ryan, whose vote had 
secured the position for him, as Huxham, his rival for the Speaker-
ship, had been elected to the Ministry less than two months after 
bemg defeated in the caucus ballot. Further, Fihelly Coyne Alf 
Jones, and William Gillies {see Appendix) had all been promoted 
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to the Ministry while he languished in the Speakership. By nomi-
nafing for the federal seat of Herbert in 1919 he proclaimed his 
discontent, and also pressured the party to consider seriously his 
position. 
Undoubtedly the Cabinet reshuffle in September 1919, in which 
McCormack was elevated to the position of Home Secretary, and 
the moves which ended in Ryan's resignation and entry to federal 
politics were planned in advance to avert possible disruption of the 
state parliamentary party. McCormack was now in a very powerful 
position; not only did the AWU have an increasing influence within 
the Cabinet, but also the QCE (Queensland Central Executive) now 
comprised a majority of supporters of Theodore and McCormack. 
Undoubtedly, his friendship with Theodore, added to his natural 
ability and acquired political skills, not only assured his rapid 
promotion in Cabinet but also marked him as a future leadership 
contender. 
McCormack served in the Theodore Ministry as Home Secretary 
until 2 July 1923, and thereafter as Secretary for Public Lands. As 
Home Secretary he did not achieve any marked parliamentary 
success: of the nine Bills for which he was responsible, six were 
amendments to existing laws; they did not provide for radical reforms 
in specific areas, merely implementing aspects of the party's platform 
resolved at conventions." This was partly the result of the nature 
of the office, which was responsible for a wide range of activities 
administratively onerous but rarely becoming politically important, 
except when large-scale strikes involved the Home Secretary. His 
duties encompassed police. Aboriginal affairs, public health, hospi-
tals, charitable institutions, asylums, prisons, orphanages, and other 
areas such as fire brigades, liquor licensing, and prickly pear 
eradication. There is no suggestion that he was other than efficient 
in his administrative duties, but these naturally attracted little public 
attention. There were other reasons for a lacklustre performance: 
the Government's financial difficulties had imposed restraints on 
departmental expenditure, and further, McCormack's ill health 
occurred again in 1920 and 1922, necessitating his absence from 
pariiament on 46 of the 126 sitting days. 
In contrast to his term as Home Secretary, McCormack, as Public 
Lands Secretary from 2 July 1923 to 22 October 1925, was 
responsible for nineteen Bills over the three sessions of parliament. 
Some Bills won him commendation from the Opposition: the Land 
Acts Amendment Bill allowed leaseholders to apply to the Land Court 
for rent review after a fall in the cattle export market; the Closer 
Settlements Act Amendment Bill, permitting the Crown to rescind 
freehold resumptions after the Land Court had determined com-
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pensation, embodied a scheme for expanding wheat-growing in the 
Maranoa and Goondiwindi areas; the Upper Burnett and Callide 
Land Settlement Bill introduced a new method of group selection 
for mixed agriculture and grazing formerly precluded by the Land 
Act; and the Sugar Workers' Perpetual Lease Selections Bill allowed 
sugar workers to secure small holdings to work during the slack 
season. The measures refiected the importance that Labor attached 
to rural development, and its constant endeavour to champion the 
cause of the small farmer. Despite the political overtones of the 
measures, it was the clarity and thoroughness of their presentation 
by McCormack that impressed the Opposition. 
On the other hand, many of the Bills were only of administrative 
importance and attracted merely routine attention. Only the Land 
Acts Amendment Bill of 1924 drew strong criticism, despite 
McCormack's insistence that it was not controversial. It gave 
absolute discretionary powers to the Minister in cases of transfers 
of selections, and imposed restrictions on land-holdings and mort-
gage. The Opposition felt strongly about government interference 
in land usage, but McCormack, always the strong party man, was 
unmoved. 
The term as Public Lands Secretary illustrated McCormack's 
administrative qualities and he endeavoured "to bring all matters 
that urgently belong[ed] to the Lands Department under it"." In 
fact, his reorganization, wresting control of leasing from the 
Treasury and Mines Department, was applauded by a majority of 
both political parties. McCormack not only appeared in complete 
control of departmental affairs, but also displayed in parliament 
authority and a strong working knowledge of every aspect of land 
administration and policy. Apart from the duties of his portfolio, 
he assumed added prominence as the spokesman on financial matters 
in Theodore's absence. As a member of Cabinet serving on the QCE, 
and as a friend and staunch ally of Theodore, McCormack gained 
a reputation as the Government's ablest defender, bringing to its 
case a deal of energy and time, and the doggedness and strength 
of character for which he was widely respected. 
During 1921 militant union leaders from the ARU (Australian 
Railways Unions) and, to a lesser extent, from the Waterside 
Workers Federation, Australasian Meat Industry Employees Union, 
and the metal trades unions, publicly embarrassed the Government 
on two counts. In October the "socialization objective" was adopted 
at the ALP Federal Conference in Brisbane by 22 votes to 10. The 
New South Wales delegates, Blackburn from Victoria, and 
McDonald, Theodore, and McCormack from Queensland, all op-
posed the motion which had originated in an all-Australian Trade 
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Union Congress four months earlier. McCormack and Theodore, 
claiming a realistic appreciation of the natural timidity and con-
servatism of electors, held that the objective "was saturated with 
ideals and dogmas that did not belong to Australia". Not only did 
their stand reaffirm their political pragmatism, but also it fore-
shadowed a clash with some militant union leaders who were openly 
critical. Secondly, in November 1921, the ARU delegates to the QCE 
successfully moved a motion condemning Cabinet for continuing 
retrenchments in the public service," despite the appeals of Mc-
Cormack and others. This was to prove the first shot in the militants' 
running battle with the Labor Government. 
The Government was struggling to maintain its majority. When 
Jens Peterson crossed the fioor in September 1921, Labor was left 
with a working majority of only one; the Opposition thereafter 
refused pairs. The Government was defeated during a division on 
the Agricultural Amendment Bill on 1 August 1922, as McCormack 
had been hospitalized and Dave Gledson confined to bed with 
influenza. To enable the Government to survive further divisions on 
the casting vote of the Chairman of Committees, Theodore ordered 
that Gledson be carried into the chamber on a stretcher. The 
following day, a want-of-confidence motion coincided with the 
disclosure of the attempted bribing of a Labor member, Frank 
Brennan, to vote for the motion. Although two journalists were 
convicted of attempting bribery and gaoled, the instigators of the 
plot were never discovered." The Opposition was temporarily 
discredited, and Theodore guillotined through the parliament a 
constitutional amendment providing for proxy voting. Brennan, who 
had been singled out because of his criticism of the party leadership 
in caucus, emerged a hero in the eyes of Labor supporters. Little 
did McCormack realize that the bribery incident would influence 
his political future: hospitalized for six months, he was unable to 
appreciate the emotional reaction within the caucus—a major factor 
in determining Theodore's successor. 
By early 1923 McCormack was involved in the conflict between 
Cabinet and the militant union leaders. At the Labor-in-Politics 
Conventipn at Emu Park, near Rockhampton, he led the arbitration-
supporting forces against an attack by the militants that challenged 
an ideological commitment sacrosanct to most Labor politicians. 
Claiming that direct action was no longer effective and that 
arbitration was the best available method, McCormack assured 
delegates that the workers had obtained significant material ends 
under Labor's arbitration system. This stance not only revealed a 
greater appreciation of constitutional government, but also reaf-
firmed his consistent advocacy of socialism through political reform. 
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Defeated on the arbitration plank, the militants moved for 
restoration of the basic wage cuts, to which Theodore countered that 
the Government would be obliged to exceed its brief and usurp the 
functions of the Arbitration Court. It was soon evident that the 
militants had mustered new numbers, many of whom had previously 
sided with Theodore and McCormack on the arbitration plank. 
Rallying to Theodore's defence, McCormack, by clever use of 
statistics, claimed that wage reductions had not eroded "effective 
wages". More important, he attacked the militants for misleading 
propaganda, openly demonstrating his personal animosity for George 
Rymer and Tim Moroney of the ARU." The motion was defeated 
by the narrowest of margins in an unconvincing victory for Cabinet's 
supporters, clearly foreshadowing an intensification of the struggle 
between Cabinet and the militants. 
McCormack's hostility towards the militants was not newly 
acquired. At QCE meetings he had often clashed with Rymer and 
Moroney over the militants' public criticism of the Government and, 
according to Rymer, at least one meeting was broken up by Theodore 
threatening Rymer with a chair.^' So complete was their determina-
tion to dominate the QCE that the militants' apologist. Lane, was 
reduced not merely to apologizing for their want of success, but to 
extolling their courage and persistence in venturing upon opposition 
to Theodore and McCormack." 
McCormack's promotion to Public Lands Secretary occurred soon 
after the Emu Park convention. It was a shrewd move by Theodore, 
as the deteriorating financial position required substantial overseas 
loans to offset a budgetary crisis: the Lands Minister would be a 
key figure in any rapprochement with the London financiers, and 
in McCormack he had not only a trusted friend but a man with 
extraordinary political astuteness and the necessary debating capaci-
ty and persuasiveness to answer the critics in Queensland. While 
Gillies was deputy leader in title, it was obvious that McCormack 
was Theodore's right-hand man. 
When Theodore announced from London in April 1924 that the 
financial boycott had been resolved by assurances that rents on the 
unexpired terms of pastoral leases would be stabilized, and by 
promises of pastoral development in north Queensland, in return for 
the conversion of maturing loans and the underwriting of a new £9 
million loan over five years, there arose the charge of capitulation 
to the London pastoral lobbies. Fihelly, Agent-General in London 
since 1922, resigned in protest, adding credibility to such charges. 
Cabinet endorsed Theodore's actions, but caucus remained wary 
until McCormack rallied backbenchers, and in a public statement 
argued that the concessions and proposed rent stability meant little 
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change in the Government's revenue from the pastoralists."" Further, 
in his May Day address, responding to criticism that Theodore had 
reversed Labor's previous stand, he candidly admitted that the 
London loan arrangements represented a compromise of principle, 
but a necessary one in the present economic circumstances. 
McCormack's strongest defence of the loan arrangements was in 
the parliament on 7 August 1924. He assailed members for not facing 
the realities of the boycott: the settlement was the responsibility of 
the Cabinet and ultimately the Government, and was necessary to 
overcome unemployment and economic hardships. Queensland 
should not be forced to repudiate its debts, he argued, even though 
there were the inevitable charges of surrender and compromise. 
McCormack, outlining the structure of pastoral rents, maintained 
that any loss in revenue due to rent stabilization was purely 
hypothetical; more important was the saving in interest from 
borrowing in London instead of New York.*' His speech reflected 
a sound understanding of the state's financial difficulties, and was 
marked by a consistently practical approach to the loan problem. 
Moreover, he was frank, wisely admitting that the Government had 
been forced to yield on one point of principle, in contrast to the 
attempts of other speakers to cloud the issue in rhetoric. 
Theodore stepped down in February 1925, and when caucus met 
to elect a new leader, it was widely recognized that only two members 
had any chance: McCormack and Gillies. The stronger personality 
and abler of the two, McCormack had been rallying support for 
several weeks and was outwardly confident of success. Gillies, 
generally recognized as a tireless worker but not as strong-willed 
as McCormack, had the advantage of being deputy leader, and of 
having acted as Premier in Theodore's absence. Significantly, 
Brennan, now Secretary for Public Instruction, had canvassed both 
McCormack and Gillies on a Supreme Court vacancy to which he 
aspired. As Bernays recalled: "McCormack openly opposed him for 
the Judgeship, and hence Brennan, both surreptitiously and openly, 
opposed McCormack for the Leadership.""^ On the first ballot, 
neither received a majority; the other contenders, including Forgan 
Smith, withdrew, whereupon Gillies was elected 22 votes to 21, with 
the support of Brennan—who then received his judicial 
appointment." It was frankly a reward for the party loyalty Brennan 
had displayed in the bribery affair, a reward fairly earned according 
to what was becoming the prevailing morality of the Labor Govern-
ment. Theodore's open support was a liability to McCormack in some 
quarters: backbenchers with militant affiliations, such as Charles 
Collins, David Weir, and Myles Ferricks, considered Gillies more 
manageable than McCormack. Thus he had to be content with the 
deputy leadership, although it proved only temporary. 
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From the outset, the Gillies Administration was confronted with 
industrial unrest on the basic wage issue. In March 1925 Mc-
Cormack addressed Trades Hall leaders on the Government's 
priorities, but instead of allaying criticisms of Cabinet, he provoked 
a reprimand for his anti-working class conduct in opposing basic 
wage increases. The reaction of the delegates indicated that the 
Government was heading for an industrial confrontation and there-
after, McCormack wisely steered clear of the basic wage question, 
fully aware that no mileage could be gained from it. 
The trouble erupted in August 1925, when the railway unions went 
on strike following the Commissioner's opposition to a wage increase 
and his locking-out of men at the Ipswich workshops after a stop-
work meeting." Developments occurred with alarming rapidity, and 
it was not until the strike was settled that the sequence of events 
became clear. The strike lasted six days, and finally the Government 
agreed to restore the wage cuts by legislation. As early as 1923 
McCormack had opposed such a move and, recognizing that the 
settlement constituted a complete capitulation on Gillies's part, 
abstained from defending him in a no-confidence debate on 9 
September 1925. For the Government, the strike was very damaging. 
Gillies had displayed a serious lack of leadership; the Arbitration 
Court had been bypassed after the Government had proclaimed its 
central importance; and the demands of the strikers had been acceded 
to, despite the economic ramifications. In retrospect, the strike 
marked the peak not only of the railway unions' influence in politics, 
but also of the ARU leaders' prestige in trade union matters. 
The Government not only honoured the strike settlement but went 
further by amending the Industrial Arbitration Act to appoint 
laymen to a Board of Trade and Arbitration. The amendment seemed 
relatively unimportant until 22 October, the day after the Bill 
became law, when it was revealed that Gillies had resigned to fill 
one lay position on the board. For Gillies it was a happy escape from 
an office which had brought him eight months of embarrassment 
and anxiety, and a continuous barrage of criticism which he found 
difficult to endure; for the party, it was a welcome relief. The 
qualities which had won Gillies the leadership—his personal kind-
ness, his freedom from spleen, his ability to co-operate with all 
factions—did not fit him for the position with credit to himself or 
advantage to the party at that difficult period of industrial unrest. 
At a special caucus meeting, the forty-seven-year-old McCormack 
was elected leader. 
McCormack seemed the man for the job. Widely respected for 
his ability, he had also displayed a firm hand in his past dealings 
with the militants. He succeeded to a much-troubled inheritance: 
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financial difficulties were pressing, and the militants were exultant 
after the basic wage victory. Although these matters were separate 
and distinct, they were connected in important respects, as any 
resolute action to bring government expenditure under control was 
certain to provoke reaction among militant unions, whereas any 
concessions to the unions would aggravate financial problems. 
Realizing the electoral liability of the issues, McCormack was 
determined to assert strong leadership from the outset. He lost no 
time in disclosing his tactics: he intended to enforce the anti-
communist pledge drawn up by the QCE despite militant objections. 
Already he had scored a victory over the ARU leaders during the 
Port Hardy dispute,"^ drawing praise from the conservative Brisbane 
Courier on 4 November as a man "who cannot be so easily swayed 
by bluff and bluster", but condemnation from the Trades and Labor 
Council for his "anti-working class attitude"."' 
On 27 November 1925 McCormack engineered the exclusion of 
Rymer and Moroney from the QCE for failing to sign the anti-
communist pledge. With the full backing of the ARU, Rymer and 
Moroney appealed to the Labor-in-Politics Convention in February 
1926, having first signed the pledge under protest. At the convention 
McCormack tackled them front on, eager to settle old scores: he 
challenged the credentials of the ARU delegation, arguing that the 
signing of the pledge under protest contravened party rules, and by 
weight of numbers carried a motion for their expulsion. It was a 
skilful manoeuvre which demonstrated decisively the ascendancy of 
his supporters,"' but it fell short of its objective of crushing the ARU's 
influence and opposition of his government. The rigidity and 
ruthlessness with which he had cynically exploited this ideological 
issue for narrow sectional and personal advantage rebounded on him, 
and brought his government into open conflict with the militant 
unions, a number of which disaffiliated from the ALP."' 
While the ARU and other militant groups were reassessing their 
position, McCormack focused full attention on the 1926 state 
elections. Opening the campaign in Cairns, he outlined a costly but 
attractive programme, concentrating on social welfare, rural reform, 
and state development, much of which was never implemented. 
Significantly, he promised to be firm with the militants, and "allow 
no one to take the business of the State out of my hands"."' 
His policy speech reflected his understanding of the practicalities 
of electioneering: he oriented his programme towards sectional 
interests, particularly those of trade unionists, with promises of child 
endownment, and small farmers, with promises of substantial 
government assistance. Moreover he was able to secure Theodore 
as campaign director, and wisely mounted an unprecedented public-
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ity campaign stressing the energy and successful programmes of 
previous Labor administrations. The Government was returned for 
a fifth term, retaining its 1923 majority of fourteen; in Cairns, 
McCormack was elected with a record majority, attributable to his 
increased prestige as Premier. Characteristically, the Worker hailed 
the Labor victory and praised the personal contributions of Mc-
Cormack and Theodore. 
The 1926-27 budget demonstrated McCormack's realistic ap-
proach to the state's financial difficulties. Queensland was stricken 
by drought, which was to seriously affect primary production for 
two years. The deficit on the consolidated revenue fund was the 
largest in the state's history and, with accumulated deficits, 
amounted to nearly £1.5 million. McCormack had three choices in 
dealing with the accumulated deficit: to add the amount to the 
funded debt and raise a loan to cover it; to issue treasury bills; or 
to allow the overdraft to remain and reduce it as the buoyancy of 
revenue permitted. By declaring for the last method, McCormack 
foreshadowed stringent economies. With the trust fund and loan fund 
no better off, he pledged that State enterprises not operating 
profitably would be closed down.^ ° This was a bold move, but the 
Government could ill afford the financial and political liability of 
enterprises with huge accumulated losses. McCormack himself had 
been a strong advocate of State enterprise, and he could claim that 
the principle was not being abandoned: many ventures had been very 
successful, but the cattle stations, smelters, and cannery had proven 
very costly. 
Consequent to the budget, McCormack introduced four taxation 
measures which passed without amendment.*' There was a Common-
wealth and State (War Service Settlers) Ratification Bill 
formalizing financial arrangements for soldier settlement; and a £9 
million Loan Bill for developmental projects. On all occasions he 
was frank in discussing the financial difficulties, but readily defended 
Labor's past achievements. He often relied heavily on comparative 
statistics to show that the increase per capita in loan indebtedness 
had been smaller in Queensland than in other states under non-Labor 
administrations. This was an effective debating point, but 
McCormack's use of statistics does not stand close security. Direct 
comparisons of expenditure, borrowings, and indebtedness are dif-
ficult, as functions which in one state are assumed by the Govern-
ment are in another relegated to local authorities. Moreover, even 
in times of stringency, some forms of expenditure may be productive 
and justifiable; in such cases retrenchment may be unwise even under 
narrow economic criteria. The frequent transfer of amounts from 
one fund to another, which regularly occurred under Theodore and 
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McCormack, often precludes accurate comparisons. Notwithstand-
ing, McCormack argued from a position of strength, as no one in 
the Opposition or his own party demonstrated an equally thorough 
and detailed command of finance. However, in legislation the session 
was very low-keyed; the bulk of the Bills introduced represented 
amendments of an administrative nature to existing Acts. 
Probably the most significant issue for its long-term repercussions 
on McCormack's career was the allegation of malpractice at the 
Chillagoe State undertaking, and the call by Arthur Moore {see Ch. 
13), the Country Party leader of the Opposition, for a royal 
commission. The Government had purchased the Chillagoe smelters 
and railway in 1918 and, two years later, had acquired and begun 
operating the Mungana mines to ensure continuity of ore supply. 
The venture had incurred losses annually since 1920, but this was 
attributed mainly to adverse market conditions, and justified as 
providing employment for a substantial population of miners. Moore 
alleged grave irregularities in management, and listed a number of 
charges." McCormack was personally affected by the attack as the 
registered shareholder of a small parcel in Mungana Mines Limited, 
from whom the Government had purchased the mines. He denounced 
Moore's allegations as a poor attempt to make political capital, but 
agreed that the charges should be investigated, not by a royal 
commission, but by the Auditor-General. For the time being a crisis 
had been averted; a cloud of suspicion prevailed, however, because 
prior to the 1926 elections McCormack had taken out a writ on the 
Telegraph, which had questioned the propriety of his shareholdings." 
By February 1927 McCormack appeared in complete control: the 
Government's parliamentary performance had been convincing; 
militant union activity had not precipitated industrial dislocation; 
and there were signs of renewed economic confidence. At a dinner 
prior to his departure for London to negotiate new loans, he was 
praised for his strong but even-handed approach to public affairs, 
and for his contribution to the Labor movement. McCormack in 
reply showed no signs of excessive complacency. He expressed 
concern about militant activity in his absence, and warned that 
Labor's unity and discipline must be safeguarded from the revolu-
tionary socialist influence of disruptors." The firm understanding 
of intra-party politics, which had underlined his polifical success, 
had not deserted him; he did not underestimate the guile of his 
militant opponents. And his reservations were well founded. On his 
return, he found the Government imperilled by the most serious 
industrial crisis of the inter-war years. 
With the ground cut from under militant union leaders by the 
anfi-communist pledge, and by the rallying of moderate unions, 
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particulariy the AWU, to McCormack's side, there were only two 
alternatives by which the militants' objectives of workers' control 
of industry could be attained: to realign with the ALP to fight for 
piecemeal implementation of their programme, or to adopt pre-
carious direct action methods to force further concessions from the 
Government. Probably it was the Government's opposition to a wage 
claim by railwaymen which influenced militant ARU officials to take 
the second course. Certainly, resentment ran deep. The Advocate, 
in bitterly denouncing McCormack's "sabotage of the Labor plat-
form", exclaimed, "Haste the day and may the Press-boomed arch 
traitor McCormack prove to be the last of his tribe"." Restlessness 
and discontent clearly foreshadowed another major confrontation 
between the Government and the militants,'* and ironically the 
pretext was provided by a dispute involving AWU members at the 
South Johnstone sugar mill. 
The dispute arose over a question of job preference. The Govern-
ment had handed the mill to a co-operative association to reduce 
its commitment to State enterprise; the new directors departed from 
longstanding practice by excluding from the labour lists a number 
of active unionists, who had worked the previous seasons. An 
industrial magistrate, and later the Board of Trade, upheld the 
employer's right to engage labour, but stipulated that former 
employees should be afforded preference. The strikers remained 
dissatisfied as there was no provision for dismissal of scab labour. 
Picket lines were drawn; additional police were assigned to South 
Johnstone; and the AWU executive endorsed the strike to restrain 
the militant local committee, although canefield workers were now 
involved." 
Tension mounted in early July when Jack Hynes, a mill picket, 
was fatally shot by an unknown assailant. A spate of bashings of 
new Australians and non-unionists followed and, afforded sensation-
al newspaper publicity, the strike captured state-wide attention. 
Farmers reaffirmed support for the mill management, announcing 
that they would resist "to the last bob and the last stick of Badilla"'*; 
while the Government continued to remain aloof, insisting that 
arbitration should prevail. But the action of the Innisfail Trades and 
Labor Council in declaring the mill black effectively widened the 
dispute and demonstrated the impotence of the AWU executive.*' 
A new stage in the strike followed a decision to remove sugar south 
as local storage facilities were exhausted. Regarded as a test 
consignment, the sugar, rejected by waterside workers at Mourilyan 
and Townsville, was hauled by ARU members, at the request of 
the AWU, as far as Bowen. AFULE (Australian Federated Union 
of Locomotive Enginemen) members retrieved the situation by 
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ferrying the consignment to Brisbane, thus avoiding a confrontation 
between the Government and the ARU, which the AWU feared at 
the outset. 
By 21 August 1927 it was evident that the strike would probably 
erupt into a major industrial dispute; the local strike committee had 
reaffirmed its black ban, and northern ARU members resolved not 
to handle further consignments. Thereafter the Railways Com-
missioner began systematically to suspend all railwaymen who 
contravened his instructions and the President of the Arbitration 
Court informed advocates for the railway unions that he would not 
hear a claim for award variation and would exclude the ARU from 
the court unless the black ban was lifted. 
The situation was extremely complex: the ARU insisted that its 
members should not scab, and was supported by the AFULE and 
other railway unions, angered by the court's heavy-handed attitude; 
while the AWU, having failed to give an early lead, responded by 
belatedly declaring the sugar black, which was misinterpreted as 
approval for the railway unions to become party to the dispute. The 
lines of demarcation were clearly drawn: the mill management, the 
farmers, the Australian Sugar Producers Association, and the anti-
Labor press were lined up against the local strikers, the AWU, the 
railway unions, the waterside workers, and various Trades and Labor 
Councils. Only the Government vacillated. 
On his return from London on 23 August, McCormack issued 
a Ministerial Statement endorsing the action of the Railways 
Commissioner, demonstrating that the grievances of the South 
Johnstone strikers were no longer the main issue. It was a question 
of the railway unions challenging the authority of the Government 
and the court.'" McCormack was openly condemned by the unions, 
but little did they anticipate his determination to reassert his 
authority. In an unprecedented move, on 29 August, he assumed 
personal control of the Railways Department, and dismissed all 
railwaymen in unions defying the Commissioner's instructions, 
subject to reinstatement on the signing of an undertaking to abide 
by the Commissioner's rulings." The lockout provoked an immediate 
storm of protest, as the ultimatum had been issued on the sole 
authority of Cabinet without reference to caucus or other Labor 
bodies. The Worker on 31 August predicted "the ultimate breaking 
up of the Labour Movement". 
For his part, McCormack now found himself in an unaccustomed 
position as head of an alliance comprising the Cabinet, the Opposi-
tion, the anti-Labor press, and most of the general public in defence 
of the Government's right to govern. The temporary nature of 
opposing forces was obvious; they could not hope to outlast the 
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situation that had called them into being. Labor backbenchers, 
campaigning to censure McCormack in caucus, were skilfully 
thwarted when he opened an adjournment debate in parliament to 
allow expressions of opinion before caucus met: in fact, only four 
backbenchers voted for the censure motion." Further, disunity in 
the union ranks, which McCormack no doubt had banked upon, soon 
threatened the solidarity of the railwaymen. Moderate unions, 
believing that the ARU was determined to bring down the Labor 
Government, sought an immediate settlement without victimization. 
Unexpectedly the Arbitration Court, which had seemed ineffec-
tive, determined the outcome: it offered final terms of settlement 
to the South Johnstone strikers and, following their rejection, issued 
an order giving the AWU twenty-four hours to accept the terms 
or face deregistration, cancellation of awards, and loss of preference. 
The AWU had little alternative, but was saved considerable embar-
rassment by the AFULE, which ordered its members back to work. 
McCormack now had the upper hand and, aware of the weakness 
of their position, the ARU and other executives terminated the 
lockout on 10 September. As for the South Johnstone strikers, 
abandoned by their supporters and disowned by the AWU executive, 
they were left little option but to capitulate. 
Although assailed as an "oppressor of the working-class", and a 
"tool of the Tory press", McCormack had clearly scored another 
impressive victory over the militants, but there was no removing the 
personal antagonism that he had created. The Advocate was 
particulariy bitter: "After such a Fool's display of statesmanship as 
crude as a bushman's swag ... McCormack's action has done more 
to teach the younger railway employees the abhorrence of scabbery 
than anything we know of ..."" While the unions should not have 
been surprised at McCormack's intervention in such a long and 
threatening dispute, the manner of his intervention was astounding 
for a Labor premier: he made no attempt to negotiate with the 
unions; indeed he ignored their existence, and dictated to the 
railwaymen directly. It was almost as if he deliberately set out to 
undermine unionism, and in an ostentatiously personal way. 
Anxious to reassert their political influence, the militants cam-
paigned to discredit McCormack, but with little effect, as they were 
impotent in the political machinery of the Labor Party, and showed 
little acumen in their dealings with the QCE. Far from attracting 
support, the militants' campaign antagonized many union sympa-
thizers, and merely reinforced their own isolation. Motions to expel 
McCormack, and to compel the Government to consult with the 
unions before referring disputes to the court, merely forced the AWU 
back to McCormack's side.'" Further, direct condemnation of 
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McCormack and the Government at the 1927 Trade Union Congress 
rallied the caucus behind its leader.'* A showdown at the 1928 Labor-
in-Politics Convention was inevitable, the outcome of which would 
have far-reaching electoral consequences: another defeat for the 
militants would strengthen the hand of the advocates of a separate 
Industrial Labour Party. 
The railway lockout overshadowed the 1927 session of parliament, 
which in terms of legislation threw up no controversies. McCormack 
produced the only important measure, the Commonwealth and State 
Financial Agreement Ratification Bill which, as he explained, placed 
financial relations on a new footing, substantially that continuing 
to the present, and gave the states a more assured income, although 
at the expense of making the Commonwealth the dominant financial 
power. Although it was merely a formal measure, McCormack was 
commended for his part in the negotiations, and for his "very lucid 
and very explicit" presentation of the Bill. Ironically, in view of the 
hard work and time he contributed to the new financial agreement, 
he was out of office when it came into effect. 
Predictably, financial considerations dominated the session. 
McCormack's efforts to impose restraints had achieved only 
marginal improvement, owing to drought and continued losses on 
State enterprises. The 1927-28 budget again cut expenditure, and 
was marked by a forceful reminder from McCormack that careful 
management was imperative, a point that partially offset the 
Opposition's attack on heavy taxation schedules. More damaging for 
McCormack was the Auditor-General's report on the Chillagoe-
Mungana undertaking, and a further call for a royal commission, 
which McCormack again resisted after promptly accepting the 
resignation of the general manager, Peter Goddard, and closing down 
the smelters. He was obviously vulnerable on the issue, considering 
his shareholdings and the fact that Chillagoe remained the most 
outstanding example extant of the failure to make good in State 
enterprises. 
By February 1928 the militants, prompted by Rymer, Moroney, 
and other union officials, had renewed their attack on McCormack 
with the specific aim of disrupting the Labor-in-Politics 
Convention." However, he was able to nullify many potentially 
explosive issues beforehand: he secured the adoption of a federal 
scheme of child endownment, and commenced unemployment relief 
programmes. When the convention assembled in May 1928, much 
of the post-lockout disenchantment had abated. Clearly, Mc-
Cormack again had the numbers, reflected in the voting for his 
nominee as chairman. Notwithstanding, there was no room for 
complacency, as the militants soon launched a number of pre-
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meditated attacks, the first of which concerned the Chillagoe venture 
and his shareholdings in Mungana mines. Claiming that the issue 
had been raised to smear his character, McCormack defended not 
only the Government's position, but his own. So convincing and 
forthright was his explanation that the matter was resolved in a vote 
of confidence carried unanimously with enthusiastic applause." 
Undeterred, his opponents moved to amend party rules in a 
number of directions: one motion called for the party to be opened 
to all industrial unionists; another sought, again, to exclude politi-
cians as convention delegates; and a third proposed censuring the 
QCE for its failure "to safeguard working-class principles when they 
were violated and challenged by the Premier and his Cabinet"— 
all of which failed. Finally, a motion to censure McCormack 
emerged, one to which he quickly responded to avoid a rift among 
the delegates. He claimed that the Government maintained neutral-
ity until the ARU attempted to usurp control of the 1927 dispute 
from the AWU, and argued that their dictatorial stance left Cabinet 
little alternative but to forsake loyalty to the unions to uphold the 
oath of office. Denying that it was "a question of getting square 
with Rymer and Moroney", McCormack warned that if the vote 
was carried. Labor would not survive an election." 
His defence reaffirmed his understanding of the character of 
Labor conventions: while the militants talked about union principles, 
McCormack concentrated on political realities. His prediction that 
the Government's future would be jeopardized was nothing short of 
a second ultimatum, which delegates accepted, unwilling to risk 
electoral defeat on an issue settled nine months beforehand. Clearly, 
McCormack had again won out over his critics and their efforts to 
reform the party on lines recommended by the 1927 Trade Union 
Congress. On the other hand the militants had failed in their 
challenge to his leadership, partly due to tactics, as their energies 
were concentrated into a personal campaign in which the struggle 
was a question of power and control, and not based on any practical 
programme of social and economic reform beyond what was already 
offered by the Government. 
McCormack entered the last session of parliament with renewed 
confidence, able to claim credit for substantial progress towards 
financial recovery, despite the drought and losses on the railways. 
The 1928-29 budget showed that his economies had checked at least 
temporarily the monotony of annual debit balances on consolidated 
revenue and trust funds. Further, he was able to announce that no 
supplementary loan estimates would be required. Predictably the 
budget was designed for electoral mileage, promising increased 
public expenditure, but at the same time it reflected the close scrutiny 
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to which McCormack had subjected state finances," making it very 
difficult for the Opposition to fault. Indeed, the uninspiring debate 
seemed to set the tone for the remainder of the session: only twenty-
three Bills, sixteen of which were amending legislation, were passed 
during the forty-six sitting days, the shortest session under a Labor 
government. McCormack was responsible for eight measures, none 
of which was significant and in fact no developmental projects or 
social reform programmes were authorized. 
Early in 1929 election preparations were finalised, but in contrast 
to 1926 when McCormack was outwardly confident of success, he 
had discerned a growing restlessness, according to Bernays: "Mc-
Cormack himself, before going into the country, professed little or 
no concern as to the result. They would come back, he said 'about 
the same'. He made a few short runs about, and coming back to 
Brisbane was encountered by Wright, late member for Bulimba, who 
remarked 'I say Mac, you and I seem to be the only two people 
who are not worrying.' 'By ' said McCormack, 'make no mistake 
I am worrying, if you are not.' "™ McCormack's policy speech was 
unappealing and negative in outlook: he cautiously called for a 
continuation of Labor's "constructive and humanitarian achieve-
ments", and apologetically attributed growing unemployment to 
drought. His social welfare, closer settlement, and developmental 
schemes all had the ring of hollow promise." In contrast, the 
Opposition campaign had been well organized and skilfully executed: 
it concentrated on unemployment relief, and employed slogans such 
as "Change the Government" and "Give the Boy a Chance" with 
outstanding success. The Government was portrayed as a tired and 
stale administration—tactics reminiscent of those employed by 
Labor in 1915. 
The McCormack Government was overwhelmingly defeated in a 
swing of 7.8 per cent from Labor, losing sixteen seats including those 
of the Speaker and two Ministers. Even in Cairns, McCormack 
experienced an 11 per cent swing against him, although still retaining 
his seat. He attributed the defeat to "a general desire for change", 
and "the attitude of certain industrial organizations".'' But his post-
mortem only scratched the surface. After fourteen years in office, 
Labor's programme had been fully implemented and even in some 
cases reversed, inevitably alienating many of its previous supporters." 
Secondly, there was a widespread belief that McCormack had 
sacrificed principle and ideals by abandoning State enterprise, by 
opposmg union wage claims, and by asserting that allegiance to the 
^u A? u ^ superseded allegiance to working-class interests. 
I hirdly, the Government had responsibly followed a cautious and 
restrictive financial policy, but the electorate "knew nothing and 
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cared not a damn about McCormack's ... 'Economics' ".'" Finally, 
notwithstanding the Opposition's campaign, reasons more personal 
to McCormack contributed to the scale of the defeat. In general, 
he had ridden roughshod over his opponents, for which he not only 
won the enmity of a well-organized militant minority, but also gave 
good reason for disquiet among others who were not ready to 
challenge him openly. One of the great temptations to which a Labor 
leader is liable is that of attaching more importance to the applause 
of his opponents than to the criticism of his own supporters, and 
McCormack was far from being immune. 
McCormack was not a popular premier: indeed, within his own 
party, it is doubtful if any other leader remained as unpopular. He 
assumed the leadership in a troubled period and, determined not to 
be compromised like Gillies, set out to crush militant pressures on 
the Government, for which he was labelled "a tin-pot Mussolini" 
and "a fitting defender of capitalist interests"." While his actions 
can be defended in the circumstances, they were bound to alienate 
sections of his party and clearly his campaign against prominent 
militants was highly personal, one which left Labor in bad shape. 
McCormack remained an admirer of Theodore and in many ways 
followed his example, although with less subtlety and acumen. In 
1924 he had praised Theodore for "courage", "ability", and "the 
will to do the thing he thinks is right"." Much the same could be 
said of McCormack: like Theodore, he was tough-minded and 
inclined to autocratic methods, discharged with ruthless efficiency; 
more important, he had a fearless disposition. But in contrast to 
Theodore, he was reluctant to listen to advice, and was given to 
lecturing before counselling, a trait which often incensed his own 
Cabinet, as one colleague remarked: "Some of his many virtues were 
considered by many to be vices. He was frank and somewhat cynical 
in expression, and a hard hitter; and he made many enemies, as well 
as many friends, because of his outspokenness."" That McCormack 
commanded the respect and loyalty of his Cabinet and party officials 
remains a tribute to his dominant personality and capacity for 
leadership. 
In parliament his task was compounded by the burdens of militant 
agitation, and of defending not only his own administration but also 
the actions of his predecessors.'* (Tlearly, his debating talents and 
natural ability equipped him for the role: while he was extremely 
sensitive to personal criticism, his well-directed interjections and 
incisive retorts often countered opposition tactics of singling him out 
personally. As Treasurer he made no claim to be an economist, and 
consistently justified his administrative actions as approaching 
financial difficulties with common sense and practical reasoning. 
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Significantly, his hard-headed bargaining with the Commonwealth 
over the establishment of the Loan Council, and his stringent 
management of three budgets cushioned the impact of depression 
in Queensland. 
McCormack resigned as Premier and as party leader on 16 May 
1929. In the ordinary course of events he could have anticipated 
a return, not to the leadership but certainly to high office. He was 
still relatively young at fifty years of age, and could have been of 
great value to his party. However, he did not sit in opposition as, 
after eight months abroad for health reasons, he resigned his seat 
in February 1930, terminating a parliamentary career spanning 
eighteen years. But he was not destined for quiet retirement, for the 
Chillagoe-Mungana issue had re-emerged, to keep him under public 
scrutiny for another two years. 
The 388 registered shares in Mungana Mines Limited had proven 
a political liability throughout his time as Premier, giving grounds 
for the inference of collusion within the Chillagoe undertaking. Up 
to 1929 he had successfully rebuffed allegations of complicity, but 
in October 1929 a dramatic sequence of events, which brought strong 
suspicion of corrupt dealings in shares, justified Moore's establishing 
a royal commission into Chillagoe-Mungana. Allegations were made 
that former Ministers had trafficked in Mt Isa shares at a fime when 
the companies were negotiating with the Government over a railway 
from Duchess to Mt Isa" Theodore publicly claimed that he had 
"never held more than 500 5/-shares",*'' while McCormack stated 
that "he did not hold a single share in any company operafing on 
the Mt Isa field"." Why they perpetrated falsehoods that were so 
easily exposed cannot be readily explained. Information was tabled 
in parliament only days later showing that Theodore had been 
allotted 5925 £l shares in two Mt Isa companies,*^ while McCormack 
similarly held 5925 £l shares." But that was not all: at a bankruptcy 
hearing Fred Reid, former lessee of Mungana mines, disclosed that 
McCormack held no fewer than 5000 £1 shares in Mungana Mines 
Limited, obtained for only £100 outlay.'" Cleariy McCormack had 
lied to parliament and to his own party to obtain past assurances 
and votes of confidence. But time had run out for him. Prompted 
by Country-National Party members for motives of political advan-
tage, and apparently by his personal disapproval of corruption, 
Moore issued terms of reference for a royal commission under a 
retired New South Wales judge, J.L. Campbell. 
Evidence was taken over two months. Significantly, on advice from 
counsel, neither McCormack nor Theodore responded to subpoenas, 
not legally binding on them as both were residing interstate." 
further, McCormack sought, but was denied, an injunction to 
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prevent the production of his bank accounts in accordance with a 
summons issued by Campbell." The evidence which McCormack had 
tried to withhold concerned payments by him to Theodore after 
receipt of dividends from Mungana Mines Limited, each of which 
amounted to almost exactly half the dividend. While his reputation 
was being blackened by inference, McCormack continued to protect 
Theodore, even by initially concealing from his own solicitors the 
fact that Theodore was involved. He preferred to play down the 
Royal Commission, evidently hoping that the report would not 
appear too damaging, in which case he would be able to counter-
allege that its purpose was political character assassination aimed 
uldmately at Theodore as Federal Treasurer, and the Labor Party 
in general. 
On 11 June 1930 Campbell subpoenaed Theodore's bank accounts; 
although the contents of McCormack's accounts had not been made 
public, the inference of Theodore's personal involvement was clear, 
and was confirmed in private correspondence between McCormack 
and his solicitor. McCormack had detailed particulars of his accounts 
and instructed his solicitor to "either explain all the details or none 
of them. It would be useless to explain evry [sic] detail outside the 
cheques to Theodore and then refuse to explain the only ones that 
are relevant to the inquiry".*' Further, he explained that he had to 
consult with Theodore before offering any instructions, and showed 
that the payments to Theodore were exactly half the dividends 
received.'* His solicitor made no attempt to conceal his conclusion 
that Theodore could offer no satisfactory explanation but would, 
under cross-examination, be obliged to make even more damaging 
disclosures. He therefore advised against Theodore's appearance, and 
Theodore did not appear. 
Unable to secure the testimony of McCormack and Theodore, 
Campbell based his report on reliable testimony in over a hundred 
documentary exhibits, and the all-important bank accounts, rather 
than on the evasive, contradictory, confusing, and partial evidence 
of witnesses, and inference of legal counsel. Central to the report 
was the conclusion that "Theodore, McCormack, Goddard and Reid 
were guilty of fraud and dishonesty in procuring the State to 
purchase the Mungana mines for £40,000" and that the "moneys 
shared between them as proceeds of that transaction were fraudulent-
ly obtained".*' Theodore's integrity suffered further damage when 
Campbell concluded that he "was guilty of the grossest impropriety 
in becoming secretly associated" with Goddard in two other com-
panies supplying the State smelters, a situation "undeniably vicious 
in its possibilities".'" The many other questions upon which Campbell 
reported took second place to the charges of corruption and misuse 
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of public office by McCormack and Theodore. The repercussions 
were immediate: McCormack's credibility and integrity were com-
pletely destroyed, while Theodore was obliged to resign, but not 
before denouncing the findings as "fiagrantly untrue and 
malicious"." McCormack expressed astonishment, and with Theo-
dore demanded that they be tried in a court of law. 
Declining to appear and then attacking the findings as political 
character assassination, they had acted according to legal advice. 
Demands for legal proceedings were merely a bold front, as opinion 
was "that a prosecution would not take place" owing to legal 
difficulties. McCormack's solicitor counselled that "the best course 
is to press for a prosecution and have prayers said that this request 
is refused".'-
Contrary to Crown legal opinion, the State Government chose to 
proceed, and amended the Crown Remedies Act so as to make 
possible the use of evidence disclosed to the Royal Commission in 
civil (though not criminal) proceedings." This decision offended the 
deep-seated tradition that laws should not be changed retrospectively 
in ways detrimental to defendants, and inevitably outraged legal 
opinion and some citizens not otherwise predisposed to sympathize 
with McCormack and Theodore. As it was, Moore and his colleagues 
were subject to the charge of political vendetta, having undoubtedly 
altered the law to undertake a prosecution that would otherwise have 
been impossible. Little could be gained from a favourable verdict; 
but credibility would be destroyed if McCormack and Theodore won 
even on a technicality. Predictably, newspaper opinion was divided. 
The conservative press supported the amendments and a prosecution 
on ethical grounds, while Labor journals denounced Moore for 
political revanchism.'" 
The trial commenced on 22 July 1931. The Crown sought to 
recovery £30,000 damages, as the difference between a fair price 
for the mines and the price actually paid to the defendants by the 
Government, specifying the amounts from McCormack and Theo-
dore, received as agents of the Crown, and misappropriated, or 
alternatively, received, in breach of their Crown duties.'^ No new 
evidence was introduced in the statements of claim submitted by 
the prosecution and the defence, and to legal minds it was not 
unexpected when a "not guilty" verdict was returned in answer to 
questions prepared by both prosecution and defence." The outcome 
was foreshadowed by the Chief Justice's summary, when he re-
minded the jury that circumstantial evidence and inference had 
clouded the case. The points to be established were conspiracy and 
fraud, "that the conspiracy was to defraud, to cheat the Crown by 
selling for £40,000, property worth only £10,000"." Given the 
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evidence of mining experts, most of whom were anxious to defend 
their own reputations, that the mines were valued at £40,000 on 
current metal prices, and the failure to establish intent to conspiracy, 
a verdict of "guilty" could not be sustained'*; but observers noted 
that although Theodore had persistently demanded an opportunity 
to vindicate his character in court, neither he nor McCormack gave 
evidence, and no satisfactory explanation was advanced of the 
payments by McCormack to Theodore that Campbell had found so 
damning. 
The failure of the prosecution seriously discredited the Moore 
Government; but for McCormack and Theodore, the damage to their 
careers was already done. For his part, McCormack had placed 
himself outside politics by his past actions; exposed lying to 
parliament, the press, and his party over Mt Isa and Mungana, he 
had infiicted further damage on Labor's electoral standing. A return 
to active politics was out of the question. He retired to his Annerley 
home; in later years, after the odium of corruption had disappeared, 
he could be found on occasions chatting to old colleagues in the 
lobbies or in the parliamentary gallery. Even during the depression 
he remained financially comfortable from his investments, from 
which he was able to support his spinster sisters for many years. 
After months of ill health, McCormack died on 21 November 1947 
aged sixty-eight," still unmarried. 
He was remembered by contemporary politicians as a warm but 
not colourful personality, strong-willed and dogmatic, and one of 
the giants of the Queensland labor movement. To the public, 
however, the spectre of political corruption was always present; and 
to sections of the union movement, his name evinced memories of 
the railway lockout; as late as 1948, pamphlets exhorting strikers 
to "Remember McCormack!" were issued during the state of 
emergency. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Arthur Edward Moore 
(Courtesy Oxley Library) 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
13 Arthur Edward Moore 
Odd Man In 
BRIAN COSTAR 
Arthur Edward Moore was the first Country Party premier of 
Queensland and the only non-Labor premier between 1915 and 
1957. He was born in Napier, New Zealand, in 1876. After 
commencing his education at Akaroa State School, Moore moved 
with his family to Australia, where his father, Edward Moore 
(senior), became General Manager of the Union Bank, Melbourne. 
While in Melbourne Arthur continued his education at the Church 
of England Grammar School. Upon leaving school Moore gained 
three years experience with a viticulturist in the Goulburn Valley 
before becoming a wheat farmer in the Jondaryan region of 
Queensland's Darling Downs in 1898. He also became the owner 
of two cheese factories. Moore soon developed an interest in local 
government affairs and for many years was the chairman of the 
Rosalie Shire Council and the president of the Queensland Local 
Authorities Association. During his long life he remained an active 
member of the Anglican Church, representing the parish of Oakey 
on the Synod, and was often a member of the Brisbane Diocesan 
Council. 
Moore entered the Queensland parliament in 1915 as the Farmers 
Union Member for Aubigny. His election coincided with the defeat 
of the Liberal Government of Digby Denham {see Appendix). 
Moore's first fourteen years in the parliament were to be spent sitting 
on the left of the Speaker. The years 1915 to 29 were ones in which 
most of the talent in the Queensland parliament was to be found 
on the Labor side. Perhaps because of this, Moore had a reasonably 
rapid rise to the position of deputy leader of the Opposition in 1920. 
He then became leader of the Opposition in 1924, and premier in 
1929. He served but one term as premier, and with the defeat of 
his government in 1932 he again took up the role of Leader of the 
Opposition. However, a crushing electoral defeat in 1935 seriously 
Arthur Moore: MLA (Aubigny) 1915-41; Premier and Chief Secretary 1929-32 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
376 BRIAN COSTAR 
undermined his position as leader and he subsequently resigned. 
Despite this resignation he remained a prominent member of the 
opposition front bench until his retirement from politics in 1941. 
He died at the age of eighty-seven in January 1963. 
Throughout his political life Moore represented Country Party 
interests in the parliament. Yet he was quite unlike the archetypal 
country member of the time. C.A. Bernays in drawing a thumbnail 
sketch of Moore says: "he is a dairy farmer and grazier of quite 
an exceptional kind. Instead of an oaf or a yokel he is a well-educated 
man who speaks good English, and owns a dress suit."' In short, 
he was a gentleman farmer. Moore's family background, his 
occupation, and his religion all combined to influence his political 
outlook. He was a man of the colonial establishment, whose views 
on politics and economics were quite conservative. Moore was a man 
possessed of an almost naive faith in the efficacy and morality of 
the private enterprise system. He conceded that while the Govern-
ment did have a role to play in economic management, that role 
was restricted to encouraging and facilitating the profit-making 
ventures of private individuals. Moore believed that a flourishing 
private sector was the only way to ensure a prosperous Queensland. 
Personally, he was well liked by both political opponents and 
political supporters. Jack Duggan, the then leader of the Parlia-
mentary Labor Party, said in his condolence speech of 1963 that 
"Mr Moore was a man of charming personality".^ Similarly, all who 
knew him attest to his personal honesty. Yet it is an exaggeration 
to claim, as Abidin has done in his thesis on the Queensland Country 
Party, that "Moore seems ... to be a little too honest to be a successful 
politician".' Moore was fully aware of the need to steer a careful 
path between his personal moral convictions, on the one hand, and 
the hard reality of electoral acceptability on the other. The fact that 
he was something of a political failure can be explained more 
adequately in terms of a lack of political acumen than in terms of 
an overabundance of personal honesty. In his defence, it must be 
said that Moore came to power at a most difficult time in the 
economic history of Australia. The depression of the 1930s destroyed 
every Australian government that was unfortunate enough to 
encounter it; it also destroyed the careers and reputation of politicians 
of much greater ability and renown than Arthur Moore. The Great 
Depression destroyed the CPNP (Country Progressive National 
Party), the political party that Moore himself had helped to create. 
In fact, the fusion of the non-Labor parties into a single party in 
1925 was one of Moore's major political achievements. 
The defeat of the Denham Government in 1915 plunged the non-
Labor forces in Queensland into a period of acute dissension. 
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Queensland's economic development determined that the urban non-
Labor party (variously termed Liberal, Nationalist, United) was 
unable to secure ascendancy over the rural non-Labor elements that 
eventually were to form the Country Party. The political birth of 
a united Country Party in Queensland was also a rather torrid affair 
which was characterized by factionalism and bitterness. Partly as 
a consequence of its internal and external disturbances the Opposi-
tion lacked a leader who could provide a match for either T.J. 
Ryan {see Ch. 10) or E.G. Theodore {see Ch. 11). In compiling a 
confidential report on the Nationalist Party organization in 
Queensland in 1920, Archdale Parkhill clearly enumerated one of 
the major problems facing the non-Labor forces: "Whilst the 
organization can be improved and built up on technical and 
systematic lines into an effective organising machine, still, it will 
clearly ... lack the enthusiasm and interest which lifts it out of a 
mere mechanical organization into a big force and inspires it with 
life and vigour, which only a trusted and capable leader can effect."" 
Denham himself was defeated in the electorate of Oxley in 1915, 
and his successors as leader of the Opposition did not prove 
themselves to be outstanding politicians; their parties suffered three 
consecutive electoral defeats under their leadership (1918, 1920, and 
1923). 
The poor performance of the ALP in the 1920 election, however, 
contained lessons which at least some in the non-Labor parties were 
quick to learn. Before the 1920 election these parties were beginning 
to exhibit symptoms of what might be called "the perpetual 
opposition syndrome". However, the troubles being encountered by 
the Theodore Government gave them hope that a return to the 
Treasury benches was indeed possible. Moore, as deputy opposition 
leader, was one of those who realized that in an optional preferential 
voting system unity was the all-important key to electoral success. 
Despite the rationality of this view, those committed to unifying the 
non-Labor forces had a difficult task ahead of them. At both the 
1920 and 1923 elections no fewer than three separate parties carried 
the anti-Labor banner. Moreover there existed deep mutual hostility 
among these parties. A city-country antagonism was further com-
plicated by fissions within the Country parties that were as frequent 
as they were incurable. Regional differences, sectional differences, 
and policy differences combined with baser motives of personal 
hatred, jealousy, and ambition to ensure that non-Labor remained 
disunited and that Labor remained the Government. 
A major obstacle in the path of those such as Moore who were 
desirous of unity was the organizational structure of the non-Labor 
parties. Nationalist organization was extremely weak and the 
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Nationalists (or United Party as they were called at the 1923 
election) were as much a parliamentary faction as they were a 
political party. The lack of party discipline made it difficult to bind 
parliamentary members to specific proposals such as a decision to 
join with other parties in an electoral alliance. Theoretically the 
Country Party was a more tightly structured organization; however, 
it was not until the late 1920s that a united Country Party existed 
in Queensland. The fact that many groups such as the United 
Graziers Association tended to disaffiliate from country political 
organizations if particular policies or strategies offended them did 
nothing to encourage solidarity. In short the fluidity and looseness 
of non-Labor party structures were an important obstacle to attempts 
at unity of purpose among them. 
Despite these impediments, various forms of unity were tried. For 
instance, in January 1923 there was an attempt at a conference held 
in Rockhampton to form a party called the "Queensland United 
Party (Nationalist and Country Party)". This was an ambitious 
venture that failed because only four of the twenty-one Country 
Party state parliamentarians were prepared to join. (Arthur Moore 
was not one of them.) One of the major reasons behind Country 
Party reluctance to become committed to the organization was the 
fear that it was really an attempt by the United Party to swamp 
them.^ This Country Party suspicion of the United Party motives 
was well expressed by Moore himself in 1925, when he said that 
many attempts at unity had foundered at the last minute because 
a small clique within the United Party always insisted upon 
dominating any coalition that might have been formed.' 
The first steps towards a lasting coalition between the non-Labor 
parties was- not taken until 9 April 1924. On that date Moore was 
elected leader of the Opposition. This decision was followed a year 
later by the merger of the CCP (Country Parliamentary Party) and 
the UPP (United Parliamentary Party) into a single "Country 
Progressive Party" with Moore as leader. In a lengthy statement the 
new party engaged in a good deal of soul-searching regarding the 
divisiveness of the past, declaring, in conclusion, that "the party is 
not sectional, and being State-wide, is for the whole of the people".' 
This noble declaration was not, however, totally in accord with 
reality. In the first instance, four United Party members (C.J. 
Taylor, W.H. Barnes, W. Kelso, and G.P. Barnes) were not invited 
to join the new party because of their alleged disloyally. This charge 
of disloyality related to their refusal to accept an agreement entered 
mto in January 1925 whereby the National Union* was to be the 
sole collection agency for the CPP and the UPP. While these 
dissidents eventually made their peace with the new party, they did 
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not constitute the only problem the new CPP and its leader had to 
overcome. 
The birth of the party was greeted with intense hostility by 
Queensland's major newspaper, the Brisbane Courier. Precise 
motives are difficult to establish, but the Courier concentrated its 
criticism upon the CPP's links with the National Union. In a stinging 
editorial the paper displayed both its hostility and its parochialism: 
"Democracy is a futility, a howling farce in fact, if the electors are 
to be subservient to a coterie of representatives of the moneyed 
interests of Melbourne such as the National Union is."' 
These attacks by the Brisbane Courier were accompanied by 
critical remarks from sections of the old CPP and UPP. Non-
parliamentary members of the two parties were angry because the 
merger was primarily enacted by the politicians, and because they 
felt that there had been inadequate consultation with other sections 
of the parties. Because of the Courier's own antipathy these 
dissidents had their views widely publicized in the paper's columns 
to such an extent that it appeared the party amalgamation would 
be aborted. However, skilful leadership combined with a display of 
solidarity by the politicians to ensure the successful birth of the new 
coalition party. In December 1925 the merger was completed and 
the name changed to Country Progressive National Party. The 
insertion of the word "National" was apparently a sop to United 
party members. 
What precise role did Moore play in bringing the parties together? 
There is no douby that he adopted a pragmatic and realistic view 
on the entire matter. Moore felt that unity was essential if the Labor 
Government was ever to be turned out. From the day he became 
deputy opposition leader Moore directed all his energies to the task 
of enhancing the non-Labor parties' electoral appeal. On the vexed 
question of the party's relationship with the National Union, Moore 
took the view that to be electorally successful a political party 
required adequate finances, and if that meant working with the 
National Union then well and good.'" Yet despite these attitudes 
Moore's personal influence regarding the merger should not be 
exaggerated. Firstly, he was incapacitated (being in hospital under-
going minor throat surgery) at the time of the May 1925 decisions. 
Because of this he could not be present at the final discussions being 
held by the parties, though the groundwork, in which Moore as leader 
had played a significant role, had been laid well before this. A more 
important factor to be noted was that Moore was by no means the 
front runner for the leadership of a united non-Labor party. In the 
early 1920s overtures had been made to Sir Thomas Robinson, 
sometime Agent-General in London, and Sir William Glasgow, a 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
380 BRIAN COSTAR 
federal politician, to undertake the leadership of a combined 
Opposition. Both however, declined these offers. Yet just before the 
two parties were linked definite offers were made to H.D. Macrossan, 
a Brisbane barrister, to assume the leadership. He too declined." 
These events reveal two important facts about Moore: firstly, he 
was neither party's primary choice as leader; secondly, he lacked the 
strength and support to establish himself as the sole contender for 
the leadership. However, when others declined, the parties turned 
to Moore as a compromise candidate. It was to Moore's advantage 
that the only other serious contender was Charles Taylor (United 
MLA for Windsor), who had been opposition leader for a brief time 
before Moore, and who subsequently became Speaker of the 
Legislative Assembly in 1929. Taylor, however, was not acceptable 
to sections of both the CPP and UPP, and was consequently ruled 
out as a possible leader. While Moore was certainly fortunate to 
be in the right place at the right time, it was his ability as a conciliator 
that gained him support for the leadership. Moore was made leader 
because he had not antagonized any major section of either party. 
There is some evidence to suggest that Moore was meant to be 
a caretaker leader only. The pre-eminent need of the non-Labor 
parties in 1924 was to effect unity: Moore was perceived as the 
ideal leader to achieve this, but it was envisaged by some that once 
the new party was firmly established Moore would hand over to a 
more dynamic personality. This, however, was not to be the case. 
While some criticism of his leadership could still be heard as late 
as 1928,'' the advances made by the CPNP in the 1926 election 
strengthened his position, and the CPNP victory in 1929 confirmed 
it. 
The Labor Party governed Queensland for almost forty years 
between 1915 and 1957. This extraordinary record of electoral 
success was tarnished only by the crushing defeat inflicted on the 
ALP by the CPNP in 1929. While one may repeat the political cliche 
that "oppositions don't win elections, governments lose them" as an 
explanation for the 1929 election result, it must be remembered that 
it is usually a confiuence of factors that determines which party 
emerges as the victor in any particular electoral contest. One of those 
factors in 1929 was the high quality of the campaign conducted by 
Moore as CPNP leader. Moore had succeeded in significantly 
increasing the CPNP vote in 1926, and in 1929 achieved the quite 
remarkable feat of taking sixteen seats from the McCormack 
Government—more than enough to secure a comfortable victory. 
A significant factor which determined the outcome of the election 
was that in a reversal of previous roles the CPNP contested it as 
a united party, whereas the ALP was racked with internal fissures. 
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Moore himself could claim a good deal of credit for maintaining 
the party's unity, because the centrifugal forces that had proved so 
damaging in the past threatened to deny the CPNP victory yet again. 
With the election due in May 1929, Abidin reports that there were 
moves to form a new non-Labor party as late as February of that 
year." While a young Australia Party was created, this proved to 
be electorally insignificant. If Moore had failed to act decisively, 
however, this minor manifestation of disaffection could have de-
veloped into something more serious. 
Many of the rumours regarding the establishment of a new non-
Labor party centred around the name of Augustus Cecil Elphinstone, 
the CPNP Member of Oxley. Elphinstone had entered Parliament 
in 1918 and soon established himself as a skilful debater. Because 
of his undoubted ability, he joined the opposition front bench and 
gained a reputation as a talented parliamentarian. However, both 
Bernays and Lack'* attest to a certain abrasiveness in his personality 
which antagonized many of his colleagues. Furthermore, Elphinstone 
clearly harboured leadership ambitions. He was in an ideal position 
to offer himself as a distinct alternative to Moore by appealing to 
CPNP misgivings regarding Moore's lack of dynamism. Moore's 
political style was almost the opposite of Elphinstone's. The former 
was a solid but unimpressive debater, while the latter was a witty 
and charismatic speaker. By 1928 Elphinstone had become a divisive 
force within the party, and displayed little reluctance in publicly 
disagreeing with the party leader. From Moore's point of view this 
was an intolerable situation, which he brought to an end by 
requesting that Elphinstone resign from the front bench. This he 
did in August 1928. Such a decisive act was uncharacteristic of 
Moore and was fraught with considerable danger. Being relegated 
to the back benches allowed Elphinstone the opportunity to organize 
against his leader in an unhindered manner. However, Moore had 
done his homework and was correct in his assumption that 
Elphinstone lacked any real depth of support within the party. When 
his offer to act as CPNP campaign director for the 1929 election 
was rejected, Elphinstone resigned from the party in February 1929. 
He contested Oxley as a lone Centre Party candidate and was 
soundly defeated by the CPNP candidate T. Nimmo. 
During the actual election Moore campaigned in the Oxley 
electorate, and wrote a hard-hitting letter to the voters in which he 
intimated that one of his reasons for dismissing Elphinstone from 
the front bench was the latter's unwillingness to devote himself full-
time to his parliamentary duties.'^ While such considerations may 
have played some part in Moore's decision, it should be borne in 
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mind that Moore's purpose in writing this letter was to cast doubt 
on Elphinstone's capacity as the representative for Oxley. Given 
his personal involvement in the electorate, Nimmo's victory refiected 
favourably on Moore's political judgement. Moore's display of 
strength over this matter certainly enhanced his position within the 
party and silenced those who were wont to label him as being weak 
and vacillating. Unfortunately for Moore he was to fail to display 
such decisiveness in the future. 
With the smell of decay rising from the McCormack Government, 
Moore had commenced a vigorous campaign schedule in 1928. In 
a pre-TV age, and at a time when politicians still regarded radio 
with a degree of suspicion, Queensland was a political campaigner's 
nightmare. With air travel a novelty, political leaders were required 
to traverse the state's vast distances by rail. Moore travelled widely 
through all areas, speaking to crowds both large and small. His 
central campaign theme was that fourteen years of Labor rule had 
reduced Queensland's economy to a ruinous condition. When he 
came to deliver his policy speech in April 1929 Moore ouUined a 
series of projected changes too numerous to itemize in full," but 
which included such promises as the abolition of the arbitration 
award for rural workers, tax relief, restoration of freehold tenure, 
and stimulation of employment. In a rare moment of rhetorical 
flourish he appealed to the voters: 
My party offers sound, progressive legislation and honest, efficient 
administration. It will undo the mischief of recent years, arrest the 
financial avalanche, plug leaking state losses, encourage instead of 
penalise enterprise and, by reducing taxation and restoring confidence, 
will promote national and individual prosperity. I appeal not to your greed 
and cupidity, but to your intelligence and patriotism." 
During the campaign Moore paid particular attention to farmers 
and to the urban working class. To the former he offered relief from 
Labour's allegedly restrictive rural legislation, and to the latter he 
offered security of employment. 
The magnitude of the 1929 victory certainly exaggerated Moore's 
ability as a political campaigner. In 1929 he was greafiy aided by 
Labor's internal difficulties, combined with the effects of an 
economic recession. In 1932 and 1935 in entirely different circum-
stances he performed much less creditably. Nevertheless, Moore 
succeeded in capitalizing on Labor's difficulties in 1929, and was 
relentless in driving home his advantage. 
Overall, the CPNP campaign was much more vigorous and 
creative than those of previous elections. Moore achieved the difficult 
task of hftmg the CPNP out of its defeatist state of mind, and 
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inspired the parliamentarians and the organization with the will to 
win. The party produced a series of very impressive cartoon-style 
dodgers which pilloried the alleged ineptitude of the Labor adminis-
tration in relation to such issues as farming, employment, and 
industrial development.'* In addition, the CPNP gained a good deal 
of mileage from its election slogans—"Change the Government" and 
"Give the Boy a Chance". Moore also troubled the Labor 
Government by declaring that upon election he would obtain 
£2 million loan to help restore the state to full employment. While 
the effect of campaigns in determining the outcome of elections 
should not be overestimated, the relatively high standard of the 
CPNP's 1929 campaign was a reflection of the revitalized state of 
the party—a revitalization for which Moore could claim a great deal 
of the credit. 
The success of the CPNP at the polls was greeted with extravagant 
enthusiasm by its supporters. Business, commercial, farming, and 
grazing interests had for years been opposed to what they regarded 
as Labor's socialist programmes, and viewed Moore's victory as 
something akin to the coming of the millenium. As extreme as it 
may appear, the reaction of the North Queensland Register was 
typical: "Grand is the news. A dawn of a new era, an era, let us 
hope, of peace, prosperity, industrial development, when man will 
be given the right to live, when the backbone of the country—the 
man on the land—will be given an opportunity."" 
After fourteen years of Labor rule, the first few months of the 
Moore Government were destined to be heady days. However, by 
late 1929 Queensland was beginning to feel the first shock waves 
of the economic depression that was about to descend upon Australia. 
As the depression deepened the high expectations of the 
Government's supporters began to sour. The hard reality of govern-
ing during a period of economic stagnation determined that the 
Government would behave differently from what had been antici-
pated. The economic climate forced Moore to break many of his 
election promises, including his grand plan for a £2 million em-
ployment loan. Barely twelve months after his election Moore was 
on the defensive, against not only the ALP but also against critics 
in his own party, as his address to the 1930 CPNP conference clearly 
illustrates: 
"Irrespective of the consequences to us as a party, we must meet the 
situation that exists today. I want you to recognise that anything the 
Government may do in the next 12 months which may be drastic and 
unpopular is being done, not because we like it, but because it is absolutely 
necessary for the welfare of the State that it shall be done."^" 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
384 BRIAN COSTAR 
As concerned as they no doubt were about "the welfare of the 
State", Moore's supporters remained unconvinced by his logic. The 
sections of Queensland society which comprised the power base of 
the CPNP gradually became disillusioned with Moore, because they 
felt he did not live up to their naive expectations of him as a saviour 
from "socialism". By the 1932 elecfion this disillusionment was 
manifesting itself in intra-party disharmony, and was a significant 
factor in the Government's electoral defeat. 
Before Arthur Moore's period as Premier is discussed, some 
mention must be made of his political ideology. Australian politicians 
are not renowned for their ability to theorize about abstract 
philosophical questions, and Arthur Moore was no exception. It 
would be a distortion to paint him as a man steeped in political or 
economic theory. As a state Country Party politician he was first 
and foremost a pragmatist. When he did comment on wider themes 
he revealed himself as a devotee of the conventional conservative 
wisdom of the day. Despite his unoriginality as a political thinker, 
his ideas, as Premier are certainly worthy of some consideration. 
Judging from his public statements Moore rejected the concept 
of class warfare. Moreover, in a speech to the Constitutional Club 
in January 1930, he declared emphatically that his Government was 
not class-biased, and did not legislate solely in the interests of any 
one class.'' However, one should not assume that Moore was in any 
sense a pluralist in his political thinking. Moore always claimed that 
he adopted a "national" view of major political questions, but his 
definition of the term "nationalism" would not be universally 
acceptable: "Nationalism, as its name denotes, stands for the 
building of a nation. We think that the building of a nation can 
best be achieved by the encouragement of individual enterprise and 
reducing governmental interference to a minimum."" 
Such views place Moore firmly in the tradition of "rural economic 
liberalism" so popular among Country Party politicians. Moore's 
laissez-faire notions encouraged him to abolish the remaining State 
enterprises and the industrial award relating to many of the state's 
rural workers. His dislike of public enterprises extended even to his 
own government's bureaucracy, and his heavy handed treatment of 
public servants with regard to wage rates and union affairs was to 
lose him many votes at the 1932 election." On the other hand, Moore 
was firmly convinced that since private enterprises (both urban and 
rural) constituted the lifeblood of the state's economy it was the 
Government's duty to assist them in any way possible.'" Moore's 
granting of various concessions to farmers and graziers as well as 
to such industrial concerns as the Toowoomba Foundry and the 
Renown Rubber Co. soon gave rise to charges that, despite his 
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protestations to the contrary, he was biased in favour of employers 
and against employees. 
The onset of the Great Depression, the full effects of which were 
being felt in Queensland by 1930, were to tax Arthur Moore's 
economic theories and policies to the limit. Soon after the election 
of the new Government the rapidly deteriorating economic situation 
convinced Moore that the CPNP's more grandiose schemes would 
have to be shelved in favour of a concerted effort to restore financial 
stability. Unfortunately for Moore, many of his parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary colleagues did not share this realization, and 
became increasingly critical of some of his austerity measures. While 
Queensland suffered less than some other states during the 1930s, 
the economic situation was indeed bleak. For instance, in 1931 the 
Bureau of Economics and Statistics estimated that the real level of 
unemployment in Queensland exceeded 30 per cent of the 
workforce." In dealing with the economic crisis Moore and his 
septuagenarian Treasurer, W.H. Barnes, adopted a predictably 
orthodox and traditional approach. At a time when J.M. Keynes 
was being denounced as an economic heretic, the acceptable course 
for a government to adopt during an economic recession was a policy 
of deflation. The Queensland Premier proved himself to be an 
enthusiasfic deflationist. 
Moore's political explanation of the economic depression was that 
it was caused by the reckless borrowing and expenditure policies of 
previous state Labor administrations. He never wearied of delivering 
lectures on the theme that, hitherto, the state had lived beyond its 
means, and that the time had now come to implement a policy of 
restraint. This policy of restraint involved reducing government 
expenditure, and balancing the state's budget. Moore never suc-
ceeded in achieving the latter objective, and his attempts at the 
former were to present serious, unforeseen difficulties. While 
Queensland was the only state possessed of a system of unemploy-
ment insurance it proved to be totally inadequate during the 1930s. 
The limitations of the insurance scheme necessitated additional 
government action to provide work and sustenance for the growing 
army of unemployed. In devising a new scheme the Government had 
to introduce a special income tax to provide for an unemployment 
relief fund." Moore again found himself in the position of repudiating 
an election promise, and this changed stance on this issue again met 
with the vocal disapproval of many of his supporters. 
The Moore Government believed that the only way to lift 
Queensland out of the morass of the depression was to render the 
state's exports more competitive on the world market." Moore 
himself believed that private enterprise contained within it the 
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capacity to lead the state out of the financial crisis. However, he 
also believed that to do this private enterprise had to be freed from 
the constraining influences of "unreasonable" industrial conditions. 
In short, the costs of production had to be reduced. Moore attempted 
to achieve this by abolishing the rural award, by increasing the hours 
of work from forty-four to forty-eight per week and by reducing the 
basic wage rate. (Over the period August 1930 to July 1931 the 
Queensland basic wage was reduced from 85s to 74s per week for 
adult males.'*) Because of Queensland's arbitration system Moore 
was required, by various Orders-in-Council, to remove approximate-
ly 50 per cent of the state's workforce from the ambit of the Industrial 
Court." Needless to say this action provoked a hostile response from 
the ALP and from the trade union movement. 
With regard to general economic policy, Moore remained a 
deflationist throughout his three-year term as Premier. While 
admitting that expenditure cuts did cause some hardship, the 
Government was always quick to argue that any policy of inflation 
would lead to a total economic collapse.'" The Queensland branch 
of the Labor Party, on the other hand, continually advanced the 
theory that only a consumer led recovery would prove successful, 
and urged the Government to increase the purchasing power of the 
people. In discussing this theory, Moore revealed his rather tradi-
tional approach to economic planning: "It is nonsense to talk about 
keeping up the purchasing power of the people. A Government 
cannot do that. All a Government should do is to give encouragement 
to private industry."'' 
Given his economic opinions, it was predictable that Moore would 
be an opponent of Theodore's plan, and a vigorous supporter of what 
came to be known as the "Premiers' Plan". This was drawn up at 
a premiers' conference in September 1931, and reflected the 
orthodox economic thinking of the time. It was essentially deflation-
ary, and it included, inter alia, a 20 per cent reduction in government 
expenditure; an increase in Commonwealth income and sales tax; and 
a reduction in public and private interest rates." Soon after the 
conference Moore called a special parliamentary session to legislate 
on the relevant proposals of the Premiers' Plan. From mid-1931 
Moore explained and defended his economic policies in terms of his 
adherence to it. During the 1932 election campaign he declared that 
"the Government will stand or fall by the Premiers' Plan ..."." The 
fact that the Government fell can, in part, be explained in terms 
of the electoral unpopularity of the Plan in Queensland. 
Taken as a whole, Moore's economic policy can only be described 
as a failure. In his defence, it must be remembered that no Australian 
government proved capable of developing a coherent economic policy 
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to deal with the depression. It was Moore's bad fortune that his 
election to power coincided with the advent of the economic collapse. 
In retrospect, it is easy to criticize his policies as being outmoded 
and inadequate but it must be remembered that he was not alone 
in believing that orthodox economic measures would ultimately result 
in financial recovery. 
As a Country Party premier of a predominately rural state, Arthur 
Moore was keenly aware of his responsibilities to the man on the 
land.'" In January 1931 he decided that the Queensland wool 
industry, which contributed 60 per cent of the state's exports, was 
in serious economic straits. The Government diagnosed the problem 
as being one of high production costs caused by interest payments 
on overdrafts. In order to improve the condition of the wool industry 
Moore suggested the following measures: 
1. Sheep grazing selectors will receive a 25 per cent reduction in rent. 
2. Sheep grazing selectors will receive a 7 years extension of lease. 
3. Sheep grazing selectors and sheep pastoral lessees will have the 
interests on overdrafts reduced from an average of 7'/2 per cent to 
6 per cent. 
4. Sheep pastoral lessees will have an adjustment made in their leases 
as financial circumstances warrant." 
Queensland wool-growers were generally pleased with the 
Government's efforts on their behalf." However, they demanded 
further concessions, which they presented to Moore in March 1931. 
These were: 
1. a reduction in crown rents by 25% 
2. an extension of leases 
3. a granting of additional areas to small selectors 
4. certain concessions to cattle holdings 
5. a reduction in railway freights 
6. the carrying forward of leases for taxation purposes 
7. the abolition of land tax 
Moore pointed out that his government intended to introduce reforms 
one to four, but he added that he could not comply with the last 
three demands because of the decline in government revenue that 
would result." 
While Moore had the overwhelming support of graziers for his 
new scheme," he was soon to encounter strong opposition from 
certain financial institutions whose concurrence was essential for its 
success. Moore had argued from the outset that the programme was 
necessarily a joint venture involving the Government, the banks, and 
the pastoral companies. However, support from some of these 
financial insfitutions was not immediately forthcoming," and Moore 
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was required to embark on a lengthy campaign to convince them 
of the efficacy of the scheme. The pastoral companies responded 
enthusiastically to Moore's proposals, and by April five leading wool 
firms and a number of private mortgagees had accepted the 
Government's plan and had cut their rates of interest on overdrafts 
to 6 per cent."" 
The trading banks, however, were rather unresponsive to the 
Government's proposals. The general manager of the Bank of New 
South Wales, A.P. Davidson, told Moore quite unequivocally that 
his bank did not approve of the scheme. In a letter of four foolscap 
pages he lectured the Queensland Premier on the evils of government 
meddling in economic affairs, and denounced the Queensland Land 
Courts' decision to reduce rentals as being "a political dictation of 
prices", which ignored the economic laws of supply and demand. 
Davidson also expressed concern that the Government's measures 
would lead to an infiation of cheque currency. He concluded his letter 
with the following warning: "it is, surely a lesson of our recent history 
that release from the present difficulties requires a diminution of 
political interference with economic adjustment rather than further 
essays in control, leading inevitably though insensibly in the direction 
of Communism.""' Moore reacted quite angrily to this letter, and 
he accused the Bank of New South Wales of acting on "erroneous 
impressions" and "inaccurate premises"."^ Such exchanges did 
nothing to improve relations between Government and the banks, 
and Moore was required to push on with the scheme without their 
support. 
In July 1931 Moore sent a letter to those pastoral companies and 
banks which had not co-operated in the Government's scheme, 
informing them that because of falling interest rates and the 
introduction of legislative protection for mortgagees, it was unlikely 
that interest for money lent on good security would exceed 6 per 
cent in the near future. Consequently, the Government felt that its 
concessions to induce the cutting of interest rates for the wool 
industry were no longer necessary. However, Moore was aware that 
should the Government withdraw its offer this would discriminate 
against clients of those companies that did not co-operate with the 
Government in the first instance. Therefore the Government ex-
tended its offer for one month to allow the companies and banb 
to reconsider their position."' On this occasion the Premier received 
a somewhat more favourable response, with most of the financial 
institutions reducing overdraft interest rates to 6 per cent for one 
year and also reducing interest rates on pastoral leases by '/t to I 
per cent for one year."" However, Moore again encountered dif-
ficulties when he asked that these concessions be made retrospective 
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to 1 January 1931. On this issue the companies closed ranks and 
flatly refused to accede to Moore's request."' The result of this refusal 
was that the Government was forced to abandon that section of the 
scheme and accept reduction from July 1931. 
The circumstances surrounding the wool relief scheme are interest-
ing, in that they exhibit the confluence and conflict of interest that 
existed among the Government, the wool-growers, the banks, and 
the pastoral companies. A Country Party premier such as Moore 
was loath to allow the wool-grower to be swamped by the economic 
depression, but scarcity of funds placed severe limitations on the 
assistance which could be given by the Government alone. As was 
mentioned before, Moore was unable to agree to some of the graziers' 
initial requests because of the adverse effect they would have had 
on an already severely diminished government revenue. Moore also 
infimated that he was most strongly opposed to introducing any 
discriminatory legislation regarding the granting of concessions, but 
also pointed out that to give assistance to all Crown tenants in the 
sheep industry would mean an annual loss in revenue of £100,000 
per year, which the Government was unable to forego unless the 
financial institutions were also prepared to make some contribution.*' 
The financial institutions, however, were reluctant to agree to the 
Government's proposals because of their resultant decrease in 
income. Most of the companies and banks involved had interests and 
commitments outside Queensland. However, on the other hand, 
many of them, for example Dalgety's and Winchcombe Carson's, 
had a substantial economic stake in the Queensland wool industry, 
and did not wish to see it collapse. In such a period of economic 
depression, the financial institutions were also wary of endangering 
their own solvency and the solvency of their shareholders by granting 
overgenerous concessions to any one industry."' This situation 
produced a virtual stalemate whereby the Government was being 
pressured into action by the wool-growers, but dared not overstretch 
itself because of the possible economic consequences. Turning to the 
financial institutions for support, the Government found that these 
organizations were not prepared to anger their shareholders by 
reducing their margin of profit. The frustrations caused by this 
situation were made apparent by Moore in a letter to the Bank of 
New South Wales in which he declared that "If all parties ... insist 
on expecting their full rights under existing contracts from the wool 
and other key industries, then bankruptcy and Communism await 
us"."* 
The debate over the wool relief scheme also clearly exhibits the 
manner in which the depressed economic situation caused division 
and acrimony among groups which, in ordinary times, would have 
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displayed a keen awareness of their common interests. Moreover, 
the circumstances that developed placed Moore in an invidious 
situation whereby he was forced to attempt to be all things to all 
men. Such situations occurred time and again during his Premier-
ship, with the result that he constantly found himself in the positions 
where his policy options were extremely limited. Perhaps a more 
skilful politician could have extricated himself from such situations 
with a greater degree of success. However, Moore possessed a fiair 
for antagonizing important sections of his party's power base by 
adopting apparently indifferent attitudes to key client groups among 
the CPNP's supporters. 
While the state of the economy demanded Moore's almost 
constant attention as Premier, equally important questions of a non-
financial nature also caused him much concern. One of these involved 
the vexed question of the re-establishment of the Legislative Council. 
Queensland conservatives looked on with horror in 1921 when the 
Theodore Government transformed the legislature into a unicameral 
system by abolishing the upper house. From that day forth the re-
establishment of the second chamber became a regular electoral 
promise of the non-Labor parties, a promise with which Moore 
associated himself during both the 1926 and 1929 election 
campaigns."' Yet those CPNP supporters who hoped for quick 
legislative action to restore the upper house were to be seriously 
disappointed. Because of the depressed economic circumstances, 
Moore was prepared to relegate the question of the Legislafive 
Council to a very low position on the political agenda. Others in 
the party, however, were not prepared to let the matter drop. 
By July 1931 the editor of the Brisbane Courier was exerting 
pressure on Moore to reintroduce the Legislative Council. The editor 
was also attempting to influence the CPNP annual convention, set 
down for August, to pass a resolution urging such action on the 
Government.^" As it turned out the conference adopted the following, 
open-ended motion: "That this conference confirms the principles of 
the restoration of the Legislative Council, and that the matter of 
giving effect to the foregoing resolution be left to the judgement 
of the Government. If it is decided to hold a referendum this 
conference recommends that it be held before the end of the current 
year"." When serious discussions were commenced within the 
parliamentary party it soon became obvious that on a number of 
contentious points a consensus did not exist. The party was divided 
over whether a referendum should be held on the question. Some 
members felt that this was unnecessary, but there existed a hard 
core of approximately twelve members who threatened to cross the 
floor if the Council was reintroduced without a referendum." There 
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was also some disagreement on the nature of the electoral system 
to be applied to the second chamber. 
Moore's own position was a rather complicated one. Theoretically 
he was in favour of re-establishing the upper house as an insurance 
against losing the 1932 Legislative Assembly election. However, he 
was unwilling to conduct a referendum on the matter because he 
felt that such a referendum would assume the proportions of a public 
test of confidence in his government and he was afraid that a defeat 
in such a referendum would seriously damage his status in the eyes 
of his party and the electorate. Clearly there was only one course 
open to him: to convince the dissidents that the matter should proceed 
without conducting a referendum. In this task he proved singularly 
unsuccessful. As the 1931 parliamentary year drew rapidly to a close 
and Moore appeared to do nothing, many CPNP supporters became 
openly critical of him. As before, the Brisbane Courier was eager 
to articulate the views of those demanding action, and displayed no 
hesitation in attacking Moore in its columns. The following editorial 
illustrates the degree of hysteria that was creeping into the debate: 
"Mr. Moore is Premier of the State, and the people will blame him, 
and not half a dozen recalcitrants of his party, if he leaves 
Queensland open to attacks by a Socialist Government without the 
safeguard that he and his party were elected to provide"." 
During the last few months of 1931 the parliamentary party held 
numerous discussions on the matter without reaching any concrete 
decision. By late November a draft Bill had been prepared, but no 
agreement could be reached upon it. The matter dragged on until 
the last scheduled party meeting of the year, at which many hoped 
for a final decision. However, the meeting lapsed because of the lack 
of a quorum. It was rumoured at the time that the lack of a quorum 
was arranged by some person who deliberately misled members as 
to the exact venue of the meeting. Regardless of the truth of these 
rumours no decision was taken and the Government did not proceed 
with any legislation regarding the Legislative Council. 
This whole episode seriously damaged Moore's political career. 
His indecisiveness convinced many, both within and without the 
party, that he was a feeble leader. The following comment, which 
he made to the press in the midst of the affair, did nothing to 
discourage this opinion: "If, on the one hand, I decided not to go 
on with the project, one section would hotly criticise me, and if, on 
the other, 1 do, another section would condemn me. There is, 
however, one thing one must have before going on with a proposal 
of this kind. That thing is a majority".'" This was Moore the 
conciliator, waiting patiently for a consensus to emerge. However, 
it should have become obvious to him that the intransigence of a 
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certain group within the party made no such consensus possible. Yet 
by late 1931 Moore was feeling vulnerable in his position as leader, 
and dared not force this issue lest it provoke open rebellion within 
the party. Moore's do-nothing attitude certainly defused the issue, 
but it had the effect of diminishing his stature within the party." 
Conciliatoriness may have been a virtue when Moore was in 
opposition, but it proved to be a decided vice when he was the leader 
of a party in government. 
Many people who are unable to remember any other piece of 
information about Arthur Moore can recall that he was the 
Queensland Premier who instituted the Mungana Royal Com-
mission, which effectively destroyed the political career of the then 
Federal Treasurer E.G. Theodore. Here is not the place to attempt 
an exhaustive analysis of the entire Mungana issue," but certain 
matters in which Moore was personally involved warrant discussion. 
Moore had been calling for a royal commission into allegations 
relating to the Labor Government's purchase of mining leases in the 
Mungana area since the 1927 Auditor-General's report had drawn 
attention to certain irregularities regarding the purchase. However, 
on assuming government, it appears that Moore required some 
prodding from the party before he decided to institute the Royal 
Commission." From this point onwards Moore took a series of 
controversial decisions which convinced Labor supporters that his 
real aim was to seriously embarrass the Federal Labor Government, 
rather than to pursue the cause of justice. 
In his search for a commissioner Moore passed over the entire 
Queensland Supreme Court Bench and appointed Mr. Justice 
Campbell, a retired judge of New South Wales Supreme Court, as 
sole commissioner in October 1929. The Royal Commissioner 
brought down his report on 4 July 1930, and in it he made serious 
allegations regarding William McCormack {see Ch.l2), and two 
others.'* Theodore immediately resigned his Ministry, but not before 
he attacked Campbell, and accused Moore of orchestrating a cheap 
political stunt." The ex-Treasurer also demanded that the 
Queensland Government bring formal charges against him im-
mediately so that he might clear his name and rejoin Scullin's 
Cabinet. However, the civil case against Theodore did not commence 
until 22 July 1931, more than twelve months after the report had 
been presented. Moore was roundly criticized for this delay on the 
ground that he was deliberately stalling in order to cause as much 
trouble for the Federal Government as possible. While it would be 
naive to suggest that Moore was not keenly aware of the overtly 
political nature of the case, there did exist extenuating circumstances 
that can be cited to defend his dilatoriness. 
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The report of Mr. Justice Campbell was forwarded to the 
Queensland Crown Law office in July 1930 for a legal opinion. It 
appears that for technical reasons,*" Crown Law was reluctant to 
recomend criminal proceedings against Theodore. Moreover, there 
existed certain legal impediments to civil action, which were only 
removed by government amendments to the Crown Remedies Act." 
Debate on the amending Bill was extremely vitriolic with the Labor 
Opposition alleging that Moore was changing the law merely to "get" 
Theodore. While the Bill received royal assent in late September 
1930, Moore sfill dallied and it was suggested at the fime that he 
hesitated because he did not wish to appear foolish if any legal action 
against Theodore proved unsuccessful." The fact that the jury of 
four did find in favour of the defendants was therefore an embarrass-
ment to Moore. However, many in the Labor Party believed that 
Moore had, in reality, achieved his real purpose: the smearing of 
Theodore's name. This version was given credibility by the rather 
tactless statement of Attorney- General Macgroarty during the 1932 
election campaign, where he declared that: "The Mungana case 
smashed the Labor Party in Australia almost beyond mending. 
Thousands of people throughout the Commonwealth consider I was 
worth what I was paid in that case"." Regardless of the political 
culpability or otherwise of Moore himself, the Mungana affair had 
at least two important political consequences: it further convinced 
Labor people of the need for a united action to oust Moore and his 
government, and it disillusioned many CPNP supporters who, 
convinced of Theodore's guilt, were angry that the Government had 
let him off the hook. 
By eariy 1932 the CPNP Government had reached a state of 
advanced decay. The economic depression was certainly the major 
cause of this, but some in the party were prepared to direct a good 
deal of the blame at the Premier. Soon after the 1932 election a 
Brisbane newspaper expressed the opinion that Moore was hindered 
in government by the mediocre performance of some of his Ministers, 
and hinted that Moore had made unsuccessful attempts to prune 
the dead wood.*" However, more uncharitable observers argued that 
Moore had deliberately chosen weak or inexperienced National Party 
Ministers in order to ensure that Country Party policy predominated 
in the Cabinet." Given that the party had been in opposition for 
fourteen years it was to be expected that Moore would have a limited 
array of talent to choose from, but he certainly raised eyebrows by 
appointing as Ministers two men who were first elected to parliament 
in 1929. (These were E.A. Atherton, Mines Minister, and N.F. 
Macgroarty, Attorney-General.) Whilst in government CPNP mem-
bers were eager to praise Moore as a man concerned more with the 
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general welfare of the community than with "popularity, personal 
or governmental"." Yet as the date of the 1932 election drew closer 
many of his colleagues began to criticize his apparent indifference 
to electoral politics. 
Moore's party lost the 1932 election because of the depressed state 
of Queensland's economy. However, other factors played con-
tributory roles. Firstly, the CPNP suffered debilitating internal 
divisions on the eve of the election. H.E. Sizer, Minister for Labour 
and Industry, was involved in a vicious pre-election battle in the 
electorate of Sandgate that did nothing to promote an image of party 
unity." A group of young party dissidents actually formed a new 
political organization called the Queensland Party which, while being 
electorally insignificant, did epitomize the divided state of the non-
Labor ranks. By 1932 Moore was no longer the confident poHtical 
campaigner he had been in 1929. Three difficult years in government 
had taken their toll, and the Premier conducted a defensive, erratic 
campaign. CPNP supporters shuddered when Moore made such 
gaffes as publicly denouncing workers who demanded a forty-four 
hour week as "parasites".'* 
Despite the favourable circumstances. Labor did not win the 
election in a landslide (the final result gave Labor thirty-three seats, 
CPNP twenty-eight and independent one). An obvious explantion 
of this close finish is that Moore had redrawn the electoral 
boundaries in his party's favour. The fact that the 1931 redistribution 
reduced the number of seats from seventy-two to sixty-two by 
abolishing seven Labor seats and only three CPNP seats gave weight 
to Labor's contention that the Bill was a gerrymander." Moore 
himself, in a particularly interesting letter to the chief electoral 
commissioner. Sir William Gall, commented: "We have been beaten 
but not disgraced—and I think that the redistribution helped us 
considerably—our defeat would have been much greater under the 
old boundaries".™ While the old boundaries had certainly become 
inequitable, some in the CPNP argued that Moore had bungled the 
1931 changes. It was suggested that Moore allowed Cabinet 
Ministers to influence the drawing of the boundaries for their own 
benefit rather than in the interests of the party as a whole, and that 
this self-interest lost the CPNP a number of key seats." 
Given the level of bitterness and dissatisfaction present within the 
ranks of the CPNP after the 1932 election defeat, Moore was 
fortunate to remain as leader. The absence of a credible alternative 
was certainly a factor in his re-election. Nevertheless the CPNP 
experienced a rapid decline after 1932. By March 1933 it was in 
severe financial trouble and was required to suspend its permanent 
staff." The lack of a central organization precipitated the decay of 
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the party's branch structure." These internal difficulties coupled with 
the successful administration of the Government of William Forgan 
Smith {see Ch.l4) spelt disaster for the CPNP at the 1935 election. 
They received only 33.79 per cent of the vote and were reduced to 
a rump of only sixteen members in a house of sixty-two. This defeat 
finally reactivated the latent forces of disintegration within the non-
Labor parties. March 1936 saw the formation of the Queensland 
Country Party, and in April the CPNP decided to disband as a 
political entity. The Queensland Country Party executive was 
prepared to embrace the country members of the CPNP, but only 
on the condition that Moore be replaced as leader. On 22 May 1936, 
Moore announced his intention to resign and was replaced by E.B. 
Maher. Moore accepted his demotion gracefully, and in a public 
statement acknowledged that he had become an electoral handicap 
to his party: "I have always recognised that some of the unpopular 
things that had to be done during the time I was Premier would 
lessen the chances of success of the anti-socialist parties while I 
remained as leader".'" Following his removal from the leadership, 
Moore served conscientiously on the opposition front bench until his 
retirement from politics in 1941. 
In reviewing Arthur Moore's political career one is tempted to 
dismiss him as a total failure. Evidence certainly exists to support 
this contention. His inability to display strong, determined leadership 
as Premier, his failure to stem the forces of dissension within the 
CPNP, and his disastrous electoral defeat in 1935 earned for him 
a reputation as a most unsuccessful politician. Yet against this one 
must balance his political achievements. Moore achieved what many 
non-Labor politicians had been unable to accomplish: he united the 
anti-Labor parties in Queensland and maintained that unity for over 
a decade. Furthermore, it was under his leadership that the long 
succession of Queensland Labor governments was broken in 1929. 
A significant, but oft-forgotten, feature of Queensland politics is its 
remarkable electoral stability. Moore's defeat of the McCormack 
Government in 1929 was the first of only two occasions in the 
polifical history of Queensland during the period 1915-77 on which 
the governemnt changed hands in a normal electoral contest. Forgan 
Smith's defeat of Moore in 1932 constituted the second occasion, 
and it should be remembered that the defeat of the Gair Government 
in 1957 was rendered "abnormal" by the ALP split that preceded 
and precipitated it. When these facts are considered, Arthur Moore's 
stature and ability as a political leader are enhanced. Unfortunately 
for Moore it was his failures rather than his victories that have been 
remembered by friend and foe alike. Subsequent to his 1932 defeat 
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the memory of Moore and his government produced a standard piece 
of ALP rhetoric. Many a Labor leader and politician quelled 
dissatisfaction with their performance by uttering the incantation 
"remember Moore" and this was usually enough to bring the dis-
gruntled to heel. These unpleasant memories of Moore's Premier-
ship were held also by his own supporters. Subsequent to the 1932 
defeat the word went out in CPNP circles that "you can't win with 
Moore", and it was this belief that cost him the leadership in 1936. 
A politician of the skill of Robert Menzies proved capable of 
throwing off the "you can't win with ... " label, but Arthur Moore 
was no Robert Menzies. 
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"Smith was actually a bit of a bore, and all you could get from 
the school gate until you parted was politics. The result was that 
Smith often walked home alone."' Forgan Smith seems always to 
have felt he was destined for politics. Even at school, the subject 
was never far from his mind. Not for him the ecclesiastical career 
his father wanted for his youngest son. Even so, his father's ambitions 
and his own had one thing in common: a good education was likely 
to be helpful in both. So William Forgan Smith, son of George Smith 
and his wife Mary, whose maiden name had been Forgan, was sent 
to school at Invergowrie, not far from Dundee, on the Firth of Tay, 
in Perthshire, Scotland, where his father worked as a gardener on 
the prosperous Brand family's Mylnefield Estate. Later, when the 
family moved, the future Premier of Queensland attended Dunoon 
Grammar School and Queen's Park, Glasgow. All this formal 
education stopped suddenly when he refused to train for the clergy 
and apprenticed himself as a painter and decorator in Glasgow.' 
The eighteen-year-old painter became a regular visitor to Glasgow 
Green, where Keir Hardie and his colleagues were vocal exponents 
of the Labour cause. Born in 1887, Smith had seen much of Scottish 
industrialism and society at its worst, in such conditions as those 
of the Clydeside shipyards. All this was part of his education, which 
he continued, more formally, in grammar school continuation classes. 
In 1911 Smith heard another great Labor man speak at the Glasgow 
Christian Institute. Andrew Fisher, now Prime Minister of Australia, 
had once been a young Scottish worker like himself. If Fisher could 
emigrate to Queensland, work for £2 10s Od a week in a Gympie 
Gold mine, and from there rise to be Prime Minister, why should 
not Willie Smith try too? 
William Forgan Smith: MLA (Mackay) 1915-42; Chairman of Committees 1920; 
Minister without Portfolio 1920-22; Secretary for Public Works 1922-25; Secretary 
for Agriculture and Stock 1925-29; Premier, Chief Secretary, and Treasurer 1932-38; 
Premier and Chief Secretary 1938-41; Premier, Chief Secretary, and Secretary for 
Public Instruction 1941-42; Minister without Portfolio 1942 
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So early in 1912, when Forgan Smith was twenty-four, he boarded 
Perthshire, bound for the Queensland sugar port of Mackay, where 
he had an aunt. Mackay's volatile political climate might have been 
made to order for Forgan Smith. The separation movement had 
engendered a unique north Queensland attitude to federation; the 
aftermath of this had lingered on, particularly in the Kanaka 
problem. The sugar industry had just been subjected to the scrutiny 
of a federal royal commission, while the memory of the big 1911 
strike was still strong, and Queenslanders were beginning to express 
politically those very principles of unionism in which Forgan Smith 
had been steeped by the disciples of Clydeside radicalism.' 
Forgan Smith almost leapt into all this political activity. He joined 
the AWU (Australian Workers Union) and WPO (Workers' Politi-
cal Organization) in February, 1913, as well as the School of Arts 
Debating Society. Within a year, he was president of the Mackay 
Branch of the WPO, and soon was also a vice-president of the 
Mackay Trades and Labor Council. He was chosen as the Labor 
candidate for the forthcoming 1915 state election, notwithstanding 
that, as the Mackay Daily Mercury put it, he was "almost a perfect 
stranger in the district" and that he had "been but a short time 
in the country."" The election resulted in a complete swing against 
the Liberal Government of Digby Denham {see Appendix), and 
Labor came to power with Forgan Smith as Member for Mackay. 
We have a descripfion of Smith in those days from J.D. Story, 
who eventually became a sort of grand old man of the Queensland 
public service. The young Member for Mackay was "very young as 
Parliamentarians go; somewhat shy and diffident; not yet wise in 
the ways of public offices, public officials, and the devious twistings 
and turnings of departmental routine; but he was dourly determined 
to be put wise to everything that mattered."^ Forgan Smith had the 
one great advantage that he wore the mantle of the North; the first 
five Labor premiers all came from there.' From the many new 
members in the house in 1915, Smith was chosen by the new Labor 
Premier, T.J. Ryan {see Ch.lO) to deliver the Address-in-Reply. 
Smith appreciated the political importance of the sugar industry to 
the state as well as to his own electorate, and busied himself at 
becoming expert in the subject. He soon became one of the 
Government's spokesmen whenever sugar matters were being 
discussed. 
There has rarely been a more rewarding time for backbenchers 
in the Queensland parliament that in these, the salad days of Labor 
rule. Ryan was a big man, both physically and temperamentally. 
He was a fluent and able speaker, a successful lawyer, a keen and 
shrewd politician, born for leadership. With all this, he was sfill a 
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Labor man of the old school, in many ways just one of the boys. 
He operated the caucus system the way it was meant to be operated; 
if he did not agree with what was being done he would warn of the 
rocks ahead, but he always acquiesced in the majority view.' 
Smith had not been in parliament long when he was called upon 
to take a side in one of the most emotive issues ever to affect 
Australian politics-conscription. In many ways his attitudes might 
have been fairly predictable, for they would be expected to follow 
those of Keir Hardie, who had very definite ideas on the subject. 
Hardie had visited Australia soon after the first introduction of 
compulsory military training in 1911, and advised all friends of 
Labor to work for its abolition. He had predicted correctly that the 
action of Labor in supporting conscription originally would cause 
the party much trouble in the future.' 
In 1916, after Hughes announced his plans for a conscription 
referendum, Forgan Smith's capacity for making speeches ensured 
him a prominent role among the anti-conscription campaigners. He 
shared their vicissitudes, as for instance at a Bundaberg meeting on 
9 October, 1916, where some of the audience threw rotten eggs and 
other missiles. He protested against these tactics, and took the 
opportunity to deny that anti-conscriptionists were anti-British, for 
which they had been denounced, and to say that he stood second 
to none in his loyalty to Britain, but that he believed in the voluntary 
system of recruiting, which he felt had not failed.' The Bundaberg 
meeting was not the only one to provide newsworthy material. When 
Queensland sent a batch of speakers south. Smith was allocated to 
Bendigo, which was to become the electorate of the Prime Minister 
in 1917. Hughes later spoke at Bendigo and began by saying: "I 
understand that Mr. Hogan-Smith, an Irishman from Glasgow, has 
been down here talking Gaelic treason to you". For the momentary 
thrill of a bitter remark, Hughes made a lifelong enemy: Forgan 
Smith never forgave him.'" 
In taking an anti-conscription stand, Forgan Smith was fortunate 
to be in Queensland, where the Labor Party remained almost entirely 
steadfast, in sharp contrast with the way it was splitting asunder 
in other parts of Australia. Premier Ryan became the acknowledged 
leader of the anti-conscription forces throughout the country. Smith 
was in good company, too, in that no fewer than twelve Labor men 
who stayed loyal to conference and executive decisions against 
conscription subsequently became state premiers, and three of them 
prime ministers. It was simply not true to say that the party was 
"blowing its brains out". 
Where the early Labor governments in Queensland did break some 
new ground, in scale if not in kind, was in their vigorous setting-
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up of State enterprises. Although there had been some such activity 
in New South Wales and Western Australia, it was in Queensland 
that the experiments were conducted in the most enthusiastic way. 
Having come from Scotland at a time when there was much talk 
of nafionalization. Smith went into parliament a vigorous proponent 
of State socialism." Doubtless it was the unhappy course of many 
of these enterprises that led to subsequent changes in Smith's 
attitudes. He became convinced that control was more important 
than ownership, and later on he was to devise methods for achieving 
this, methods which met with considerable success. His later 
legislation on the supply and reticulation of electricity was an 
example of control without ownership. 
Since legislating is by no means a full-time job, it was not unusual 
for Tory members of parliament to regard this activity as a sideline 
to their normal occupation. Not so Labor members, who were 
expected by the party and by their supporters to refrain from any 
other remunerative pursuit. Many of them were left with a surfeit 
of spare time. Forgan Smith used much of his time for reading. From 
the knowledge he later showed on parliamentary procedure, we may 
be sure he studied Sir Thomas Erskine May's book on parliamentary 
practice and Standing Orders. But it seems probable, according to 
those who knew him well, that his reading was uncoordinated. He 
never read from a list. He could always talk from a tremendous store 
of knowledge, yet it sometimes seemed to lack correlation. In later 
years, almost anybody could induce him to read any book. He was 
a devotee of George Bernard Shaw, of Eugene Debs, and of Paine, 
whose Rights of Man he read several times. He read Plato's Republic 
right through, and was always ready to quote from it, as he was 
from the Bible. Philosophy was his favourite topic, his particular 
liking being for Spinoza. Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations and John 
Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty he regarded as basic texts to be read 
on numerous occasions. Indeed most of his political analogies came 
from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries-from Wilberforce, 
Owen, Bright, and Moore, as well as from Adam Smith and Mill. 
He seemed to have no particular recollection of the ideas of more 
modern political philosophers. He found Hegel and Marx dreary. 
But he did have quite a knowledge of Darwin, Havelock Ellis, 
Froebel, Freud, Huxley, and Spencer. 
One book he was very fond of, and entreated all his colleagues 
to read, was The Ragged Trousered Philanthropist, Robert 
Tressell's novel that expressed the ideas of socialism through the 
dialogues of painters and decorators. Smith must have found it easy 
to identify with Owen the painter who was brighter than all the 
others, able to see through the system. Neither Owen nor Forgan 
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Smith were like their fellow workers, ragged-trousered philan-
thropists, willing to toil away their lives without question so that 
their betters could remain their betters. All in all, it seems a 
reasonable speculation that as a young man Smith read as a discipline 
and as a means of self-improvement. In later years he was to read 
more for the delight of books, and for peace and retirement." 
By 1917 Smith had progressed sufficiently to have been appointed 
a temporary Chairman of Committees. His growing knowledge of 
parliamentary procedure no doubt influenced the choice. Eariy in 
1920 Forgan Smith was elected as the Legislative Assembly's 
Chairman of Committees, in which position he soon became an 
authority on parliamentary procedure. Two months after this 
election, however, Forgan Smith entered the Cabinet as Minister 
without Portfolio assisting the Premier. When John Fihelly resigned 
the Works portfoio in 1922, Smith took over that department. 
Edward Theodore {see Ch. 11) gave Smith his head in getfing a 
new system of unemployment relief on to the statute books. Since 
it called for contributions from workers as well as from employers 
and the Government, in a period of growing unemployment, Theo-
dore thought it would run into trouble in the caucus. But Smith 
piloted his proposals through caucus, and in 1922 got it through 
parliament. 
When Theodore resigned in 1925 to stand for the forthcoming 
federal election, William Gillies {see Appendix) took over as 
Premier, and appointed Forgan Smith to his own former portfolio, 
Agriculture. Smith was recognised as having done a good job in the 
Public Works portfolio where he had been the Minister administering 
the unemployment workers' insurance and having most dealings with 
the trade unions. On learning of his transfer to Agriculture, the 
Queensland Trades and Labor Council, then containing the most 
militant union officials and often in dispute with the State Govern-
ment, complimented Smith on his period as Minister: "We regret 
the transfer of Mr. Forgan Smith from the Public Works Depart-
ment. The unions having always received every courtesy and 
consideration and further we are of the opinion that during the Labor 
Regime his management of that department has been most successful 
and satisfactory to this Council and affiliated unions."'' 
Gillies had brought a farmer's enthusiasm to the cause of primary 
production, but Forgan Smith had more initiative and more push. 
Under his auspicies, organization of the primary producers of 
Queensland received great impetus. He had no technical agricultural 
qualifications that fitted him for the job. Although he had a love 
of the soil and of creation derived from his father, he had not formally 
studied the subject, nor had he ever been a practical farmer. But 
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was recognized as a strong, forceful person in both the caucus and 
the Labor Party organization. Like Theodore and McCormack, he 
concentrated his efforts in the central party organization as well as 
in the parliament. He had been a member of the QCE (Queensland 
Central Executive) between 1916 and 1918, but it was after 1923, 
when he was re-elected to that body, that he began to emerge as 
a person of considerable political strength. In 1926 he was elected 
to the executive committee or "Inner Executive" of the QCE and 
was thereafter, until his retirement, one of a small number of men 
who tightly controlled the destinies of the Labor Party and Labor 
governments. It was Forgan Smith, after 1925, who took over from 
McCormack as the main force on the QCE and at Labor-in-Politics 
Conventions, keeping the party organization on those lines that 
would not upset the position or work of the parliamentary party. 
Smith was rarely beaten in QCE debates. However, one debate 
in 1924 stands out and needs to be mentioned for the light it throws 
on Forgan Smith and the Labor Party. The Amalgamated Foodstuffs 
Unions had applied for affiliation with the QCE, having previously 
allowed Chinese cooks to become members of the union. Forgan 
Smith fought against the affiliation while the Chinese remained in 
that union since, being members of an affiliated union, they were 
therefore a part of the Labor Party. Despite Forgan Smith's 
opposition and later his seeking a rescinding of the affiliation motion, 
the QCE overwhelmingly approved the Foodstuffs Union's affilia-
tion, Chinese cooks and all. Forgan Smith demanded that his dissent 
from the motion be recorded in the Minutes.'* 
In 1929 Labor stunned nearly everybody by losing the election. 
Blame for the debacle was hung substantially on McCormack, not 
without justification, for he had fallen out badly with the rank and 
file, notably during the railway strike of 1927. Here Forgan Smith 
had kept his own reputation clean by staying well away from public 
comments on the strike. In the 1929 election Labor held its own 
reasonably well in the north and west, and in most rural parts of 
the state. Its losses were in the cities and industrial towns. These 
included Ipswich, Toowoomba, Gympie, three seats in Rock-
hampton, and five in Brisbane; the party had obviously lost its 
support in these vital areas. Frank Cooper {see Appendix) only just 
managed to hold Bremer, which included the North Ipswich railway 
workshops, close to which many railwaymen lived; it was a seat long 
regarded as absolutely a Labor stronghold. Even in Mackay, Forgan 
Smith's personal majority was halved. Forgan Smith now found 
himself in opposition, a new experience for him as for the majority 
of Labor members, most of whom had won their seats in 1915 or 
later. On McCormack's retirement after the election, Smith was 
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elected unanimously to the party leadership, and therefore became 
leader of the Opposition. He showed in this role the same qualities 
which had distinguished him as a Minister. His criticisims, as his 
speeches on his own Bills had been, were prepared with meticulous 
care and well-ordered sequence. As always, his attention to detail 
was a conspicuous feature of his period as leader of the Opposition. 
All government Bills were farmed out to front-bench members for 
perusal. In all such cases, the member was required to report to Smith 
personally so that intelligent and vigorous opposition would be 
possible. 
Smith decided that the hardships of the time would work against 
A.E. Moore {see Ch.l3) and his government, giving Labor a 
reasonable chance of success in the 1932 elections. He concentrated 
on keeping the peace within the party, preventing the pro-Lang 
faction from attaining any stature, at the same time expressing 
only limited support for the Premiers' Plan, and resisting moves 
(such as that at the Labor-in-Politics Convention held in January 
1932) to give greater emphasis to socialist theories in the party's 
election promises. The defeat of 1929 gave Smith the opportunity 
of leading the party back into power in 1932, with a renewed sense 
of purpose, and a degree of hope that it could not possibly have 
possessed had it been in charge through the most demoralizing years 
of the depression. Instead of taking the blame for the depression. 
Smith was able to draw attention to the faults of the Moore 
Government and the CPNP (Country Progressive National Party). 
That task became progressively easier as the depression deepened. 
Mackay was agog with excitement when Forgan Smith arrived 
there to deliver the Labor policy speech in April 1932, for the election 
to be held on 11 June. It was the first time the town had been chosen 
for such an honour. Labor's Brisbane newspaper, the Daily Stan-
dard, hardly non-partisan, said that the several thousand people who 
had "come to hear a message of hope for deliverance from the 
thraldom the people of the state [had] lived in since the advent of 
the Moore Government [were] not disappointed."" Many more 
heard the speech on their radios, which were still a comparative 
novelty. One of Smith's attributes was his good radio presence, 
described soon after the election in these terms: 
He looks at the microphone, regards it with a friendly uncritical glint 
in his eyes, and then addresses it as though he were speaking to a Caucus 
meeting. His Scottish burr is much in evidence over the air, and adds 
that little touch of character and colour of voice personality so acceptable 
to the radio listener. It has the effect of not only making the listener 
hear his voice, but of feeling his presence.'" 
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In his policy speech Forgan Smith spoke of the unimpressive 
record of the Moore Government; the £3,885,229 deficit in three 
years, the 156 per cent increase in unemployment. Much of the 
trouble, he said, flowed directly from Moore's adherence to the Lyons 
federal regime and the Premiers' Plan. Labor, he said, would press 
for a review of the Premiers' Plan, and where necessary give relief 
from its burdens. This would be achieved mainly by floating a 
£2,500,000 Queensland Revival Loan, proceeds being used to absorb 
unemployed workers in "reproductive" works, those that would 
generate future wealth rather than be mere "make-work" 
operations." As policy speeches go, Forgan Smith's effort on this 
occasion was quite good enough. It put him and his party into 
government, so who could gainsay it? There was something for 
everyone, including the tobacco growers of Mareeba; this was the 
centre of a new seat called Tablelands, which had been created in 
the Moore redistribution and which could go either way. Compared 
with Moore's feeble effort delivered the next day, Forgan Smith's 
was a fiery oration. 
Adherence to the Premiers' Plan, even if it involved further 
retrenchment and wage-cutting, was the principal feature of Moore's 
response. He hardly improved his chances when, perhaps in an 
unguarded moment, he referred to the working class as "parasites". 
And the 29,602 public servants could hardly be expected to enthuse 
over his reference to the possibility of further salary reducfions, 
accompanied by a biting attack on the public service generally. By 
contrast, Forgan Smith's whole election campaign developed into 
something of a state-wide triumphal progress. He covered the north, 
with meetings in Proserpine, Ingham, Ayr, Home Hill, Cairns, 
Mareeba, Babinda, Townsville, Bowen, Sarina, Gladstone and 
Bundaberg, as a prelude to a major speech at Brisbane City Hall. 
Moore had been counted out there at least a hundred times, with 
hoots, catcalls, and stamping varying the monotony of the count-
out. Then Forgan Smith headed west; Rosewood, Toowoomba, 
Warwick, Stanthorpe, and back to Ipswich, one of the seats lost in 
1929. The final week of the campaign he spent in his own electorate. 
The electors rewarded his zealous campaigning with a majority 
of seven seats. It was a narrow win, very dependent on the traditional 
Labor areas of support in the central and northern areas but 
enhanced by winning seven additional seats in Brisbane. In the 
Brisbane metropolitan area. Labor won twelve of the nineteen seats 
created by the redistribution of electoral boundaries. Such a clear 
majority was not reflected in the total votes cast across the 
metropolitan area, of which Labor got 89,104, non-Labor 83,026. 
The reverse situation applied to the non-metropolitan seats in the 
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southern area. For 72,143 votes. Labor won eight seats; for 88,949, 
non-Labor won fifteen. In the central area. Labor's 27,829 votes gave 
it six seats; non-Labor's 24,342 votes gave it three seats. For the 
north, Labor's 40,041 votes gave it eight seats. In very marked 
contrast non-Labor's 26,128 votes gave it only two seats. In the whole 
state. Labor won thirty-three seats for 229,117 votes, non-Labor 
twenty-eight seats for 222,445 votes. The reason for Forgan Smith's 
initial 1932 victory, or perhaps more correctly, Moore's defeat, are 
not hard to find. Moore could hardly be blamed for the depression, 
which was a world-wide phenomena. And the people of Queensland, 
always one of the Cinderella states, were not unused to hard times. 
But they had never known anything as shocking or degrading as 
the three years they had just passed through. 
The caucus election for the Cabinet resulted in victory for senior 
members of the party, who represented the moderate wing. Forgan 
Smith was thus spared the pressure of what the Brisbane Courier 
called the Young Hot Gospellers, younger members who had just 
been elected for the first time and had no experience in office. As 
well as its moderate bias, the Cabinet had three other features. 
Geographically, it was unbalanced. Six of its ten members repre-
sented northern seats. Of the other four, three were from southern 
provincial areas. Only E.M. Hanlon {see Ch. 15) represented a 
metropolitan electorate, even though an important part of Labor's 
strength now came from the Brisbane area. For the Cabinet to be 
a moderate one, such imbalance was inevitable, for the electoral 
swing had been mainly in the city seats, where many of the Labor 
members were of the newer, more militant kind, whom responsibility 
in office had not yet mellowed. The second noteworthy feature of 
the Cabinet was the strong influence of the AWU. The Premier 
himself had been prominent in AWU affairs; he had been president 
of the Mackay branch of the Labor Party and vice-president of the 
local Trades and Labor Council. Jack Dash (Transport) had been 
a vice-president of the AWU on his election to parliament; he had 
been a district secretary of the defunct Amalgamated Workers 
Association. "Mossy" Hynes (Labour and Industry) was senior vice-
president of the AWU in Queensland. Both Frank Bulcock (Agricul-
ture and Stock) and Harry Bruce (Public Works) had been AWU 
organizers, while Frank Cooper (Public Instruction) had been an 
active member of the union. The third feature of the Cabinet was 
to cause some trouble in later years. All except three of the new 
Ministers were Catholics; only Smith, Bulcock, and Cooper were not. 
One other Catholic entered parliament in that election. Vincent Gair 
{see Appendix) defeated Moore's Attorney-General Macgroarty for 
the South Brisbane seat. 
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When Forgan Smith arrived back in Brisbane on the Wednesday 
after the 1932 election, reporters were quick to quiz him on his 
intentions regarding the Treasury. His answer was fairiy definite. 
"What do you think about it?" he asked them. "I led all the financial 
debates, did I not? Without being egotistical, I do not see anyone 
else about. It is essential that the Premier should sit on the Treasure 
chest."" Two days later he confirmed that not only would he be 
Premier, Chief Secretary, and vice-president of the Executive 
Council, but Treasurer too as McCormack and Theodore had been. 
He was destined to hold the role for six years, until after the 1938 
election, when he relinquished it in favour of Frank Cooper. 
As Premier and Treasurer, Forgan Smith had to face the 
immediate problem of a premiers' conference at which the future 
of the Premiers' Plan was to be discussed. The new Premier had 
found it convenient to be in opposition when the Premiers' Plan had 
been adopted. It had brought Labor to disaster in South Australia, 
Victoria, and New South Wales, the states where it had held power. 
Forgan Smith had been neither for Langism nor for the Premiers' 
Plan. At a Special Federal Conference of the Labor Party in March 
1931, when he had spoken out on behalf of the moderate^ position, 
he had said: "Members may be disloyal in two ways. Those who 
pretend to be more radical than the majority are just as disloyal 
as those who deserted to the Opposition." Now the forthcoming 
premiers' conference placed him in a situation of having to stand 
up and be counted. 
Prime Minister Lyons began proceedings by moving "That this 
Conference affirms its adherence to the Premiers' Plan and under-
takes to meet interest obligations, and to continue progressively to 
reduce budget deficits."'^ It was not a message ringing with hope 
and confidence. Forgan Smith could hardly have accepted it and 
looked his electors in the eye again. His speech began ominously. 
He wished "to say that the Queensland Government is determined 
to meet all its contractual obligations—interest and others—but 
cannot subscribe to the Premiers' Plan in all particulars."'" He 
wanted the Prime Minister's resolution amended to declare: "That 
this Conference of Premiers affirms its determination to meet all 
interest obligations, to continue progressively to reduce budget 
deficits and to conduct public policy with a view to reviving industry, 
so as to restore normal employment to those of our citizens who 
have neither work nor wages.'"' Complete omission of any mention 
of the Premiers' Plan was going a bit too far for the majority and, 
in the final resolution, accepted unanimously, they agreed: "That 
this Conference affirms its adherence to the principles of the 
Premiers' Plan of 1931, and undertakes to reduce budget deficits, 
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and to conduct public policy with a view to reviving industry, so 
as to restore normal employment to those of our citizens who have 
neither work nor wages."" 
Insertion of the words "the principles o f before "Premiers' Plan" 
observed the letter of Forgan Smith's election policy. In Brisbane, 
Acting Premier Mullan claimed that Forgan Smith "had changed 
the whole outlook of Australia from one of gloom and depression 
to one of hope and national reconstruction."" Eventually the 
Commonwealth Bank agreed that the states could have £7,000,000 
for the task of national reconstruction, of which Queensland was 
to get £920,000. This took the place of the promised £2,500,000 
Queensland Revival Loan. Smith's Weekly said of Forgan Smith's 
performance at the 1932 premiers' conference that he had "saved 
the Conference from becoming a band of accountants and forced 
it to agree to do something about unemployment. He injected 
humanity into the cold proceedings."'* 
Forgan Smith's proposal at the premiers' conference to "conduct 
public policy with a view to reviving industry, so as to restore normal 
employment to those of our citizens who have neither work nor 
wages" was evidence of his forward economic thinking. The same 
philosophy was at the basis of Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal, 
but Forgan Smith was almost a year ahead of Roosevelt in getting 
it implemented. In his inaugural address nine months later, Roosevelt 
was to say: "Our greatest task is to put people to work." Moreover, 
the economic policy inherent in Forgan Smith's remarks at Canberra 
in 1932 were similar to those being outlined by J.M. Keynes. Smith's 
1932-33 budget set the pattern for all six he prepared. Each of them 
was to provide for a deficit. His first had to be within the £1,485,000 
agreed to at Canberra, rather than the £2,750,000 that Moore's 
preliminary estimates had anticipated. He achieved this by minor 
reductions in expenditure, some transfers and adjustments, rises in 
land tax, railway freights and fares, and income tax. The burden 
of increased income tax was to be on those individuals with incomes 
of over £250 a year, and on companies. The state's finances gradually 
improved. By 1938-39 revenue had increased to £8.6 million, 
compared with £5.6 million in 1932-33. Relief tax had dropped from 
32 per cent of revenue to 28 per cent and income tax had risen from 
£1.7 million to £3.2 million. 
Smith quickly turned to ameliorating the miseries then being 
caused by Queensland's most immediate economic problem. Concern 
for the unemployed remained his lifelong preoccupation. Like Keir 
Hardie, who managed to earn himself the name "MP for the 
Unemployed" at Westminster, Forgan Smith had seen enough of 
unemployment on the Clydeside to know the misery it caused. He 
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had been the obvious choice to pilot the 1922 Unemployed Workers 
Insurance Act through caucus and Parliament. During the depres-
sion it was only to be expected that Forgan Smith would be 
commenting actively on the subject. At the federal conference of 
the party in 1930, he moved that a special committee on unemploy-
ment should be set up. It was his view that: "If the Labor Movement 
cannot deal with the problems of unemployment, then the movement 
will have failed. This strikes basically at the life of everyone in the 
community ... Everyone knows that unemployment is due to the 
present economic fabric of society itself, and that economic organisa-
tion has to be completely altered before unemployment can be 
brought to an end". He was more concerned with immediate relief 
than with long-term considerations. He observed that "the objectives 
of five years ahead do not matter. Present relief is the only thing 
that counts". 
By the time Forgan Smith spoke at the conference, pressure of 
unemployment had become so great that even non-Labor govern-
ments were being forced to take fairly drastic steps in attempting 
to relieve it. In Queensland, the Moore Government levied a new 
tax of threepence in every pound of income to fund the scheme 
started in March 1930. Married relief workers were paid £3 a week, 
compared with the £4 basic wage, which drew an attack from Labor 
members of parliament. So too did the fact that the tax fell at an 
equal rate on all incomes. The tax was not enough to sustain the 
fund and eventually had to be doubled. In his 1932 policy speech 
Forgan Smith promised to pay the basic wage to all relief workers. 
It was fairly apparent that if the new Government was to fulfil this 
promise, more money would have to be found. This was done by 
introducing a graduated tax, with rates of up to one shilling in the 
pound on income of £500 and over. Forgan Smith's power to increase 
the tax by Order-in-Council rested on Moore legislation passed in 
1931, when the Governor-in-Council had been authorized to continue 
the' tax, and limitation on his power to increase it had been repealed. 
At least one Brisbane newspaper was hopping mad about this, now 
that Forgan Smith was taking advantage of it. The culprit, according 
to the Daily Mail was not Moore for passing the legislation, but 
Forgan Smith, for not opposing it more vehemently at the fime. In 
fact, one of the first things parliament did when it first met after 
Forgan Smith's election was to cancel this particular power. 
By 1 August 1932 all relief workers were being paid at the rate 
of £3 14s Od a week, to which the basic rate had by then fallen. 
The need for single men to walk from centre to centre to collect 
ration coupons was abandoned. They could draw rations in their 
home town as from 28 June 1932. Even this scheme was replaced 
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by one that gave single men a share of the available relief work— 
one day every second week. As well as the Unemployment Relief 
Tax, there were other funds that could be used to provide work. Of 
the special £7,000,000 found for the states by the Commonwealth 
Bank, Queensland got £920,000, a handy supplement to the Relief 
Tax Fund, particularly when put beside the £620,000 of ordinary 
loan funds allocated to Queensland that year. Pressure on the 
Unemployment Relief Tax fund was gradually eased by falling 
unemployment. From the peak year of 1932, when it reached 18.8 
per cent, the figure fell to 11.7 per cent by 1934. That was bad 
enough, but it was the lowest in Australia, due partly at least to 
Queensland's lesser degree of industrialization. 
Rates of Unemployment Relief Tax were reduced in 1935, an 
election year, and again in 1938, another election year. But by then 
the scheme of unemployment relief was drawing to the end of its 
life in any case. At the Labor-in-Politics Convention at Mackay in 
February 1938 there were no fewer than fifteen separate motions 
for the abolition of relief work. By this time, Forgan Smith was 
himself beginning to have serious misgivings about the efficacy of 
the Intermittent Relief Scheme. It had been in operation for eight 
years, but there was still substantial unemployment. And while much 
useful and lasting work had been accomplished, costs had been 
excessive. 
The scheme was by its very nature unsound on a long-term basis. 
It was designed as an emergency measure to get people back to work, 
to provide them with hope. But many relief workers had drifted into 
a hopeless dead end, in which their morale was sapped and their 
earnings kept on a poverty level. There had been abuses too. Those 
who were making a permanent profession of relief work were 
becoming quite uninhibited; more than half the male population of 
Coolangatta, on what is now called the Gold Coast, consisted of relief 
claimants. Some local authorifies had taken advantage of the scheme, 
undertaking permanent capital works and conducting essential 
services with relief labor, and thus with funds provided by the relief 
tax, a practice which militated against any effect the scheme might 
have had in providing additional employment. 
Still, for a Labor-governed state to be the first to abolish 
unemployment relief was quite a drastic step. For a time it was 
uncertain that Forgan Smith would be able to get the party to follow 
him in this course." But it did, and when parliament met in 1938 
a completely new scheme was presented. Its provisions included 
abolition of relief work, which was to be replaced with a co-ordinated 
programme of public works. These would generate full-time work, 
at the same time as providing the state with essential public works. 
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The State Development Tax was part of that scheme. In the 1938 
session, the Income (Unemployed RelieO Tax Acts 1930-35 were 
repealed by the Income (State Development) Tax Act, which was 
to operate from 1 January 1939. The State Development Tax was 
nothing more than the old tax with a new name. Instead of being 
paid into a Trust Fund, it was paid into Consolidated Revenue. Nor 
did the State Development Tax require re-enactment every year; it 
continued until repealed or changed by parliament. It had all the 
marks of permanence. 
The changes from Unemployment Relief Tax to State Develop-
ment Tax were consistent with the shifting emphasis in Forgan 
Smith's attitudes to public works. At first he had justified his works 
programmes substantially on the grounds of economic recovery. In 
introducing his second budget on 4 October 1933 he said: 
In addition to creating assets of value to the community, the utilization 
of funds for these purposes relieves unemployment in a most effective 
way. Business is stimulated by the circulation of increased purchasing 
power, which in turn augments the demand for consumer goods. To the 
extent that consumers' purchasing power is created, so will solvent 
demand be restored, which will permeate, with beneficial results, all 
sections of trade and commerce. 
Even as early as 1934 he was beginning to shift his ground. In 
introducing his budget that year, he said: 
Even if there were no problem of unemployment to demand the utmost 
endeavours to provide useful work for our citizens, the opportunities of 
cheap and plentiful money, and of cheap construction, would themselves 
dictate such a policy. This is the time to equip our State with necessary 
public utilities; it is economical to do so ... The Government is pursuing 
a perfectly sound business policy ... even from the narrow points of the 
works themselves ... The works on which we are engaged, and which 
we are assisting, are the actual requirements of a young country, and 
will pay for themselves. 
Queenslanders have ever been receptive to talk of development. The 
Forgan Smith formula for public works had proven quite acceptable 
to the electors three times already when the State Development Tax 
was introduced. Continued spending at a high level would appeal 
to the financial and commercial sections of the community, as well 
as to the working class. A great multitude of minor works had been 
carried out under the unemployment relief scheme. To provide 
maximum relief of unemployment, it was necessary to undertake 
projects that could be started quickly, and that had a high labour 
content and a wide geographical spread. But Forgan Smith was a 
great builder. He wanted to see the state developed, and if this were 
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to occur, something additional to the unemployment relief scheme 
was necessary. The role of planning longer-term, more substantial 
projects went to the Bureau of Industry, set up soon after the 1932 
election. Forgan Smith was president, while J.B. Brigden, a former 
professor of economics at the University of Tasmania, who had been 
brought to Queensland by the Moore Government as Director of 
the Bureau of Economics and Statistics (which the Bureau of 
Industry replaced), was Director.'" The bureau soon busied itself with 
plans for such major works as the Story Bridge and Somerset Dam; 
later on it would find a further outlet for its resources in the new 
university buildings at St. Lucia. 
The building of the Story Bridge from Kangaroo Point was 
politically contentious. Whether it should be built at all, whether 
or not it was a suitable project for the State Government to 
undertake, whether the administrative machinery set up was ap-
propriate—all these were the subject of much argument. Until the 
1930's the metropolitan part of the Brisbane River was crossed by 
bridges in only two places. There was one road bridge, the Victoria 
Bridge, which took traffic from William Street, Queen Street, and 
North Quay across to South Brisbane. The original Victoria Bridge, 
built in 1877, was washed away in the 1893 flood, and the existing 
structure replaced it. By the 1920s it too was the subject of much 
concern. Since the only other bridge was the rail crossing at 
Indooroopilly, Victoria Bridge was the sole road traffic bridge across 
the river, and a vital artery. Engineers had uttered repeated warnings 
that the traffic it was carrying had reached the margin of loading 
to which it could safely be subjected. In 1925 the Brisbane City 
Council, taking heed of these warnings, appointed a Cross River 
Commission, which had made an exhaustive enquiry into the city's 
needs for additional facilities. It proposed a new bridge from 
Kangaroo Point to the neighbourhood of Petrie Bight or Bowen 
Terrace. The Commission could foresee one of the main two 
problems, and had a solution to offer: the obstruction of shipping 
could be overcome by a canal through Kangaroo Point. If this were 
done, a low-level bridge could be built; as well as lower cost, easier 
grades for traffic would result. There was one other difficulty, the 
cost of construction, which was beyond the means of the Brisbane 
City Council." Although the Commission estimated that a bridge 
at the Kangaroo Point site would take 33 to 40 per cent of the traffic 
across the river, it recommended instead a stopgap measure. A low-
level bridge between Grey Street and North Quay could be 
completed in much less time, and would give earlier relief to the 
overtaxed Victoria Bridge. Resulting from this recommendation, the 
Grey Street Bridge (now called the William Jolly Bridge) was built 
in a very short fime in 1931." 
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For a Labor government on the lookout for suitable public works, 
the bridge project had much to offer. The 1929 election defeat had 
been substantially due to the disenchantment of metropolitan voters. 
They had returned to the fold in 1932 in barely sufficient numbers 
to put Labor back in power. If significant progress on the bridge 
could be shown before the 1935 election, it might help to convince 
these voters that their judgement had been right, and perhaps 
persuade some others to join them. Considerable employment would 
be generated. The metropolitan commercial classes would also 
benefit from the extra business provided by such a large project. 
The Government must therefore have been pleased when the 
Bureau of Industry's provisional report suggested the building of a 
bridge at Kangaroo Point. Detailed planning took some time. Forgan 
Smith eventually signed the contract in his office on 30 April 1935, 
in good time for the 1935 election, and with appropriate public 
relations flourish. As he wielded the shovel that turned the first sod, 
the Premier told onlookers, "I'll have ye knaw, that I hae a union 
ticket for this class of work." His statement was literally true, for 
in Queensland not even a premier was exempt from compulsory 
unionism; it was customary for Labor politicians to take out a ticket 
in the AWU. Work on the bridge soon began in earnest, and there 
were regular calls on the £1,500,000 loan that had been arranged 
with the Australian Mutual Provident Society. Strikes and steel 
shortages delayed progress, so the superstructure was not joined until 
28 October 1939. When the bridge was finally open to traffic on 
6 July 1940, Forgan Smith was the main speaker. The two 
archbishops, Halse and Duhig, left in a huff because they had been 
seated in the sun among the ordinary visitors on the bridge roadway. 
A couple of days later Forgan Smith issued a half-hearted apology. 
He chose to ignore the rumours that the portable radio the 
contractors presented to him had been stuffed full of notes, £10,000 
being the favourite sum quoted. 
Another project likely to appeal to metropolitan electors was the 
building of a dam to secure an adequate water supply for the 
Brisbane and Ipswich areas for the next fifty years, and to prevent 
or mitigate damage caused by floods in the Brisbane River." From 
a variety of proposals the Bureau of Industry clearly favoured a dam 
at Little Mount Brisbane, on the Stanley River (a tributary of the 
Brisbane), together with river works at Kangaroo Point to permit 
a faster flow of water in times of flood. Since the project would 
provide work for 1500 men for four years, the Bureau proposed that 
half the cost be found from the Unemployment Relief Fund. As with 
the Story Bridge, the Somerset Dam proved to be a longer-term 
project than its planners had intended. Only in September 1941 did 
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the dam reach a sufficient height at all points to permit closure of 
the six-foot slot left to permit the flow of water. Eventually the war 
forced the dam-builders to give up. Work resumed in 1948, but 
Forgan Smith did not live to see the dam completed. Not until 1954 
was all the concrete and subsidiary work finished. As part of the 
flood mitigation works, the Brisbane River at Kangaroo Point was 
widened to a minimum of 800 feet, the concave bend regularized, 
and rocks removed from the river bed. Some consequent reconstruc-
tion of wharves and road access to them was required. 
Of all major public works initiated during his Premiership, Forgan 
Smith very likely got most personal satisfaction from the new 
university building at St. Lucia. The University of Queensland since 
its foundation in 1909 had been housed in the old Government House 
at the bottom of George Street, near Parliament House. The 
arrangement had only ever been intended to be temporary, and after 
nearly thirty years cramped accommodation was handicapping both 
staff and students. During the 1920s Dr. James O'Neil Mayne and 
his sister donated 200 acres of land at St. Lucia, valued at £50,000, 
as a new site for the university. In 1936 Forgan Smith announced 
that the Government intended to make a start on the project, at 
an esfimated cost of £300,000 for the initial stages. In laying the 
foundation stone of the new university buildings on 6 March 1937, 
Forgan Smith observed that there were people who said there would 
never be a university at St. Lucia, that the Government was not 
serious in its expressed intention to build. These people would live, 
he hoped, to see that: "This is no empty gesture. The new buildings 
can and will be erected. The money will be found to finance the 
construction. As surely as night follows day I shall be present at 
the opening, at no very distant date."'" Work began on the grounds 
in August 1937, when intermittent relief workers began laying out 
a sports oval. Construction of the library and main building began 
in March 1938. Once again we may suspect the keen Forgan Smith 
sense of timing, for the state election was less than a month away. 
This comment is the more pertinent when the subsequent slowness 
of the work is noted. Once World War 11 began, the new university 
did not seem to warrant high priority. Entry of J^pan into the war 
put a stop to all progress until peace returned. Only then was 
sufficient accommodation available for any worthwhile exodus from 
the old cramped and crowded George Street quarters. 
Such a large project as the Mackay Outer Harbour construction 
in Forgan Smith's own electorate was sure to draw some comment. 
Smith's Weekly, at times favourably disposed towards the 
Queensland Premier, eventually complained that: 
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payers of relief taxes in Queensland unknowingly are helping Premier 
Forgan Smith to make his seat safe in Mackay. Forgan Smith can take 
the credit for the Mackay Harbour Scheme, but some of the cash for 
it is coming from Relief Tax. Every Friday the Relief Taxpayer is 
consolidating a vote for Forgan, whether he likes it or not ... Why is 
the Mackay Harbour scheme being undertaken at all, except that it 
means a great deal of money spent in Forgan Smith's own electorate?" 
In fact there had been long agitation for a deep water harbour at 
Mackay, and it was a constant source of resentment against the far-
away Brisbane Government that nothing had been done about it." 
In 1933 the Mackay Harbour Board was able to announce that 
the Government had offered to assist in financing an outer harbour 
project, provided a poll of electors was taken. The result of the poll, 
taken on 24 February 1934, was 10,528 for the scheme and 1510 
against, presumably on the ground that they thought the district could 
not find the interest payments on the money needed, even though the 
Harbour Board had pointed out that present lighterage costs were 
more than enough for this. Tenders for the work were called. The 
winning tender came from Brisbane contractor George A. Stronach, 
whose bid of £785,213 18s 6d was £150,000 less than the next 
highest. Stronach had completed other major contracts successfully, 
and the Engineer of the Harbours and Marine Department was able 
to explain away his low price. So Stronach got the job. Forgan Smith 
placed the first stone in position on 14 September 1935, by which 
time 281 men were at work and £140,000 already spetit." Less than 
a year later he arrived back from a trip to Britain to hear that things 
were not going at all well on the Mackay Outer Harbour project. 
The cost of work to date had far exceeded the estimates and the 
Engineer of the Harbours and Marine Department, who had been 
so confident about Stronach's contract, now recommended that it 
be cancelled." 
Forgan Smith was too astute a politician to make the Mackay 
Harbour Board's decision for it. On 24 July 1936 it met, cancelled 
Stronach's contract, and took over the main contract itself, prior 
to dividing it into three sections. M.R. Hornibrook Pty. Ltd got the 
job of building the pier and Brisbane Street Bridge, but there were 
no tenders for the uncompleted breakwaters. Mackay Harbour Board 
decided to continue these works itself, a decision that would hardly 
have dismayed Forgan Smith, for day labour rather than contracting 
had been widely used by the Queensland Government when he had 
been Works Minister." Three years later the job was substantially 
completed. Forgan Smith performed the official opening ceremony 
with his usual flair. He chose to arrive by the Sydney Star, the first 
ship to tie up at the new pier. He waved his tartan scarf to the 
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spectators, shouting through the megaphone that it was the Mackay 
tartan, a tribute to John Mackay, who had settled the town seventy-
seven years before."* Actually, a lot more work had to be done on 
the harbour, and it was a year after the official opening before it 
was complete. 
Many public works of a less spectacular nature were undertaken 
by Forgan Smith governments. Many of the state's roads were 
improved, for instance, and there were other projects in Brisbane, 
such as the new long-distance railway station at Roma Street, 
Breakfast Creek drainage works, and elimination of railway level 
crossings, notably that at Bowen Bridge Road. 
Forgan Smith did not see the university as only so much bricks 
and mortar, so much unemployment relief, so much public works, 
something to tell the voters about at election time. His zeal for the 
interests of Queensland led him to an appreciation that education 
was a primary factor in the state's development. He always saw a 
complement of trained men and women as vital, and he acknowl-
edged that for vocations which required university qualifications, 
only a university could supply sufficient trained people. His en-
thusiasm was not Umited to university education, however. His 1941 
National Education and University of Queensland Act Amendment 
Act provided for a "complete national system of education from 
Kindergarten to University". When introducing the Bill, he observed 
that his government had a policy "whereby the doors to education 
shall be open to all citizens of the State, no matter how humbly 
situated". There was enough of the intellectual in him to value 
learning for its own sake, although he would not have had much 
to say on that topic in the party room, or on the hustings."' 
His first contribution to the university was in 1926, when as 
Minister for Agriculture he argued that a Faculty of Agriculture 
was highly desirable, not only on the teaching and research side of 
the university, but as a general aid to the agricultural industry. He 
arranged for a grant of £5000 a year, enough in those days to enable 
the new faculty to be established." But his greatest contributions 
were to come in his years as Premier. In 1934 he announced "a 
goodwill gesture for the continued success of the university", a new 
library at the George Street site."' In laying the foundation stone, 
during the University Jubilee Celebration Week, he thought it politic 
to observe that "the people should take pride because the university 
had not neglected the practical for the merely cultural. It had 
remembered the needs of the daily life of the people"."" 
In 1935 Cabinet decided to invite well-known doctors and other 
officials to form a select committee to give it preliminary advice on 
the establishment of Faculties of Medicine and Veterinary Science. 
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In addition to the Government's wish to see the university prosper, 
there was also the question of health services. The Government 
intended to establish a full-scale Ministry of Health if it won the 
forthcoming election."' On the same day that he announced the plan 
to consider the two new faculties, Forgan Smith announced that the 
university's endowment, cut from £20,000 to £16,000 in the Moore 
days, would be restored."* Keenly aware that Queensland's university 
lagged behind those of other states, Forgan Smith pushed ahead with 
its development. The reports on the proposed Faculties of Medicine 
and Veterinary Science were favourable, and they commenced 
teaching in 1936. The plan to build at St Lucia was pushed through 
largely by Forgan Smith's tenacity in the face of Cabinet indifference 
to the whole project. And as part of the Government's co-ordinated 
development of the university and the state's health services, a 
Faculty of Dentistry was established; the new building for it erected 
in Turbot Street was opened in 1941. 
If Forgan Smith was showing his kindness to the university, then 
the university was fairly warm in its response. On 3 May 1935, just 
a month after the announcement of the medicine and veterinary 
science enquiries, three days after he laid the foundation stone of 
the new library, and only a week before the state election, he was 
admitted honoris causa to the degree of Doctor of Laws. It "seemed 
fitting that the close and fruitful association between the university 
and the Government of Queensland should be recognised by confer-
ring on the leader of the Government of the day the highest honour 
at the disposal of the Senate". Forgan Smith received the honour 
proudly, and wore his robes often."' 
But the honeymoon between Forgan Smith and the university 
gradually gave way to tension. The Premier's introduction of the 
National Education and the University of Queensland Act Amend-
ment Bill in 1941 produced the first overt signs. This particular Bill 
increased the university's annual endowment from £20,000 to 
£40,000. But whereas the Senate had previously had twenty mem-
bers, ten nominated by the Government and ten elected every three 
years by the University Council, the Government now proposed that 
there would be twenty-five members, fourteen appointed by the 
Government and nine by the University Council, with the Director-
General of Education and the President of the Professorial Board 
members ex officio. 
The annual meeting of the University of Queensland Union carried 
a motion of protest, and there were some letters in the papers. There 
were varying accounts of an interview between Forgan Smith and 
the president of the Union, which opposition leader Maher described 
as a "command interview". Maher quoted student leader Hopkins 
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as saying that for forty minutes the Premier had told him of the 
Government's intentions and achievements at the university, and that 
the Bill would go through in spite of what the students said or did. 
Hopkins had tried to put the students' side of the case but could 
not get a word in. While Maher made these allegations, Forgan 
Smith continually interjected, claiming that they were untrue. He 
wound up the debate with the statement that the Government, in 
taking full responsibility for the university's expenditure, where it 
exceeded revenue, was entitled to a managing say in the control of 
the university; university people should not regard themselves as a 
privileged section of the community above the law."' 
Forgan Smith's attitude to the university always showed some 
ambivalence. For one thing, all the faculties set up under his auspices 
were technical ones. Perhaps this was because such faculties were 
lacking, or perhaps because they appealed more to the pragmatic 
Queensland mind. But he was always conscious of the risk of rearing 
a brood of illiterate scientists, and pointed out to the university the 
need for a Chair of Civics. A civic conscience must be developed 
in this and other countries to establish democracy on its rightful 
pinnacle for the preservation of freedom, he said."' His respect for 
academic qualifications was in sharp contrast to his lack of patience 
with intellectual snobbery. His standard explanation as to why 
communism attracted many university people was that in a com-
munist order they would be able to satisfy their lust for power. Their 
feeling of conscious superiority led them to the feeling that they 
would be in charge.'" However, files in the Queensland State Archives 
show that it was not communists in any university positions that 
Forgan Smith had under view, but communists, suspected com-
munists, and radicals among the trade unions and unemployed that 
Forgan Smith had the state police watch, infiltrate, and report on 
during the 1930s. 
In spite of such reservations about academics, and the tension that 
had grown up between him and the university, Forgan Smith 
succeeded Sir James Blair as Chancellor when the latter died in 1944. 
In this role, the ex-Premier presided over much of the general 
expansion of the university in the post-war years. He was still 
Chancellor when he died in 1953. Vice-Chancellor Story said of him: 
"The university owes much to Forgan Smith; it should perpetuate 
his honour worthily; generations of graduates will owe much to him 
for making it possible to widen university opportunities; to all of 
us he gave a lead in service and in the living of a busy and useful 
life"." 
In a decade when dictators were in the ascendant, it was unlikely 
that a leader as vigorous as Forgan Smith would long escape being 
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dubbed with the term. It came from within the party as well as from 
without. Accusations of Forgan Smith's dictatorship first came from 
outside the party in November 1936, when he fell foul of the 
newspapers for hanging some additional clauses on the Racing Bill. 
The object of these was to prevent newspapers from obtaining and 
disclosing prior information about proposed legislation: they pro-
vided severe penalties for persons refusing to divulge the sources of 
their information on Bills or parliamentary papers. All this was a 
direct result of the Courier-Mail having published information about 
the Racing Bill some days before it was introduced in parliament, 
information which Forgan Smith described in the house as stolen. 
Then the furore started. The Courier-Mail dubbed the clauses 
the "Press Bludgeon". The Telegraph quoted an article by Delane, 
of The Times, in support of press freedom." Truth used the term 
"Dictator" for the first time in the affair and possibly for the first 
time in a newspaper." Keith Murdoch wrote in the Melbourne 
Herald of "a dictatorial invasion of public liberties", and published 
a cartoon showing a "Queensland politician" between portraits of 
Hitler and Mussolini.'" The Telegraph published a cartoon of Forgan 
Smith seated on a large throne between pictures of Hifier and 
Mussolini, giving a Nazi salute and reading a life of Hitler, while 
a Gestapo-type policeman dragged a reporter off the scene." 
Opposition leader Maher used the word dictator again in 1940 
when speaking on the Public Safety Bill, which gave the Government 
almost limitless powers in time of war. But on that occasion Forgan 
Smith was able to demand and get an apology on the floor of the 
house.'' In fact, the most authoritarian piece of legislation introduced 
by a Forgan Smith government attracted little public debate at the 
time; certainly it did not fill the newspapers in the way the press 
clauses of the Racing Bill had done. The State Transport Act of 
1938 included drastic emergency powers. Section 22 proclaimed that 
the Governor-in-Council might declare a state of emergency, upon 
which "no legal proceedings could be brought against the Com-
mission, and proclamations, Orders-in-Council, and regulations 
should not be questioned in any legal proceedings whatsoever". The 
Opposition was hardly exaggerating when it described these powers 
as tremendous. 
We may examine for ourselves just how "dictatorial" these three 
pieces of legislation really were by comparing them with similar 
legislation elsewhere, or similar legislation passed in Queensland by 
other governments and we can consider how the suspect legislation 
was implemented by Forgan Smith. The clauses in the Racing Bill 
were in conformity with the British Official Secrets Act, passed by 
the House of Commons." The Federal Government had also recently 
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expelled a reporter from the press gallery for premature publication 
of information. And although the clauses stayed on the statute books 
for twenty-three years, they were never once implemented." The 
Public Safety Act enabled the Government, in the event of war, to 
abrogate the common law rights of every individual and to take away 
all rights of habeas corpus. It was very much akin to a Bill just 
passed in Victoria, and there were similar Bills in Britain and New 
Zealand. The Act was proclaimed soon after Japan came into the 
war, but the fiow of National Safety Regulations from Canberra 
made it look tame indeed." The offending Section 22 of the State 
Transport Act was word for word the same as provisions in the Moore 
Government's Railway Strike and Public Safety Act of 1931, an Act 
which Forgan Smith had repealed as soon as he had come to power. 
The Opposition could hardly be too vocal about his re-enactment 
of the Bill. Section 22 of the State Transport Act was to be invoked 
several times in the future, but never by Forgan Smith. Hanlon used 
it enthusiastically against striking meatworkers in 1946, and striking 
railwaymen in 1948, Gair against shearers in 1956, and Bjelke 
Petersen against would-be disrupters of a football match, in which 
the South African Springboks played, in 1971. From all this it is 
hard to come to the conclusion that Forgan Smith had any more 
than a normal politician's tendency to become a dictator. There was 
more in his bark than his bite. 
Within the Labor Party he had his detractors. The Trades and 
Labor Council held a protest meeting about the Public Safety Act 
in the City Hall.'" And at the 1941 Labor-in-Politics Convention 
at Southport, the Premier was taken to task by Frank Waters for 
"the many undemocratic principles contained in the Public Safety 
Act".*' Waters was one of several ALP members who had chafed 
under the restraints imposed by Forgan Smith and had been refused 
nomination as the Labor candidate for Kelvin Grove, the seat he 
had held from 1932 to 1938, but which he had lost three years before 
to the Protestant Labor Party. Forgan Smith and Clarrie Fallon, 
the AWU state secretary, were in complete command of the ALP 
during the 1930s. The loss of the 1929 election and the consequent 
measures of the Moore Government against workers and unions, 
when added to the continuing fear of unemployment in that decade, 
kept the militants in the ALP comparatively quiet. Nevertheless 
Forgan Smith believed that the militants on the left of the party 
had been a factor in the loss of office by Labor in 1929 and he, 
Fallon, and the "Inner Executive" were determined that Labor would 
not again be brought down by this section of the party. The ALP 
was kept under a tight rein with QCE meetings becoming mere 
formalities endorsing decisions already made by the "Inner Ex-
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ecutive", which often met in Forgan Smith's own office at Parliament 
House. Billy Demaine, the QCE president, was a figurehead only. 
In spite of all the unkind things said about Forgan Smith and 
his authoritarianism, there is no evidence of real dictatorial tenden-
cies. Sometimes his administration was a little heavy-handed, but 
he always consulted his Ministers before coming to a decision on 
a major matter, and in the event that they did not agree with him, 
he accepted the rejection with goodwill. Particularly in the later 
Forgan Smith years, he had to rule the parliamentary party strongly, 
to replace the cohesive force, absent in the Queensland parliament, 
that a vigorous Opposition would have provided. People who knew 
him well and held him in high regard say there was no doubt about 
his increasing authoritarianism. But he was in no sense paranoic. 
He was acutely conscious of the authority he had so easily 
established over his own party. He sometimes confided in close 
associates, such as economist Colin Clark, that he felt uneasy about 
it, and feared that later this authority might fall into the wrong 
hands." 
Forgan Smith's career had been one of solid progress to the state's 
highest political office. The Scottish painter became premier at forty-
five, an assured and experienced politician. In an age when medi-
ocrity was the keynote in Australian politics, he stood out as a man 
of ability and purpose. He had grown used to power, to being obeyed. 
His basic success was that he understood people and, although dour, 
he could mix at any level of society. During the 1930s federal Labor 
was so short of talent that it would have been natural for Forgan 
Smith to think of deserting state politics in favour of the big league 
at Canberra, following in the footsteps of Fisher, Ryan, and 
Theodore, all of whom had started their political careers in 
Queensland. We have no way of knowing Forgan Smith's own 
innermost thoughts on the subject. What we do know is that 
journalists and political commentators at the time were more than 
ready to help him decide. They constantly speculated that he would 
take over from Scullin, and later, from Curtin. 
For most of the time Smith was Premier, rumours like this 
continued. They always gained emphasis before elections, the general 
line being that as soon as he had led the party to victory in 
Queensland, he would leave for Canberra. And whenever there was 
a by-election for a Queensland federal seat, Forgan Smith's name 
was always bandied about. The Premier regularly issued denials, but 
the rumours never stopped. With such a grip on the situation in 
Queensland, Forgan Smith was possibly too astute to be catapulted 
into the factionalism of federal Labor politics in the 1930s. He had 
been twenty years in politics, only three of them in opposition, so 
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he could hardly relish that role in Canberra. Moreover Forgan Smith 
was a good friend of Jim Scullin, and would hardly seek to depose 
him. At the same time, he would be unlikely to accept anything less 
than leadership. Once Curtin had made good in that role, with unity 
restored, even if somewhat haltingly, Forgan Smith's line of progress 
to the prime ministership seemed to be effectively blocked. Now the 
speculators began to see him in the role of Agent-General in London, 
even Governor. Perhaps he would be found a seat in the House of 
Commons, possibly get a place in the next Labour Ministry in 
Britain. But nothing ever came of any of these ideas, and the Premier 
simply carried on as Premier. 
Why did Forgan Smith consistently turn his back on federal 
politics? Sir Robert Menzies wrote that Forgan Smith never aspired 
to federal office at all, that he was a "dyed in the wool 
Queenslander"." This is probably too innocent a view. A more 
realisfic variation on this theme is that he saw impending troubles 
in the federal party, and wanted no part of them, particularly in 
view of his failing health. Nor was he particularly friendly with 
Curtin or several other leading figures in the federal party. They 
were all too far to the left for his liking. It would not be worth while 
being leader without control of the party machine, as he had been 
used to in Queensland. Too many compromises would be involved.*" 
The less charitable view is that he aspired to be prime minister, and 
wanted to take short cuts to get there. If that was the case, he could 
not expect much encouragement from Labor politicians in Canberra. 
Curdn in particular had reason not to be enamoured of up-and-
comers from Queensland. He had chafed in idleness and disillusion-
ment on the back bench after being passed over for a Cabinet post 
in both Scullin governments. According to Page, Curtin was inclined 
to blame Theodore for his exclusion. As a Theodore protege, Forgan 
Smith was likely to be another domineering personality. Curtin was 
fearful of his thrusfing ambition, particularly as he had been 
identified so often, however unofficially, with the federal leadership. 
Proposals to bring him into a federal government, whether by means 
of a seat in the House of Representatives or in a wartime Cabinet 
consisfing of the Prime Minister and the state premiers, always got 
a cold reception from Curtin." 
Although Forgan Smith stayed clear of federal politics he did get 
involved in the federal affairs of the party, doing some of the leaders' 
dirty work for them. For instance, it was he who in 1940 told the 
troublesome New South Wales executive that it would have to go, 
while Curtin stayed away. His opposition to communist influence 
in the party was longstanding. The aftermath of the Russian 
Revolution, which occurred in his early days in politics, had shocked 
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him. We may assume that he was not enthusiastic about the 
socialization objective written into the party platform at the 1921 
Brisbane conference; both his mentors, Theodore and McCormack, 
voted against its adoption. He was active at the 1927 federal 
Conference, when the socialization objective was watered down. 
From personal notes he left, we know that he saw communism as 
"essentially materialistic in character", and with "no moral-
inhibitions regarding the methods used". It was a "totalitarian 
doctrine" which adopted "the same methods as the Nazis and 
Fascists"." 
On the other hand, socialism was something quite different, 
something to which he could subscribe with all his heart and soul. 
"Socialism challenges the gross materialism of Tory and Communist 
alike", he wrote. "Socialism is a moral principle operating through 
all forms of human activity, and is based on the truism that man 
is greater than the institutions he creates ... Socialism does not aim 
to destory profitable activity, but proposes that all engaged in human 
effort shall share equitably in the results of that industry". His view 
of socialism was a flexible one. He had been through the full cycle 
of the State enterprises—the State produce agency, the State hotel 
at Babinda, the State butcher shops, the State cattle stations, and 
the like. He had been involved in the heady days of their genesis, 
he had been through the torment of seeing them falter and fail, and 
he had been through the experience of closing many of them down. 
He came to the realization that one way to socialism was through 
State-regulated capitalism. His elaborate scheme for the man-
agement of the sugar industry was an excellent illustration of this. 
An even more graphic example of this philosophy exists in the control 
measures that Forgan Smith developed for the electricity generation 
industry in Queensland. It is a paradox that only in that state, the 
state with the strongest socialist tradition, was the major electricity 
undertaking operated by private enterprise. 
Forgan Smith showed his flexibility too in his changed attitude 
to conscription. In the forefront of those opposing it in 1916 and 
1917, he was nevertheless prepared to reappraise his attitude in the 
changed circumstances of 1942. At the QCE meeting on 12 
November 1942, he fought vigorously for the adoption of Curtin's 
proposals that conscription for service in limited areas should be 
introduced. In the event, the Queensland Executive decided to oppose 
Curtin's plan, but it was carried federally by four states to two. 
After a somewhat shaky start in 1932, Forgan Smith governments 
had a comfortable electoral record. From 1935 on, there never 
seemed the slightest possibility that they might lose an election. 
Labor's success in 1935 was spectacular enough for one observer 
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to write that "by a free vote, Mr. Forgan Smith obtained an election 
result which in its unanimity almost rivalled those obtained by 
Mussolini and Hitler by the blandishments of blood and iron"." This 
seems to be going a bit far in the light of the evidence, for although 
Forgan Smith governments were remarkable in the nature and 
duration of their electoral success, the voters of Queensland were 
certainly never behind them to an extent that could be described 
as "unanimity". 
The 1932 election was based on electorates defined in the Moore 
redistribufion of 1931. Reducing the total seats from seventy-two 
to sixty-two eliminated seven Labor seats and three non-Labor seats. 
Such an approach was largely justified, for since 1915 Labor had 
allowed many safe Labor seats to drift to less than half the proper 
quota of electors. The commissioners for that redistribution, gazetted 
on 4 February 1932, worked on a quota of 8000 electors for 
metropolitan electorates, 7500 for larger towns, 7000 for smaller 
towns and their districts, and 6500 for remote country shires. Labor 
vehemently opposed this redistribution. Forgan Smith argued for 
equality of representation and a continuation of the "one vote, one 
value" principle that Kidston had introduced in 1910. In the debate, 
in pariiament on 8 September 1931, he said: 
A principle of representative government is veing violated. A principle 
of representative government in a democracy is that, so far as it is 
humanly possible, each vote shall be of equal value: but in this case the 
Government are perpetuating a system whereby one electorate can have 
3,200 votes fewer than an adjoining electorate and yet have the same 
influence in Parliament ... it is devised chiefly in the interests of the 
Country Party, with a view to the return of five members on that side 
to four members on this side. 
For the 1935 election, the Forgan Smith Government arranged its 
own redistribution. This created a new metropolitan seat, Baroona, 
almost assured to Labor, and eliminated a rural one, Murilla, 
traditionally held by the Opposition. Fry, an unsympathetic contem-
porary commentator, described the process as "electoral gerryman-
dering, which goes under the name of redistribution of electoral 
boundaries"." To many observers Forgan Smith's name became 
synonymous with gerrymandering, a notoriety he hardly deserved. 
His accusers base their charges on the 1935 redistribution, the only 
one made during the Forgan Smith years. Forgan Smith may have 
once been elected on a minority vote, but his minority was not really 
sinking. For example, in 1938 Labor obtained 47.2 per cent of the 
valid vote, the Country and United Australia Party 36.6 per cent, 
the Protestant Labor Party 8.7 per cent, and Social Credit, Com-
munists, and Independents 6.8 per cent. If the Protestant Labor Party 
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vote had been added to Labor's, it would in fact have had an absolute 
majority. 
The regional basis of Labor support in the Forgan Smith years 
also had some interesting aspects. Although reasonably successful 
in the metropolitan area. Labor was by no means exclusively 
dependent on town workers. Indeed, its genesis had been amongst 
the miners, bush workers, and provincial city workers. In the early 
days it had caught on only slowly in Brisbane. Consequently it 
continued to rely for its hard core support on the mining, pastoral, 
and industrial workers of northern and central regions where Labor 
majorities were usually quite considerable. In the state elections of 
1935, 1938, and 1941, Forgan Smith governments won all ten 
northern seats. In the central Queensland seats, the posifion was 
much the same; Labor won all except three seats there in the state 
elections of 1932, and all except one in 1935, 1938, and 1941. Only 
in the southern seats did the combined opposition parties have any 
worthwhile success at all—they always had a majority of those. 
However much it may be argued that some gerrymandering did 
go on, the Opposition's abysmal showing in Queensland during the 
1930s and early 1940s can only be attributed to its own ineptitude. 
The CPNP was at best a compromise organization that had come 
into being when the Nationalists and the Country Party had devised 
a "working arrangement". After the debacle of the 1935 election, 
the arrangement began to come loose; in fact it had been creaking 
at the joints for some time." Finally, in 1936, it was announced that 
"the CPNP organisation has been dissolved, and Country Party 
members in the House have terminated their alliance with the 
Nationalists". Now that the Opposition was divided, it was even 
easier to conquer. 
The Nationalists were absorbed into the UAP (United Australia 
Party), which set up a branch in Queensland on 8 April 1936, two 
days after the final break-up of the CPNP. Forgan Smith must have 
enjoyed the spectacle of the Country Party and the UAP battling 
for the federal seat of Darling Downs, when the death of the sitting 
UAP member necessitated a by-election in December 1936. One of 
his most competent Country Party adversaries, Arthur Fadden, who 
had been defeated in the 1935 state election, won his way into the 
House of Representatives in this by-election. The two opposition 
parties did manage to come to terms on sharing out the electorates 
to be contested in 1938, but there was a partial breakdown of the 
arrangement in 1941. Demoralization in the Opposition was com-
plete. In keeping with its arrangement with the UAP, the Country 
Party did not enter a single candidate for a metropolitan seat in 
1938. Consequently their total showing in the election was thirty-
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four candidates, and since the party needed at least thirty-two seats 
to form a government, they clearly had no such aspiration. Nor was 
the UAP ever a force in Queensland politics. Its numbers rose from 
three to four in the 1938 election, but in 1941 it saw its parliamentary 
leader lose his seat to Bruce Pie, who was not even a government 
candidate but an Independent. There seemed little possibility of a 
workable coalition between the Country Party and the UAP, in view 
of their continually strained relations. Even if such a coalition had 
occurred it would have been a most unsatisfactory alternative to 
Forgan Smith's well-organized and well-disciplined Labor Party. 
The electors seem to have been only too aware of that. 
Given Forgan Smith's frequently stated concern about the trend 
of federal-state relations, particularly in financial fields, his opposi-
tion to the uniform tax scheme was only to be expected, notwithstand-
ing the fact that it had been devised by his federal Labor colleagues.™ 
He had represented Queensland at the premiers' conference from 
which the Financial Agreement of 1927 had emerged. He later 
maintained that he had never been in favour of ending the 
Commonwealth's per capita payments to the states, but that they 
had been presented with no alternative." He saw the Loan Council 
system as a distinct infringement on the sovereign rights of each 
state parliament. Queensland sent but one representative to the Loan 
Council, which made decisions that were binding on the Queensland 
parliament whether it liked them or not. Possessing views like this, 
he could not have been expected to look with favour on developments 
that would extend federal power further. He joined with the other 
state premiers in rejecting the Menzies proposals for uniform tax, 
presented to a special meeting of premiers in Canberra on 27 June 
1941. 
Less than a year later, with Japan now in the war, and the Curtin 
Labor Government in power in Canberra, uniform tax proposals 
came up again. When the premiers turned them down, Curtin and 
his Treasurer, Chifiey, went ahead with their plans, submitting to 
federal parliament four related Acts that made uniform tax a fait 
accompli without the consent of the states. Forgan Smith described 
these actions as "an assault on the states", and "an evasion of the 
consfitution". If the scheme were not an amendment of the Constitu-
tion, then it was an evasion of it, and it was a matter of grave regret 
that it had not been left to more normal times. He expressed his 
determination to fight the plan to the bitter end." 
There were newspaper reports that Forgan Smith would resign 
from the Premiership so that he might devote himself to the fight 
against uniform taxation." He soon denied this, saying that he could 
wage the fight more successfully while able to call on the resources 
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of his office. His point of view was succinctly put in a newspaper 
article published over his name: "The Commonwealth government 
proposes, without the consent of the people of Australia, to effect 
a revolutionary change in our political structure. By usurping the 
power to be the sole taxing and collecting authority in Australia it 
will reduce the states to mere vassals dependent on the dole for their 
very existence"." Notwithstanding the resistance of the states, the 
uniform tax legislation became law, and survived a High Court 
challenge by Queensland and other states. Forgan Smith made the 
most of all this; he pointed out that the states had managed to have 
it clearly established by the court that the states were sovereign and 
that the new scheme was only valid for the duration of the war, a 
view history was not to support. 
In fact most Queenslanders stood to gain financially from uniform 
tax. The Queensland Taxpayers Association came out in favour of 
it, which is not too surprising when it is considered that throughout 
the Forgan Smith years Queensland had always been the most highly 
taxed state. But Forgan Smith remained a states' rights man. The 
coming of uniform taxation, associated with the general atfitude of 
the Curtin Government to state powers, was by no means the least 
factor leading to his resignation from the Premiership and from 
parliament later in the year. 
Taking up his new life in Queensland where he did and when he 
did, and given his already well-developed taste in politics, it was 
inevitable that Forgan Smith would be drawn into sugar matters. 
Sugar had been a subject of great political activity for many years, 
and Mackay was the sugar capital of Australia. The question of 
Kanaka labour was resolved ten years before Forgan Smith arrived 
in Mackay. The emotive issues then were the prices paid by millers 
to farmers for sugar cane, and working conditions and wages offered 
by both of them to hired labour. CSR (Colonial Sugar Refining 
Company) dominated the industry, and although a royal commission 
of 1912 had been unable to find evidence of malpractice on its part, 
there was nevertheless considerable opposition to the CSR among 
growers and pressure for an independent price-fixing mechanism. 
The farmers in particular were in a cleft stick, particularly after 
an Industrial Court Award guaranteed sugar workers a minimum 
scale of wages, without any corresponding guarantee that farmers 
would get an economically viable price for their cane. They therefore 
became an important factor in the 1915 election, a sufficient number 
having decided that their best hope of salvation lay with Labor. Every 
northern constituency returned a Labor member, Mackay changing 
its traditional allegiance in the process by electing Forgan Smith. 
The new Member for Mackay soon set about making himself the 
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Labor Party's authority on sugar matters. Even before parliament 
met, the Ryan Cabinet had issued a proclamation acquiring the 1915 
crop. The idea has stuck, for the Queensland Government has 
subsequently acquired the sugar crop every year. As soon as 
pariiament met in 1915, the proclamation was given legislative 
sanction by the Sugar Acquisition Act of 1915, which has been the 
keystone of the organized marketing of Queensland sugar ever since. 
The cane prices dilemma was resolved by the Regulation of Sugar 
Cane Prices Act of 1915, which set up a series of Local Sugar Cane 
Prices Boards, each with two canegrowers' representatives, two 
millers' representatives, and a chairman, normally the stipendiary 
magistrate. These boards had the judicial capacity to make price 
awards and specify conditions. Appeal from them was to the Central 
Sugar Cane Prices Board. When the legislation was before the house, 
Forgan Smith observed that it was the desire for this Bill that had 
been to a large extent the reason for the Labor Party's coming to 
power." 
In the years that followed, much of the marketing organization 
of the sugar industry was developed, substantially in the form in 
which it still exists. When Forgan Smith became Minister for 
Agriculture in 1925, he gave particular attention to the sugar 
industry. His monumental Primary Producers' Organization and 
Markefing Act of 1926 made provision for a graduated system of 
management for the industry, with a Mill Suppliers Committee for 
each mill. These sent representatives to District Cane Growers 
Executives, which in turn sent representatives to the Queensland 
Cane Growers Council. Affiliation with all three was mandatory for 
each and every farmer. By 1928, when expansion in the industry 
had reached such a point that no further markets were available, 
no additional land was assigned for cane-growing." It was virtually 
impossible to sell cane not grown on assigned land. Not until after 
World War 11 were extra areas opened up, to enable returned 
soldiers to start sugar farms. 
The sugar industry suffered a severe setback in 1932, soon after 
Forgan Smith became premier. The Sugar Agreement between the 
Queensland and Commonwealth Governments guaranteed a min-
imum price for sugar sold on the domesfic market. During the Moore 
regime it had been set at fourpence-halfpenny, but once the Labor 
Party took over in Queensland, the Lyons Federal Government 
started to pressure the Queensland Government to accept a reduction 
in price. A new rate of fourpence a pound was eventually forced 
upon the unwilling Queenslanders. As one delegate of the 
Queensland Cane Growers Council put it: "They put a pistol at our 
heads and had their fingers on the trigger"." 
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Forgan Smith journeyed to Britain several times on behalf ofthe 
sugar industry. In 1934 he went to London to represent Australia's 
interests in Britain's overall review of its sugar requirements. The 
preference for dominion sugar was worth £1,000,000 to Queensland 
each year. Smith was back in London again early in 1936, this time 
to represent the industry at a projected World Sugar Conference. 
This was eventually abandoned, a development the Queensland 
Premier found entirely to his satisfaction, for it would have been 
suggested there that a 7 per cent cut in output should be agreed 
to by all sugar-producing countries.'* Smith came back from that 
trip convinced that restriction of production was inevitable, and 
began to prepare the industry psychologically for it." In 1937 he 
was in Britain again, this time to attend the International Sugar 
Conference held under the auspices of the League of Nations. This 
conference seemed unlikely to offer Queensland anything but 
restriction, but if it had to be held then it was just as well for 
Australia to be heard there.*" There was a fuss when Lyons 
announced that Casey and Bruce would represent Australia, for the 
industry clearly wanted Forgan Smith. Lyons scrambled out by 
appointing Smith as substitute delegate.*' When Australia's quota 
of 400,000 tons, plus a share of any unforseen market increase, was 
announced, the industry was jubilant.*' 
Growers still seemed disinclined to limit production voluntarily, 
so in 1938 a royal commission was set up to look into the subject. 
It proposed more vigorous enforcement of all mill peaks, as a 
corollary to which there would need to be farm peaks, a maximum 
that any one farm could supply to the mill in any one season. In 
fact it was to be a long time before these provisions came into effect, 
for the outbreak of war soon meant that Britain was prepared to 
take as much sugar as Queensland could send. Not until after 1948 
was there any need to think again about limiting the crop. By then, 
sugar had provided Forgan Smith with his retreat from politics. 
Although the original Act had not specified that the chairman of 
the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board should be a judge of the 
Supreme Court, all appointments followed this principle until 1936, 
when an amendment to the Act specifically provided for it. Yet only 
three years later, another amending Bill included provision that a 
lay chairman might be appointed. This led to speculation that either 
Forgan Smith would himself take the position or that it would be 
offered to a federal member, thus creating a vacancy for Forgan 
Smith in Canberra.*' 
As things turned out. Smith was to stay on as Premier for another 
three years, but he did eventually take up the sugar job late in 1942. 
He resigned the Premiership on 16 September 1942, staying on in 
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the Cooper Government as a Minister without Portfolio, concerning 
himself with sugar matters. On 9 November he resigned from the 
Government and on 10 December took up the appointment of 
Chairman of the Central Sugar Cane Prices Board, the term of the 
Chief Justice, Sir William Webb, having expired on that day. It was 
an office in which Forgan Smith would have the status, the 
responsibilities, and the duties of a Supreme Court judge, a fact of 
which he remained acutely conscious. He would have to make 
decisions affecting the lives of thousands of people, and the economic 
stability of the state. Soon he was also appointed a member, and 
then chairman, of the Sugar Board, thus gaining a controlling 
position in both the production and marketing sides of the industry. 
What motivated him to accept these posftions? There were many 
persons ready to put it down to cynical self-interest. The 1939 
legislation seemed calculated to reinforce this view. The dual 
positions carried a salary of £1650, no small sum in 1942, when the 
basic wage was still under £5 and the salary of the Premier was 
only £1450. There can be little doubt that he saw it as an escape 
from politics. But he had inherited no sinecure, and it was probably 
true, as he himself said, that if the job had been elective he would 
have won it.*" Expansion of the industry was in full swing during 
the later years of Forgan Smith's life. By the time of his death on 
25 September 1953, the state's annual output of sugar had grown 
to a million tons. In 1915, the year when he had entered parliament, 
it had been less than 150,000 tons. 
Forgan Smith's personality and caution certainly contributed to 
his career, but it was built on a more solid foundation too. He worked 
his way upwards one step after another, earning each promotion by 
doing his homework well, and putting a pathway of achievement 
behind him. He revelled in day-by-day administration, and expected 
his Ministers to do the same. When he was to speak in the house 
on a matter of importance, he prepared himself well, a practice his 
Ministers emulated if they did not wish to earn his displeasure. He 
did not ask for loyalty. He demanded it. His work for Queensland 
was the work of consolidation. His name does not appear in many 
works on Australian politics, for he created few spectacular prece-
dents. He did not lead the Labor Party into power for the first time. 
He did not have any exciting confrontations with the industrial wing. 
He did not abolish any upper houses. He did not lead his party to 
any absolute routs. Nor did he ever stride sullenly across the floor 
of the house, nor walk defiantly out of any meeting-rooms. 
During his long political history he saw many drifts in Labor 
policy, and he accommodated himself to them. He witnessed the 
failure of the party's first attempts in State enterprises, or socialism 
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as some people called them. He started as a radical and finished 
as a moderate, a democratic rather than a dogmatic socialist. He 
did not go on mouthing the same old platitudes, as many other Labor 
leaders have tended to do. But there was a limit to how much 
accommodation he was prepared to make, particularly in the matters 
of growing federal power and what he saw as the increasing influence 
of communism in the unions and on the party. His active partici-
pation in politics did not long survive his resignation from the 
Premiership. He took part in the conscription wrangle late in 1942, 
and during the first few weeks of 1943. After that his disengagement 
from politics was not only precipitate, but complete. 
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A City Bushman 
KENNETH W. KNIGHT 
"1 will never resign. They will have to carry me out with my boots 
on." That is what Edward Michael ("Ned") Hanlon was reported 
to have told friends when they pressed him to relinquish the 
Premiership of Queensland because of failing health.' The response 
was typical of him. No one really expected that Hanlon would step 
down or retire from politics, so it came as no surprise that he died 
still in office on 15 January 1952.' By then Hanlon had represented 
the Brisbane electorate of Ithaca for twenty-six years, had served 
in Queensland ministries for a total period of just under twenty years, 
and had been Premier of the state for almost six years. He had risen 
from obscurity to become widely known as a vigorous, forceful, and 
active political leader. In the aftermath of World War II his 
government had faced many difficulties and some of his actions and 
decisions had caused controversy and great hostility. 
Yet Queenslanders who remember Hanlon seldom refer initially 
to his Premiership. Indeed that period of six years often goes 
unmenfioned. Instead the discussion is usually about his work on 
behalf of mothers and children and in the development of hospitals. 
This is understandable because Hanlon served between 1932 and 
1944 as Home Secretary and then as Secretary for Health and Home 
Affairs, during which time he did a great deal to encourage the 
growth of Queensland's public hospital system and to improve 
numerous aspects of social welfare. His political reputation was 
firmly established in that period, so much so that the rest, despite 
its drama and strife, was almost anti-climactic. The feeling of many 
was summed up by the Queensland president of the AWU (Austral-
ian Workers Union), who in commenting in 1952 on Hanlon's career 
said: "While his work as Premier will stand the acid test of success, 
Edward Hanlon: MLA (Ithaca) 1926-52; Home Secretary 1932-35; Secretary for 
Health and Home Affairs 1935-44; Treasurer 1944-46; Premier, Chief Secretary, 
and Vice-President of the Executive Council 1946-52 
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it was his years as Minister for Health and Home Affairs which 
brought forth some of his most brilliant achievements ... "' This 
conclusion is supported by one of Hanlon's former political oppo-
nents. Sir Thomas Hiley, who has expressed the view that Hanlon's 
"greatest contribution was to the public health of this state" and 
that "hospital development and other facets of public health in 
Queensland moved further in Hanlon's period than under anyone 
else up unfil then"." 
For Hanlon the path to top political office in Queensland was a 
common one among the earlier generation of Australian Labor Party 
leaders. In many respects his career may be seen as an archetype, 
an ALP "model". 
One of the seven children of an Irish agricultural labourer, Hanlon 
was born on 1 October 1887 in the Brisbane working-class suburb 
of Paddington, where he still lived at the time of his death. His 
parents, Michael and Mary Anne Hanlon, had migrated to Australia 
about 1880. Two of their children had been born before they left 
for Australia; five, including Edward Michael, were born in 
Queensland. 
After an initial period in the Spring Hill and Paddington areas 
of Brisbane the Hanlons took up a selection at Barambah Creek 
near Gayndah. They farmed that selection for seven or eight years 
but eventually a prolonged drought forced them off the land and 
they returned to Brisbane. 
Hanlon's schooling had been neglected in the country and he 
started behind scratch at the Red Hill convent and later the Petrie 
Terrace State School. Times were difficult for the family. The father, 
Michael Hanlon, had bought some cows and was trying to start a 
milk run and Ned with his brother Frank delivered milk before and 
after school. At fourteen he left school and went to work as a 
messenger boy for a group of barristers, each of whom contributed 
ninepence towards his weekly earnings of six shillings. Six months 
later he obtained a position in a grocery store for fifteen shillings 
a week. There he worked from 7 a.m. to 7 p.m. each day and then 
went on to evening classes at the Brisbane Technical College. This 
brief period of attendance at evening classes provided Hanlon's only 
formal schooling after he left the Petrie Terrace State School at the 
age of fourteen. 
In 1908 Hanlon joined the railway service, first as a porter at 
the Roma Street goods shed and later as a shunter, and soon began 
to develop an interest in union affairs and politics. As a member 
of the WPO (Workers Political Organization), a forerunner of the 
Labor Party's branch system, Hanlon was one of a group of speakers 
who regularly conducted street corner meetings to advocate the 
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policies of the labor movement. Within the railway service he was 
associated with men such as Frank Cooper {see Appendix), Mike 
Kirwan, Joe Sherry, and Tom Brown, all later to be prominent 
figures in the Queensland labor movement,^ and with them he helped 
to create the Queensland Railway Employees Association, which 
later became the ARU (Australian Railways Union).' Hanlon 
became vice-president of the new union and a member of its 
management committee. 
At that time unions were beginning to be a power in industry, 
but their growing influence was meeting strong opposition from 
employers. Ironically, in view of subsequent developments, one of 
the earliest steps in Hanlon's rise to prominence was his role in a 
major industrial conflict, the General Strike of 1912. 
Employees of the privately owned Brisbane Tramway Company 
had been endeavouring for many years to establish their right to 
join a union which would be formally recognized by the company. 
However, all such attempts had been blocked by the management 
of the tramways, which had not hesitated to dismiss or discipline 
those in the forefront of the moves to introduce unionism. On 15 
December 1910 the Australian Tramway Employees Association 
obtained federal registration and members were recruited for a 
branch in Brisbane. Early in 1911 the company was advised of this 
but would not recognize the union. Later union members were 
refused permission to use the company's recreation rooms and the 
ALF (Australian Labour Federation) and the PLP (Parliamentary 
Labor Party) concluded that the company's actions and attitudes 
affected not only tramway employees but the whole of organized 
labour. The situation was potentially explosive and it was clear that 
further trouble between tramwaymen and management would almost 
inevitably lead to serious and widespread industrial action. 
To foster trade unionism and to emphasize the notion of solidarity 
unionists at that time commonly wore badges. This had already given 
rise to dispute in southern states and in September 1911 the matter 
had been referred to the federal Arbitration Court. When the badges 
were received in Queensland in January 1912 it was decided that 
they should be worn. The tramway company, however, directed the 
men not to wear union badges and dismissed those who persisted 
in doing so. Although non-unionists were employed as replacements 
the company found itself so short of trained staff that its services 
had to be severely curtailed. 
Several public meetings, with attendance up to an estimated ten 
thousand in one case, were held in Brisbane and there were 
allegations of brutality when mounted police cleared the roads. When 
the company refused to negotiate with the Australian Tramway 
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Employees Association a general strike became a distinct possibility. 
The company's actions were seen as part of a concerted attack on 
trade unionism as such and the ALF convened a meeting of union 
representatives to discuss the situation on Sunday, 28 January 1912. 
That meeting, attended by delegates from forty-three unions, decided 
that unless the Australian Tramway Employees Association were 
recognized and its members allowed to wear union badges, a "general 
cessation of work" would be declared from 6 p.m. on Tuesday, 30 
January. This ultimatium was ignored by the company and the strike 
began as planned.' 
Among railwaymen there were serious divisions of opinion about 
the dispute but a mass meeting of members of the Queensland 
Railway Employees Association gave strong support to the call by 
the ALF for a general strike. Hanlon was elected chairman of the 
railway strike committee* and served as a member of the general 
strike committee. In both those capacities his drive and organizing 
ability quickly became apparent and when the unions were faced 
with a criticial shortage of funds it was he who devised a special 
"currency issue" to induce stores to provide rations on the basis of 
credit notes redeemable after the strike. 
The background to the dispute and the events of the five-week-
long strike have been described by Daddow, Morrison, Murphy and 
Kennedy. It was a significant landmark in Queensland's industrial 
history, denoting the end of the ALF in the state, the formation 
of the Queensland Railways Union as a state-wide all-grade railway 
association, and the emergence of the AWU as the dominant force 
among Queensland unions. 
In personal terms the strike was for Hanlon an event of tremendous 
magnitude and one which had a profound effect upon his future. 
He was a marked man. Leaders of the political labor movement like 
T.J. Ryan {see Ch. 10), E.G. Theodore {see Ch. 11), and W. 
McCormack {see Ch. 12), declared their opposition to the principle 
of the general strike in which Hanlon had played such a prominent 
part, and the strike was settled on terms which forced Hanlon, 
Cooper, Kirwan, and Sherry to leave the railway service. The events 
of the period were to have a lasting effect upon Hanlon and upon 
his political attitudes. Although his own victimization and that of 
other leading strikers strengthened his determination to work for the 
cause of organized labour, Hanlon was also left with a conviction 
of the futility of general strikes, in which it is difficult to provide 
financial help for the families of strikers. 
Although the events of 1912 represented an important element 
in Labor's coming to office in the state elections of 1915, Hanlon 
was not on hand to witness the triumph. When he was forced to 
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resign from the railway service he went back into the grocery 
business, but at the outbreak of World War I in 1914 he enlisted 
and served in Egypt and France with the 9th Battalion, a unit that 
saw a great deal of active warfare. 
Hanlon was discharged at the end of the war with the rank of 
sergeant, and he returned to the grocery trade, this time in 
partnership with his brother, P.J. Hanlon. Before he enlisted Hanlon 
had been secretary ofthe Ithaca branch ofthe WPO, the name given 
to local branches of the Queensland Labor Party, and after the war 
he resumed his interest in Labor politics. He also became active in 
the affairs of the Returned Soldiers League. In common with most 
members of the Labor Party Hanlon detested Australia's wartime 
Prime Minister, W.M. Hughes, because of his actions during the 
conscription issue, and he greatly resented such events as returned 
soldiers chairing Hughes in Brisbane and crowning him with a 
digger's hat. He believed that these acts were rigged for political 
purposes and that the Returned Soldiers League was being exploited 
by shrewd politicians for their own political ends. With other labor 
men, therefore, he formed a political body of returned soldiers, the 
Returned Soldiers Labour League. 
In 1922 Hanlon married Elizabeth Carver, the daughter of an 
Ashgrove dairyman. Two years later he made his first attempt to 
gain elected office when he opposed John Fihelly, author of the 
Queensland State Insurance Act, Minister for Railways in the state's 
first Labor Government in 1915, and Queensland Agent-General in 
London, in a pre-selection ballot to choose a candidate for the 
Paddington ward in the Greater Brisbane elections. He astounded 
Fihelly by almost beating him in his own Irish stronghold. 
As the 1926 state elections approached doubts began to be 
expressed about the effectiveness of J.T. Gilday, the ALP Member 
for Ithaca. The QCE (Queensland Central Executive) of the Labor 
Party began to take stock of the situation, and as that became known 
no fewer than fourteen party members nominated for the Ithaca pre-
selection ballot, presumably reasoning that if it were intended to drop 
Gilday others might as well put themselves forward for consideration. 
Most of the candidates had little to commend them except their own 
optimism, although apart from Gilday himself there was a serious 
contender in Robert Funnell, afterwards MLA for Brisbane. Funnell 
was not only a good organizer but also had the backing of a 
significant element within the QCE. His candidature, however, 
stimulated a good deal of resentment among the numerous party 
members of Irish extraction living in the Paddington area. To them 
Funnell was practically a foreigner from over the border—he lived 
in the Kelvin Grove area. To keep Ithaca "in the family" Hanlon 
was encouraged to nominate. 
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Hanlon won the pre-selection ballot, defeating Gilday, Funnell, 
and the fourteen other nominees. After protests, however, the Central 
Executive disallowed the ballot and ordered another. Intense or-
ganization and lobbying preceded this second ballot, for which there 
were only three candidates: Hanlon, Funnell, and Gilday. Hanlon 
not only had considerable numerical support at the branch level but 
also significant backing from prominent party members such as 
Joseph Coll and T.E. Maloney, later Commissioner for Railways. 
The closing stages of this second ballot produced all the elements 
of drama which legend associates with ALP pre-selection contests. 
At 6.00 p.m. the returning officer left the room to collect sixty postal 
ballots which had been overlooked, but Hanlon promptly closed the 
door of the office being used for the poll and declared that as the 
voting hours were over no more ballot papers would be allowed into 
the room. With his brothers Frank and Joseph Coll he then guarded 
the ballot box throughout the night and, when subsequently the votes 
were counted, Hanlon had won. Of the sixty postal votes not admitted 
to the count at least fifty were for Hanlon's opponents.' 
Having won pre-selection for such a strong Labor seat as Ithaca, 
Hanlon's election to parliament was almost a formality. The various 
party factions in the electorate, including the supporters of Gilday, 
rallied behind him and on 8 May 1926 he entered the Queensland 
parliament. 
As a parliamentarian Hanlon quickly demonstrated that he had 
the gift of plain, incisive speaking, but his first three years as a back-
bench supporter of the Government gave him little opportunity to 
distinguish himself. He was still serving his apprenticeship. His 
personal opportunity came when the Labor Party lost the May 1929 
election. That election produced one of the most sensational land-
slides in Australian political history. Labor, which had held office 
for fourteen years, went to the polls with forty-three seats out of 
seventy-two, but succeeded in winning in only twenty-seven elec-
torates. Four Ministers were among the sixteen Labor represent-
atives who lost their seats, and a remarkable feature of the result 
was the strong vote against Labor in all the cities and industrial 
centres. A vigorous performance in opposition was essenfial if the 
party were to restore the morale of its members and regain office. 
Hanlon was one of those who came to the fore in this period and 
by his forcefulness as an opposition member carved for himself a 
place in the Ministry William Forgan Smith {see Ch. 14) was to 
form in 1932. 
The ALP's period in opposition was short-lived. The Moore 
Government, which had replaced it, quickly became electorally 
unpopular, in part because of the drastic economies it imposed, h 
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suffered in the 1932 election from the activities of a new political 
organization, the Queensland Party, which was in essence a group 
of independents convinced that both of the established political 
parties had lost popular support. The Queensland Party did not 
succeed in winning any seats in the election but it did cut into the 
non-Labor vote quite significantly. The ALP under the leadership 
of Forgan Smith won thirty-three seats in a house of sixty-two 
members.'" Included among those seats were twelve of the eighteen 
metropolitan electorates. Two Ministers of the Moore Government 
were defeated. 
The new Labor Ministry was elected by caucus on 17 June 1932. 
Its composition represented a victory for the senior members and 
moderate wing of the party. Six of the ten members of the new 
Cabinet represented northern constituencies; one sat for a western 
electorate; and two were from southern provincial areas. The sole 
Minister representing a metropolitan constituency was Hanlon." All 
Ministers except Hanlon had close connections with the AWU. 
Hanlon was allocated the difficult Home Office portfolio and from 
his first day in the department displayed an administrative flair that 
developed even more fully as his detailed knowledge of departmental 
operations grew. Over the years he built up a high reputation as 
both a Minister and a parliamentary performer. His approach to 
his administrative and political functions was always a vigorous one. 
In debate he was noted for his large store of invective, employed 
indiscriminately against any and every opponent. He was always 
ready to join in the rough and tumble aspects of politics and, indeed, 
had no superior as a political in-fighter. This is not, of course, 
surprising. No man who had learned his political ABC in Paddington 
and had won Labor Party pre-selection against a sitting member 
could fail to have the ability to "mix it" in politics. 
In his ministerial office, Hanlon provided a complete reorganiza-
tion of the departments associated with public health and welfare. 
He brought in Raphael Cilento as Director-General of Health to 
do the reorganization. Cilento was then an experienced and am-
bitious medical administrator who joined with Hanlon in seeking to 
provide a system of free public hospitals with comprehensive medical 
treatment. Hanlon greatly expanded the hospital service; con-
siderably increased the facilities for ante-natal care throughout the 
state; was responsible for the creation of the Queensland Radium 
Institute, a significant organization for the treatment of cancer, and 
for the formation of the Queensland Health Education Council; he 
extended the state's creche and kindergarten services; initiated the 
system of prison farms; and devoted a great deal of attention to 
improving the conditions of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders. 
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However, it was with regard to hospitals that he made his greatest 
contribution to the state. In 1936 the Hospitals Act was passed, an 
Act that brought together a multitude of earlier Acts and regulations. 
Local hospitals no longer were required to seek outside help when 
their expenditure outran their income; this was made up by state 
and local governments. A new women's hospital was opened by 
Hanlon in 1938. The amendment to the Hospitals Act in 1944 placed 
responsibility for the building and maintenance of public hospitals 
on the State Government, and from 1945 local government was no 
longer required to assist in financing local hospitals. It was when 
Hanlon was Treasurer that he negotiated the Commonwealth bed 
day subsidy, which provided Queensland with free public hospitals 
after I January 1946. Some of these moves, particulariy the 
expansion of the public hospitals system, brought a storm of abuse 
around his head. He also made a host of political enemies, including 
some in the state and federal Labor parties, because of his hot temper 
and assertive nature. 
At this stage, as had been the case for many years previously, 
the AWU was one of the dominant elements in Labor Party and 
Queensland politics generally. Although Hanlon represented a 
metropolitan electorate and had no direct AWU connections it is 
clear that his political ideas were in close harmony with those of 
leaders of that union and with the rural development orientation of 
his Cabinet colleagues. 
From his initial appointment as Home Secretary in 1932 Hanlon's 
progress towards the Premiership of the state was steady but sure. 
He had very few setbacks along the way. His ministerial career as 
Home Secretary and from 1935 as Minister for Health and Home 
Affairs was a very successful one. His work in reorganizing the 
hospitals and health services was of lasting benefit to the state. 
Although he himself regarded hospitals as his "speciality", his 
contributions towards reforming the penal system and improving a 
number of social services were very significant. 
During the pre-war period Hanlon steadily and carefully built up 
his influence in the state Labor Party and with the powerful AWU. 
Only once did he encounter a serious difficulty which almost cost 
him the seat of Ithaca. That was in the election of 2 April 1938 
when, following a particularly bitter sectarian fight, an appeal was 
lodged by the Protestant Labor Party candidate, G.S. Webb, against 
the election result on the ground of alleged irregularities in the poll; 
invesfigating the matter, the Election Tribunal (Mr Jusfice E.A. 
Douglas) found that Hanlon had not been legally elected. On appeal 
to the full bench of the Supreme Court, however, that finding was 
reversed and Hanlon's election was confirmed." 
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Although Hanlon's dislike of criticism and his tendency to lose 
his temper and over-react when people did not agree with him 
represented a political weakness, he was essentially a man with a 
highly developed sense of political timing. When the position of 
deputy leader of the PLP became vacant in 1940 there were a number 
of suggestions that he should stand for the position but that sense 
of political timing rightly told him that his moment had not arrived. 
Instead he moved in caucus the nomination of E.A. Cooper, who 
was duly elected as Forgan Smith's deputy. 
The parliamentary period of 1942 and 1943 covered two Labor 
ministries: the Forgan Smith Ministry, which resigned on 16 
September 1942, and the Cooper Ministry, sworn in on the same 
day. 
An announcement in the Courier-Mail of 10 September 1942 of 
the resignation of the Premier had been the first intimation that 
many members of parliament had had that the Premier had just 
become Chairman of the Sugar Cane Prices Board. The Ministry 
resigned six days later. 
With the swearing-in of the Cooper Ministry, Hanlon was ap-
pointed deputy Premier whilst continuing to hold the portfolio of 
Health and Home Affairs. 
In 1944 Labor was re-elected to office and at the party's first 
caucus meeting on 25 April Cooper and Hanlon were unanimously 
endorsed as leader and deputy leader of the parliamentary party. 
The eight other members of the Ministry were also re-elected by 
caucus and on the following day Cooper announced the allocation 
of portfolios. Perhaps the biggest surprise was the transfer of Hanlon 
from Health and Home Affairs to Treasury. In deciding upon this 
move Cooper argued that the work of the Premier's Department had 
grown heavier and would continue to increase as it became necessary 
to embark on extensive post-war planning. For that reason it was 
desirable to separate the offices of Premier and Treasurer and for 
Hanlon as deputy Premier to take the important Treasury portfolio. 
By now Hanlon's strong position in the Government was firmly 
established and there was no doubt that his ultimate succession to 
the Premiership was virtually assured. Had there been any doubt 
about this it would have been resolved in any case by the ability 
which Hanlon had displayed and was to display in various periods as 
Acting Premier: as, for instance, in the work he did in April 1945 
towards ending a serious bread strike which had come about because 
of a clash between the Commonwealth Prices Commissioner and the 
bakers; and in his actions during a dispute in August-September 1945 
between the Brisbane City Council and the Tramways Union. During 
both these strikes Hanlon was prominent in the negotiations between 
the disputing parties. 
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Less than seven months later, on 7 March 1946, Cooper resigned 
on the ground of increasing age and Hanlon's long foreshadowed 
move to the Premiership came about. Because of his experience and 
ability all sections of the party regarded Hanlon as the natural and 
logical choice and he was unopposed for election as leader of the 
parliamentary party. He was succeeded as deputy leader by E.J. 
Walsh, who somewhat surprisingly defeated Foley (the Minister for 
Health and Home Affairs) by six votes in the final ballot. In the 
Ministry, sworn in on 7 March 1946, Hanlon served as Premier and 
Chief Secretary and vice-president of the Executive Council." 
In his period as Premier, from 1932 to 1940, Forgan Smith had 
exercised considerable influence on Queensland's economic policy. 
As Member for Mackay he had close connections with the sugar 
industry and his views about the importance for Queensland of 
primary production generally were quite unequivocal. Hanlon's 
attitudes, then and later, were in accord with this. Although he was, 
as Premier, to place great stress on the need for capital works projects 
which would help develop the state industrially, he saw most of these 
projects as having a direct relationship to the stimulation of rural 
industries. He envisaged an immense hydro-electric grid and huge 
irrigation works, arguing that, given water and adequate power 
supplies, Queensland could be one of the richest and most productive 
parts of the world. The Blair Athol deposits could provide very cheap 
coal, while water supply schemes and the low-cost supply of 
electricity would encourage the settlement ofthe inland areas ofthe 
state.'" 
Immigration was low on Hanlon's list of priorities. In most states 
increased immigration was closely linked with governmental policies 
designed todevelop secondary industry, but in Queensland immigra-
tion was seen not as part of a process of industrialization but as 
being related to rural development.'^ As Hanlon put it: 
We will open up works in the country ... with the view of taking a big 
proportion of the migrants out into new callings and occupations where 
they will not become a pool of unemployed in the city, and by working 
in the country on projects established there they will be encouraged to 
become primary producers and go on to the land instead of cluttering 
up the labour market." 
There is no doubt that the economic policies of Queensland 
governments up to World War II were overwhelmingly "rural" in 
emphasis and the orientation towards ruralism and decentralization 
(with a concomitant neglect of manufacturing) was continued into 
the post-war period and throughout the term of office of the Hanlon 
Government. Although a secondary industry department was estab-
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lished inside the Labour Department when V.C. Gair {see Appendix) 
was the Minister, the policy emphases of the period were based on 
a faith in the state's future as a primary producer and a belief that 
external conditions, world demand, and prices would continue in 
Queensland's favour in the foreseeable future." Of the government 
members, moreover, it was Hanlon who was, both inside and outside 
pariiament, the staunchest of the advocates of ruralistic economic 
policies. Up to his death, for instance, he remained enthusiastic, 
despite clear evidence of serious problems, about the Peak Downs 
scheme which had been introduced in 1948 to encourage, through 
a joint Queensland/United Kingdom corporation, primary prod-
uction and the processing and marketing of foodstuffs." 
Sir Thomas Hiley has spoken approvingly of Hanlon's ideas for 
the developing of Queensland. In his view there was much to 
commend in the various projects that Hanlon supported: agricultural 
production at Peak Down; development of Blair Athol coal for 
export; and the construction of major irrigation schemes, especially 
on the Burdekin. He has argued, however, that the measures adopted 
to put the ideas into practice proved to be faulty: "There was this 
purblind enthusiasm ... but the homework wasn't done ... It wasn't 
the visions that were wrong, it was the way in which they were 
applied"." 
Defence, too, has always played a significant part in Queensland's 
political affairs and a virtual obsession with the problem of the 
"empty north" has been a feature of much of the local political 
writing and debate. The link between northern development and 
defence appears again and again as a theme in Hanlon's speeches, 
as in the 1946 Address-in-Reply debate, for instance, when he 
asserted that if white civilization were to survive in Australia it was 
essential that the North be developed and populated.'" 
Associated with the emphasis on the North in Hanlon's thinking 
was, of course, a general support for decentralization as such. 
Throughout his political career Hanlon strongly advocated decen-
tralization, arguing that the concentration of population in a few 
large centres should be avoided and that each region of the state 
should be encouraged to build up a rural population to the full extent 
of its physical and economic resources, with a city as the natural 
centre of each region. In particular, Hanlon saw decentralization 
as having the desirable effect of curbing the growth of Brisbane and 
leading to a dispersal of industry among country centres. 
The controversial Electoral Districts Bill introduced by Hanlon 
on 8 March 1949 to increase the number of electorates from sixty-
two to seventy-five gave the ALP a substantial benefit. The 
legislation was in essence rurally oriented and reflected Hanlon's 
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"city bushman" beliefs. While the then deputy Premier remarked 
in an interview in Dublin in 1975 that the scheme probably originated 
with the Principal Electoral Officer, B.J. Maguire," Hanlon saw two 
reasonable premises on which to base such a Bill. These were that 
the numbers of voters in each electorate should depend on the 
distance of the electorate from Brisbane and the sparseness of the 
population in the electorate. It can be said that his proposals fitted 
something of the framework of much of Queensland politics in the 
previous forty years. Hanlon's Bill divided the state into four separate 
zones with a different quota of voters per electorate in each zone. 
There were to be twenty-four seats in the metropolitan zone with 
a quota of 10,716 voters; twenty-eight seats in the south-eastern zone 
(stretching south from Mackay) with a quota of 9536 electors; 
thirteen northern seats with a quota of 7852; and ten western 
electorates having a quota of 4783 electors. Country areas were given 
nine of the thirteen extra electorates. In introducing the Bill, Hanlon 
asserted that one of its aims was to prevent Brisbane with its 
inevitable population growth being allowed to dominate parliament. 
He also argued that there was a need for the creation of new states, 
including one covering north Queensland. 
In line with this stance, and despite the fact that he represented 
a metropolitan electorate, Hanlon was acknowledged in both Can-
berra and London as a powerful fighter and an able advocate for 
the interests of the sugar industry. For many years he maintained 
close associations with all sections of the industry and on various 
occasions led successful delegations to Canberra to obtain price 
increases for sugar. He also played an active part in negotiations 
with the United Kingdom Government for adjustment of the 
Australian sugar agreement. In October 1949, for example, Hanlon, 
at the invitation of Prime Minister Chifiey, led an Australian 
delegation to a conference of sugar-producing countries of the British 
Commonwealth. Later Hanlon was able in negotiations with the 
British authorities to obtain a very favourable agreement for the 
supply, during an eight-year period, of 600,000 tons of sugar a year, 
a figure which involved a considerable expansion of the canefields 
of north Queensland." The obtaining of this long-term agreement 
was widely recognized as a triumph for Hanlon and an indication 
of his substantial negotiating ability. 
Hanlon's approach to political issues was also strongly pro-
Queensland. He did not hesitate to attack the Commonwealth 
Government, no matter what its political complexion, if he felt that 
Queensland's interests were jeopardized in any way. Generally 
speaking, he was suspicious of Canberra and believed that the central 
government was not giving Queensland enough money for develop-
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ment. As part of his political tactics, moreover, he was quite prepared 
to invent mythical or unspecified foes, "the vested interests of the 
south", who were denying Queensland its fair share of progress. 
Hanlon's attitude towards the central government is apparent in 
the stands he took over several major matters of inter-governmental 
concern. He was particularly bitter, for instance, about Common-
wealth provisions designed to help the states to meet the cost 
of hospital treatment, arguing that the officials of the central 
government had failed to appreciate conditions outside New South 
Wales and Victoria. He asserted: "The Commonwealth bought into 
this cheaply and put up a good case to the public on its claims to 
provide free hospital treatment ... It is an agreement between one 
man with an axe in his hand and another man with his hands tied 
behind his back.'"^ 
Similarly, Hanlon adopted a firm "states' rights" posture in 
categorically refusing to transfer to the Commonwealth Government 
the authority to license the operations of commercial aircraft within 
the state. Speaking in parliament on 3 December 1947 to the Air 
Navigafion Act Amendment Bill, designed to formulate the respec-
tive roles of state and central governments in controlling air traffic, 
he indicated that Trans-Australia Airlines would be subject to state 
government authority so far as routes within Queensland were 
concerned, and that he would maintain the state's right to license 
intra-state operators and impose appropriate taxation.'" 
Again, in another significant inter-governmental dispute of the 
period—the proposed creation of a joint coal board—there was never 
any doubt about where Queensland and Hanlon stood: the future 
development of Queensland coal would not be handed over to a board 
"dominated by southern interests"." To that position Hanlon held 
firm despite considerable pressure from the Chifiey Labor Govern-
ment and in the face of threats of a general strike made by the 
powerful Miners Federation. 
We are determined not to hand over the future development of the 
industry to a body outside the state. We dare not allow competitive 
interests outside Queensland to control our industries, because our 
industries are really dependent on coal. If you control coal you control 
everything." 
In this stand Hanlon was strongly supported by the Queensland 
press," which exhibited what was one of Hanlon's own outstanding 
characteristics: a passionate belief in Queensland's future. In every 
respect—geographically, economically, and because of its natural 
resources—Hanlon regarded Queensland as the key state of the 
Commonwealth and he was anxious to ensure that nothing stood 
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in the way of the developing of the state's potential. As he saw it. 
This is the State which will in the long run support the greatest number 
of people. It has the greatest natural resources and offers the greatest 
employment in the development of them. We can create more wealth 
here than can be created elsewhere. Common sense demands that we 
should enjoy priority in national development works. Anything else is 
simply a success for sectional interests which are not concerned with the 
welfare of the Commonwealth as a whole.'* 
In general, Queenslanders readily accepted this line of argument, 
particularly since many were convinced that central government 
policies tended to favour the southern states. 
By 1950 Hanlon was widely regarded as the leader ofthe premiers 
in their common battle for greater financial assistance from the 
Commonwealth and less interference in the rights and autonomy of 
the states—a leadership role he was happy to assume since, as has 
been suggested, it fitted so well with a substantial body of public 
opinion in Queensland." 
Perhaps the key to Hanlon's political philosophy, however, is to 
be seen in the fact that from early in his political career he was 
a strong opponent of communism and time and time again he stressed 
the need for members of the Australian Labor Party to take a more 
active interest in the affairs of their unions, which might otherwise 
be taken over by communists. Hiley has commented on Hanlon's 
courage in opposing "left wing intrusion into the Labor Party and 
into the Trade Union movement", going on to say that "it is courting 
unpopularity in the Labor movement to take a stand against union 
pressures. He did that and did it quite boldly".^" So much did 
opposition to communism feature in his political activities that he 
earned the nickname of "anti-Red Ned" and his attitudes were 
summed up in one article by the caption: "Queensland's Premier 
Hanlon believes in two things—that Australia is good and com-
munism the worst evil."" 
At the time Hanlon became premier he was little known outside 
Queensland but within a few months had gained Australia-wide 
prominence as a result of his actions during Queensland's seventeen-
week-long meat strike. 
The meat dispute began on 4 March 1946, a few days before the 
Cooper Government went out of office. It arose initially at the 
Murarrie bacon factory when four meatworkers were dismissed— 
in the view of AMIEU (Australasian Meat Industry Employees 
Union) officials, because of their union activities. Although the strike 
dragged on, it might have been no more than a run-of-the-mill 
industrial dispute had it not begun to spread to other unions central 
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to Queensland's economy. Early in June the miners and waterside 
workers came out in support of the 8000 meatworkers involved and 
Queensland's industry began to come to a halt." Hanlon believed 
that the strike had been deliberately instigated and fostered by 
communists and when on 18 June 1946 two key railway unions, the 
ARU and the AFULE threatened to cease work on the following 
day, he apparently decided it was time for a showdown. In the face 
of the threat by the railway unions, Hanlon issued a statement: 
Cabinet gave consideration to the disturbed industrial conditions existing 
throughout Queensland today. 
It will be recalled that when the Meat Industry Union withdrew labour 
from the meat works in support of the dispute at the Murarrie Bacon 
Factory the Government issued a statement to the effect that the stoppage 
was unwarranted. 
Members of the Meat Industry Union had at that time free access 
to the Arbitration Court for their protection and for the remedying of 
their grievances. 
The strike has now dragged on for fourteen weeks, and repeated efforts 
by the Government to effect a settlement have been abortive. 
A small group of union officials are now endeavouring to extend the 
strike to other industries; in fact, the coal mining industry has already 
ceased operations throughout the whole State. 
The government desires to stress to the workers of Queensland the 
futility of further extending the industrial dislocation now existing. 
Queensland has the most efficient Conciliation and Arbitration system 
in the Commonwealth and it is readily accessible to registered industrial 
bodies. 
There can be no excuse for a cessation of work without having 
exhausted the remedies provided under the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Act. 
The people of Queensland have repeatedly expressed their approval 
ofthe settlement of industrial disputes by arbitration. The Government 
of Queensland has been elected pledged to the support of that policy, 
and is determined to stand by it. 
The Government again appeals to unionists throughout the State to 
make use of this machinery. 
The people of Queensland—men and women alike—are heartily sick 
of the strike weapon as being used today. 
It is unlikely that any extension of the dispute, no matter how seriously 
the public may be inconvenienced, can have any effect on the settlement 
of the original dispute in the bacon factories. 
Unless there is a speedy resumption of work in the coal mines, and 
no further involvement of essential industries, we are faced within a few 
days with the curtailment of rail transport and a serious shortage of gas 
and electricity for lighting, cooking and power. 
The Government will then have no alternative, but to prohibit the use 
of gas or electricity for other than essential purposes, and to prevent 
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the use of railways for other than essential goods and passengers. 
No matter how serious this inconvenience may be, it will make no 
difference lo the determination of the people to vindicate the Arbitration 
system in which they have complete faith. 
There is only one sane way to a settlement, and that is to accept the 
decision made by the Court in the original dispute, and thus enable 
members of the Meat Industry Union to bring their case before the lawful 
tribunal which should have been allowed to deal with the matter in the 
first instance." 
This statement has been quoted at length because it does provide 
a good example of Hanlon's attitude to industrial disturbances, 
particularly those which he believed had been fomented by com-
munists. 
As foreshadowed in the statement, the Government acted firmly 
to bring the strike to an end. The first step was the proclaiming 
on 26 June of a state of emergency, under the State Transportation 
Act, followed almost immediately by an order, empowered by the 
state-of-emergency proclamation, that the Industrial Registrar con-
duct a secret ballot amongst members of the AMIEU to determine 
whether they were prepared to accept the Industrial Court's direction 
that they return to work. Hanlon also made it clear that if the 
officials of the union refused to co-operate they would be liable for 
severe penalties. 
While only the meat industry was involved in the dispute, he 
argued, a state of emergency would not have been proclaimed, but 
with other important unions also on strike and basic services likely 
to collapse, steps had to be taken to bring the dispute to an end. 
The Government, therefore, could not tolerate opposition on this 
matter. 
On 28 June a mass meeting of over three thousand strikers 
condemned the Government's actions in ordering a secret ballot and 
seizing the union's records and in the face of this indication of the 
views of such a substantial section of the rank and file Hanlon did 
not persist with the decision to impose a court-controlled ballot on 
the union. In making known this change of attitude on 6 July, 
however, he also announced that an Order-in-Council had been 
issued under authority of the state-of-emergency proclamation 
directing that the meatworks be reopened and that there be a general 
resumption of work at the earliest possible date and not later than 
12 July. 
There had been some practical difficulties in the way of conducting 
a court-controlled ballot, but Hanlon's reversal of the original 
decision was largely influenced by the fact that the union executive 
was in favour of a return to work but had been overruled by the 
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disputes committee of the Trades and Labor Council. As Hanlon 
saw it there was in Queensland a group of union officials anxious 
to destroy the arbitration system and using the meat industry dispute 
as a means to that end. They had pressed the union to refuse to 
take part in the arbitration process and instead to embark on direct 
action. Had the strike succeeded, similar action would have been 
taken in other industries. The Government, however, was pledged 
to maintain arbitration as a means of settling industrial disputes and 
felt that without an arbitration process there would be continued 
industrial disturbance with widespread unemployment—a situation 
producing would-be dictators of both communist and fascist 
persuasions. 
During Hanlon's Premiership there were several major scandals 
affecting Hanlon himself or members of his government. The first 
of these was a charge on 18 October 1946 that Hanlon had given 
preference to political supporters in making two public service 
appointments. 
On 22 October 1946 there was a seizing by Commonwealth excise 
officers of a quantity of contraband tobacco stored in the garage 
of a house occupied by T.A. Foley, Minister for Health and Home 
Affairs, and a subsequent issuing of a summons charging Foley with 
an offence under the Excise Act. Court proceedings subsequently 
exonerated Foley and in December 1946 he resumed his portfolio, 
of which he had been relieved at his own request on 19 November. 
There were allegations in 1949 of malpractice in the running of the 
Queensland Golden Casket lottery. During Hanlon's absence over-
seas, Vince Gair, as Acting Premier, refused demands for a royal 
commission. The charges, however, involved Hanlon and his brother 
among others, and after his return to Brisbane Hanlon obtained 
Cabinet's agreement to the rescinding of the original decision and 
the appointment of a royal commission.'" Wide terms of reference 
were given the Commission, which began its investigations on 16 
January 1950. In February the Commission completely cleared the 
politicians and officials associated with administration of the lottery. 
Charges were levelled against the state's Principal Electoral 
Officer, B.J. Maguire, of forging ballot papers, and on 2 January 
1951 Mr Justice Mansfield declared void the election of the Labor 
candidate and Mem.ber for the state electorate of Bulimba on the 
grounds that there had been fraudulent practice associated with the 
election on 29 April 1950. 
Finally, there were charges of fraud in connection with absentee 
votes cast in the election in 1950 of the Labor Member for Windsor, 
T. Rasey, who had won by twenty-nine votes. 
The most serious crisis in Hanlon's Premiership, however, came 
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in the shape of the railway strike of 1948—the most extensive and 
bitter industrial dispute in Queensland's history. A full account of 
this dispute and associated events has been given elsewhere," so 
detailed coverage is not needed here. What is important is the picture 
of Hanlon and his government which emerges from the attitudes 
expressed and methods used to deal with the strike and its effects. 
In her discussion of the period Cribb has said: "At the time of the 
lock-out of the railwaymen by McCormack in 1927, Hanlon entered 
the debate in the Assembly in support of his former work-mates, 
yet, in 1948, as Premier, in another strike situation, he introduced 
legislation which had a much more repressive effect on trade 
unionism than any action of McCormack's."" Indeed, the contrast 
between Hanlon's earlier record and his strike-breaking actions when 
in political office produced a bitterness which persists today, twenty-
seven years later. Consider, for instance, the views of Viv Daddow, 
a railwayman from 1916 and Secretary of the Southern District of 
the ARU from 1940 until his retirement in 1964: "In 1948, Ned 
Hanlon turned the clock back thirty-six years in dealing with strikers 
and peaceful citizens. It was a strike ... that showed to the worid 
a Government's tyranny and contempt for the first principles of the 
labour movement, principles which Hanlon had endorsed in his rise 
to political power."" 
Even more indicative of the sense of betrayal felt by those who 
were involved in the 1948 strike is the comment by Frank Nolan, 
Queensland secretary of the ARU for twenty-five years: "If ever 
there was a weak collection of salary-chasing opportunist humbugs 
devoid of even a semblance of working-class principles, it was the 
members of the Labor Party led by Hanlon. No Tory government 
could have been more vicious."" 
There is no doubt, however, that Hanlon emerged from the 
railways strike as one of Australia's most discussed and formidable 
political leaders, with a strong grip on the Queensland Labor Party. 
This he had achieved by travelling a route which took him from 
leadership of the railwaymen in the general strike of 1912 to ruthless 
strikebreaking, first in the 1946 meat strike, which he ended by 
arming the Government with strong emergency powers and requiring 
unions in future to conduct ballots of their members before embark-
ing on strike action, and then in the 1948 railways strike, which 
he countered by even more sweeping measures. His actions seem 
to have been largely motivated by his deep hatred of communism. 
The railways strike of 1948 began formally at one minute past 
midnight on 3 February, following abortive negotiations on new wage 
rates and open and secret strike ballots by various railway unions. 
From the outset Hanlon made it clear that his government would 
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not negotiate outside the arbitration system. On 6 February he was 
reported as saying: 
There is nothing more that the Government can do about the strike. The 
Government is committed to the arbitration system for the settlement 
of disputes and we are quite agreeable to accept the decision of the 
Arbitration Court but we will not make any alterations in awards except 
through the Court... The Government has no intention of departing from 
its policy of arbitration. To depart from it in this instance would bring 
about the unsuitable industrial conditions that exist in other parts of the 
Commonwealth." 
Two days later he reiterated that "we abide by arbitration, we will 
continue to abide by arbitration, and we will not let Queensland fall 
into the same state of confusion and disruption as other States, where 
arbitration has been abandoned"."" Then, in a statewide radio talk 
on 15 February, he again made it clear that the Government would 
have no direct dealings with the railway strikers, arguing that 
confinual industrial stoppages had occurred in Australia whenever 
arbitration had been departed from and that the basic issue was 
whether or not wages were to be fixed by the court."' 
Hanlon and the press seem originally to have believed that the 
strike would be short-lived;"' it continued, however, and by the second 
week train services had been brought to a standstill and thousands 
of workers had been stood down. It was clear that all aspects of 
the strike, including extensive picketing, were very well organized 
and the strike leaders were succeeding in extending the dispute. 
The Government's response to the situation was to proclaim, on 
28 February, a state of emergency under section 22 of the Transport 
Act. At the same time by Order-in-Council it banned picketing and 
prohibited the counselling of strike action or disobedience of a court 
order. The Commissioner for Railways also ordered all railwaymen 
to return to work or be dismissed."' In announcing the state of 
emergency Hanlon said that "if necessary we will take control of 
all transport, railroad, air, sea—everything"."" He also asserted in 
a speech broadcast over a twenty-eight-station state-wide radio 
network that the dispute represented a challenge to democratically 
constituted government, having all the elements of civil war, and 
he went on to make a scathing attack on the "high command of 
the communist party", "mimicking Molotovs", and "budding com-
missars from the south" who had invaded Queensland."* 
The declaration of the state of emergency did not have the effect 
expected by the Government. The dispute did not come to an end 
instead it widened and on 9 March the Industrial Law Amendment 
Act, one of the most drastic measures ever to come before an 
Australian legislature, was rushed through, with only two members. 
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Fred Paterson (Communist, Bowen) and Tom Aikens (Independent, 
Mundingburra), voting against it. This Act gave the police much 
more extensive powers than they had had under the earlier state-
of-emergency declaration. They were enabled by the Act to take 
action against anyone they suspected might influence others to strike 
or remain on strike; they could arrest without warrant; could prohibit 
picketing; enter union offices or meetings at any time; and could 
use force whenever they considered it necessary. 
As Cribb has observed, the legislation outraged liberal opinion 
and was widely condemned outside Queensland. As executed, 
moreover, it constituted an attempt by those in authority to terrorize 
strikers and their families so as to force a return to work."* Nolan, 
echoing a leaflet issued at the time, has stated that the Act "legalised 
scabbery, outlawed picketing and justified violence and intimidafion 
against the strikers, made strikes illegal and above all its purpose 
was to cripple the power of trade unionism";"' whilst Daddow's view 
is that it "smashed the last vestige of right, in the estimation of the 
trade union movement, the Queensland Government may have still 
held to the claim of being 'Labor' ".** 
One of the most disturbing events of the period was the ugly 
incident which occurred on the morning of St Patrick's Day when 
a large contingent of police violently broke up a quite peaceful 
demonstration against the Industrial Law Amendment Act. The 
demonstration consisted of a small group of men and women who 
left the Trades Hall carrying placards and a coffin marked "Trade 
Unionism". They had gone only a short distance, no more than a 
few hundred yards, when the police attack was launched without 
warning and the marchers were scattered by savage punches, kicks, 
and baton blows. The injuries sustained by three people, including 
Fred Paterson, necessitated their being admitted to hospital, whilst 
five others, among them barrister Max Julius and Mick Healy, 
secretary of the Trades and Labor Council, were arrested and gaoled. 
Paterson, who was very seriously injured by a blow on the head, 
had not been one of the marchers, but when hit had been standing 
on the footpath taking notes. In commenting on this incident Sir 
Thomas Hiley has said: 
He [Hanlon] told the police to break up a march and although the person 
who actually gave the order isn't clear, batons were used and people were 
clubbed down. Fred Paterson, ... a meek and mild inoffensive fellow, 
weighed about seven stone wet through; they clubbed poor old Fred down 
you know and Fred physically was never right again from that bashing." 
Naturally the trade union movement reacted very strongly to this 
attack and on the following day a mass demonstration in King 
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George Square attracted a crowd of from eight thousand to ten 
thousand.^ The Government and the police, perhaps feeling that 
further provocation would be dangerous, took no action to prevent 
this large-scale demonstration. Neither Hanlon nor any of his 
Ministers, however, expressed regret for the police violence of the 
preceding day—though it is hard to see how a Labor government 
could have authorized or condoned the use of force in such 
circumstances. 
The explanation is probably to be found in a complex of factors: 
the particular position of the ARU, which over the years had clashed 
repeatedly with various Labor governments in Queensland and with 
the power group behind those governments, the AWU;*' the need 
for the Government to display firmness during the dispute so as to 
regain electoral support lost in the 1947 election largely because of 
the preceding period of industrial trouble; and the strongly anti-
communist views of Hanlon and influential Ministers such as Gair 
and Duggan. Although the strike had resulted from a genuine 
industrial grievance, there is no doubt that communist leaders set 
out to use the dispute as a means of pressing for what they saw 
as valid working-class objectives. For its part the Government was 
equally determined to make political capital out of the situation, even 
though this might involve attacks on individual and group freedoms 
and principles held dear by important sections of the labor 
movement." 
Apart from the anti-communism associated with his religious 
background, Hanlon had probably never been strongly motivated by 
purely ideological considerations. He had always been something of 
a political pragmatist, even though he had adopted a militant stance 
at the outset of his career. By 1948, however, he had moved far 
from that early position. 
Hanlon's enemies within the labor movement asserted that he was 
opposed to trade unionism, but Hanlon himself vigorously denied 
that charge. His term of office as Premier was marked by industrial 
unrest, partly arising from the aftermath of war but seen by Hanlon 
as due to the activities of communists. The major strikes in the meat 
industry and the railways during his Premiership were, he believed, 
politically directed by the Communist Party with the object of 
destroying the arbitration system and bringing down his government 
by unconstitiitional means. Accordingly, he felt these strikes had to 
be resisted by any available means. At the same time, as an ALP 
leader he could not afford to remain for long out of step with trade 
union opinion, which in this particular instance was largely opposed 
to the Industrial Law Amendment Act. Many unions, even those 
of moderate persuasion, had complained about the legislation. 
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believing its provisions to be too drastic. In these circumstances, 
within two months of the settlement of the railway strike early in 
April it was announced that the Act was to be repealed, a decision 
that forestalled proposed union action to disrupt the sugar industry 
at the height of the season. In addition, on 19 August 1948 another 
of the Government's dilemmas was resolved when someone secretly 
paid the fines of Englart, Healy, and Julius, who had been gaoled 
for refusing to pay penalties imposed on them for picketing offences. 
Many believed that payment of the fines had been arranged by the 
Government itself, though Hanlon denied that. 
Blazey and Campbell, discussing Gair, refer to what might be 
called the "Queensland factor" in Australian political life, suggesting 
that politics in Queensland is "characterised by gerrymanders, 
authoritarianism, anti-intellectualism, the use of office for private 
gain, a tendency to flamboyant rhetoric and anti-communism"." It 
would be incorrect to say that Hanlon's career exemplifies the 
"Queensland factor", but it does nevertheless display elements of 
most of the characteristics mentioned. 
Hanlon was a very able politician who "knew every trick in the 
parliamentary book and a few that weren't in the book ... He was 
a master in the House. He was most astute and when he wanted 
to he could be as smooth as silk. When he wanted to be he could 
be as dirty as you could wish"." As leader of the PLP he was strong 
and autocratic. State governments in Australia have frequently been 
controlled for long periods by one party and sometimes by one leader. 
In its own way the Hanlon Government was as much a one-man-
band as those of Playford, Bolte, or several others that could be 
mentioned. Hiley's view was that "There was no independence in 
the Hanlon cabinet. He ruled his cabinet as Forgan Smith in his 
day had done it. People would drift; Hanlon brought them back under 
a firm whip, and he drove his cabinet as a team where he wanted 
to take them"." 
Although Hanlon did not have the AWU connections of his 
predecessors, the policies he sponsored in office were aimed essen-
tially at stimulating Queensland's rural development. Of post-war 
premiers only Bjelke-Petersen has been a more obvious Queensland 
chauvinist. 
In general Hanlon was a realistic, perhaps opportunisfic, politician 
who became "one of a series of tough, autocratic leaders of the ALP 
in Queensland whose policy and belief was moderate and gradual 
reformism"."' He legislated directly to introduce sick leave for 
Queensland workers in 1946 and the forty-hour week in 1948. There 
must, however, be a substantial debit entry because of his introduc-
tion in 1946 and 1948 of legislation clearly at odds with trade union 
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aspirations and with no regard for the fact that his actions would 
inevitably produce stresses and tensions having long-term detrimen-
tal effects on the labor movement as a whole. His Electoral Districts 
Act of 1949, similarly, was against the Labor ideal of equality of 
representation and "one man, one vote, one value". It too was a debit. 
On the credit side of the ledger, however, he will be best remembered 
for his positive achievements in the health and welfare fields. These 
will last well beyond the influence of the anti-strike legislation and 
the "gerrymandering" of electoral boundaries. 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
Vincent Clair Gair 
Premier, 17 January 1952-12 August 1957 
(Courtesy Oxley Library) 
Property of University of Queensland Press - do not copy or distribute
16 Vincent Clair Gair 
Labor's Loser 
BRIAN COSTAR 
Vince Gair (1952-57) was Queensland's last Labor premier. He had 
the dubious distinction of being the only Queensland Premier to 
lose office as a direct consequence of expulsion by the organisa-
tional wing of a political party. That expulsion and the subsequent 
election ushered in over thirty years of unbroken non-Labor rule in 
a state previously dominated by the Australian Labor Party. Vic-
toria exorcised the ghost of its split with the election in 1982 of a 
government led by the son of the premier who lost office in 1955; 
Queensland Labor is yet to emulate that electoral feat. While the 
circumstances of his departure from the Premiership were unique, 
in many other respects Gair was typical of Queensland Labor 
premiers since Theodore — and of some non-Labor premiers since. 
He dominated his cabinet; he was politically conservative; he was 
not an initiator of major reform policies; and he was intolerant, 
arrogant and dictatorial. Gair resembled two other premiers, T.J. 
Ryan and E.G. Theodore, in only one major respect: like them, he 
had a career in federal politics — as leader of the Democratic Labor 
Partyfrom 1964 to 1973. 
Vincent Clair Gair was born in the provincial Queensland city of 
Rockhampton on 25 February 1901 of a Scottish father and an 
Irish mother. He was educated at a local state primary school and 
St Joseph's Christian Brothers College. Like so many 
Queenslanders then and since, he left school without completing his 
secondary education, joining the Railways Department as a clerk in 
1916. The family moved to Brisbane in the same year. There the 
young Gair remained in the railway service and, influenced by his 
mother, joined the Australian Labor Party. In 1924 he married 
Florence Glynn and moved to a house in Park Road, South 
Brisbane. Florence Gair died tragically in an accident in 1929 and 
her death, combined with that of their only daughter in 1941, had a 
profound effect on Gair. He married his second wife, Ellen Mary 
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Sexton, who had been in religious orders, in 1944 and had two sons 
by this marriage. 
By the 1920s Vince Gair had become deeply dissatisfied with his 
work in the Railways Department and turned his attention to local 
Labor politics. He held office as branch secretary and president, 
and acted as campaign director for state and local government can-
didates. 
The seat of South Brisbane in the 1920s could be described as 
solid for Labor without being impregnable and was held 
throughout this period by Myles Ferricks. Ferricks, however, could 
not withstand the anti-Labor landslide of 1929 and the seat was 
won for the CPNP (Country Progressive National Party) by Neil 
Macgroarty. Macgroarty proved to be a controversial member of 
the Moore cabinet {see Ch. 13) and made an enemy, among others, 
of James Duhig, Catholic Archbishop of Brisbane. The first of 
many apocryphal stories concerning Gair has it that Duhig became 
so incensed at Macgroarty's alleged discrimination against his own 
church that he directed the local parish priest to liaise with ALP 
operatives to find a loyal Labor Catholic who could unseat 
Macgroarty. Gair was the choice and in a plebiscite occasioned by 
controversy (one of the defeated candidates was Gerry Dawson 
who left the ALP in disgust and was president of the Communist 
Party at the fime of the 1957 split) was chosen as Labor's can-
didate. He duly defeated Macgroarty and entered the Legislative 
Assembly in 1932 aged thirty-one. 
Gair was to spend the next ten years on the backbench before 
becoming Secretary for Mines in the Cooper Ministry on 16 
September 1942. There was no doubting Gair's ability but he was 
not a favourite of Premier William Forgan Smith (1932-42) who 
used his considerable influence to exclude him from Cabinet. 
Statistics assembled by Frank Mines reveal that while Gair was 
regarded as a competent parliamentary speaker, he was an infre-
quent contributor to debates during his backbench years.' The ex-
planation given — that perhaps Gair heeded the advice Forgan 
Smith is alleged to have given him that "there are two corridors out 
of this Assembly . . . one . . . leads to the bar and the other 
leads . . . to the library . . . take the corridor to the library and 
research what you say" ^ — is difficult to accept having regard to 
the drinking habits of both. 
More credible is the explanation that as a new member in a 
marginal seat (he polled 52 per cent of the vote in 1932) Gair realis-
ed that his political future depended on the way he treated the con-
stituents of South Brisbane, an area badly affected by the economic 
depression of the 1930s. Nearly forty years later, during the con-
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dolence motion for Gair in the House of Representatives, the then 
leader of the Opposition and later Governor-General, Bill Hayden, 
whose family were long-time constituents of Gair's, spoke glowing-
ly of his attributes as a local member: "He discharged his respon-
sibility with dedication, diligence and humanity . . . The Labor 
movement is forever indebted to him for his work and his charity in 
those years.^  In the seven elections Gair contested prior to becom-
ing Premier he polled an average of 56 per cent of the primary vote 
(range 50 to 68 per cent; the Queensland electoral system changed 
from contingent to plurality in 1942). While this was a substantial 
improvement on Ferricks's performance, Gair's results tended to 
mirror the state-wide Labor vote — in the pro-Labor landslide of 
1935, for example, he achieved his highest-ever vote of 68 per cent; 
whereas when Labor struggled in 1947 Gair's own vote dipped to 53 
percent. 
Gair made South Brisbane a safe Labor seat but on one occasion 
he came close to defeat. The 1938 Queensland state election was 
made noteworthy by the appearance of twenty-three Protestant 
Labor Party candidates and the defeat of Labor MLA Frank 
Waters by that party's leader, George Morris, in Kelvin Grove. As 
a politician who always wore his religion on his sleeve, Gair was a 
natural target for the new party, whose candidate polled 20 per cent 
of the vote — most of which came from Gair's 1935 majority. Gair 
achieved just short of an absolute majority, but retained the seat on 
a 14 per cent leakage of Protestant Labor Party preferences. 
By all accounts the electors of South Brisbane benefited from the 
activist humanitarianism of its youthful member, yet the skills Gair 
developed as an earnest farmer of his electorate were to develop in-
to negative traits later. His political responses as Premier were 
often personahty-based and myopic, and he retained too much of 
the ward-heeler mentality. 
While not a parliamentary activist, Gair was made secretary to 
the ALP Caucus in 1935 and became Chairman of Committees in 
August 1941. He played little part in the high councils of the Labor 
Party's extra-parliamentary organisation and did not become a 
member ofthe QCE (Queensland Central Executive) until 1944. On 
Forgan Smith's dramatic resignation on 9 September 1942 the sep-
tuagenarian Frank Cooper became Premier and in the ministerial 
reshuffle Gair was appointed Minister for Mines. In April he ac-
quired the additional portfolio of Labour and Employment, the 
name of which was changed to Labour and Industry in 1947. The 
defeat of Ted Walsh at the 1947 elections paved the way for Gair's 
election as Deputy Premier by one vote on 14 May 1947. He was 
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also to hold the important post of Treasurer in the two years prior 
to his becoming Premier in 1952. 
Gair's ministerial duties naturally brought him into contact with 
the trade union movement. Gair, of course, had never held office in 
a trade union and, unlike most of his colleagues who held grace-
and-favour AWU tickets, he retained his membership of the 
Federated Clerks Union. By the time Gair became Minister, 
Labor's industrial relations policies had been long-established and, 
on balance, his innovations were relatively minor. One achievement 
that did stand out was the establishment of a general forty-hour 
working week. The issue came before the 1944 Labor-in-Politics 
Convention and Gair succeeded in having a motion passed which 
committed the Government to a forty-hour week when the 
economic dislocations ofthe war had abated. 
By the time of the 1947 Convention nothing had been done and 
the trade unions were clearly restive. It was proposed "that the In-
dustrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act be amended to provide 
for a forty-hour week"; whereupon Premier Ned Hanlon moved an 
amendment: "As the Government of Queensland has consistently 
supported the establishment of a national forty-hour week before 
the Federal Arbitration Court, Convention urges the Queensland 
Government to amend its Arbitration Act to establish a standard 
forty-hour week for the State of Queensland, in the event of the 
Federal Court failing to do so." " Gair spoke strongly in favour of 
Hanlon's amendment, which was carried on the voices.' Not sur-
prisingly the Government found no difficulty in heeding conven-
tion's wishes and the amended legislation came into effect from the 
beginning of 1948. 
Relations between Hanlon, Gair and the Queensland trade union 
movement were not always as cordial as this incident suggests. 
Queensland, in common with other states, experienced an upsurge 
of militant industrial activity in the late 1940s as unions attempted 
to make up for the stagnation of conditions during the war years. A 
major strike affected the meat industry in 1946 and more severe 
turbulence accompanied a state-wide railway strike in 1948.* Like 
Queensland premiers before and since, Hanlon reacted with draco-
nian legislation designed to suppress the militant unions. The 
evidence suggests that Gair adopted a hawkish attitude in Cabinet 
and was instrumental in having states of emergency declared in 
both 1946 and 1948.^  Yet Gair's cunning is also obvious in that it 
was Hanlon who publicly took the fight to the militant unions and 
made the bellicose remarks while Gair remained in the 
background.s It is somewhat surprising then that when Hanlon died 
in early 1952 the TLC (Trades and Labor Council), the home of 
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many of the militant unions, passed a generous condolence motion 
during which Frank Waters of the Postal Workers Union spoke 
glowingly of Hanlon's achievements.' Ominously, the TLC did not 
feel inclined to congratulate Gair on his elevation to the Premier-
ship. 
Edward Michael Hanlon, who had become Premier on Cooper's 
resignation in March 1946, died after a prolonged illness on 15 
January 1952. He was to that time only the second Queensland 
Premier to die in office, thus creating a minor constitutional 
crisis.'" Gair had been Acting Premier since 30 August 1951 and 
when he formally notifed the Governor, Sir John Lavarack, of 
Hanlon's death the latter decreed that the Government had thereby 
ceased to exist and asked Gair if he could form a new one. Gair 
consulted Cabinet, but not caucus, and answered in the affir-
mative, whereupon he was sworn in as Premier on 17 January, 
together with the remainder of Hanlon's cabinet. 
Gair did not inform caucus of these developments until 23 
January and then told the Labor members that they had before 
them two options: either endorse Cabinet's decision or hold a 
ballot for the leadership. A motion endorsing Cabinet's action was 
carried swiftly and unanimously and in the only election required 
Jack Duggan defeated Arthur Jones twenty-three votes to twenty 
for the deputy leadership." It was not until 10 March 1952 that E.J. 
Riordan was elected to replace Hanlon in Cabinet. Gair's cabinets 
were as stable in terms of personnel as those of Forgan Smith, with 
only three changes occurring between 1952 and 1957. Even more 
extraordinary was the fact that Gair was never required to face a 
caucus ballot as Premier. His standing within the parliamentary 
party was so high, largely because of his electoral popularity, that 
he was re-elected by acclamation after both the 1953 and the 1956 
elections. 
Vince Gair's near-six-year term as Premier of Queensland can be 
divided neatly into two parts. The years 1952 to 54 were relatively 
tranquil, the only major controversy being the passage of the 
Printers and Newspapers Act of 1953 which gave the Supreme 
Court Registrar extensive powers over the printing and publication 
of newspapers and which provoked a storm of protest from the Op-
position, the media and some trade unions.'^ The personal 
highlights for Gair were undoubtedly his official attendance at the 
Coronafion of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953 and her visit to 
Queensland in March 1954. Clearly the dramatic Australian 
political events ofthe early 1950s did not occur in Queensland. All 
this was to change during the final two years of Gair's Premiership 
as the fabric of Labor unity was rent by internecine conflict. Dur-
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ing this period Gair was to face five major crises and an analysis of 
his responses to those crises illustrates much about the Premier's 
political and personal style. The crises were: the so-called 
"Creighton Affair"; the 1956 Shearers' Strike; the Motor Spirits 
Distribution Bill; The University Act Amendment Bill; and the 
three weeks' annual leave dispute. 
The Creighton Affair '^  involved allegations of official corrup-
tion in the granting and extension of pastoral leases. In mid-1955 
articles began appearing in the AWU paper the Worker alleging 
malpractice in the affairs of the Lands Department in a manner 
which suggested access to confidential information. The president 
of the AWU, Joe Bukowski, also made a number of public 
statements, and in July 1955 the AWU executive placed its concerns 
before Premier Gair. The union claimed that Gair promised them a 
full inquiry but subsequently failed to initiate one. Gair, for his 
part, denied in parliament ever having promised "a top-level 
inquiry to anyone".'" By mid-1955 Gair's relations with the AWU, 
and more particularly with its president, were little better than 
poisonous, and it is clear that the Premier was not prepared to give 
credence to their complaints. 
Bukowski let it be known that he would be prepared to appear 
before the Bar of Parliament to share his knowledge of the matter. 
Sensing obvious political advantage, the leader of the Opposition, 
Frank Nicklin, moved accordingly on 15 September 1956.'^  Speak-
ing strongly against the motion, Gair suggested that the AWU's 
"evidence" was little more than gossip and that Bukowski was 
seeking the privilege of parliament to spread "hearsay statements, 
inferences and innuendo".'* Nicklin's motion was defeated along 
party lines. There matters rested until February 1956 when Senator 
Ian Wood (Liberal, Queensland) made a short but dramatic speech 
in federal parliament in which he alleged that certain Queensland 
graziers were forced to pay sums ranging from $4,000 to $20,000 to 
ensure the renewal of pastoral leases. He hinted that these 
payments had found their way to the Labor Party.'^ 
Having refused any form of inquiry for over six months, Gair, in 
his own words, established a Royal Commission into the scandal 
"within six or seven hours" of reading the press report of Wood's 
speech.'* The Minister for Public Lands and Irrigation, Tom Foley, 
was stood down from Cabinet at his own request. The Commis-
sioner, Mr Justice Townley, provided an interim report to the 
Premier in April, the result of which was Foley's criminal prosecu-
tion. Foley was acquitted, but the Commission's final report later 
found him guilty of improperly soliciting funds for the ALP. Foley 
was sacked from Cabinet, and on 25 October 1956 he was expelled 
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from the Labor Party, thereby robbing Gair of a supporter in the 
caucus. 
During the commission hearings it was revealed that much of the 
AWU's information had come in the form of letters from the 
Chairman ofthe Land Administration Board, Vivian Creighton, to 
its northern district secretary, Edgar Williams. Gair's Cabinet 
decided to press in parliament for Creighton's dismissal on the 
grounds of serious misconduct. While the new Minister for Public 
Lands and Irrigation assured the House that the motion was "not 
moved in a spirit of malevolence" the debate which followed sug-
gested otherwise." Gair was particularly incensed at Creighton's 
alleged reference to him as the "Mick's Master" and the "Master 
of Micks". While the Premier was certainly justified in describing 
these remarks as sectarian bigotry unbecoming a senior public 
officer,2" the successful pursuit of Creighton in the parliament oc-
casioned unnecessary controversy. In fact, while Gair's handling of 
the lands scandal had no obvious electoral costs (the ALP easily 
won the state election held during the Imbroglio controversy on 19 
May 1956), it can be faulted on other grounds. He obdurately 
refused to hold an inquiry until forced by Wood's statement, and 
his deep personal dislike of Bukowski clouded his political judg-
ment in a manner which put the credibility of the Government at 
risk. Also Creighton's dismissal further alienated the AWU which 
had continued to champion his cause. 
The vendetta between Premier Gair and ALP president 
Bukowski^ ' was also central to the 1956 Shearers' Strike which was 
partly coterminous with the Creighton affair.^ ^ In November 1955 
the Queensland Industrial Court handed down a 10 per cent reduc-
tion in the shearing rate to operate from 1 January 1956. The 
AWU, not known for its miUtancy, nevertheless encouraged 
shearers not to work at the new rate and the TLC, with which the 
AWU had reaffiliated, declared wool shorn under the new award 
"black"." Gair's initial reaction to the dispute was mildly suppor-
tive, influenced perhaps by the large number of his Cabinet and 
backbench who had close links with the AWU. When the Industrial 
Court ruled that the refusal of men to work at the new rate con-
stituted an unauthorised stoppage, Gair publicly disagreed and 
asserted that the shearers were not obliged to work for a rate they 
regarded as inadequate.^ ^ 
The shearing dispute was to last nearly nine months, but govern-
mental involvement was negligible until the middle of 1956 when 
the cancellation of the August wool sales and the supportive 
industrial acfion by railway unions began seriously to affect state 
revenue. Gair then negotiated with the federal government to 
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arrange the shipment of "black" wool to a special sale set down for 
early October. The Premier was required to defend the action in 
caucus and it was widely condemned by union leaders. '^ 
Characteristically, Joe Bukowski was Gair's most vehement critic 
and in a radio broadcast stated that "as a Labor Premier, Mr Gair 
should understand that once a man steps across the line against the 
people within the Labor movement, it is very, very hard to step 
back again".2* 
For his part, while publicly advocating formal conciliafion and 
arbitration, Gair attempted to end the dispute by convening a series 
of informal conferences of the Queensland Graziers Association, 
the woolbrokers and the AWU. At one such meeting in late 
September Gair attempted to conciliate the parties by urging a com-
promise shearing rate and suggesting a federal industrial award as a 
solution to the dispute.^ ^ When both proposals were rejected by the 
AWU, Gair called on the graziers and woolbrokers to cease hiring 
non-union labour, and on 4 October issued an Order-in-Council 
under the state-of-emergency powers of the Transport Act directing 
the storemen back to work.^ * The Storemen and Packers Union 
voted to return to work and the shearers' original grievance was set-
tled by a rehearing in the Industrial Court. 
Gair's handling of the shearers' dispute was reasonably adept 
from a purely industrial relations point of view. As Anne 
McMurchy convincingly argues, however, the shearers' strike was 
significant for political, not industrial, reasons.^ "^  In terms of Gair's 
ultimate political fate, the key outcome ofthe shearers' dispute was 
the strengthening of the ideologically bizarre alliance between the 
AWU and the TLC and, on a personal level, between Bukowski 
and the ambitious secretary of the Boilermakers Union, Jack Eger-
ton. Another important development which was to encourage the 
"Gair must go" element in the Labor Party was that the Premier's 
support in the parliamentary party, his natural power base, suf-
fered somewhere during the dispute. When the strike first became 
an issue in caucus in early September, Gair got his way unchal-
lenged. On 3 October he easily won a ballot approving his con-
ciliatory actions thirty-one to sixteen, but on the very next day his 
decision to order the storemen to return to work was carried by the 
much narrower margin of twenty-seven votes to twenty.'" 
Gair's third crisis arose from the unlikely source of the Univer-
sity of Queensland. Unlike Forgan Smith, Gair took little interest 
in the university and, later in life, displayed open hostility towards 
academics. On 21 March 1957 the Minister for Public Instruction, 
Les Diplock, introduced a Bill to amend the University of 
Queensland Act which provided, inter alia for a slight increase in 
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the size of the Senate and a full-time salaried vice-chancellor.'' 
What the Minister failed to mention was that the Bill introduced 
machinery to permit unsuccessful candidates for academic posts to 
appeal formally against the decision and also to permit appeals 
against punishment or dismissal. This element of the Bill was to 
create in the words of Malcolm Thomis, the University's historian, 
"the biggest crisis . . . in the university's relations with the govern-
ment throughout its entire history"." It was met with 
unprecedented opposition from the Academic Staff Association, 
the Professorial Board and the students, all of whom argued that 
the proposal was an insidious attack on the university's autonomy 
and would deter quality overseas candidates from applying for 
academic posts. 
Gair quickly became involved in the debate and asserted that the 
clause was necessary to protect staff against Senate incompetence, 
thereby contradicting Diplock who claimed that the purpose of the 
clause was to protect the Senate." Gair's real motivation did not 
take long to surface and it involved a recent appointment to a chair 
of mathematics in which an overseas candidate was preferred to a 
local." It appeared that after the unsuccessful candidate had 
approached a Government Minister, Gair became acquainted with 
the case and he settled on the idea of an appeals mechanism in the 
belief that this would aid local candidates. Flere was Gair the ward-
heeler at his worst.'5 His actions were rendered more indefensible 
by the fact that at the 1947 Labor-in-Politics Convention he had 
spoken against a motion seeking to extend Crown employees' rights 
of appeal.'* As well, the Premier was guilty of what he had con-
demned in Creighton — religious bigotry and paranoia — in that he 
believed Catholics were discriminated against at the university 
where Masons "held the balance of power"." 
This issue might have remained just another chapter in the 
history ofthe university's turbulent relations with government save 
that the former's case was enthusiastically embraced by Gair's 
enemies within the ALP. The powerful inner executive of the QCE 
entertained a delegation from the Staff Association, and the 
liberal-conservative Professor of History, Gordon Greenwood, ad-
dressed a meeting of the TLC at which he was warmly received."* 
Again Gair's actions had produced curious alliances and the 
Premier was probably in no danger of losing his money when told a 
leading member of the Labor Party that he "would give the party 
20 pounds if he could spell academic".'' While the legislation was 
passed by the parliament it remained unproclaimed at the time of 
Gair's defeat and the new Government let it lapse. 
By 1957 almost any issue had the potential to become part of the 
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poHdcal maelstrom engulfing Gair and his opponents. In mid-1956 
oil companies had made an application to the Queensland Prices 
Commission for an increase in the price of petrol. When by 
January 1957 no decision had been made, the companies, led by 
Shell, announced that they would bring no further standard-grade 
petrol for sale into Queensland. Gair's response was to berate the 
oil companies publicly and to commence negotiations to import 
petrol from Formosa to break the blockade. Here surely was an 
issue the beleaguered Premier could turn to his advantage by 
skilfully exploiting Labor's traditional dislike of monopolies. In 
fact Frank Nicklin alleged"" that Gair had adopted a deliberately 
confrontationist approach to the oil companies in order to appease 
his critics within the party. If this was his tactic, then in the early 
stages of the controversy at least it appeared to work. Gair's stand 
won strong support from the TLC and even evoked a con-
gratulatory telegram from federal parliamentary Labor leader, Dr 
H.V. Evatt."' 
This unity of purpose was ruptured, however, in early April 
when the Government introduced and passed the Motor Spirits 
Distribution Bill. The Bill gave extensive powers to a registrar of 
licences and abolished single-brand petrol stations. Predictably the 
Bill was vigorously opposed by the oil interests and the Opposifion. 
Less predictable was the attitude of ALP president Bukowski who 
broke his public silence on the issue on 1 April 1957 by complaining 
that Gair had not consulted the QCE before introducing the Bill — 
a complaint that was echoed by the TLC."^ This provoked a public 
slanging match between Gair and Bukowski which culminated in an 
inner executive meeting of the QCE at which the legislation was de-
nounced by Deputy Premier Jack Duggan, after which the 
executive voted six votes to one (Gair's) to repeal the legislafion."' 
Gair stood firm but was not assisted by the federal president of the 
DLP (Democratic Labor Party) who praised him for standing up to 
the "oil combine"."" Gair's failure to unite the ALP on the petrol 
legislation was symptomatic both of the divided state of the party 
and of the obsessive hatred Bukowski had developed for the 
Premier. After Gair's expulsion from the ALP on 24 April 1957 the 
legislation was not proceeded with. 
These four crises paled into insignificance compared with the one 
that became the catalyst for Gair's expulsion from the ALP and for 
the defeat of Labor in Queensland. The issue concerned a pro-
longed contest between Gair and his several enemies over the in-
troduction of three weeks' annual leave for all workers under state 
awards. As Denis Murphy observed"5, the 1953 Labor-in-Politics 
Convention passed an apparently innocuous motion supporfing a 
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week's extension of annual leave for Queensland workers. The 
matter lay relatively dormant until late 1955 when it flared in 
anticipation of the next Labor-in-Politics convention scheduled for 
February 1956. In response to niggling complaints of tardiness by a 
number of unions, the Premier announced that three weeks' leave 
could not be introduced because of the state of Queensland's 
economy, but that long-service-leave entitlements would be 
extended in part compensation."* 
This promise did not placate the unions, twenty-one of whom 
petitioned for a special QCE meeting to consider the matter. The 
meeting, held on 11 November 1955, directed the Parliamentary 
Labor Party to legislate for three weeks' leave during the current 
parliamentary session."' Cabinet met and rejected the QCE's direc-
tive on 14 November and caucus exhaustively debated the issue for 
more than six hours on 16 November. Gair delivered a major 
speech at the caucus meeting in which he asserted that "never in the 
history of the Labour Movement in Queensland has the QCE 
directed the Parliamentary Labor Party as to the time legislation 
should be introduced"."' He concluded by threatening that Cabinet 
would have to give consideration to resigning if caucus accepted 
the QCE directive. Felix Dittmer (who belonged to the anti-Gair 
facfion) then moved a compromise motion urging a conference 
with the QCE to resolve the dispute. Tom Rasey (one of Gair's 
strongest supporters) moved a tougher amendment supporting 
Cabinet's rejection ofthe QCE's ultimatum. Despite deputy leader 
Jack Duggan's support for Dittmer's proposal, Rasey's amend-
ment was carried twenty-eight votes to twenty. V^en the caucus 
decision was made public Jack Egerton demanded Gair's resigna-
tion on the grounds that Labor could not win the 1956 election with 
him as leader."' 
The issue subsided over the holiday period, but when the Labor-
in-Polifics Convention assembled in Mackay on 27 February 1956 it 
soon became obvious that Bukowski and Egerton had managed to 
assemble a majority coalition against Gair. It had long been a 
Labor tradifion in Queensland to test the numbers at convention 
early in the proceedings. In 1956 the opportunity arose on the first 
day by way of an appeal against a plebiscite result: when conven-
tion divided the vote was seventy-eight to fifty-five, with Gair 
numbered among the minor ity. ^o 
Later in the convention Jack Devereaux of the Amalgamated 
Engineering Union moved the critical motion 
that the Conciliation and Arbitration Act be amended as under: — Sec-
tion lOA Sub-secfion 2(i): delete "three weeks" and insert "four 
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weeks". Section lOA sub-section (ii): delete "two weeks" and insert 
"three weeks''. '^ 
What followed was a prolonged debate in which all the major pro-
tagonists participated. Given the passions generated, it was a 
remarkably cordial exchange with even Gair and Bukowski engag-
ing in some playful banter." Egerton was the only speaker to inject 
rancour, by saying "I think that there is much logic in what the 
Premier said, but the time for logic had disappeared" and "We are 
not directing the Government; we are directing those members of 
the Parliamentary Labor Party and members of the Parliamentary 
Labor Party will carry out the rules or be dealt with"." With the 
addifion of a crucial amendment requiring the Premier to include 
the promise of increased leave in his election policy speech and to 
legislate its introduction in the first session of the new parliament, 
the mofion was passed by seventy-five votes to fifty-eight.'" One 
important point to emerge during the debate was that many union 
officials had seized on Gair's earlier statements that a minimum of 
three weeks' leave was inevitable for all workers and had given 
undertakings to their members accordingly.'' Some unions had 
pursued the matter in the Industrial Court but were rebuffed on the 
grounds that the court had no power to grant a leave increase save 
by consent. The unions then called on the Government to deUver on 
a promise which they believed Gair had clearly made. Having had 
no senior union experience himself, the Premier appeared insen-
sitive to these industrial concerns. 
When the vote went against him at convention Gair convened an 
emergency cabinet meeting which decided unanimously that "it did 
not accept the directions contained in [the] resolution".'* Amid 
rumours that Gair was about to resign, private talks ensued during 
which he seems to have given an undertaking to introduce extended 
leave "sometime" in 1956." This promise, combined with the ap-
proaching May 1956 state election, had the effect of again cooling 
tempers. Soon after the poll (which Labor won easily) Gair 
repeated his support for the principle of extended leave and said it 
would be introduced as soon as possible.'* When the figures for the 
financial year ending 30 June 1956 became available, however, they 
revealed that Queensland had a deficit of $3.4 million instead of the 
$36,430 surplus Treasurer Ted Walsh had budgeted for.'' Gair then 
returned to his argument that to introduce three weeks' leave would 
be economically irresponsible and would cause unemployment. 
This statement was not well received by the QCE and the TLC 
and another round of QCE ultimatums and cabinet and caucus 
rejections of them dominated the remainder of the year.*" In 
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September the QCE wrote to all members of the Parliamentary 
Labor Party to ascertain whether they were prepared to support the 
immediate introduction of three weeks' leave; twenty replied in the 
affirmative and twenty-seven said "not in 1956" (one was away 
ill).*' Then in February 1957 the TLC circulated a petition among 
unionists calling on Gair to introduce extended leave.*^ At an 
important caucus meeting on 17 March, John Turner moved "that 
three weeks' leave be introduced" and Jack Duggan made a very 
carefully worded speech supporting the QCE. Turner's motion was 
lost twenty-six votes to twenty-one and a motion calling for yet 
another conference with the QCE was carried twenty-six votes to 
nineteen.*' This meeting failed to resolve the matter and the 
Premier's refusal to carry out the directions of convention and the 
QCE was the major charge on which he was arraigned before the 
QCE and expelled on 24 April 1957.*" 
What must now be explained was why a dispute as trivial as a 
week's extension of annual leave, and which was ripe for settlement 
on any number of occasions, led to the expulsion of a premier from 
his party and the defeat of the last Labor government in 
Queensland for more than thirty years. It is tempting to argue that 
the three weeks' issue was merely the last of the five crises faced by 
Gair and that it was their cumulative effect that brought him down. 
Yet it was not the crises that produced the schismatic culture so 
obvious in the Queensland ALP In the mid-1950s, rather it was the 
existence of a culture of rancour and suspicion that escalated all 
five relatively minor issues into major battlegrounds for Gair and 
his opponents. Of course, it is equally tempting to argue that the 
Queensland split of 1957 was merely a delayed reaction to the con-
vulsions that tore the party apart federally and in Victoria in 1955. 
While those events were certainly relevant to the Queensland situa-
tion, they alone provide an inadequate explanation for the 1957 
split. WTiat is a more satifactory explanation is that the Queensland 
Labor split was the product of Premier Gair's failed attempt to 
restructure power relationships within the party in a manner 
favourable to himself. 
From the mid-1920s until the retirement of Frank Cooper as 
Premier in 1946 the AWU and its parliamentary allies were the 
dominant force in the Queensland ALP. Hanlon was not close to 
the AWU and its influence waned somewhat during his Premier-
ship, but it was Gair who was determined to secure independence 
from the AWU power brokers. In seeking to curb the AWU Gair 
was confronted by a serious dilemma because that union's tradi-
tional enemies were the unions affiliated with the Trades and Labor 
Council. The problem was that most of their leaders were too far to 
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the left ideologically to be part of any coalition supporting the con-
servative, Catholic Gair. Where then was the Premier to find his 
allies? Gair's power base was the Parliamentary Labor Party 
where, paradoxically, he remained dominant even on the eve of his 
expulsion — it must always be remembered that Gair was over-
thrown by the QCE and not by his cabinet or caucus. Gair hoped to 
secure his position in the extra-parliamentary wing of the party 
through the efforts of the ALP Industrial Groups which were at the 
zenith of their power when he became Premier in 1952. 
The groups were established in Queensland in 1948 and were con-
trolled initially by a committee comprising Joe Bukowski, Tom 
Rasey and Ted Walsh. Being under the obvious patronage of the 
AWU hierarchy, who approved of their anti-communism and their 
activities in left-of-centre unions, the Groups flourished and a new 
oligarchy emerged in the Queensland ALP with the AWU and 
Grouper-influenced unions dominating the QCE. This cosy ar-
rangement was to be shattered by the events of 1955. Evatt's 
dramatic speech of October 1954, which precipitated the 1955 ALP 
split, made pointed reference to the disruptive influence of the 
Groups and of the Catholic Social Studies Movement.*' 
Queensland's delegates to the ALP's Federal Executive were Gair 
and state secretary Jack Schmella who voted against each other on 
the question of the future of the Groups.** Heated exchanges 
followed within the QCE, but at a meeting on 6 January 1955 the 
AWU-Grouper alliance held firm against attempts to direct Federal 
Executive delegates as to how they should vote on the "Victorian 
problem".*' When the ALP Federal Conference assembled in 
Hobart later in January 1955 Gair emerged as a strong supporter of 
the "Old Executive" in Victoria and led a walkout of delegates 
when it was refused admission to the conference by vote (six votes 
to three) of the Federal Executive. 
Dramatic though these events were, the major blow to Gair's 
political strategy was the rift that developed between Bukowski and 
the Groups. In the wake of Evatt's October 1954 denunciafions of 
the Groups and the Movement, Bukowski made a public statement 
defending the operations of the Groups in Queensland and denied 
that any "outside influences of a religious or political nature" were 
at work within the Queensland ALP.*' Bukowski, however, was 
pulled into line because federal AWU secretary, Tom Dougherty, 
had decided to support Evatt in the power struggle that broke out 
in the federal ALP. After the Hobart conference the ALP Federal 
Executive instructed state branches to dissolve the Groups and 
threatened formal intervention if they did not do so. In the face of 
this pressure the QCE disbanded the Groups on 15 April 1955 and 
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at the 1956 Labor-in-Politics Convention Groupers and their allies 
were cleaned off the QCE. 
The decline ofthe Groups in Queensland after 1955 robbed Gair 
of a major weapon in his campaign to free himself from AWU con-
trol. He then committed a serious political blunder in forcing the 
AWU into the arms of its long-time political and industrial enemy, 
the Trades and Labor Council. It was from within this most unlike-
ly coalifion that the forces that destroyed him politically were to 
emerge. Gair certainly aspired to emulate William Forgan Smith's 
dominance of the Labor Party, but he made a crucial error in not 
aligning himself with a competent numbers man experienced in the 
sometimes Byzantine workings of the party. Forgan Smith had 
Clarrie Fallon as his loyal advocate within the ALP organisation 
but Gair had no-one comparable.*' Deputy Premier Jack Duggan 
was at best lukewarm in his support for Gair and regularly clashed 
with him at QCE meetings, Ted Walsh was divisive and probably 
coveted the Premiership.™ Gair's private secretary, Brian Mullins, 
was closely connected with the Movement, but was inexperienced in 
high-level Labor Party and trade union politics. Gair himself failed 
to read the many danger signals so evident after 1955 and he lacked 
a skilled confidant to advise him since all the well-connected 
numbers men were on the other side. 
What blame then can be attributed to Gair for causing the 1957 
schism? Denis Murphy convincingly argues that there was nothing 
inevitable about the split and that Gair was not wholly responsible 
for it." The Queensland split was the unintended consequence of a 
struggle for power in the party that went horribly wrong. In the 
wake of the Premier's expulsion Bukowski and Schmella invited 
themselves to the ALP caucus meeting and made tendentious and 
self-jusfificatory speeches during which Bukowski declared that 
"Gair had been arrogant, pompous and uncooperative".'^ He 
could have added that the Premier was also autocratic, aloof, 
devious, chauvinistic and a heavy drinker, but these personal fauhs 
do not make him solely responsible for the split. If any one person 
could be held so responsible it was Bukowski himself. Murphy's 
comment that in 1957 Bukowski lacked "political balance and 
commonsense" and that "his behaviour . . . suggests instability 
and a certain paranoia" " errs on the side of charity.'" 
Any summary of Gair's Premiership is clouded by the manner of 
its terminafion. His failings, both political and personal, were 
obvious; but it must also be remembered that his electoral populari-
ty rivalled that of T.J. Ryan and William Forgan Smith, that he 
evoked strong loyalty from his cabinet and the majority of his 
caucus — his opponents were horrified when eight of his nine 
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ministers and sixteen backbenchers followed him out of the ALP — 
and it must never be forgotten that, despite the events of 1956 and 
1957, the vote to expel him from the party was extremely close 
(thirty-five to thirty). Gair as Premier was not a policy initiator; he 
was fiscally conservative and when asked in 1971 to nominate his 
achievements as Premier he produced a catalogue of relatively 
minor industrial reforms." He is perhaps best remembered for his 
constant battles with the federal government over funding to 
Queensland, particularly in the area of health. Gair's administra-
tion was the end product of thirty-four years of near-continuous 
Labor governments — governments which had surrendered the 
reforming zeal of Ryan and Theodore well before 1952. 
Subsequent to his expulsion from the party his government was 
to be denied supply by a combined vote of the Opposition and the 
official ALP. Gair had made overtures to the Country Party in the 
hope of retaining the Premiership,'* but when these failed he 
advised an election, which was held on 3 August 1957. The 
Queensland Labor Party (as Gair's group was called) lost over half 
its twenty-five seats and a coalition government was formed bet-
ween the Country and Liberal parties. Gair was returned in South 
Brisbane but was defeated in 1960. He was then appointed, without 
advertisement, to a position as liaison officer in the Secondary In-
dustry Division of the Department of Labour. Gair failed in an at-
tempt to enter the Senate in 1961 but did so in 1964, whereupon he 
was elected leader of the Democratic Labor Party. He retained this 
office until deposed in 1973. Embittered, he accepted a post as 
Ambassador to Ireland from Labor Prime Minister Gough 
Whitlam in March 1974. His behaviour in Dublin caused 
diplomatic consternation and he was recalled by the Fraser Govern-
ment in 1976." Gair then retired to his Brisbane home and died on 
11 November 1980. 
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"HonestFrank" — the Gentleman Premier 
BRIAN STEVENSON 
"His courtesy is legendary. It is even said today that he gets out of 
his chair when the office boy comes into the room — only it is 
probably untrue! But if the office boy stumbled you could bet that 
Mr NickUn would be the first to pick him up, dust him down, and 
send him on his way rejoicing." ' 
So speculated one journalist in a 1961 profile of Frank Nicklin, 
the first conservative premier to rule Queensland after Labor's 
quarter-century in power. Nicklin's courtesy was well attested by 
other contemporaries and is even less controvertible than his famed 
reputation for personal probity. The two traits made Nicklin the 
most Hkeable of Queensland's more recent premiers, although they 
were not always accompanied by political effectiveness. Still, 
NickUn's calming influence helped to make the 1960s a com-
paratively tranquil decade for state politics. 
George Francis Reuben Nicklin was born in Murwillumbah, New 
South Wales in 1895, eldest son of the local newspaper proprietor. 
Nicklin senior aired his conservative views frequently in his 
editorials and presumably in his home, the roof of which was once 
showered with rocks after an especially bitter state by-election.^ 
Nicklin was educated in New South Wales but left school in 1910 
when his father sold his newspaper to take up banana farming at 
Beerwah, north of Brisbane.' After a few years on the family farm, 
Nicklin enlisted in the army in 1916. Corporal Nicklin was awarded 
the Military Medal in France in 1918 for rallying his beleaguered 
platoon during an engagement near Dernancourt in which his 
senior officers were killed." Nicklin was reticent about this ex-
perience, causing some confusion sixty years later when, amid the 
flurry of Nicklin obituaries, a Brisbane newspaper published an ac-
count of an entirely different exploit as the award winner.' 
Back home, Nicklin purchased a small pineapple farm at 
Palmwoods 75 kilometres north of Brisbane, through the soldier-
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settlement scheme. He had saved wisely during the war, and a good 
financial start, along with his farming experience, may have saved 
him from penury during the early post-war years * when fruit prices 
slumped as Europe returned to full production. When the first 
soldier settlers' crops were ready, processing costs were too high for 
the growers to make a profit. On the north coast, thousands of 
cases of unwanted fruit rotted in the sun.' 
Labor governments throughout the 1920s created marketing and 
fruit-growing organizations to assist growers. Nicklin was con-
nected with all of the local organizations, usually as an office 
bearer. The organizations were legally barred from politics, but 
Nicklin's intense involvement in local affairs extended to lending a 
hand to the Country Party at election times. 
In 1932 the retiring member for Murrumba, a blue-ribbon Coun-
try Party seat, suggested to the thirty-six-year-old farmer that he 
stand for pre-selection. Nicklin was initially reluctant, later claim-
ing he was "really shanghaied into politics". He won the plebiscite, 
and although Moore's Country-National Government was crushed 
at the subsequent state election, Nicklin easily retained Murrumba 
for his party.* 
Nicklin entered the Legislative Assembly as an opposition 
backbencher, humblest of all forms of parliamentary life. He was 
at his most effective when speaking on agriculture. Early in his 
parliamentary career his expertise was noted and praised by a 
worthy adversary, Frank Bulcock, who was perhaps Labor's most 
effective agriculture minister.' Nicklin was less convincing as a lay 
economist. Predictably, he harped on the need for government 
encouragement of private enterprise, but his utterance in parlia-
ment showed little understanding of economic matters. Nicklin 
proved to be a popular local member. During a lean decade for the 
Country Party he reversed the electoral trend and consolidated his 
hold on his seat. 
In 1941 Labor easily defeated a fragmented Opposition, winning 
forty-one seats to the Country Party's fourteen and the UAP's 
(United Australia Party's) four. After the election federal and state 
Country Party members met with their UAP counterparts at 
Parhament House in Brisbane without the knowledge of their 
respective organizations. The two parliamentary teams, in a move 
engineered by Acting Prime Minister Arthur Fadden, decided to 
merge.'" (The merger was to lapse after only a few years and the 
conservatives returned to the previous two-party arrangement.) 
Opposition leader E.B. Maher stood down, saying that a merger 
would be "incomplete" without a new leader," and nominated 
Nicklin for the leadership. Nicklin was elected to the post unop-
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posed, and commenced sixteen tedious, weary years as the leader of 
a team that lost five elections in a row. Although most of the 
defeats were drubbings, Nicklin was never challenged publicly for 
his post. 
Successive Labour governments shored up their position in ways 
that made Nicklin's chances of leading his team to office slim. In 
November 1942 the optional preference vote was abolished for 
state elections, guarding Labor against losing seats on preferences 
when faced with more than one strong opponent. 
Worse followed for the conservatives in 1949 when the state was 
divided into four electoral zones, each of which had different enrol-
ment quotas. The western and northern zones — predominantly 
Labor areas — were allotted additional seats and lower quotas than 
the south-eastern zone, where the Country Party predominated, 
and the metropolitan zone, where the Queensland People's Party 
(formerly the UAP and soon to be the Liberals) was strongest. 
Labor won the 1950 election easily. Premier Hanlon observed with 
candour and satisfaction: "I do not think that on the old 
redistribution we would have been too secure at all." '^  Frustrafing 
as it was for Nicklin, he was at least safe from being made a 
scapegoat for an election defeat. No contradiction was forthcom-
ing in 1955 when he told the Country Party conference that "with 
the present boundaries it would take something of an electoral 
earthquake to bring about a change."" 
As Country Party leader, Nicklin's parliamentary performance 
was solid, but his rigid adherence to the party line at times made the 
agreement between the two parties to co-ordinate their efforts 
appear hollow. In 1951, for example, he accused the Hanlon 
Government of causing stagnation in primary industry by assisting 
other industries, some of which, while using government revenue, 
also provided urban employment.'" At times like these, Nicklin's 
regional outlook made him seem far more the Country Party leader 
than the leader of the combined conservative Opposition. 
A hardworking Opposition leader, Nicklin spoke at length on 
almost every bill that came before the House. Tom Hiley, a senior 
Liberal of the time, held that Nicklin was obliged to do so by the 
indolence of his Country Party colleagues, who seemed reconciled 
to the idea of remaining permanently in opposition, and preferred 
to look to the needs of their own electorates rather than concerning 
themselves with wider issues." 
Without the Labor split of 1957 Nicklin probably would have 
soldiered on as Opposition leader until retirement — a future he 
reportedly considered after his last defeat in May 1956 when Labor 
Premier Vince Gair savoured his second successive spectacular vie-
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tory.'* But the stage was set for the political accident that would 
change the course of Queensland history. 
Nicklin had attacked Labor for years over Labor parliamen-
tarians' responsibihty to the party organization. All political 
groups, including the Country Party, owed some allegiance to an 
organizafion, but in the suspicious atmosphere of Cold War 
Australia, sinister inferences could be drawn and exploited where 
members of a left-of-centre party were constitutionally obliged to 
carry out the instructions of a governing body not responsible to 
electors. During the 1956 campaign Nicklin said of the QCE 
(Queensland Central Executive), the governing body of the Labor 
Party: "If Labor is re-elected Queensland will, beyond all possible 
doubt, be governed by a small body of left-wing and Communist 
union leaders." " 
When the QCE tried to force Gair in that year to introduce three 
weeks' leave for all employees under state awards {see Ch. 16), 
Nicklin sympathised with the Premier on constitutional grounds. 
On 4 April 1957 Nicklin said that the Opposition would "fight to 
maintain constitutional authority and . . . resist as far as is within 
its powers . . . any attempt to dictate to the elected representatives 
ofthe people".'* 
Gair was expelled from the Labor Party on 24 April, but even 
before this there were rumours of overtures to Nicklin aimed at 
forming a coalition of Country Party members and Gair supporters 
to give the Premier the numbers to survive. There is evidence in 
Nicklin's papers that he at first intended to support Gair in return 
for an electoral redistribution and the introduction of court-
controlled ballots for industrial unions." 
Nicklin said on 27 April that he would support a Gair-led govern-
ment "in certain circumstances", and that given the choice between 
supporting Gair's group and the other Labor members the Opposi-
tion would choose Gair. When asked about a possible coalition 
with Gair, Nicklin answered, with obviously unconscious irony, 
"That is not for me to decide — that is for the organizational head-
quarters of the Country Party.' ' 2° 
Wiser heads than Nicklin's were monitoring the situation. 
Federal Country Party leader Arthur Fadden flew to Brisbane and 
was soon able to convince Nicklin of what he should have known 
all along — that his chance for power had arrived. 
NickUn met briefly with the Premier on 30 April. In Nicklin's 
presence Gair told journalists: "No arrangements have been 
reached with regard to support for the Government or 
otherwise." 2' Gair was doomed. 
Nicklin and the Liberal leader. Ken Morris, wrote to the Ad-
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ministrator. Chief Justice Alan Mansfield, informing him, "The 
political party from which your present advisers were drawn has 
now divided into two separate and distinct parties . . . which 
. . . do not and cannot command a majority . . . in order to 
govern democratically."" Mansfield summoned pariiament to 
assemble on 11 June for what would be the shortest parliamentary 
session in Queensland history. Nicklin and his men watched as the 
Labor Party that had recently seemed impregnable tore itself apart. 
Shortly after 10.30 p.m. on 12 June 1957 Ted Walsh, Treasurer in 
the Gair Government, moved that supply be granted. 
It was the most important moment of Nicklin's life. The rem-
nants of the official Labor Party, led by Gair's former deputy and 
Minister for Transport Jack Duggan, crossed the floor to vote that 
supply be denied to the Government of which they had so recently 
been a part. From his unaccustomed seat behind the ranks of his 
enemies C.G. "Nugget" Jesson, a Duggan supporter, waved a 
handkerchief in grim, symbolic farewell to what was left of the 
Gair Government. Parliament was dissolved the next day." 
On 3 August 1957 an era of conservative coalition government in 
Queensland that would last until 1983 began when the coalition 
routed the divided Labor Party at the polls. The first NickHn 
Ministry was sworn in on 12 August. 
Nicklin moved to preserve his unexpected elevation by altering 
the electoral boundaries. He needed to achieve three goals with a 
redistribution. First, the Country Party had to remain the senior 
coalition party. Second, the Liberals had to be appeased, but not to 
the extent of becoming the senior coalition partner in the 
foreseeable future. Third, any redistribution would have to 
increase, if not guarantee, the coalition's chances of retaining 
power in 1960. He was successful on all three counts. 
In November 1958 coalition members met to discuss the 
redistribution. After hours of haggling, a bargain was struck. Four 
extra seats were created in the metropolitan area and one seat in the 
country was abolished. In return, the Liberals agreed to keep the 
system of weighted zonal representation.^" 
Under the new Act, the four-zone system was replaced by a 
three-zone system. The number of seats in the metropolitan zone 
was increased from twenty-four to twenty-eight. Two new zonal 
categories were created: the country zone of thirty-eight seats and 
the provincial cities zone of twelve seats — two each in Ipswich, 
Rockhampton, Toowoomba and Townsville, and one each in Bun-
daberg, Cairns, Mackay and Maryborough. Though by now more 
urban than rural, Redcliffe and the Gold Coast were not regarded 
as provincial cities but were placed in the country zone. 
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Placing most non-urban areas into the single-quota country zone 
helped the Country Party. Many sparsely populated electorates in 
the old northern and western zones — hitherto subject to a smaller 
quota — were either abolished or greatly enlarged. Five seats in the 
western zone had remained faithful to one or other of the Labor 
parries during the trauma of 1957: three of these were abolished, 
leaving Labor with less scope to recoup their losses in their former 
blue-ribbon territory. In the old south-eastern zone where the 
Country Party was strongest, several new seats were created. Most 
provincial city electorates had been safe for Labor even when the 
seats had included a rural hinterland. The new Act divested the 
dries of their rural surrounds, confining a strong Labor vote to 
only a few seats. 
The urgent need for a metropolitan redistribution was never 
quesfioned. In March 1958, nine electorates were below and twelve 
were above the quota laid down under Hanlon. Most of the above-
quota electorates were Liberal, giving the Liberals some grounds 
for believing that an increase in the number of metropolitan seats 
would be to their advantage. 
By correcting such anomalies, the redistribution brought 
Queensland closer to the "one vote, one value" ideal," which had 
formed the basis of the Queensland electoral system from 
1910-1949, even though this was never the intention of the NickUn 
Government. But mere figures do not reflect the way the boun-
daries were drawn. Some of the boundary changes that breached 
the commission's stated guidelines of community of interest and 
local authority boundaries favoured the Government — something 
from which unfortunate inferences would be drawn. What would 
not be fully appreciated at first was that there were now two 
separate cases of electoral privilege in Queensland. The coalition 
was favoured over Labor, but within the coalition the Country 
Party was favoured over the Liberals.^ * 
Liberal representation in Brisbane stayed at sixteen after the 1960 
elecfion. The Country Party retained both coalition seniority and 
the principle of electoral weightage with no advantage whatsoever 
accruing to the Liberals, who had got the worst of a cynical 
bargain. Festering discontent over the deal would be only one of 
the foci for intra-coalition conflict during the Nicklin period. 
Even so, Nicklin's Premiership represents a golden age of sorts 
for coaUfion harmony. Nicklin dealt cautiously and wisely with his 
Liberal colleagues, never losing sight of his need for them — a need 
that was rooted in Queensland demography. 
Queensland is the only state with less than half the population 
resident in the capital city. This has had far-reaching effects on con-
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servative politics. Rural parliamentarians have always been present 
in higher proportions than in other states, where Country-National 
members are generally far fewer in number than their Liberal 
counterparts. In Queensland there have always been more Country-
National members than Liberals, but until 1983 neither party ever 
had a majority in parliament. Co-operation between the Liberals 
and the Country-Nationals was necessary to get either the numbers 
for government or credibility while in opposition. 
The conservative parties emphasised their unity of purpose in the 
1957 campaign, delivering a joint policy speech. On the hustings 
they hammered away at Labor's ability to offer only a divided 
government. Before the election the coalition had agreed to allocate 
the Premiership to the senior party and the Treasury to the junior 
party." Once they had won the elections, six Country Party and 
five Liberal members were selected by exhaustive ballot by their 
respective parliamentary parties; then Nicklin and Morris confer-
red, and allocated the portfolios without, according to Morris, 
"the slightest acrimony, disputation or disagreement". *^ 
Unlike Nicklin, Morris, hardworking but ambifious, bombastic 
and abrasive, was not always an easy man to get on with, but his 
high regard for Nicklin cannot be doubted. The two men had been 
friends since Morris's childhood, when he had had his father's 
praises of Nicklin's qualities "dinned into" him.^' But Morris 
traded on Nicklin's easygoing nature. In Cabinet, although in-
dividual submissions from Ministers were customarily dealt with in 
order of receipt, Morris would sometimes plead a coming engage-
ment in order to have his proposals discussed first, thus gaining 
more time to plead their case. Even after Nicklin realised this, for 
the sake of a quiet life he usually let Morris jump the queue. 
The coalition's first term was harmonious. The busy legislafive 
programme of the early years consisted largely of a backlog of 
measures that both parties held were long overdue, so there was 
minimal potential for conflict in this sphere. Nicklin's sage regula-
tion of Cabinet's decision making helped keep the peace. After a 
submission was discussed, a vote was taken. If the majority was 
slim, or if it was obvious that there was a clear division along party 
lines, Nicklin either dropped the proposal or called for further 
discussion.'" 
The question of seat aUocation for the 1960 election was settled 
amicably, and a similar agreement was made in July 1962 for the 
election of 1963. But the face of coalition relations was altered 
forever on 31 October 1962 when both parties agreed to restore 
preferential voting after a lapse of twenty years. The Liberals had 
been far keener than their Country Party colleagues to see preferen-
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rial vofing reintroduced. From 1958 to 1962 every annual Liberal 
Party state convention had voted overwhelmingly in favour of it, 
but the Country Party feared, correctly, that it would give the 
Liberals both the means and the excuse to mount three-cornered 
contests in seats the Country Party considered its territory. The 
deciding factor was the rapidly diminishing electoral support for 
Gair's Queensland Labor Party (QLP). 
In 1960, Gair's party had been reduced from eleven seats to four, 
whUe the official Labor Party had increased its vote from 28.89 per 
cent in 1957 to 39.89 per cent in 1960. Neither coalition party could 
boast of a similar increase, so it could be inferred that QLP voters 
were returning to the official Labor fold. If the trend continued, it 
was reasoned, the coaUtion could well lose seats in 1963 if the elec-
tion were run under the "first past the post" system. Gair had lost 
his own seat in 1960. Out of parliament, but still president of the 
QLP and as crotchety as ever, he asserted publicly that his party 
might not bother with the 1963 election if preferential voting was 
not introduced." The Liberals felt that better use could be made of 
the hardcore QLP vote. Liberal strategists believing that 85 to 90 
per cent of the QLP preferences could be expected to favour the 
coalifion.'^  
Nicklin himself was characteristically cautious and diplomatic 
when discussing the preferential voting proposal at a joint party 
meefing. CarefuUy steering the middle course, the Premier sum-
marised the arguments for and against the measure, adding that he 
personally favoured the reintroduction of optional preferential 
voting. The vote was close, and — although figures were not reveal-
ed — it was reported that several Country Party men changed their 
views almost at the last minute. It was agreed to amend the Election 
Act. To maximize the effect of the minor parties, preferential 
voting was made compulsory and not optional as it had been 
previously." 
Following the adoption of preferential voting, coalition relations 
were never the same. With the "first past the post" system there 
was litfie point in splitting the anti-Labor vote by running Liberal 
and Country Party candidates against one another; but now it 
could be argued that preferential voting maximized the anti-Labor 
vote. Liberal impatience increased when it became clear that their 
party was amassing strong support outside its designated territory, 
especially in the beach resorts in south-east Queensland which were 
rapidly becoming more urbanized. 
At the Liberal Party's state conference in May 1964 a resolution 
to contest rural seats held by the Country Party was passed. Even 
with the next election two years away, Nicklin's reaction was far 
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less than inflammatory: "It is not good politics for the Liberal 
Party to establish branches in traditional Country Party seats. The 
success of the Government has been due to the close organizafional 
and parliamentary co-operation ofthe two parties." '" 
Nicklin's mild reaction did not make the problem go away. On 2 
April 1965, state Liberal president Senator R.D. Sherrington 
affirmed that the Liberals would contest some Country Party seats 
"for the benefit of the coalition"." Nicklin had reason to worry. 
Party strength stood at twenty-six for the Country Party and 
twenty for the Liberals, which meant that the Liberals had to take 
only four Country Party seats to become senior coalition partner — 
something that was quite on the cards if Liberal candidates stood in 
the south- and north-coast electorates. 
Nicklin tried valiantly to mend the rift. On 4 July he urged the 
Country Party executive to promise not to contest any seat against 
a sitting Liberal if the Liberals would promise not to run a can-
didate in the seat of Albert. The executive complied with his wish, 
but the Liberals did not reciprocate.'* The Liberals contested eight 
Country Party seats in 1966. None changed hands, but in the south-
and north-coast electorates the campaigns were bitter. 
Following this election — Nicklin's last — the focus of coalifion 
conflict shifted to the Legislative Assembly where the so-called 
"Ginger Group" led by Charles Porter, former Liberal Party 
secretary, and Member for Toowong, sniped at the Country Party. 
The Premier was generally exempt from these attacks. In 1980 
Porter declared that researchers of the Nicklin period "will not find 
alleged against the late Frank Nicklin the palest shadow of the 
vituperation, abuse and charges of corrupt and despotic pracfices 
that have been a consistent feature of [recent] Liberal pro-
nouncements"." 
Nicklin was fortunate in that almost all of the senior Liberals of 
the time, including the four leaders, Morris, Munro, Hiley and 
Chalk, were staunch coalitionists. Chalk's pro-coalitionist sen-
timents went so far as to oppose the formafion of Liberal branches 
in his own, chiefly rural electorate. Never far from Nicklin's mind 
were the twenty-five wasted years in opposition and the accident of 
history that ended them. While opening the last Country Party con-
ference that he attended as Premier he counselled delegates: 
We should let the troubles of our Labor opponents serve as a reminder 
of the disastrous results that follow disunity in a government's ranks. It 
would be a great mistake to imagine that we could indulge in a struggle 
for party supremacy within the coalition and escape the severe censure 
of the electors." 
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Nicklin's words were proved correct — for the Liberals — sixteen 
years later. For the National Party, they remain a warning of events 
that may yet come to pass. 
When Frank NickUn became Premier, the otherwise divided labour 
movement was united in apprehensiveness over the prospect of the 
first non-Labor government for a generation. It was feared that 
improved working conditions achieved by the close co-operation 
between the AWU and successive Labor governments were under 
threat. In retrospect, these fears were exaggerated, for the conser-
vafives knew that there was little electoral capital to be gained in 
removing or reducing standard conditions of employment at a time 
of comparative economic prosperity. 
The first major industrial legislation came in 1961 when the old 
Industrial Court lost its conciliative, arbitral and award-making 
funcfions to the newly established Industrial Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission. The new commission was not empowered 
to award or increase bonus payments, although it could abolish or 
decrease them. This led to a stoppage at MIM (Mount Isa Mines), 
whose employees had bonus applications before the Court that now 
had to be dropped. From 25 September the mine closed down. 
After an indecisive two months the Commission ordered the unions 
to direct their members to return to work by 20 November. The 
AWU members obeyed, but the craft unions refused to comply. 
NickUn proclaimed a state of emergency and ordered the men back 
to work, simultaneously directing MIM to negotiate with union 
leaders on work conditions. But the Government could not compel 
the parties to discuss bonus payments, and the 1961 dispute ended 
with an uneasy truce. 
The issue resurfaced in 1964 when the Commission refused an 
AWU application for a £4 weekly rise to compensate for lost 
bonuses over recent years. The AWU ordered its members to revert 
from contract to wages work, slashing working hours and mine 
output and forcing MIM to close its copper smelter. Large coal 
orders were cancelled and the government railways lost freight 
revenue. Nicklin issued an Order-in-Council ordering the miners to 
return to contract work. It was ignored, and the order was amend-
ed to give the company the right to suspend or dismiss any miner 
refusing to comply. On 15 December 230 miners were dismissed. 
All Mount Isa closed down except for essential operations. 
Once more the Commission heard the AWU application for a £4 
increase. A prosperity loading of £3 per week was gained on 
Christmas Eve, but the miners now made other demands, including 
the reinstatement of their unofficial leader Pat Mackie, who had 
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been dismissed early in the dispute. They stayed out, and other 
industries dependent on minerals from Mount Isa began to suffer. 
By mid-January the strike-weary miners were beginning to feel 
the economic pinch. On 27 January George Fisher, MIM chairman, 
announced that if sufficient miners reported for work the mines 
would reopen on 1 February. Both Industrial Commissioner Harry 
Harvey and AWU secretary Edgar WilUams advised the men to go 
back; the end of the strike seemed only a matter of time. 
To reinforce the company's hand, however, Nicklin issued a 
further extraordinary Order-in-Council that incorporated several 
startingly severe regulations. Police were authorized to enter any 
premises forcibly and to prevent any "undesirable" person from 
coming to Mount Isa. Another regulation stated that the opinion of 
a police officer was all that was required to obtain a convicfion for 
aiding and abetting the strike." 
Fearing police intervention, the AWU decided not to hold 
meetings until the order was withdrawn. This left them unable to 
consider MIM's offer to reopen the mine. In Sydney the general 
secretary of the AWU, Tom Dougherty, said it all: "If the Nicklin 
Government had wanted to continue the strike they could not have 
done anything more foolish or stupid.""" Nicklin did little to con-
tradict Dougherty's impression when he expressed his hope that the 
AWU would take advantage of police protection to call a meeting 
and have a vote taken."' No meetings were held, reflecting the shor-
tage of Mount Isa unionists willing to attend gatherings where 
police were empowered to arrest people and have them convicted at 
whim. 
The infamous order was condemned in editorials across 
Australia. The message finally sank in, and the Government 
suspended the order on 1 February. On 17 February the company 
opened its gates. When returning workers were picketed, Nicklin 
rushed anti-picketing legislation through parliament to counter the 
picketers. On 7 April 1965 the remaining strikers voted overwhelm-
ingly to return to work: the most severe crisis of Nicklin's premier-
ship was over. 
The Nicklin Government drew little kudos from the Mount Isa 
episode. Morris's poorly conceived, short-sighted and unworkable 
legislation of 1961 precipitated the trouble, but even after an expen-
sive dry run in that year repeal or modification of the legislafion 
was not considered. When the big strike came, Nicklin acted only 
after months of strife. Considering how close the strikers were to 
the end of their tether, the Order-in-Council of 27 January was 
harsh, provocative and, worst of all, unnecessary. Nicklin's hasty 
backtracking after the order's hostile reception was probably an 
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indication that Nicklin could see that he had gone too far for most 
of the community. Certainly he did not show the firmness of 
resolve that the Bjelke-Petersen Government would later 
demonstrate in its dealings with strikers. If his anti-picketing 
legislation was a belated attempt to show toughness, it achieved lit-
tle else, as it came far too late to have any effect on the outcome of 
the strike. 
Nicklin's erratic ruthlessness with Mount Isa unionists con-
trasted with his benevolence towards the public service unions, 
especially during his first few years of government. Like their blue-
collared brothers, white-collar unions were apprehensive about 
what Nicklin might do. He allayed their fears within days of his 
election when, in a symbolic gesture, he restored the privilege of a 
half-day's leave for public servants to attend Brisbane's annual Ex-
hibition. Further reforms were promised, and the public service 
rapidly adjusted to working with its new masters. Cyril Muhldorff, 
State Service Union president, and a recent vice-president of the 
QCE, said in his Christmas message for 1957: "Public servants will 
have least cause for regret at the passing of Labor." "^  
In 1958 all public servants were reclassified and the greatest 
general salary rise in public service history was implemented. 
Salaries were increased to a level comparable to those in banking 
and insurance, two fields that had hitherto poached discontented 
pubUc servants. Almost overnight public service recruitment 
figures increased. Over the new few years other reforms were 
introduced."' 
Nicklin had excellent motives for his benevolence: There had 
long been signs that unattractive salaries were causing recruitment 
problems,"" and staff shortages would have jeopardized the 
smooth running of day-to-day government business — not an ideal 
situation for a novice ministry the most senior member of which 
(Nicklin himself) had never previously served in a government. The 
loyahy of the public service was vital and Nicklin was wilUng to 
take dramatic steps to gain it. He succeeded so well that a Labor 
member of his day later recalled that the performance of his party 
in opposition was hampered by the lack of public service leaks 
during Nicklin's time."' 
The momentum of reform proved difficult to maintain, and by 
1968, when Nicklin retired, the State Service Union was complain-
ing that public service salaries trailed those of all other states and 
the Commonwealth. Nicklin's genial personality deflected some 
criticism; the union paid tribute to him as "a man who found it 
easy to say a very firm 'No' in a very pleasant manner". Salary 
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disparities were mentioned, but with the cautious addition: "This 
fact does not reflect on the man Nicklin in any way." "* 
Nicklin's geniality was only one facet of a deceptively open per-
sonality, part of a political operator who behaved at times in the 
manner of a political ingenue and at others like a virtuoso. His very 
leadership was a paradox. For most of this century Queensland has 
produced authoritarian premiers who have dominated both cabinet 
and the parliamentary party — Forgan Smith, Hanlon and Bjelke-
Petersen are indisputably examples of this. But although Nicklin 
was reputedly a user of "the iron fist in private","' he does not fit 
their mould, since he did not impose his wiU on Cabinet or party. 
Yet he was able to win from his peers enough respect and loyalty 
never to have his leadership questioned. His position was rein-
forced by a reputation for personal honesty. He was not unique — 
scores of his contemporaries completed careers in politics without 
ever having their integrity questioned — but in NickUn's case his 
reputation, encapsulated in his sobriquet, "Honest Frank", firmly 
fixed a favourable image of Nicklin the man in the mind of the elec-
torate. 
When he became Premier, NickUn was largely unknown to the 
public. During the 1957 campaign. Country Party strategists had 
been concerned at the lack of an identifiable public image for their 
parliamentary leader."* Unlike every other Queensland Premier 
since 1932 he had not built a reputation in a cabinet portfolio. Nor 
was he a showman. But he was well aware that at least one 
favourable facet of his personality had filtered through to the 
public consciousness. Nicklin was a modest man, but he was too 
much of a poUtician to baulk at mentioning this trait in his 1957 
policy speech: 
[After] the long years of Labor rule in Queensland . . . the average per-
son has now come to regard the average politician as a cross between a 
rogue and a fool . . . snide political practices are regarded as attributes 
of the smart politician . . . political honesty and decency are considered 
to be indications of weakness and ineptitude. I have heard it said of 
myself on a number of occasions "Nicklin is too honest to be a politi-
cian." I ask you . . . to reflect deeply on [such statements] and all that 
they imply."' 
The origin of the nickname "Honest Frank" is not substanfiated 
by any written record, but Sir Sydney Roberts, Country Party 
president from 1968 to 1971, recalled that it was coined during a 
1957 campaign meefing when Nicklin's personal probity was 
remarked on as a potenfial electoral asset. "Honest Frank" was 
contributed by someone — Roberts was unable to recall by 
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whom.'° Somehow the press picked up — or were fed — the name 
and, perhaps because it was easy to remember, appealing and near-
tautological, it stayed. Nicklin was more fortunate than the dozens 
of members of all parfies in the Assembly whose integrity was 
unquestioned as well as unpublicized. During his 1961 Address-in-
Reply speech. Opposition leader Jack Duggan wanted to know why 
the distinction was limited to the Premier: 
Why the suggestion in this Pariiament that only one man should be 
labelled as a symbol throughout the State, as "Honest Frank"? Would 
anyone suggest that the Deputy Leader of the Country Party, the Hon. 
Jack Pizzey, should not be referred to as "Honest Jack" or his col-
leagues as "Honest Otto" [Madsen] or "Honest Tom" [Hiley] "Honest 
Gordon" [Chalk] and so on? 1 know it is something of an embarrass-
ment to the Premier. Everyone knows he is honest." 
Had the nickname been undeserved, it would very likely have 
become an ironical taunt used more by Nicklin's opponents than by 
his supporters. This did not happen. The guileless Nicklin was no 
actor, and could never have maintained the facade necessary for 
such a large-scale public deception. 
Nicklin also attempted to place the rest of the Cabinet beyond 
moral reproach. On taking office, all Ministers in the new govern-
ment resigned from company directorships to eliminate the 
possibiUty of conflict of interest. In March 1962, when the state 
seemed to be on the verge of an oil boom following the discoveries 
at Moonie, Nicklin asked his Ministers to refrain from investing in 
oil shares. Two of them. Jack Pizzey and Ernest Evans, Minister 
for Development, Main Roads and Electricity and a former 
Minister for Mines, held shares in Australian Oil and Gas, which 
was participating in the Moonie venture. Nicklin conceded that 
legally a Minister was allowed to hold shares in public companies, 
but he reminded his men that in practice it was important that there 
be no doubt in the public mind about such investments. Evans's 
reply to the Premier was characteristically blunt, but tempered with 
a respect for his leader. He refused to sell his two thousand shares 
until he was "good and ready", but he assured Nicklin that he 
would not buy any more.'^ 
Early polls showed that the Nicklin image transcended political 
barriers. Over two-thirds of intending Labor voters and virtually all 
Liberals agreed that Nicklin was honest in surveys taken prior to 
the 1963 and 1966 polls. Nicklin scored highly with the Liberals on 
other questions about his personality and performance, though 
half of them felt he was not forceful enough. Despite the smallness 
of the sample — 249 Liberals — it could be safely surmised that 
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Nicklin's personality contributed to the fact that despite organiza-
tional differences most Liberals were comfortable with Nicklin at 
the head of their government." 
How accurate was the tag "Honest Frank"? Perhaps no poUti-
cian can be truly honest. A large part of political gamesmanship 
consists of stressing the strong points of one's own platform while 
underplaying those of the opposition. A certain amount of distor-
tion — as opposed to outright dishonesty — inevitably accom-
panies such a process. Nicklin was no exception to this fact of 
political life, but instances where he could be accused of outright 
dishonesty were rare indeed. 
In ten years as Premier, NickUn was forced to dismiss a Cabinet 
Minister only twice. On both occasions he showed that he was 
capable of making statements to the people of Queensland that he 
knew to be untrue. Shortly before the 1960 elecfions, the name of 
the Lands Minister, Alf MuUer, was pubUshed in a Ust of tax 
defaulters. Nicklin was not made aware of this until the eve of the 
meeting at which the Country Party parliamentarians were schedul-
ed to choose the Cabinet by ballot. (The Premier was not granted 
the privilege of choosing his own Ministers until the Country Party 
conference in May 1961.) Muller denied the charge and said that he 
was not the "Muller, Adolf G." named in the report. Relieved, the 
Premier permitted the meeting to go ahead, and Muller was duly 
selected. But Nicklin held back from officially naming Muller as a 
member of Cabinet until the latter could furnish proof from the 
taxation authorities that he was not the offender. Caught out, 
Muller admitted to his colleagues that he had lied to them. Accord-
ing to Treasurer Tom Hiley's later account, the Cabinet was "mov-
ed by the extraordinary spectacle of a colleague whom we had 
known and reverenced for a long, long period of years, a pififul 
broken hulk of a man".'" Muller had no cards to play, but in his 
wretched state he somehow developed a stubbornness that was now 
pitted against the will of the Premier and the Cabinet. It was sug-
gested that he indicate his unavailability for Cabinet on medical 
grounds. Muller refused. The cantankerous old fellow suggested to 
Nicklin that instead he be offered a lesser portfolio which he would 
then refuse. Every member of the Cabinet was against the pro-
posal, which Muller seemed unable to comprehend would involve 
an unnecesarily messy exit. He stuck to his guns, and the wiU of an 
errant Minister prevailed over that of the Premier and the rest of 
the Cabinet. The charade went ahead. Muller resigned after the 
offer of Agriculture, a lesser portfolio, but the whole truth leaked 
out after a couple of months. NickUn confessed to the deceit, say-
ing simply "I wanted . . . to cover up as much as I could for an old 
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friend and an old cobber."" Duggan said wryly of the Premier: 
"In this matter he has been neither honest nor Frank." '* 
The other minister dismissed by Nicklin was Alex Dewar, Liberal 
Minister for Industrial Development who relinquished his portfolio 
on 3 June 1967. NickUn explained to the press: "Mr Dewar 
approached me last week and asked to be relieved of his ministerial 
duties for business reasons."" Two other sets of reasons for 
Dewar's resignation emerged later. Dewar claimed that he had been 
sacked after a clash with another Liberal Minister over, of all 
things, the monopoly on koalas then held by the Brisbane tourist 
resort Lone Pine. Liberal leader Gordon Chalk, however, provided 
a third version which became the most widely accepted of the three: 
Dewar had been fired after two of his female staff complained of 
what they considered unseemly and unwarranted attentions.'* 
Nicklin was guilty of a cover-up once again, but he won the sym-
pathy of the Courier-Mail, at least, by claiming that he had sup-
pressed the sensational circumstances out of consideration for the 
parties involved. The Courier-Mail concluded: "Moralists may 
argue whether there is such a thing as a white lie. If there is, then 
this would seem to be one."" But Nicklin knew full well that a 
scandal could disturb the carefully nurtured equanimity of his 
government. The Courier-Mail did him a favour by choosing to 
focus on only one of the reasons Nicklin had for lying to the people 
of Queensland. 
Nicklin also covered — in special circumstances — for the 
Queensland Commissioner of Police, Frank Bischof, when it was 
discovered that he was receiving remuneration from illegal starting 
price bookmaking operations in return for police protection. As Sir 
Thomas Hiley recalled, there were difficulties inherent in charging 
the feared Police Commissioner, for no bookmaker would have 
taken the stand against him. Nicklin did the next best thing. 
Together with Hiley and Alex Dewar, whose portfolio included 
Police, he confronted Bischof with evidence of his alleged activities 
and told him that the Government was considering setting up a 
public inquiry. NickUn omitted to mention that the Government 
was unUkely to succeed in a charge against the Commissioner. He 
ordered Bischof to desist. Bischof was devastated by the exposure 
and shortly after resigned from the police force.*" 
It should be said in Nicklin's favour that although his handling 
of the matters of Muller and Dewar represent lapses from his usual 
candour, there was never any doubt that they had to leave his 
cabinet, even though their misdemeanours were unconnected to 
their portfoUos. As for Bischof, with hindsight it seems likely that a 
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public inquiry would have uncovered more evidence than Nicklin 
could possibly have dreamed of. 
Nicklin himself was never touched directly by any breath of per-
sonal or political scandal. Gaunt and tired, he left parliament in 
January 1968 after a series of serious illnesses. Few could have 
reacted other than favourably to one of his last statements as 
Premier: "1 hope I leave Parliament without an enemy. I've tried 
only to make friends . . . honesty is the only policy."*' Two days 
after his refirement he said: "As I vacate the leadership I am not 
concerned at being separated from the hurly-burly of politics."'^ 
He was as good as his word, and he refrained from public comment 
on the subject almost enfirely. He was succeeded in his Land-
sborough seat (to which he had switched from Murrumba after the 
1949 redistribufion) by a former president of the Young Country 
Party, Mike Ahern, who two decades later would become Premier. 
Nicklin was knighted in June 1968. In a rare concession to for-
mality he chose to be dubbed Sir Francis rather than Sir Frank. In 
1977 advanced infirmity forced him to leave his Caloundra home 
for the Sundale Garden Village in Nambour. On 29 January 1978, 
Sir Francis Nicklin died peacefully at Sundale, aged eighty-two. In 
accordance with his own wishes he was not farewelled in death with 
the pomp and ceremony of a state funeral. 
There is no doubt that Nicklin viewed his own achievements in 
terms of his contribution to the development of Queensland. From 
his early days as Premier, State Public Relations Bureau publica-
tions emphasized the Government's role in exploiting Queensland's 
natural resources and encouragement investment. The word 
"development" has proved of perennial usefulness to Queensland 
politicians. Development proved to be an easy theme for the 
Bureau and the coalifion parfies to sell.*' The word "development" 
can, of course, be used to describe an infinite number of economic 
and social situations, some of which were present in Frank 
Nicklin's Queensland. During his decade as Premier the face of 
Queensland changed: road mileage doubled; the gross value of 
agricultural production almost doubled: the number of secondary 
schools more than doubled; the area under irrigation almost 
trebled; and the amount expended on new government buildings 
trebled. 
The most publicized improver was mining. The gross value of 
minerals produced almost trebled in the decade after 1957 —just as 
it had, with far less fanfare, in the final decade of the former Labor 
administrafion.*" In 1955 bauxite had been discovered at Weipa on 
the Cape York Peninsula. The Weipa bauxite deposit contained a 
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quarter of the world's known reserves; within a few years it had 
become the largest bauxite mine in the world. 
The 1950s and 1960s brought an increased world-wide demand 
for minerals. Australia, by comparison with most countries, was a 
poUfically stable nation and it possessed many of the minerals 
required to fuel the post-war expansion of the world's great in-
dustrial economies. Government legislation certainly facilitated the 
operations of overseas mining companies, and their presence in 
Queensland was encouraged, but it is unlikely that any amount of 
legislation and promotion would have lured foreign investment had 
Australia's political situation, natural resources and the world 
economy not been on the side of the Nicklin Government. Once the 
revenue from mining began flowing into government coffers, new 
development projects could begin. 
NickUn himself played only a limited, albeit crucial role in 
encouraging mining operations, although from all accounts he took 
a strong and energetic interest in them. Liberal Treasurers Chalk 
and Hiley handled most of the dealings with overseas companies, 
but both have testified that they were assisted by Nicklin's reputa-
tion, which gave foreign entrepreneurs confidence that the Govern-
ment with which they were dealing was headed by an honest man. 
NickUn's real significance to Queensland political history lies in 
the part his personality played in making the 1960s the most tran-
quil decade of this century in state politics. Once he became 
Premier, he was willing to share the power for which he had waited 
so long. Rarely trying to override the will of his cabinet or his 
party, he never leaned on his Liberal colleagues. He presided over, 
rather than dominated his men. Yet, although by political stan-
dards a gentleman, he was able to survive, and indeed thrive, 
without a single leadership challenge in over a quarter of a century 
as Country Party leader. 
NickUn wiU not be remembered for his talents as an innovator or 
as the developer of the state which he loved, but as the benevolent 
co-ordinator of a cabinet that had no shortage of men more 
talented than he. It is probably not the way in which he would have 
preferred to be remembered, but on reflection Honest Frank 
NickUn, Queensland's gentleman Premier, may well have agreed 
with that verdict. 
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18 Johannes Bjelke-Petersen 
' 'The Populist A utocrat'' 
JAMES WALTER 
In terms of electoral success, and of influence on the political 
debate, Johannes Bjelke-Petersen was the most effective Australian 
state premier in the postwar period. He served nineteen years and 
four months as Premier. Only two others achieved such lengthy 
terms, Thomas Playford and Henry Bolte, and neither was an ac-
tivist in the sense that Bjelke-Petersen was in pursuing his state's in-
terests (and his own vision) at a national level; nor was either quite 
so firmly identified in the broader debate as the focal image, the 
very locus, of politics in his state. There is no one else who comes 
anywhere near these three. 
Politics is best understood in terms of the interaction between 
history, political economy, and the activists brought forward by, 
and reacting to, that context. Bjelke-Petersen did not, single-
handed, shape the course of Queensland politics between 1968 and 
1987. He was heir to a particular history, and the beneficiary of 
developments in the Australian economy. He succeeded because he 
embodied, for a time and for a particular constituency, qualities 
that it saw as salient to its concerns. He was (like any leader) a 
creature of his times, not simply the shaper of them. He was, fur-
thermore, a successor to the tradition of strong leadership that 
flowed out of the practices of the Queensland Premiers considered 
in the rest of this book. With Bjelke-Petersen, this tradition — and 
its excesses — can be seen in full flower. At the same time, he came 
to seem in the end an anachronism, the end of the line. 
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen came from a Danish immigrant family of 
impoverished circumstances. His father Carl had emigrated to 
Tasmania with his parents in 1891 after an education in 
Copenhagen and Heidelberg. Carl taught in Hobart before training 
as a Lutheran pastor in New Zealand. In 1896 he was sent to south-
eastern Queensland as a pastor. Here he met Maren Poulsen. She 
too belonged to a pious immigrant Danish family which had 
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established a dairy farm in the South Burnett in the early 1890s. 
Carl Bjelke-Petersen returned to New Zealand in 1903, and Maren 
Poulsen travelled there to marry him in 1904. Their three children, 
Christian, Johannes and Agneta were born in New Zealand. It is 
said that hard work and poverty undermined Carl 
Bjelke-Petersen's health, and after ten years the family decided to 
return to the South Burnett region and to take up dairy farming. By 
then, however, Carl's health was so delicate that he was never to 
take a substantial part in the work of the farm. Hence, the family 
came to depend on the work of Carl's wife, Maren, for sustenance.' 
These circumstances were profoundly to influence the children, 
The first child, Christian, came to share the scholarly interests (and 
the delicate health) of his well-educated, bookish father — now 
deprived of a vocation. Johannes, in contrast, shared his mother's 
practical bent, and followed her example of intense work on the 
farm. As he later described it: 
I was filled with a tremendous desire and a tremendous determination to 
work and to strive and to overcome the problems that confronted my 
parents and I was encouraged by my mother who worked long hours. 
There didn't seem to be anything else on the horizon or anything else 
that mattered other than to work and strive.^  
And, on another occasion: "My father had a problem that didn't 
permit him to work hard physically. So in those early days I was be-
ing trained and organized to take initiatives, to plan and think and 
play a part with my mother, and to try and keep the home fires bur-
ning. They were pioneering days".' 
The family emphasized doctrinaire religious views. Johannes 
Bjelke-Petersen has spoken of the influence of his father's religious 
views and of reading and discussing with his father the books from 
his library." While Carl played little role in the life of the local 
church after the family's return to Queensland in 1913, Maren was 
active in Lutheran women's groups and in the local Sunday school. 
Johannes himself began to teach in the Sunday school in his 
teenage years, and later became Sunday school superintendent. 
Despite the unusual roles of the parents in practical terms, 
Lutheran conservatism was evident in the family hierarchy: the 
family followed a patriarchal authoritarian model. Hence even in 
his twenties, by which time he was clearly the mainstay of the 
family, Bjelke-Petersen had to seek permission to borrow money to 
buy a tractor: "Nothing was done w'thout father's permission."' 
In 1933, when Johannes Bjelke 'etersen was twenty-two, the 
family acquired a second property. Working at developing and 
clearing the land, he lived alone on this property for fifteen years in 
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what had been a cow bail, returning to his parents' home only at 
weekends. Motivated by such desperate circumstances, a develop-
ing organizational talent, and a boundless capacity for hard work, 
Bjelke-Petersen gradually forged his means of escape through 
business success. He moved into more diversified farming, 
acquired heavy machinery to undertake new mechanical forms of 
agriculture, accumulated more capital for further development by 
using that machinery in contracting work for others, then took up 
flying as a means of servicing the expanding contracting business. 
This led in turn to aerial spraying and seeding, and eventually into 
oil and mineral exploration and its corollary — speculative trading 
in stocks and shares. Bjelke-Petersen had achieved considerable 
financial success before embarking on his political career, and had 
acquired quite practical abilities and organizational and ad-
ministrative skills. Other attitudes resulting from these origins were 
to make their mark on his mature political style and views. 
His religious training provided Johannes Bjelke-Petersen with 
both a prescription for the good life (and righteousness) and the 
hcence for material striving and ruthlessness which would 
characterize his later achievements. This arose, it has been argued, 
because the breakaway variant of Lutheranism characteristic ofthe 
Danish community in the South Burnett and espoused by the 
Bjelke-Petersen family placed particular emphasis on the divide 
between sacred and secular.* The Lutheran concept of a dualism of 
spheres — the kingdom of the world and the kingdom of God — 
goes some way to explaining how Bjelke-Petersen later managed to 
maintain his piety while pursuing political courses that seemed to 
many ethically dubious: the normative judgments appropriate to 
the "sacred" realm simply did not apply to the secular world of 
pohtics and business. This world view was also strongly based on 
materialism and the belief that piety would be materially rewarded. 
Finally, this form of Lutheranism lends itself to a model of 
authoritarian and patriarchal government "in which the ruled are 
subdued and the God-ordained ruler can overrule the wishes of the 
people if he thinks their best interest demands it".' 
It is little wonder that, in a family as precariously situated as his, 
the young Bjelke-Petersen should have been prone to see the world 
as threatening: "I had to overcome extreme poverty in the days 
when there was no social service, and you either lived or died." Nor 
is it remarkable that battles should have been represented in terms 
of ulfimates: it was, if his already stated view is representative, 
either life or death. Aggression, too, was a logical response: of his 
school days Bjelke-Petersen has said "At the drop of a hat I'd be 
into someone", and though he argued that the proclivity was tamed 
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by the humbling experience of illness (he suffered from polio from 
age nine to eleven), aggression remained a key feature of his adult 
career. 
The personal style that would become characteristic of Bjelke-
Petersen stemmed not only from the disadvantaged situation of his 
family, however, but also from formative experiences within the 
family. On the positive side, strong bonds developed with his 
mother, and his mother and sister both remained close and suppor-
tive. His wife, Florence, and his pilot while Premier, Beryl Young, 
were later to follow the pattern of supportive and influential female 
loyalists, so notably a feature of his early family experience, 
Perhaps these relationships taught him "winning" ways: in his 
private interaction with like-minded people he was mild, un-
complicated and courteous, and he showed an ability to develop 
close relationships with others in his personal orbit, particularly 
within his close-knit family and with his personal staff who evinced 
intense loyalty and devotion. On the negative side, however, it 
seems feasible to assume that the seeds of resentment and aggres-
sion lay in the more problematic relations with his father and 
brother. The working alliance with his mother and the gradual 
achievement of security must be set against the fact that his father, 
while taking a minimal part in the work of the farm, continued to 
play the patriarch, without whose permission nothing could be 
done. A glimmer of this came through when Bjelke-Petersen paid 
his filial dues: "He left me with a tremendous heritage of faith and 
hope in the teachings of the Bible"; but he added that his father 
could not carry "a fair share of the load". Chrisfian, the scholarly, 
sickly elder brother who seems so closely identified with the father 
in retrospect, was a target for more overt resentment. Bjelke-
Petersen described him as a clock-watcher who worked only until 
the time his father had set and then left Johannes to carry on alone 
if the job was not finished: "I felt Christian could perhaps have 
helped me a bit more, but he didn't like farm work and he was not 
well . . . I couldn't understand why Christian didn't want to work. 
He would sit and study and study, I don't know where he put it 
all." In fact, Bjelke-Petersen later described Christian's early death 
— at the age of twenty-two from stomach ulcers — as due to too 
much study: "He studied too much, he wasn't interested in sport or 
work."* 
This scenario gives some insight into the predilections Bjelke-
Petersen came to display in his political career. Features of his 
family life encouraged solitary self-sufficiency in the face of a 
malign world; this remained part of his style but was leavened by 
the ability to develop close ties with supportive allies. HosfiUty and 
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aggression, however, were easily tapped by the imposition of con-
straints, or the experience of competition. He was a fighter and 
hater, a bearer of grudges (like those he bore towards his father and 
brother?). Observers were to be continually perplexed by Bjelke-
Petersen's ability to foster a regime in which not only did he 
himself transgress the bounds of propriety, but his government also 
seemed increasingly party to widespread corrupfion in public life, 
and yet his own conviction of personal morality and piety remained 
unshaken. His form of belief, however, encouraged a separation of 
the sacred and secular — and the considerable advantage of being 
able to play "hardball politics"' without the hindrance of moral 
self-doubt. He had no empathy for the weak and disadvantaged 
who, he presumably believed, could overcome this condition if they 
worked (compare his incomprehension of — and perhaps contempt 
for — Christian, who "didn't want to work"). He was a man of ac-
tion rather than ideas (ideas, after all, were the devalued realm of 
his father and brother). Having been at the mercy of a (resented?) 
patriarch for so long, he later refused to be accountable to anyone: 
rather than explaining himself or answering questions, he demand-
ed to be taken on trust. In fact as Premier he himself played the 
strong patriarch, and on a grand scale. 
Johannes Bjelke-Petersen was elected to the Queensland 
Legislafive Assembly for the Australian Country Party in 1947. His 
biographer Hugh Lunn suggests that he had first become known to 
prominent Country Party figures as an enterprising entrepreneur 
with organizational abilities and had been drawn in to help them 
with their election campaigns, and thus became engaged in the 
political machine.'" On his own account: 
I was in the contracting business with heavy equipment and making 
more money in a couple of days than I could make out of a whole year 
as a Member of Parliament, but they talked me into standing as a 
Member of Parliament because I was well known and had a pretty good 
record. But then I learnt what politics is all about, so I have come to a 
deep appreciation that there are attempts made to change it . . ." 
The threat represented by change was to become for him one of the 
chief spurs to action. 
Bjelke-Petersen was groomed for politics by a powerful mentor, 
the then federal Primary Industries Minister, Charles Adermann. 
Not only a key figure in Country Party circles, but also an active 
layman in the Church of Christ, Adermann shared with Bjelke-
Petersen a conviction of his own piety. The party in-fighting sur-
rounding Bjelke-Petersen's election, however, contained indica-
tions of what was to come: the plebiscite for his pre-selection for 
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the seat of Nanango had been controversial, with an outcry from 
supporters of an alternative candidate, which included allegations 
of a plan to gain control of the local branch and a rigged plebiscite. 
Bjelke-Petersen remained aloof from the in-fighting, but state 
parliamentary Country Party leader Frank Nicklin intervened on 
his behalf, and he was subsequently given support by the party 
machine and by Nicklin and Adermann in the election campaign.'^  
Bjelke-Petersen served sixteen years on the Queensland 
backbench before first being chosen as a Minister, for Works and 
Housing, in 1963. He was fifty-two. In 1968, though regarded as 
the outside candidate, he defeated two better known candidates to 
be elected deputy leader of the Country Party, largely because he 
had impressed as an organizer, had devoted himself to meefing peo-
ple, and had built up political debts by tirelessly campaigning for 
others. Later that same year, when Nicklin's successor as State 
Premier and leader of the Country Party, Jack Pizzey, died sud-
denly, the still largely unknown Bjelke-Petersen was elected leader 
of the parliamentary Country Party. Shortly thereafter, despite a 
tussle with their partner in the coalition government — the Liberal 
Party, whose leader. Sir Gordon Chalk, had been appointed 
caretaker Premier after Pizzey's death — the Country Party 
parliamentarians used their numbers in the joint party meeting to 
ensure that Bjelke-Petersen became Premier. Perhaps misled by 
this slow run-up to high office and inauspicious accession to power, 
many saw Bjelke-Petersen initially as a short-term leader. Yet the 
signs of his later dominance — toughness, single-minded deter-
mination, an extraordinary application to work — had long been 
evident: 
No other minister had come within cooee of doing what I did. The 
organizing and operating on the telephone. Everyone who gave me a job 
got it it done. They came to me and I followed it through with an inten-
sity, well, the same intensity that I ran my business with." 
Events soon forced the parliamentary Country Party to 
recognize Bjelke-Petersen's persistence and endurance. Recurrent 
rumblings about apparent conflicts of interest between Bjelke-
Petersen's private shareholdings and business interests and his 
public duties came to a head in 1970 when it was revealed that his 
wife (along with some prominent conservative politicians) had 
taken advantage of a preferential share issue by the aluminium 
company Comalco. Worse, Bjelke-Petersen responded angrily and 
ineptly when challenged on these matters on television. Dissatisfied 
members of the parliamentary Country Party mustered votes 
against Bjelke-Petersen, and on the night before a parUamentary 
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party meeting urged him to step down as they had the numbers (six-
teen to ten) to defeat him. Bjelke-Petersen spent all night on the 
telephone calling in debts for former campaign help and favours; 
by morning he had turned the fide to some extent. In the party 
room he arranged for an ally to call for a vote of confidence before 
the dissidents could move no confidence. Then, by producing the 
proxy vote of an absent colleague (whom no one had been able to 
contact), and using his own vote in his favour, he managed to 
secure an even vote (thirteen, thirteen), and to retain his posifion. 
When the dissidents threatened to take the issue to parliament and 
secure the support of the Liberals for a change of premier, Bjelke-
Petersen called on the National Party machine, whose president, 
R.J. Sparkes — in order to forestall public divisions — threatened 
any member involved with loss of party endorsement. Bjelke-
Petersen was not to be seriously challenged again until 1987. 
These same qualities of ruthlessness, political astuteness, and 
refusal to concede defeat were instrurnental in Bjelke-Petersen's 
success in thwarting the federal Whitlam Labor Government of 
1972-75. His conviction that Whitlam's government was taking the 
wrong direction, and his determination to do something about it, 
led to one of his famous sallies on the national scene. He travelled 
the country speaking against the "socialist" excesses of the federal 
government. He refused to be courted by Whitlam, rejecting the 
financial incentives offered to his state. More importantly, in a 
brilliant display of second-guessing and acute organizational sense, 
he managed in 1974 to frustrate Whitlam's plans to change the 
complexion of the Senate in Labor's favour through the induced 
resignation of Senator Gair; and in 1975, with a cavalier disregard 
of convention, he himself effected a change in the Senate balance 
of power by appointing his own nominee in place of Labor Senator 
Bert MilUner who had died. These moves, details of which are well 
documented,'" are generally conceded to have contributed 
significantly to the demise of the Whitlam Government. His 
maverick campaign for a Royal Commission into the alleged illicit 
dealings of federal Labor ministers in foreign loan negotiations — 
convincing evidence for which was never disclosed — also played a 
damaging part in the 1975 federal election campaign. Thereafter, in 
the eyes of a considerable conservative constituency nation-wide, 
the man who took on Whitlam and won could do no wrong. 
More liberal observers, however, found Bjelke-Petersen's conti-
nuing success to be puzzlingly at odds with what they took to be the 
democratic fundamentals of Australian politics. Queensland's 
record of repressive policy and legislation under Bjelke-Petersen 
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was to them surprising. Yet central to his very appeal within the 
state was the litany of repression: proclamations of states of 
emergency to deal with situations as diverse as demonstrations 
against a visiting South African football team and against striking 
electrical trade union workers; street-march legislation aimed at 
proscribing demonstrations; endorsement of questionable police 
activity in "controlling" a student march and in a widely publicized 
drug raid, coupled with refusal to allow invesfigation into the 
police force (which eventually led the Police Commissioner, Ray 
Whitrod, to resign in 1976, complaining that his efforts to in-
vestigate such matters had been frustrated by government in-
terference); government intervention in "liberal" education pro-
grammes; electoral malapportionment; draconian "essential ser-
vices" legislation to prevent strikes; raids on family-planning 
clinics known to perform abortions; the erosion of Aboriginal land 
rights in the face of development projects, and refusal to listen to 
their protests because their leaders were alleged to be "left-funded" 
and "Coms"; and through it all, the increasing evidence of a 
subversion of Westminster principles and corruption in public life. 
These are matters to which we will return, but if the apparatus of 
repression was one feature of Bjelke-Petersen's reign, alongside it 
must be noted the professionalization of politics in Queensland, led 
by the Country Party. 
In 1974 the Country Party in Queensland officially changed its 
name to the National Party of Australia. This new image was in 
keeping with a changed constituency — that is, it was designed to 
appeal to entrepreneurial capital rather than to purely rural in-
terests. After 1970, under the very thorough direction ofthe state 
president, R.J. (later Sir Robert) Sparkes, the party had developed 
policies intended to make Queensland the money-market capital of 
Australia. The abolition of death duties (the Queensland Govern-
ment was the first government in AustraUa to take this controver-
sial step in 1977), major cuts in stamp duties, yearly increases in the 
exemption levels on payroll tax, and decreasing land taxes were ex-
amples of the emphasis on low taxation to induce foreign and in-
terstate capital to invest in Queensland's economic "progress" and 
"development". Such policies were indicative also of the National 
Party's underlying strategy of stealing the "free enterprise" mantle 
from its coalition partner, the Liberal Party. These emphases were 
facilitated by a tight alliance between the National Party organiza-
tion and the Premier. There was never any doubt about the impor-
tance of the party machine behind Bjelke-Petersen; one commen-
tator described it as being organized like an efficient business in 
comparison with the Labor Party's old-cronies network. Equally, 
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there was, for most of his Premiership, no doubt about Bjelke-
Petersen's effectiveness in implementing National Party policy. 
Between the party president's intervention in the attempted party-
room coup against Bjelke-Petersen in 1970 and the rift marked by 
Bjelke-Petersen's ill-fated campaign in 1986 to gain a federal seat, 
there was no question of the machine's endorsement of the leader. 
The organization supported Bjelke-Petersen because he was suc-
cessful in securing the political base for its developmental policies, 
while Bjelke-Petersen worked hand-in-glove with the organization 
because its emphases accorded with his personal predilictions. Par-
ticular economic interests benefited from favoured treatment under 
the Bjelke-Petersen Government (and particular individuals receiv-
ed reciprocal benefits from those interests); but the Government in 
turn could represent economic progress for the whole state as 
encapsulated in the activities of those interests. Whatever the 
permutafions of this equation, the public impression the Bjelke-
Petersen Government worked at creating was that under him things 
got done in Queensland, and everybody benefited. 
Sparkes's intention throughout was to reform the party, to en-
sure its continued dominance in a state that was undergoing 
demographic change. Its parliamentary representation would, he 
recognized, suffer from the effects of rural depopulation unless it 
could win electoral support from outside its traditional areas — 
hence the new image and the new policy approach." Part of the 
strategy had to be to increase party membership, reorganize party 
finances, and identify issues of concern to voters in areas targeted 
as susceptible to National Party expansion. This involved an effi-
cient, professional organization, relying on professional polling 
and market research and on hand-picking candidates (often well-
known community figures) who would appeal to the electorates 
they were to represent. This meant, eventually, breaking through in 
metropolitan areas and directly confronting the Liberal Party on its 
own ground. A further consequence was a change in the parliamen-
tary profile of the National Party: the group of elderly farmers and 
graziers with little formal education and long years of party service 
that were characteristic of the National Party and dominant in 
Bjelke-Petersen's cabinet '* (and of whom Bjelke-Petersen was 
typical) came to be joined by a better-educated, younger cohort, 
sometimes with professional qualifications, and with a record of 
community activism rather than party service. 
Increasingly discomforted by the expansionary progress of its 
senior coalition partner, the Liberal Party itself contributed to 
coalifion tension, and played a role in the success of the National 
Party strategy, by deciding in 1976 to engage in three-cornered elec-
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toral contests against sitting National Party members," and opting 
in 1980 for a separate Senate ticket. The gap in seats held at subse-
quent elections simply increased in the Nationals' favour.'* All 
came to a head with the state election of 1983 — an election from 
which the Bjelke-Petersen Government emerged with power in its 
own right. 
The 1983 election was precipitated by a crisis within the coalition 
which was sparked by the Liberal Party's own frustrafion." In view 
of subsequent events, it appears likely that Bjelke-Petersen and 
Sparkes had prepared to capitalize on just such an eventuality.^  
The point at issue was Liberal Party support for a public accounts 
committee capable of scrutinizing government business — an in-
itiative Bjelke-Petersen always opposed. On 4 August 1983, Terry 
White, a Liberal Minister in the Bjelke-Petersen Government, 
crossed the floor to vote with Liberal backbench colleagues (and 
the ALP) in favour of a motion intended to bring on debate about 
the establishment of such a committee. He was then asked to resign 
by his parliamentary leader, Dr Llew Edwards, on the grounds that 
by voting against his cabinet colleagues and by failing to support 
the government's order of business he had breached ministerial 
responsibility. On his refusal to resign, he was dismissed. White 
then indicated that he intended to challenge Edwards for Liberal 
state parliamentary leadership. It appears likely that Edwards knew 
he could not survive such a contest,^' and for several days he 
delayed calling a party meeting. Bjelke-Petersen also made his 
plans: on the morning of 9 August he moved that parliament be ad-
journed "until a date to be fixed". When, later on 9 August, the 
Liberals convened to resolve matters, Edwards found himself 
unable to prevent a spill motion; he declined to recontest the leader-
ship, and White was elected leader unopposed. Bjelke-Petersen, 
however, had argued from the start that he would refuse to work 
with White as Liberal leader (and hence Deputy Premier), and 
when he remained intransigent White recommended that remaining 
Liberal Ministers resign their commissions. Bjelke-Petersen played 
on their reluctance to do so, and enhanced division within the 
Liberal Party, by recommending to the State Governor that these 
resignations not be accepted. After several further days of 
recrimination and division, the Liberal Ministers resubmitted their 
resignations. This fime they were accepted, and the Governor ac-
cepted Bjelke-Petersen's recommendation that the Nafional Party 
be allowed to form a minority government without reference to 
parliament, pending an election.^ ^ Rather than call a snap poll, 
however, Bjelke-Petersen opted for a prolonged pre-election 
period, nominating October 22 as polling day and gambling on fur-
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ther destabilization among the Liberals in the meantime. He was 
not disappointed. 
The Liberal Party campaign was a debacle: before its inception 
former Liberal Prime Minister, Malcolm Fraser, attacked White 
for his breach of cabinet solidarity, and Sam Doumany resigned the 
deputy leadership; during the campaign two former and one pre-
sent Liberal premier from other states joined the fray, on behalf of 
the National Party. There were pre-selection squabbles, and 
rumours of an impending challenge to White's leadership by 
former Health Minister Brian Austin broke a week before polling 
day. The Liberals' attempts to make capital out ofthe need to pro-
tect the Westminster system against Bjelke-Petersen's depredations 
went badly awry. Against them, the National Party ran a slickly 
professional, state-chauvinist campaign. Bjelke-Petersen took 
every advantage of the legitimacy of incumbency, railing against 
the Liberals' betrayal of sound government, their "trendy" policies 
and their internal divisions, and offering strong and cohesive 
leadership. In the result, both the National Party and the Labor 
Party gained ground, the National Party winning five Liberal Party 
seats (to give it a total of forty-one) and the Labor Party seven 
(total thirty-two).^' The Liberal Party's last faint hope of using its 
remaining eight members to influence Bjelke-Petersen's minority 
government was dashed when, two days after the election, two of 
its re-elected members, Don Lane and Brian Austin (both of whom 
had been Cabinet Ministers for the former coalition), defected to 
join the National Party. They were made ministers in the new 
National Party Ministry, and Bjelke-Petersen had the majority 
(forty-three out of eighty-two) to govern alone. 
This was to be the high point of the Bjelke-Petersen-Sparkes 
alliance. On the night of the 1983 poll, Bjelke-Petersen announced 
one ofthe goals that was eventually to bring the partnership down: 
his interest in moving to the federal sphere. Another factor that was 
to come between them was the electoral success of the younger, 
educated and articulate Nationals who would pursue different 
policies and come to question Bjelke-Petersen's way of doing 
things. At the time, however, it seemed that the Government 
depended on Bjelke-Petersen alone, and that he was the pre-
eminent figure in the state's life. In the palmy days of 1984, Bjelke-
Petersen allowed himself to be "persuaded" by close friend and 
National Party trustee. Sir Edward Lyons, to accept State Govern-
ment nomination for a knighthood: the Queen's citation on the 
award of the knighthood referred to his belief in parliamentary 
democracy and improvements to the parliamentary process.^" In 
eariy 1985, shortly after he had engineered a massive confrontation 
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with State electricity unions and passed emergency legislation that 
effectively removed the right to strike, Bjelke-Petersen was award-
ed an honorary Doctorate of Laws by the University of 
Queensland, despite some mystery about how the recommendation 
had passed through the university Senate, widespread consterna-
tion among academics,^' and vigorous demonstrations against the 
conferral on campus. 
The cracks that would erode Bjelke-Petersen's dominance, 
however, were soon to appear. The economic performance of the 
state began to deteriorate, at a time, paradoxically, when Nafional 
Party electoral success had swept aside the highly regarded Liberal 
Ministers who had developed expertise in complex portfolios, in-
cluding Treasury.^ * A series of scandals surfaced, including the 
forced resignation of Bjelke-Petersen confidant Sir Edward Lyons 
from chairmanship of the TAB (Totalisator Agency Board) and 
National Party trusteeship after alleged misuse of his TAB credit-
betting account; questions over a conflict of interest concerning the 
family business of Cabinet Minister Russell Hinze; criminal charges 
against a close associate of Bjelke-Petersen, Allan Callaghan, and 
his wife Judith over misappropriation of public funds; and the 
disclosure that the Government planned to revoke the national 
park status of a section of Lindeman Island in order to seU it to 
East-West Airlines whose Queensland operations were directed by 
Sir Edward Lyons. Sir Robert Sparkes himself intervened to force 
Bjelke-Petersen to back down on the Lindeman Island scheme, and 
was subsequently challenged for the presidency of the National 
Party for the first time during his incumbency. 
The pervasiveness of the malaise, a drop in Bjelke-Petersen's 
own popularity rating, and the uneasy relationship between the 
organizational and parliamentary wings of the National Party 
prompted many to question whether Bjelke-Petersen could retain 
power in the 1986 elections, at least without again entering into a 
coalition. The Nafional Party campaign hit problems, among them 
an accusation from a National Party trustee. Sir Roderick Proctor, 
that the Government was characterized by cronyism, special 
favours and doubtful tendering practices, and that business was 
afraid to speak out; and the revelation that Alan Bond, the new 
owner of television station QTQ-9, had paid $400,000 to Bjelke-
Petersen as an out-of-court settlement of a defamation action 
brought against the stafion by the Premier — this was widely inter-
preted as an attempt to buy government favour. Still, the campaign 
advertising (drawing on a budget neither of the other parties could 
match) centred almost entirely on Bjelke-Petersen, and the "equa-
tion of Sir Joh and the Nationals with the interests of ordinary 
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Queenslanders".^' Along with the fatherly/grandfatherly images 
went the familiar strident appeals to state chauvinism and the 
promise of "Strength — not weakness. Decisions — not summits. 
Obedience to the law — not union anarchy". As National Party 
support appeared to falter, Liberal Party confidence grew, and the 
party began again to campaign on issues such as a fair election bill, 
and the promise of restoring trust in government, with the expecta-
don that, at the very least, the party would return to a coalition 
government where it could influence these matters. It did not take 
sufficient account of the Nationals' resolve never to re-enter a 
coaUfion, nor of the sheer size of the budget the Nationals were to 
draw on in their campaign of vilification. At the same time the 
ALP impugned the credibility of the Liberal promise to attend to 
the electoral system, pointing out that in twenty-six years of coali-
fion partnership the Liberals had done nothing about it. Attacked 
from both sides, the Liberal Party lost ground. For its part, the 
ALP recognized the historical appeal of strong leadership in 
Queensland and tried to stress the positive qualities of its unassum-
ing and straightforward leader, Neville Warburton, while pointing 
up the growing aura of chicanery surrounding the National Party 
Government, with the slogan "Your honest choice for 
Queensland".^ * Despite the volatility of opinion polls and the er-
rafic nature of the campaign, the election served to confirm 1983: 
the National Party once again won government "on the coat-tails 
of Sir Joh Bjelke-Petersen's style of leadership". ^ ' It appeared that 
"the volume and extent of criticism against Sir Job's government 
finally had negligible effect on voting intentions . . . the Nationals 
are now regarded by the majority of conservative voters . . . as 
their natural choice".'" The win, however, was to push Bjelke-
Petersen into an act of hubris that was rapidly to dissipate his 
credibility in conservative politics, and to contribute to his 
downfaU: the "Joh for PM campaign". 
On claiming victory on election night, 1 November 1986, Bjelke-
Petersen reiterated his intention to lead a push against 
"Canberra". In 1983 his interest had been declared; during 1984 
the manifestations of a national campaign emerged against Bob 
Hawke's federal ALP government;" and during the 1986 state 
election campaign, several journalists mapped out 
Bjelke-Petersen's intended federal campaign and the interests 
behind it in some detail.'^ His state victory appeared to clear the 
way for these federal ambitions and, ignoring the troubled state of 
the Queensland economy and the gathering cloud over his own 
government, Bjelke-Petersen began mustering support for his 
cause. Considerable financial support was proffered by a group of 
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wealthy entrepreneurs with Queensland interests whom the press 
dubbed "the white shoe brigade". In January 1987 he began his 
onslaught on the leaders of the federal coalition, John Howard 
(Liberal Party) and Ian Sinclair (National Party), called for the end 
of the federal coalition, and floated the proposal of recruifing a 
group of alternative candidates to stand on a platform he and his 
supporters endorsed. In February he announced his own intention 
to stand for federal election, and his wish to be Prime Minister. 
While early reports suggested that Sparkes was "nonplussed at Sir 
Job's national crusade" and "no longer able to anticipate the 
Premier's next move",", the state organization supported the cam-
paign. But it was soon to create division within the Nafional Party 
and the federal coalition: the party's federal leader, Ian Sinclair, 
challenged Bjelke-Petersen to declare loyalty or set up a separate 
party; subsequently Queensland's National Party MPs left the 
federal coalition, and shortly thereafter the coalition — unshaken 
since 1949 — itself split when it became apparent that Sinclair 
could not guarantee the loyalty of remaining National Party 
members. Bjelke-Petersen then claimed, despite furious denials 
from Sinclair, that he would deliver the federal Nafional Party 
policy speech and lead the campaign. It was on this issue that 
Bjelke-Petersen and Sparkes split, as Sparkes tried without success 
to overcome the National Party rift by restoring peace between 
Bjelke-Petersen and Sinclair. The link between the parliamentary 
and organizational wings of the Queensland National Party, so in-
tegral to Bjelke-Petersen's long success, was thus sacrificed to 
Bjelke-Petersen's ambition. 
Within a month of these events, another development increased 
pressure on the State Government: on 11 May on the highly-
regarded "Four Corners" programme ABC television screened 
"The Moonlight State", a documentary which investigated corrup-
tion in Queensland. The effect of the programme was to give a new 
focus and impetus to allegations that had gradually gained currency 
over a period of years and had already prompted newspaper 
inquiry.'" The following day Bill Gunn, the Police Minister and 
also Acting Premier while Bjelke-Petersen was away pursuing his 
national campaign, announced that an inquiry would be establish-
ed to investigate the aUegations. Bjelke-Petersen had already 
denied on television that an inquiry was necessary, and there were 
later indications that he disagreed with his Police Minister's in-
ifiafive, but Gunn and others insisted that the inquiry proceed. In 
any case, Bjelke-Petersen was preoccupied with other concerns. 
On 25 May, Bjelke-Petersen flew to America on a business trip. 
The following day, the Police Minister, Bill Gunn, and the 
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Attorney-General, Paul Clauson, announced that Mr Gerald 
(Tony) Fitzgerald, Q.C, was to head the inquiry. Then on 27 May, 
taking advantage of favourable economic circumstances and the 
now considerable turmoil in the federal Opposifion, the Prime 
Minister, Bob Hawke, announced that there would be an early 
federal election, on 11 July. Overseas, and having completed only 
the inifial stages of his strategy of travelling the country to lobby 
financial support and choose candidates, Bjelke-Petersen was in no 
posifion to respond. Returning to Australia, he found himself 
unable to revive his campaign and on 3 June the "Joh for PM" 
campaign was abandoned. Bjelke-Petersen, however, persisted in 
playing a troublesome individual role, to the dismay of the conser-
vative parties, announcing a separate flat-tax-rate policy and a 
separate policy launch, and continuing to push his own candidates. 
On 11 July the Hawke Government won a third term with an 
increased majority. The Labor vote rose most in Queensland, 
prompting the ALP state secretary, Peter Beattie, to say "We 
couldn't have done it without Joh." Ian Sinclair also attributed 
"sole responsibility" for the coalition defeat to Bjelke-Petersen, 
who for his part was quite unrepentant. 
Ensuing months, saw a rapid downhill slide for Bjelke-Petersen. 
Increasingly he clashed with junior colleagues and with Sparkes, 
opposing policies that were of contemporary urgency but which 
represented a divergence from the values he stood for. There were 
further indications of his attempts to persuade Gunn to "expedite" 
or wind down the Fitzgerald Inquiry." At the same time, public 
figures whose careers had advanced during Bjelke-Petersen's rule 
— most notably his hand-picked Police Commissioner, Sir Terence 
Lewis — were embroiled in the matters investigated by Fitzgerald. 
As disquiet within the National Party grew and calls for Bjelke-
Petersen's resignation became public he became more stubborn in 
his resolve to hang on. After narrowly beating off an attempt at the 
party's central council meeting in October to force his retirement, 
however, he announced that he would retire on 8 August 1988, the 
twenfieth anniversary of his accession to the Premiership. Though 
Sparkes endorsed this, peace was shortlived. In early November 
division was again apparent as Sparkes again emphasized the need 
for new directions and the party conference ruled in favour of 
policies which appeared to be tactically chosen to constrain Bjelke-
Petersen or arouse his opposition. By now Cabinet Ministers 
Russell Hinze and Don Lane, and Bjelke-Petersen's close associate. 
Sir Edward Lyons, had been impUcated in aUegations before the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry. 
Matters came to a head when Bjelke-Petersen, without warning. 
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determined on a strategy to expunge dissent by reshaping his 
ministry. On 23 November, without consulting his colleagues, he 
wrote to the Governor, Sir Walter Campbell, advising that he wish-
ed to restructure his cabinet to eliminate a number of portfolios, 
and proposed the resignation of his entire ministry and a commis-
sion to form a new administration. The Governor advised that this 
was not an appropriate means of achieving restructuring, and that 
he should first seek the resignations of those he sought to remove 
while discussing his restructuring proposals with Cabinet. Bjelke-
Petersen then called in five key ministers — including Deputy 
Premier Bill Gunn and favoured leadership contender Mike Ahern 
— and demanded their resignations: all refused. Gunn subsequent-
ly informed the Governor that these initiatives did not have cabinet 
support. On 24 November, after further negotiation, Bjelke-
Petersen again wrote to the Governor to say that the number of ex-
isting ministries was after all to be retained, but that the commis-
sions of three Ministers who "are not prepared to conform to the 
policies I have laid down" should be withdrawn. This advice was 
accepted, and Ahern (Minister for Health and Environment), Brian 
Austin (Minister for Mines and Energy, the Arts) and Peter 
McKechnie (Minister for Industry and Technology) were dismissed. 
The announcement of the sackings unleashed a furore. Gunn and 
Ahern announced that they would contest the leadership, and 
Ahern claimed the dismissals were linked to an attempt to impede 
the Fitzgerald Inquiry. Sparkes called on the National Party 
Management Committee to convene a party meeting at which a 
spill of leadership positions could take place. Bjelke-Petersen refus-
ed to recognize the meeting and did not attend. Nevertheless, on 26 
November the parliamentary National Party met and resolved that 
all elective positions be declared vacant, and new elecfions held. 
Mike Ahern was elected leader, with Gunn as his deputy, and wrote 
to the Governor requesting that he be issued a commission to form 
a government. He appended a supporting document signed by all 
parliamentary National Party members except Bjelke-Petersen, 
and four legal opinions attesting the validity of the parliamentary 
meeting called by the management committee. The Governor at 
first declined Ahern's request, asking him to persuade Bjelke-
Petersen to resign the Premiership, or to take the matter to parUa-
ment. Bjelke-Petersen refused to resign, or to see Ahern. For 
several days the impasse continued, with Bjelke-Petersen refusing 
to see Ahern, refusing to heed Cabinet's request that he resign, and 
vowing to take the leadership fight to parUament. Appeals to party 
loyalty brought no response. Indeed, it was said at the fime that he 
negotiated with both Liberal and Labor parties for their support in 
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parliament, and subsequent evidence indicates that the then ALP 
state secretary, Peter Beattie, at least entertained this proposition 
as a means of completing the disarray of the Nationals. In the end it 
was said that an ultimatum — to resign or pick up his own poten-
tially considerable legal costs in numerous outstanding defamation 
actions — brought about Bjelke-Petersen's capitulation.'* On 1 
December 1987 he resigned, saying, "It was my intention to take 
this matter to the floor of State Parliament . . . However, I now 
have no interest in leading the National Party any further. I've 
decided to resign as Premier and retire from Parliament, effective 
immediately."" So, in a series of events as extraordinary as 
anything in his remarkable career, Bjelke-Petersen's Premiership 
ended with defeat, not by a vote of the people, but by the party he 
had dominated for so long. The Fitzgerald Inquiry, however, went 
on for another year and it was this that threw new light on Bjelke-
Petersen's administration and can now serve as a resource in ex-
plaining the mesh of Bjelke-Petersen's style and the nature of his 
regime, and the way both appealed to his constituents. 
Bjelke-Petersen's performance within his party, in parliament, and 
in the administration of his own state revealed quite clear 
characteristics. Commentators noted that one of his greatest skills 
was in organizing others to work for him. He applied himself to his 
polifical work in the same manner as he applied himself to his own 
business interests — relentlessly, with a command of detail that 
enabled him to direct others, demanding (and getting) total loyalty 
from his staff. It was also evident that he dominated Cabinet, not 
only because of his organizational skill and command of detail, not 
only because he was a boots-and-all politician unafraid to display 
an intimidating anger in the face of opposition, but also because he 
had the ultimate weapon — the ability to hire and fire. Despite 
recurrent calls from the backbench of his own party for a 
democrafic method of selecting the Ministry, Bjelke-Petersen 
resolutely asserted the party leader's prerogative of selecting his 
own ministers. In this he was supported by the president of his par-
ty. Access to the power and perks of office therefore could be ob-
tained only through Bjelke-Petersen. Parliamentarians from both 
sides of the Legislative Assembly claimed that Cabinet Ministers 
were infimidated by Bjelke-Petersen, and that most backbenchers 
toed the line in order to win favour and eventual accession to the 
Ministry. 
Bjelke-Petersen's dominance of Cabinet was further ensured by 
the procedures he instituted. As Peter Coaldrake has shown, under 
the guise of security and streamlining he gained control of the flow 
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of paper and the agenda, and limited the possibilities for debate 
between ministers.'* As Cabinet's deliberative capacity was reduc-
ed, authority became more and more concentrated in the Premier 
and his own advisers, and he established a monopoly over central 
agency permanent heads. His own pre-cabinet briefings involved 
both permanent heads and personal advisers (including his pilot, 
Beryl Young). Cabinet business was characterized by a jumbled 
deliberative process in which Ministers who were not informed of 
each others' submissions sometimes descended to displays of "sibl-
ing rivalry", and Bjelke-Petersen could dominate the oral in-
terplay; the result was that no one was in a position to know 
enough to challenge him. The encouragement of National Party 
policy development committees — which were allowed to make 
demands on the public service — provided alternative forums in 
which Ministers could cultivate support and political standing and 
channelled the energies of backbenchers in ways that suited Bjelke-
Petersen's preferences and left him dominant. 
The parliamentary institution suffered in Queensland during 
Bjelke-Petersen's tenure of office. The relationship between parlia-
ment and executive was characterized, in Coaldrake's terms, by "a 
downgrading of the legislature's position" and an "apparent lack 
of concern" for the parUamentary institution which led to an "in-
tensely executive-dominant style of government"." Indigenous 
factors — a unicameral system with no house of review or second 
chance to scrutinize legislation, and a political culture receptive to 
domination by "strong" personal and political leadership — 
played their part. But Bjelke-Petersen's government adopted pro-
cedures that further constrained the possibility of scrutiny by the 
legislature: Speakers explicitly interpreted their responsibility as 
being to government rather than to legislature; question fime was 
rendered ineffective as Ministers insisted that questions be placed 
on notice, or took up time with ministerial statements; the Opposi-
tion leadership was denied the usual parliamentary privileges (such 
as right of reply) and was provided with a miniscule staff and 
inadequate accommodation; no effective parliamentary committee 
structure was allowed to develop; budget estimate debates (because 
of the lack of prior parliamentary committee consideration) were 
so unwieldly as to allow only some ministries to be examined in any 
one year, and these were chosen by the executive; the procedures 
for examining legislation were inadequate; and parliamentary sit-
tings were kept short. 
Alongside these characteristics of his rule can be set what 
amounted to a refusal to be accountable, in the normal parliamen-
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tary sense of being open to scrutiny. Thus, a one-time leader of the 
Opposition, Keith Wright: 
If you get up in the parliament, and ask him a question, he won't answer 
it; he'll come back and just attack you, and be bitter and turn on you. 
And the things he's been saying about me . . . this business of not being 
able to lead anyone across an open paddock — typical one-liners, but 
the media let him get away with it . . . They never bother to question 
him — he won't answer them anyway — but they never take him 
on . . . "° 
Bjelke-Petersen himself has said: "One of the most important 
things in politics that I learned was not to answer the question they 
ask, but to answer the question you want to answer.""' 
Closely allied to this approach to questions was Bjelke-Petersen's 
much-commented-on inarticulateness. Certainly this was partly a 
character trait — when angry or frustrated Bjelke-Petersen could 
splutter unintelligibly. But he also capitalized on uncontrolled 
rambling and fractured syntax to avoid answering questions, as is 
evident when his circumlocutions while Premier are compared with 
the more economic and straightforward style evident in the Han-
sard record of his earlier career. Indeed, it has been suggested that 
an influential press secretary, Allan Callaghan, pointed out to 
Bjelke-Petersen that if he rambled for four minutes (the average 
length of film in a portable television camera) he could avoid 
answering questions."^ An illuminating study of President 
Eisenhower"' suggests that Eisenhower's apparent inarticulateness 
was one of the most important strategic skills in his political reper-
toire, since it enabled him to reveal only what he wished to reveal. 
The corollary of such practices is that power is reinforced by con-
trol of information. And Bjelke-Petersen played other games with 
information: he manipulated others (or at least manipulated the 
public images of others) by suggesting that he could release damag-
ing information from secret dossiers; he used the threat of defama-
don action to constrain critics; and he shrouded his own affairs in 
secrecy and refused to be questioned about them. 
In his resistance to scrutiny, and his manipulative domination of 
party and parliament, Bjelke-Petersen confounded the expectations 
of those accustomed to the Westminster tradition of open govern-
ment. He was a "hardball politician","" a lone wolf"' who, accor-
ding to one opponent: "you know . . . is not going to play by the 
rules. Joh doesn't have any rules. He makes up the 
rules . . . within Cabinet, within his party, within the parliament, 
within the State. We are dealing with a very, very hard man, but 
he's a successful politician because of it." "* 
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In fact, Bjelke-Petersen was shown at the end to have a limited 
knowledge of the rules, at least in the sense that he displayed a 
deficient understanding of liberal democracy in general and the 
Westminster system in particular. Asked at the Fitzgerald Inquiry 
to comment on his "strong belief in the concept of parliamentary 
democracy", he responded incongruously "Yes, the free enterprise 
system that we have inherited.""' Again, asked "What do you 
understand about the concept of individual responsibility of 
Ministers under the Westminster system?", instead of referring to 
the conventions (of responsibility for decisions within a portfolio 
and for the department under the minister's control) Bjelke-
Petersen replied: 
Well, like in all walks of life, you get some that put a tremendous zest 
and enthusiasm and drive into what they are doing. Others take it more 
casually . . . some go home in the afternoon early and come in 9 
o'clock (sic). I was always there early . . . and also late into the night."* 
He went on to question the assertion that a minister was responsible 
only to cabinet, suggesting instead that the premier should have 
ultimate control — "because I was the Premier and I was respon-
sible to everybody". Led to comment on a case — his intervention 
in certain inquiries supported by a former Minister for Police, Max 
Hodges, and the then Police Commissioner, Ray Whitrod — he 
stated: 
I had no problem with Max Hodges, none at all, because I made 
statements on behalf of the Government and was supported by the 
Cabinet. I said there would be no inquiry into police brutality. I didn't 
ask Hodges. I didn't ask Whitrod. I just made that statement because of 
my summing up and the support I got from Cabinet. We were a collec-
tive Government. None of them disagreed with it."' 
Finally, questioned directly (by Mr Michael Forde, Counsel for the 
ALP) on the issue of the separation of powers, Bjelke-Petersen 
displayed complete confusion. 
Forde: What do you understand by the doctrine of the separation of 
powers under the Westminster system? 
Bjelke-Petersen: No, I don't quite know what you're driving at . . . I 
don't know which doctrine you refer to . . . 
Forde: There's only one doctrine of the separation of powers? 
Bjelke-Petersen: I believe in it very strongly, and despite what you may 
say, I believe that we do have a great responsibility to the people who 
elect us . . . and that's to maintain their freedom and their rights . . . 
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Forde: I'm sure you're trying to be responsive . . . but the question 
related to the doctrine of the separation of powers . . . 
Bjelke-Petersen: Between the Government and the — is it? 
Forde: No, you tell me what you understand? 
Bjelke Petersen: Well the separation of the doctrine that you refer to in 
relation to where the Government stands and where the rest of the com-
munity stands, or where the rest of the instruments of Government 
stand. Is that what . . .? 
Forde: No . . .? 
Bjelke-Petersen: Well you tell me and I'll tell you where you're right or 
not. Don't you know? '° 
Mr Forde then explained the principles of the separation of parlia-
ment, executive, judiciary "and the enforcement arm, namely the 
police", and suggested that Bjelke-Petersen's interference in the 
relations between Hodges, Whitrod and the Police Department 
flew in the face of those principles. At this, Bjelke-Petersen ex-
pressed what might have been close to the governing belief that 
determined his actions: 
We have very unique circumstances; we had a very difficult cir-
cumstances (sic) and I was the one who carried . . . the main respon-
sibility of the Government towards the people, and if you had been in 
my place and heard what the people continually said to me right 
throughout the length and breadth of Queensland, words of desire and 
hope that we would not tolerate or let a situation get — this situation get 
out of control — and you're not talking about normal times and normal 
circumstances." 
During Bjelke-Petersen's Premiership, the Westminster assump-
tion of division between politics/policy and implementation was 
broken down by his assumption that the public service was an ad-
junct to the executive. This was manifest in such unusual practices 
as having public servants involved in briefing party policy commit-
tees, the frequency with which service on a minister's staff served as 
the path for advancement, the intensely political scrutiny of anyone 
aspiring to the top, and the practice of declaring senior positions 
non-appealable and making them fixed term rather than perma-
nent.'^ Beside this "gentle politicization"," there were spectacular 
challenges to the doctrine of a separation of powers: the affair of 
Bjelke-Petersen and his cohort in Cabinet refusing to accept Mr 
Justice James Douglas as Chief Justice because of a knowledge, il-
licitly obtained, that Douglas had once voted Labor provides a 
striking example.'" But the most forceful illustration of Bjelke-
Petersen's infringement of the separation of powers and perversion 
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of the neutrality of the machinery of state is to be found in his use 
of the police force. 
Bjelke-Petersen saw the police force as a natural ally and exten-
sion of government. He made efforts to establish good relations 
with police as he travelled around the state, and took every oppor-
tunity to remind them of his support; they in turn came to 
reciprocate that support." He expected the police to work closely to 
government directives, and to share his values. He saw nothing 
wrong in using the police to enforce government decisions. Police 
ministers who held different views — Max Hodges, Bill Glasson, 
even Russell Hinze — found themselves bypassed, then forced out, 
as police dealt directly with the Premier. Ray Whitrod, Police 
Commissioner 1970-76, an educated and intelligent advocate of 
modern police methods who was appointed by the then Minister, 
Hodges, specifically to reform the force, was eventually forced to 
resign because of conflict with the Premier. Whitrod's resistance to 
Bjelke-Petersen's directives, his advocacy of a more highly 
qualified force, his probing into police corruption, his proposals to 
establish inquiries into unnecessary police violence during 
demonstrations and the notorious Cedar Bay drug raid, were seen 
by both the Premier and the police union as neither signs of 
strength nor supportive of the Government.'* Bjelke-Petersen in-
tervened when possible to prevent Whitrod's initiatives, and when 
Hodges did not comply he was moved sideways to the Tourism 
portfolio. Hodges was later to reveal that he became so concerned 
over developments in the police force that he began leaking sen-
sitive material to ALP backbencher Kevin Hooper for use in parlia-
ment in an attempt to keep the pressure for reform on the Govern-
ment."Bjelke-Petersen subsequently said of Whitrod: "In those 
very volatile times we needed somebody that had a different ap-
preciation of the problem . . . it was very difficult for me and the 
Government to expect the co-operation and support from Whitrod 
in view of his record . . . We had a real problem with this man." '* 
Finally, when a Bjelke-Petersen protege, Terence Lewis, was 
made Assistant Commissioner in what the press described as "the 
biggest promotion jump the police can recall"," Whitrod resigned, 
saying: "In Queensland, there has been . . . increasing interference 
with the responsibilities of the Police Commissioner . . . I believe 
[the Premier] does not regard those actions as "interference", but 
rather as routine type instructions to be given to any Public Service 
Head."*° Terry Lewis, a man who had ingratiated himself with 
Bjelke-Petersen, who had paved his own way by sending the 
Premier adverse comments on Whitrod, and whose reputation had 
already been clouded by allegations that he had acted as "bagman" 
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for a former corrupt commissioner, was then made Police Commis-
sioner. Bjelke-Petersen later said of Lewis, "He had an understan-
ding of the seriousness of the situation in which we lived at that 
time." *' Lewis and Bjelke-Petersen were of like mind: the Premier 
had found, as Lewis's diaries subsequently revealed, a commis-
sioner who was prepared to work closely to poUtical direction.*^ 
Lewis became one of Bjelke-Petersen's closest confidants, dealing 
directly with him — often to the detriment of the Police Minister — 
able, it was said, to influence the choice of police minister,*' prone 
to assure the Premier of police support around election time,*" and 
consulted even over judicial appointments and overtly polifical 
matters. 
Bjelke-Petersen used the police not only in the control of civil life 
(in dealing with what he saw as the civil disturbance of street 
demonstrations, strikes and dissidence) but as a tool against 
political opponents. Threat and insinuation always played a part in 
Bjelke-Petersen's pubUc performance in the state political arena. 
Once, for instance, he produced what was alleged to be a poUce 
Special Branch report on a Liberal parliamentarian who had incur-
red his displeasure, and threatened to divulge its contents in the 
chamber. Fie suggested on television that the then leader of the Op-
posifion, Keith Wright, "would not be where he is if people knew 
what I know". He never shrank from using the same tactic of sug-
gesdve and unsubstantiated allegation that did so much to discredit 
the Federal Labor government over the "loans affair" in the face-
to-face politicking of the state parliamentary chamber. What the 
Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed was the extent to which Bjelke-Petersen 
used the police to give substance to such threats: they were his in-
telligence arm against an array of opponents — politicians of all 
varieties*' — and even former allies. One time National Party 
secretary Mike Evans, for instance, was to find his telephone tap-
ped after he had fallen out with the Premier.** 
So deeply committed was Bjelke-Petersen to "his" police that he 
refused to heed warnings or criticism. The alarm had been sounded 
about police corruption even before Bjelke-Petersen's regime,*' but 
as long as they served him well and told him what he wanted to 
know he refused to act on the many allegations that confronted 
him. Lewis was defended and protected through most of Bjelke-
Petersen's regime. Indeed, critics who alleged corruption and 
demanded investigafion were liable to find the tables turned and 
their own lives subject to police inquiry.** Eventually, media com-
ment and public awareness of how desperate the situation had 
become precipitated the Fitzgerald Inquiry: the extent of high level 
corrupfion and criminal acfivity in the force was revealed; and 
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Bjelke-Petersen's confidant and protege, Lewis, the Police Com-
missioner himself, saw his career destroyed. At this, all Bjelke-
Petersen could say was, "If you are not prepared to take the word 
of your top officer, who do you go to?" *' Bjelke-Petersen placed his 
failures squarely on the betrayals of people in whom he placed his 
trust. There is nothing to suggest that he was wittingly party to cor-
ruption. But his perversion of the proper role of the police, his will-
ingness to back them to the hilt, uncritically and without question, 
so long as they served his political ends, provided the context in 
which the worst elements could flourish. 
In the political sphere more generally, Bjelke-Petersen's refusal 
to comply with convention created a climate conducive to high-
level misconduct. Nowhere was this more evident than in his refusal 
to bow to expectations concerning a public figure's duty to be seen 
to avoid conflicts of interest between his private affairs and his 
public obligations. Bjelke-Petersen had far-reaching and diverse 
business interests. Over the years there was a litany of allegations 
concerning the manner in which government decisions and policies 
were said to serve those business interests and so benefit Bjelke-
Petersen or members of his family. The first flurry, over his 
family's acceptance of a preferential share issue that so nearly cost 
him the leadership in 1970, set the pattern. The Fitzgerald Inquiry 
revealed, among other business dealings: an approach by Bjelke-
Petersen to a bank for a $3 million loan to a family company, 
which was followed by an internal bank memorandum indicating 
the bank would get preference in Queensland Government business 
if it responded (Bjelke-Petersen denied having mentioned govern-
ment business); the use of $400,(X)0 received as an out-of-court set-
tlement for defamation received from QTQ-9 to meet an interest 
bill on a loan (the defamation settlement was subsequently describ-
ed by counsel before the Australian Broadcasting Tribunal as 
"commercial blackmail"); the receipt of $950,000 from a Japanese 
company associated with Sir Edward Lyons for opfions on clay-
mining leases that were never taken up on land owned by a family 
company (this was shortly after East-West Airlines, of which Lyons 
was also a director and the Australian owners of which were in 
partnership with the Japanese company, had been granted a State 
Government licence to service coastal towns), and an attempt by 
Bjelke-Petersen to get his farm exempted from being open to min-
ing exploration, an exemption not available to a private citizen, but 
justified, said Bjelke-Petersen, by concern for his security (an ex-
planation described by counsel before the Fitzgerald Inquiry as 
"ridiculous")."* Bjelke-Petersen swore to the last that no member 
of his family had received financial benefits from his activities as 
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Premier, but this history shows him to be, at the least, a man blind 
to conventional understanding of conflicts of interest. 
The unusual inflection of religious conviction that in some sense 
divorced secular from sacred enabled Bjelke-Petersen to continue 
to proclaim his probity, and to deny questions. When confronted 
with evidence of explicit business connections, and taxed with the 
issue of conflict of interest, he begged the question by responding, 
"We are men of integrity. We have been put there by the people 
year after year . . . The people know me and trust me. We fought 
an election on i t ."" When the Fitzgerald Inquiry revealed the ex-
tent to which that trust had been betrayed, Bjelke-Petersen could 
only proclaim himself "horrified" by the corruption, and protest: 
"[I] set the example that I believed everyone would seek to follow 
and I did it relentlessly and with tremendous effort.'^ His example, 
however, was at best ambiguous: other interpretations might be put 
on the nature of his business dealings while Premier by those with a 
more conventional understanding of what constitutes conflict of in-
terest. At worst, it showed a fundamental flaw in his leadership 
style, his satisfaction with generalized knowledge, and his will-
ingness to leave detail to his colleagues while he led from the front. 
Questioned on radio in 1989 he was still saying, "If you're a leader, 
you've got to go out and lead, you don't set up 
committees . . . you make decisions, and you've got to accept the 
consequences . . . If you are leader . . . you must be out in 
front . . . you must set an example."" Yet confronted with the 
consequences of this course, all he could claim was that he had been 
betrayed. 
It is likely that Bjelke-Petersen's own business dealings set a 
precedent in politics that was adopted even more blatantly by some 
of his colleagues.'" The rorting of the system of ministerial expenses 
confessed to by Don Lane (and which even Bjelke-Petersen sug-
gested might have been "a bit of a smokescreen to cover himself" 
for more serious misdemeanours)," and the extraordinary web of 
$4.14 million worth of loans, gifts, benefits and payments to 
Russell Hinze from developers while he was Minister for Main 
Roads, Local Government, Police and Racing,'* provide only the 
most striking examples. 
A central feature of Bjelke-Petersen's political practices was his 
constant travelling around the state in the government aircraft (a 
facility that was not shared by, and could not be matched by, the 
Opposition). Bjelke-Petersen continually asserted that one of his 
great strengths was that he was "in touch": "My winning formula 
is to get out into every corner, and go into every detail. I get 
around. I have mobility. I get into every nook and cranny. I make 
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contact with people." " This habit, allied with his assertion that the 
people trusted him, suggests a rationale for his willingness to ignore 
the received forms and accepted conventions of the political institu-
tions: Bjelke-Petersen was a leader of a classically popuUst kind, 
orchestrating the supposed grievances of "the people", identifying 
the will of "the people" with morality and jusfice (and putting it 
above other social standards and mechanisms), and insisting on a 
direct relationship between people and government largely indepen-
dent of institutions and their petty constraints. 
The obverse of such a concern with "the people" is to show 
oneself directly responsive to their needs, at least in so far as they 
can be recognized in the limited context of individual electorates. 
The evidence suggests that the Bjelke-Petersen Government 
energetically pursued the poUtics ofthe pork-barrel. The case ofthe 
unusual benefits showered on the small settlement of Duaringa — 
which serviced a property managed by Bjelke-Petersen's son and 
owned by a family company — was one instance thoroughly aired 
before the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and then in the press.'* 
We can gain a deeper insight into Bjelke-Petersen's popuUsm if 
we consider his world view, and the manner in which that was 
translated into political action. He was an unreflective religious 
fundamentalist, and presented himself as an uncritical exponent of 
self-help and free enterprise. In fact, his claim to support for free 
enterprise must be qualified by the recognition that the Queensland 
Government under Bjelke-Petersen played an active part in the 
state's economic development through its interventionist role in, 
for example, the awarding of contracts, mining leases and land 
release for development." The Government directed development 
and, it has been argued,*" was able to exercise patronage in business 
circles by the manner in which it did so. Bjelke-Petersen perhaps 
accommodated this form of adulterated "free" enterprise by 
reference to a long Australian tradition of action by the state to 
smooth the path of capitaUst enterprises; but it was also his convic-
tion that development was the best means to economic security for 
all and must be achieved at all costs. In other words, because on 
this matter he was convinced he was right, he would facilitate cer-
tain of the activities of business enterprise through the organs of 
government: he was an economic paternalist. Such paternalism is 
more explicit in comments such as "I wanted to be a better boss 
than anyone else and some families worked for me for more than 
thirty years",*' and "Every week, I get people coming up to me 
and saying 'Don't leave, Mr Premier, please, because while you're 
there we've got the confidence to keep going'."*2 It could be 
argued that Bjelke-Petersen found his first model for such pater-
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nalism in his father; but, as Premier, he eclipsed his own father so 
far as to become the "father" of his state. 
Leaving Bjelke-Petersen's personal imperatives aside, however, 
the Government's relations with business to many seemed fre-
quently to blur the Une between facilitation and complicity. Ques-
tions were consistently raised about the interests of members of the 
Government in the letting of tenders, the location of power 
stafions, the management of coal leases and casino licences — 
Bjelke-Petersen either ignored them or turned the attack back on 
the questioner.*' Matters were further complicated by the establish-
ment of National Party machinery explicitly to solicit donafions 
from business: initially, the Bjelke-Petersen Foundation (which 
was publicly established) and later, after Bjelke-Petersen had fallen 
out with Sparkes who controlled the foundation, a private com-
pany, Kaldeal Pty Ltd (which was not publicly recognized), one of 
the directors of which was Sir Edward Lyons. It came to be believ-
ed that a suitable donation was a precondition for getting anything 
done in the state, and that donations could result in knighthoods.*" 
It has been shown,*' to cite some instances, that Citra Construc-
tions Limited, which donated $250,000 to the National Party in 
December 1983, received favoured treatment shortly afterwards 
when it tendered successfully for part of a mainline rail electrifica-
tion scheme, and won the contract to build a new hospital (the lat-
ter against the recommendations of relevant departmental 
officers). Citra was later a substantial donor to Kaldeal. Again, 
another company. Electric Power Transmissions, donated $90,000 
to the Nafional Party within days of gaining the contract for stage 1 
of a rail electrification scheme, and then was successful in tendering 
for stages 3 and 4. Bjelke-Petersen was later to reveal that 
anonymous donors, saying things like "We want to help the party, 
we are interested in the way you operate", left tens of thousands of 
dollars in cash donations with his office, and that these were later 
channelled through Kaldeal.** Bjelke-Petersen continued to main-
tain that there were no connections between such donations and 
government decisions, but it is extraordinary for a political leader 
in any system to allow such direct connections between government 
leadership and party fundraising. 
Bjelke-Petersen constantly reminded people of his business 
success before turning to politics, identified himself as a 
businessman, and found his closest confidant in another 
businessman with a similar background, Edward Lyons. Thus 
Lyons — who, apart from his role as a National Party trustee, held 
no polifical office, and whose own affairs were to come under ques-
don before the Fitzgerald Inquiry — entered the inner circle of 
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political influence.*' But Lyons, another battler made good, con-
firmed Bjelke-Petersen's personal experience: deeply conscious of 
his own trajectory as a self-made man, Bjelke-Petersen believed his 
rise from poverty to riches was open to anyone prepared to work 
hard enough, so long as the state did not impede the way through 
regulations and constraints on the marketplace. It was in support 
of the business ethic that he worked so tirelessly, it was the 
marketplace which he did not wish to see changed, not the forms 
and traditions of the political system. He was, by extension, a 
politician of the radical right, and not a conservative. He had no 
care for the conventions of the country's political life and institu-
tions, nor was he disturbed when the face of his state and the life of 
its community were radically altered by entrepreneurs and market 
forces — "development" was progress, was virtue. 
Yet he knew too, as his religion told him, that there was evil 
abroad. For him opposition could not be understood simply as 
sincere difference of views: it was either immoral and stupid (and 
so his anger at those who refused to see the "right" way), or 
malevolent. He would not control his rage at being crossed, even in 
parliament: according to one-time state Opposition leader, Keith 
Wright, "The anger that is in that man's face, it is unbelievable. He 
just gets so angry."** Not surprisingly, several parliamentarians 
also testified that he was a "good hater", vengeful, and capable of 
bearing long-term grudges against those who had once antagonized 
him. 
The corollary was that Bjelke-Petersen became an expert at 
identifying threats. His central preoccupation, the centre of his 
politicking and campaigning, was the "socialist menace" and 
beyond it the communist bogey with which Labor was always 
associated in his rhetoric. But in addition, he was ever ready to 
point to the threatening encroachment of federal governments (of 
either complexion), to the economic infringements of other states, 
to the guilty secrets of seemingly commonplace politicians on the 
other side of the chamber (or on his own side when it suited him), 
and to the white-anting of the community's foundations 
represented by dissidents. 
Bjelke-Petersen invariably associated dissidence with com-
munism (when questioned in a Michael Parkinson interview about 
political protesters, he said, "I can't tell you who they are, but they 
can be recognized because they carry a red flag with a hammer and 
sickle on it"). He also represented the political battle in terms of 
ultimates — because the stakes were so high, impUcitly one was 
justified in ignoring liberal-democratic conventions where 
necessary and making one's own rules. He once said of his battles 
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with the Whitlam Labor Government: "My colleagues made the 
mistake of assuming that we were dealing with gentlemen. I never 
made that mistake." *' Yet Bjelke-Petersen's readiness to go "one 
step further" ^ was always defended by the putative mandate from 
"the people", the populist alliance which transcended parliamen-
tary norms and assured Bjelke-Petersen that God was on his side. 
Undoubtedly, part of Bjelke-Petersen's preoccupation with un-
masking the enemy was a political tactic: "I have always found 
over the years that you can campaign on anything you like, but 
nothing is more effective than communism." " Further, his preoc-
cupation with confrontation, and the law-and-order stands that 
went with it, proved a vote winner: with every foray — the Spr-
ingbok state of emergency in 1971, the street-march confronta-
tions, the harsh action against striking unionists in the electricity in-
dustry in 1984 — his support grew. Equally, there can be little 
doubt that he subscribed to the view of a world which is basically 
an "economy of violence" (MachiavelU's world view as Isaiah 
Berlin described it).'^ Two questions might be asked about such an 
attitude: What were its sources within himself? Why did it strike a 
chord within the populist context he referred to, and did so much to 
cultivate? 
Queenslanders are different from other Australians in that they 
are very much less urbanised, much less educated, more likely to be 
Australian-born and less likely to work in a factory. Their dif-
ferences then, can be explained not in terms of the mythic 'deep 
north' which is stereotypically racist, authoritarian and brutal, but 
(as historian Humphrey McQueen notes) in terms of population 
distribution, educational attainments and work-force participation 
— differences which have been determined by the primary-industry 
bias of Queensland's political economy. McQueen writes that con-
tinuities in the priorities of the state's successive Labor govern-
ments, which were in power almost continuously from 1915 to 1957 
and which were rural and not urban-based, and those of the conser-
vadve governments since 1957 are clear: "At root there was a 
shared commitment to rural life as morally, politically and 
economicaUy sound." " 
Because of its primary-industry base, historically Queensland has 
occupied a precarious position in the national economy, with most 
of the nation's wealth and population concentrated in New South 
Wales and Victoria — states which dominated the manufacturing 
industries. Glen Lewis argues that regionalism has been of great 
significance in Queensland politics, since it has meant that as well 
as being dependent economically, Queensland has been extremely 
vulnerable and internally divided. Because of its geographic situa-
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tion, Queensland has had particular defence concerns — as late as 
the 1950s the fear of the "yellow hordes" overrunning 
Queensland's vast north was widespread. And because of uneven 
regional and urban development patterns in a state whose capital 
city remained underdeveloped and was never the centre of 
Queensland's economic life, the south was the only area to achieve 
any satisfactory degree of economic diversification. By 1939 h was 
the only region to have diversified into agricultural, manufacturing 
and pastoral and mining industries, whereas the north, with its 
dependence on pastoral, mining and sugar production, and the cen-
tre, with its reliance on the pastoral industry, remained bounded 
within a framework of primary production.'" 
The state's political economy has produced characteristic 
features of politics in Queensland. Despite some radicalism (the 
first Labor government in the world took office in Queensland — 
for a few days only — in 1890; Australia's first general strike occur-
red in Brisbane in 1912; a Labor government abolished the 
Legislative Council in 1922), Queensland, as Lewis points out, has 
normally been a conservative state. Distinctive features of the 
Queensland economy have been the high proportion of non-
Queensland ownership and control of the state's natural resources 
and the degree of control private enterprise has exerted over 
Queensland politics." Continuities can be seen between the almost 
uninterrupted forty-two-year Labor rule and the rule of the conser-
vative governments in Queensland: not only a commitment to 
agrarianism (even to gerrymandering of electoral boundaries to the 
advantage of rural-based parties) but close connections between 
business and politics, pervasive government corruption, and strong 
state chauvinism.'* McQueen points out, however, that the bush 
workers and small farmers who kept Labor in power have disap-
peared and that, despite the former Premier's populist and state-
chauvinist rhetoric, Bjelke-Petersen's constituency was not the 
rural populace but foreign capital." Yet if foreign capital became 
the constituency he served, he could be successful in this only 
because his populist rhetoric had an appeal to the broader public. 
Their acquiescence ensured that the penetration of the economy by 
foreign capital went unquestioned. 
The point is this: Bjelke-Petersen both "explained" the causes of 
Queensland's present advantage as flowing from the beneficence of 
his government, and revived the resentment associated with 
memories of underdevelopment. He and his government were able 
to masquerade as the authors of the state's good fortune. At the 
same time he was able to play on an historical disquiet associated 
with long-term economic disadvantage and vulnerability, and to 
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appeal for unity by "naming" continuing threats such as dissidents 
within the state — most frequently described as socialists and com-
munists — as well as the socialists and communists without; the 
federal government threatening to diminish the state by the cen-
tralization of control; and the populous and economically 
ambitious south-eastern states which could be expected to try again 
to bleed Queensland as they did in the past. With its reference to 
implied threat and conspiracy, its assertion of a direct connection 
between the people and the Premier, and its call for the people's 
trust in their leader, this was a populist appeal of a classic kind.'* 
Its resonance in the Queensland context was indicated by the 
significant popular support the Premier maintained within the 
state. He was finally brought down not by election, but by his own 
party. 
Most of those characteristics of Bjelke-Petersen which commen-
tators and academic observers outside Queensland described as 
weaknesses could be identified as his strengths when seen in con-
text. His singleness of purpose and his obstinancy provided a focus 
in a state that seemed to demand direction. Such a focus would pro-
bably have been unattainable by a more flexible, more liberal 
leader. The incipient resentment and public edge of aggression in 
his polifics gave expression to the community's pervasive disquiet 
which was a consequence of the particular evolution of their state's 
political economy. Similarly his preoccupation with identifying 
threats articulated the subconscious feelings of a large public. Even 
his lack of fluency under challenge was a strategic advantage: it 
enabled him to avoid explaining himself, and so to avoid scrutiny. 
In fact, the refusal to engage in debates concerned with self-
justification — such debates being a feature of more "open" 
democracies — had as its corollary the assertion that the people 
would take him on trust — another strategic strength in the 
populist approach. 
Bjelke-Petersen's characteristics and preoccupations derived 
from his personal history. His concern with development and 
defence of what had been attained in the face of a malign world had 
its roots in individual experience. But his ability to translate this 
personal project into an effective political career endorsed by his 
community indicated that he touched more universal concerns 
within the state. A particular conjunction of social history, 
economy and personality enabled him to transcend his individual 
condidon and to become the representative figure for his state." 
Nonetheless, times change, history, economy and society form new 
conjuncfions, and the leader who was appropriate for a time can 
become an anachronism. Sparkes, and others in the National Party 
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recognized the demographic changes induced by the rapid 
developments Queensland was undergoing and sought to set the 
party on a new course, more appropriate to the likely future. This 
involved bringing in a new breed of National Party parliamentarian 
— more educated, more professional, and critical ofthe excesses of 
the old regime. In time, of course, they would demand a leader 
more suited to the new climate which Bjelke-Petersen had made 
possible. But he found it impossible to adapt — he was tied to the 
past that produced him, and afflicted by the rigidity of old age."* 
In the end his own excesses and his own misjudged grab for even 
more power — the Prime Ministership itself — gave the new guard 
the opportunity to bring him down. 
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Premier, 17 January 1968-31 July 1968 
(Courtesy Queensland Newspapers) 
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(Courtesy Queensland Newspapers) 
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Parliamentary Careers of 
Queensland Premiers 
NAME, LIFESPAN, and 
OCCUPATIONS 
HERBERT, Robert 
George Wyndham 
(1831-1903) 
Civil servant 
MACALISTER, Arthur 
(1818-83) 
Solicitor 
MACKENZIE, Robert 
Ramsay 
(1811-73) 
Squatter 
LILLEY, Charles 
(1830-97) 
Barrister, judge 
PARLIAMENTARY OFFICES 
in Queensland 
(periods as Premier are shown in bold 
face) 
MLA (Leichhardt) 1860-63, (West 
Moreton) 1863-66; Premier and Colonial 
Secretary 10 December 1859-1 February 
1866, Premier and Vice-President of Ex-
ecutive Council 20 July-7 August 1866 
Acting Colonial Treasurer 1864. 
MLA (Ipswich) 1860-68 and 1872-76, 
(Eastern Downs) 1868-71; Secretary for 
Lands and Public Works 1862-66; Pre-
mier and Secretary for Lands and Works 
1 February-20 July 1866; Premier and 
Colonial Secretary 7 August 1866-15 
August 1867; Secretary for Public Lands 
and Works 1868-69; Secretary for Public 
Works and Goldfields 1869-70; Premier 
and Colonial Secretary 8 January 1874-5 
June 1876; Secretary for Public Works 
and Mines 1874. 
MLA (Burnett) 1860-69; Colonial 
Treasurer 1859-62; Colonial Secretary 
1866; Premier and Colonial Treasurer 15 
August 1867-25 November 1868. 
MLA (Fortitude Valley) 1860-74; 
Attorney-General 1865-66, 1866-67; 
Premier and Attorney-General 25 Novem-
ber 1868-3 May 1870; Colonial Secre-
tary 1869-70. 
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PALMER, Arthur Hunter 
(1819-98) 
Squatter 
MLA (Port Curtis) 1866-78, (Brisbane) 
1878-81; MLC 1881-98; Colonial Secre-
tary 1867-68; Secretary for Public 
Works 1867-68, 1873; Secretary for Pub-
Secretary 3 May 1870-8 January 1874; 
Colonial Secretary and Secretary for 
Public Instruction 1879-81. 
THORN, George (Junior) 
(1838-1905) 
Gentleman 
MLA (West Moreton) 1867-73, (Fassi-
fern) 1873-74, 1887-88, 1893-1902, (Ip-
swich) 1876-78, (Northern Downs) 
1879-83; MLC 1874-76; Postmaster-
General 1876; Secretary for Public 
Works and Mines 1876-77; Secretary for 
Public Lands and Mines 1877-78; Pre-
mier 5 June 1876-8 March 1877. 
DOUGLAS, John 
(1828-1904) 
Squatter, 
civil servant 
MLA (Port Curtis) 1863-66, (Eastern 
Downs) 1867-68, (Maryborough) 
1875-80; MLC 1866, 1868-69; Minister 
without Office 1866; Postmaster-General 
1866, 1868-69; Colonial Treasurer 
1866-67; Secretary for Public Works 
1867; Secretary for Public Lands 
1876-77; Premier and Secretary for Pub-
lic Lands 8 March 1877-7 November 
1877; Premier and Colonial Secretary 7 
November 1877-21 January 1879. 
McILWRAITH, Thomas 
(1835-1900) 
Engineer, squatter, 
speculator 
MLA (Warrego) 1870-71, (Maranoa) 
1873-78, (Mulgrave) 1878-86, (North 
Brisbane) 1888-96; Secretary for Public 
Works and Mines 1874; Premier and 
Colonial Treasurer 21 January 1879-13 
November 1883; Premier, Chief Secre-
tary, and Colonial Treasurer 13 June-30 
November 1888; Minister without Office 
1888-89; Colonial Treasurer 1890-93; 
Premier, Chief Secretary, and Secretary 
for Railways 27 March-27 October 1893; 
Chief Secretary and Secretary for Rail-
ways 1893-95; Minister without Office 
1895-97. 
GRIFFITH. Samuel Walker 
(1845-1920) 
Barrister, judge 
MLA (East Moreton) 1872-73, (Oxley) 
1873-78, (North Brisbane) 1878-93; 
Attorney-General 1874-78; Secretary for 
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Public Instruction 1876-79 1883-85; 
Secretary for Public Works 1878-79; 
Premier and Colonial Secretary 13 No-
vember 1883-1 April 1886; Premier and 
Chief Secretary 1 April 1886-13 June 
1888; Colonial Treasurer 1887-88; 
Postmaster-General 1885; Premier, Chief 
Secretary, and Attorney-General 12 Au-
gust 1890-27 March 1893 
MOREHEAD, Boyd Dunlop 
(1843-1905) 
Stock and station agent, pastor-
al investor 
NELSON, Hugh Muir 
(1835-1906) 
Squatter 
MLA (Mitchell) 1871-80, (Balonne) 
1883-96; MLC 1880-83, 1896-1905; 
Postmaster-General 1880-83; Colonial 
Secretary 1888; Premier, Chief Secre-
tary, and Colonial Secretary 30 November 
1888-12 August 1890. 
MLA (Northern Downs) 1883-88, 
(Murilla) 1888-98; MLC 1898-1906: 
Secretary for Railways 1888-90; Secre-
tary for Railways and Public Works 
1890; Minister without Office 1892-93; 
Colonial Treasurer 1893; Premier, Chief 
Secretary, and Treasurer 27 October 
1893-13 April 1898. 
BYRNES, Thomas Joseph 
(1860-98) 
Barrister 
DICKSON, James Robert 
(1832-1901) 
Auctioneer, 
company director 
MLC 1890-93; MLA (Cairns) 1893-96, 
(Warwick) 1896-98; Solicitor-General 
1890-93; Attorney-General 1893-98; 
Premier, Chief Secretary, and Attorney-
General 13 April 1898-1 October 1898. 
MLA (Enoggera) 1873-88, (Bulimba) 
1892-1901; Secretary for Public Works 
and Mines 1876; Colonial Treasurer 
1876-79; Secretary for Railways 
1897-98; Postmaster-General 1897-98; 
Home Secretary 1898; Premier, Chief 
Secretary 1 October 1898-1 December 
1899. 
DAWSON, Anderson 
(1863-1910) 
Miner, journalist 
PHILP, Robert 
(1851-1922) 
Merchant,company director 
MLA (Charters Towers) 1893-1901; 
Premier, Chief Secretary 1-7 December 
1899. 
MLA (Musgrave) 1886-88, Townsville, 
1888-1915; Secretary for Mines and 
Public Works 1893-96; Secretary for 
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MORGAN, Arthur 
(1856-1916) 
Newspaper proprietor 
KIDSTON, William 
(1849-1919) 
Ironmoulder, chemist, book-
seller 
Public Instruction 1894-95; Secretary 
for Railways 1895-97; Secretary for 
Mines 1896-99; Treasurer 1898-99; Pre-
mier, Treasurer, and Secretary for Mines, 
7 December 1899-1 February 1901; Pre-
mier, Chief Secretary, and Secretary for 
Mines 1 February 1901-17 September 
1903; Premier, Chief Secretary and 
Treasurer 17 November 1907-18 Febru-
ary 1908. 
MLA (Warwick) 1887-96, 1898-1906; 
MLC 1906-16; Chairman of Committees 
1891-93; Speaker 1899-1901; Premier, 
Chief Secretary, and Secretary for Rail-
ways 17 September 1903-19 January 
1906; President, Legislative Council, 
1906-16. 
MLA (Rockhampton) 1896-1911; 
Treasurer and Postmaster-General 1899; 
Treasurer 1903-6; Premier, Chief Secre-
tary, and Treasurer 19 January 1906-19 
November 1907; Premier and Chief Sec-
retary 18 February 1908-7 February 
1911. 
DENHAM, Digby Frank 
(1859-1944) 
Produce merchant 
MLA (Oxley) 1902-15; Home Secretary 
and Secretary for Agriculture 1903-4; 
Secretary for Agriculture and Public 
Works 1904-6; Home Secretary 1907-8; 
Secretary for Public Lands 1908-11; 
Premier and Chief Secretary 7 February 
1911-1 June 1915. 
RYAN, Thomas Joseph 
(1876-I92I) 
Teacher, barrister 
MLA (Barcoo) 1909-19; Secretary for 
Mines 1915; Premier, Chief Secretary, 
and Attorney-General 1 June 1915-22 
October 1919. 
THEODORE, Edward 
Granville 
(1884-1950) 
Miner, 
union organizer 
MLA (Woothakata) 1909-12 (Chill-
agoe) 1912-25; Treasurer and Secretary 
for Public Works 1915-19; Premier and 
Chief Secretary 22 October 1919-26 Feb-
ruary 1925; Secretary for Public Lands 
1920; Treasurer and Secretary for Public 
Works 1922; Treasurer 1919-20, 
1922-25. 
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GILLIES. William Neal 
(1868-1928) 
Farmer 
McCORMACK, William 
(1879-1947) 
Miner, 
union secretary 
MOORE, Arthur Edward 
(1876-1963) 
Farmer, dairy factory proprie-
tor 
MLA (Eacham) 1912-25; Minister 
without Portfolio 1918-19; Secretary for 
Agriculture 1919-25; Premier, Chief 
Secretary, and Treasurer 26 February 
1925-22 October 1925. 
MLA (Cairns) 1912-30; Speaker 
1915-19; Home Secretary 1919-23; Sec-
retary for Public Lands 1923-25; Pre-
mier, Chief Secretary, and Treasurer 22 
October 1925-21 May 1929. 
MLA (Aubigny) 1915-1941; Premier 
and Chief Secretary 21 May 1929-17 
June 1932. 
SMITH, William Forgan 
(1887-1953) 
Painter 
MLA (Mackay) 1915-42; Chairman of 
Committees 1920; Minister without 
Portfolio 1920-22; Secretary for Public 
Works 1922-25; Secretary for Agricul-
ture and Stock 1925-29; Premier. Chief 
Secretary, and Treasurer 17 June 
1932-12 April 1938; Premier and Chief 
Secretary 12 April 1938-8 December 
1941; Premier, Chief Secretary, and Sec-
retary for Public Instruction 8 December 
1941-9 February 1942; Premier and 
Chief Secretary 9 February 1942-16 Sep-
tember 1942; Minister without Portfolio 
1942. 
COOPER, Frank Arthur 
(I872-I949) 
Clerk, journalist 
MLA (Bremer) 1915-46; Secretary for 
Public Instruction 1932-38; Treasurer 
1938-42; Premier, Treasurer, and Chief 
Secretary 16 September 1942-27 April 
1944; Premier 27 April 1944-7 March 
1946. 
HANLON, Edward Michael 
(1887-1952) 
Grocer 
MLA (Ithaca) 1926-52; Home Secretary 
1932-35; Secretary for Health and Home 
Affairs 1935-44; Treasurer 1944-46; 
Premier, Chief Secretary, and Vice-Presi-
dent of the Executive Council 7 March 
1946-17 January 1952. 
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GAIR, Vincent Clair 
(1902-1980) 
Clerk 
MLA (South Brisbane) 1932-60; Secre-
tary for Mines 1942-47; Secretary for 
Labour and Employment 1944-47; 
Secretary for Labor and Industry 
1947-50; Treasurer 1950-52; Premier, 
Chief Secretary, and Vice-President of 
the Executive Council 17 January 
1952-12 August 1957. 
NICKLIN, George 
Francis Reuben 
(1895-1978) 
Farmer 
MLA (Murrumba) 1932-50, (Lands-
borough) 1950-68; Premier, Chief Secre-
tary, and Vice-President of the Executive 
Council 12 August 1957-26 September 
1963; Premier and Minister for State 
Development 26 September 1963-17 Jan-
uary 1968. 
PIZZEY, Jack Charles 
Allan 
(1911-68) 
Teacher, manager 
MLA (Isis) 1950-68; Minister for 
Education 1958-60; Minister for Educa-
tion and Migration 1960-63; Minister for 
Education 1963-68; Premier and Min-
ister for State Development 17 January 
1968-31 July 1968. 
CHALK, Gordon 
William Wesley 
(1913- ) 
Accountant 
MLA (East Toowoomba) 1947-50, 
(Lockyer) 1950-76; Minister for Trans-
port 1957-66; Treasurer 1966-68; Pre-
mier and Treasurer 1 August 1968-8 
August 1968; Treasurer 1968-76. 
BJELKE-PETERSEN, 
Johannes 
(1911- ) 
Farmer, speculator 
MLA (Nanango) 1947-50, (Barambah) 
1950- ; Minister for Works and Hous-
ing 1963-68; Premier and Minister for 
State Development 8 August 1968-20 
June 1972; Premier 20 June 1972-19 
August 1983; Premier and Treasurer 19 
August 1983-1 December 1987. 
AHERN, Michael John 
(1942- ) 
Grazier/Farmer 
MLA (Landsborough) 1968- ; Min-
ister for Primary Industries 1980-1983; 
Minister for Industry, Small Business 
and Technology 1983-1986; Minister for 
Health December 1986-November 1987; 
Premier, Treasurer and Minister for 
Arts 1 December 1987-22 September 
1989. 
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COOPER, Theo Russell 
(1941- ) 
Grazier/Farmer 
MLA (Roma) 1983- ; Minister for Cor-
rective Services and Administrative Ser-
vices December 1987-22 September 1989; 
Minister for Police 19 January-29 August 
1989; Premier 22 September 1989- . 
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Irrigation, water conservation, 273, 
309, 329, 331, 414-15, 444, 445. 
492 
Japan. 243, 244, 415, 421, 427, 518 
Jesson, C.G., 480 
Joh for PM campaign, 507-9, 526 
Jones, Arthur, 463 
Kaldeal, 521 
Keith, A. Berriedale, 255, 256, 323, 
480 
Kelvin Grove, 461 
Kerr, George, 213, 216, 249, 258, 
268 
Kidston, William, xx, 2, 3, 4, 213, 
214, 215, 216, 221-61, 264, 266, 
267, 268, 269, 271, 283, 299, 303, 
304, 308, 320, 321, 324, 328, 332, 
343, 425, 574 
Knighthoods, 505, 521 
Labor Government, Queensland, xvi, 
xvii, xviii, xxi-xxii, 3, 207, 210, 
218, 219, 263, 271, 273, 274, 275, 
277, 283, 301, 302, 303, 307, 309, 
312, 313, 314, 316, 317, 319, 320, 
321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 
328, 330, 332, 341, 348, 349, 351, 
352, 354, 355, 356, 357, 359, 360, 
361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 
368, 369, 370, 377, 379, 380, 382, 
383, 385, 392, 395, 399, 400, 402, 
403, 404, 410, 411, 412, 414, 415, 
416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 429, 431, 
433, 439, 440, 449, 450, 451, 452, 
453, 454, 455, 456, 471, 474, 477, 
478, 480, 485, 487, 492, 502, 523, 
524 
Labor-in-PoIitics Convention, 230, 
234, 248. 272. 273. 302. 324. 327. 
328, 337, 344. 350, 351, 355, 360, 
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366, 404, 405, 411, 421, 462, 467, 
468, 469, 471, 473 
Labour movement, xv, 205, 210, 
213, 264, 266-70, 272, 277, 283, 
284, 286, 290, 295, 297, 298, 302, 
312-16, 319, 326, 333, 334, 347, 
350, 362, 364, 372, 373, 400, 406, 
410, 436, 448, 452, 455, 457, 461, 
466, 469, 485 
Labour, Labour legislation, 6, 12, 
28, 29-31, 41,42, 73, 85, 87-89, 
102, 107, 108, 111, 113, 123, 129, 
139, 150, 157, 164, 167, 168, 
170-74, 184, 190, 204, 210, 214, 
224, 242, 250, 251, 258, 263, 269, 
273, 374, 275, 278, 289, 293, 295, 
297, 298, 300, 301, 303, 304, 305, 
306, 307, 308, 311, 315, 319, 324, 
327, 331, 332, 333, 337, 344, 347, 
348, 351, 359, 362, 363, 366, 409, 
410, 412, 416, 421, 428, 436, 438, 
444, 449, 453-44, 456 
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Department of, 304, 394, 407, 
445, 461, 475 
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legislation, xxii-xxiii, xxiv, 6, 12, 
16, 20, 22, 24-27, 28, 32, 38, 45, 
48, 49-50, 51, 52, 55, 57, 61-62, 
63-68, 75, 76, 77, 79, 81, 88, 89, 
96, 105, 126, 135-38, 140, 148, 
152, 157, 164, 165, 167-70, 205, 
211, 218, 242, 243, 248, 249, 251, 
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320, 330, 331, 353, 354, 383, 387, 
409, 429, 435, 444, 465, 520 
Lands, Minister for, 490 
Lands Department, 464 
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Lane, Donald Frederick, 505, 509, 
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Larcombe, James, 216, 323, 330 
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11, 19-20, 30-31, 33, 46-47, 65, 
72-73, 77, 79-80, 83-87, 90, 94, 
109, 115, 120-21, 124, 126, 131, 
133, 139-41, 143-56, 160-61, 
164-67, 168, 170-75, 177, 180, 
182-86, 190, 238, 240, 251, 257, 
264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 274, 277, 
278, 280, 281, 284, 288, 289, 291, 
293, 300, 303, 304, 306, 307, 311, 
316. 317, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 
324, 337, 352, 353, 355, 359, 372, 
380, 393, 399, 419, 421, 428, 432, 
433, 435, 438, 441, 443, 444, 448, 
452, 455, 456, 463, 464, 466-67. 
485, 486, 501, 502, 506, 507, 512, 
523. See also Courts, Privy 
Council, Constitutions 
Leahy, John, 207, 208, 212, 214 
Legislative Assembly, xvii, xix, 3, 6, 
14-15, 17-20, 34-35, 45-49, 
51-52, 55, 57, 59-60, 62-64, 73, 
95, 103, 105-6, 111, 145-47, 150, 
152, 200, 205, 208, 210, 211, 214, 
216, 235, 236, 240, 242, 243, 244, 
246, 251, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 
258, 259, 260, 263, 268, 269, 271, 
283, 285, 300, 301, 308, 320, 321, 
322, 323, 349, 352, 380, 391, 402, 
420, 426, 452, 456, 460, 477, 484, 
489, 499, 511 
Legislative Council, xvii, xxi, 3, 
15-17, 35, 48, 56-57, 62-63,65, 
67-68, 80, 112, 177, 182, 188, 
205, 207, 210, 212, 213, 214, 215, 
217, 218, 219, 236, 238, 242, 243, 
245, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 256, 
257, 258, 261, 270, 271, 274, 276, 
277, 278, 279, 283, 285, 286, 291, 
306, 310, 313, 315, 317, 319, 320, 
321, 322, 336, 390-92, 524 
Lennon, William, 206, 214, 218, 219, 
263, 269, 274, 301, 303, 317, 320 
Lewis, Glen, 523, 524 
Lewis, Terence Anthony, 509, 
516-17, 518 
Liberal, liberalism, 6, 50, 52, 56, 
63, 65-66, 71, 73, 76, 85, 87-88, 
109, HI , 121, 126, 128, 130, 137, 
143-45, 152-53, 164, 168, 171-72, 
175, 177, 221, 224, 227, 228, 230, 
238, 264, 265, 266, 275, 284, 454, 
467 
Liberal Party, xvii, 3, 4, 46, 71, 83, 
97-99, 103, 110, 114, 115, 117, 
121, 138, 145, 152-54, 164-65, 
168-69, 175, 199. 212. 221, 227, 
228, 229, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 
240, 248, 252, 261, 264, 271, 272, 
285. 303. 306. 309. 317, 321, 375, 
377. 399 
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Liberal Party of AustraHa. 
Queensland, xviii. 478, 480, 
481-84, 485, 501, 502, 503, 504, 
505, 506, 507, 510 
Lilley, Charles, xvi, xxi, 2, 4, 17, 39, 
45, 48, 52, 54-56, 60-61, 67, 69, 
71-91, 106, 124, 144-48, 150-51, 
177, 184, 289, 297 
Lindeman Island, 506 
Loans, government, 37, 50-59, 68, 
122, 124, 139, 167, 194, 218, 219, 
235, 242, 245, 251, 258, 259, 260, 
287, 309, 313, 315, 316, 317, 318, 
319, 320, 321, 331, 356, 357, 361, 
362, 367, 383, 385, 406, 409, 414 
Loan Council, 366, 370, 411, 427 
London, 11-12, 15, 23, 26, 28-29, 
33, 45, 50, 58-59, 68-69, 72, 102, 
124, 151, 154-56, 161, 165, 189, 
194, 218, 219, 244, 258, 274, 276, 
288, 315, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 
322, 328, 341, 356, 357, 362, 364, 
379, 423, 430, 439, 446 
Lunn, Hugh, 499 
Lutheranism, xx, 495, 496, 497, 519 
Lyons, Edward, 505, 506, 509, 518, 
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Lyons, Joseph Aloysius, 295, 406, 
408, 429, 430 
Lutwyche, Alfred James Peter, 
33-37, 41-42, 73, 83 
Macalister, Arthur, xx, 4, 17, 37-40, 
45-69, 74-77, 79-82, 99, 112, 
126, 144, 147-48, 151, 155-56, 
571 
McCawley, Thomas, 275, 278, 286, 
288, 289, 304, 305, 306, 320, 322, 
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McCormack, William, xx, xxii, 2, 4, 
271, 275, 280, 298, 300, 301, 302, 
312, 313, 323, 327, 337, 338, 339, 
341-73, 380, 382, 392, 395, 403, 
404, 408, 424, 438, 452, 575 
McDermott, Peter, 153, 179, 275 
McDonald, Lewis, 271, 312, 354 
Macgroarty, Neil, 337, 393, 407, 
460 
MacGregor, WilHam, 129, 160-61, 
163, 169, 271, 303 
MachiaveUi, 523 
Mcllwraith, Thomas, xvi, xix, xx, 2, 
3, 4, 5, 46, 57-59, 61-62, 83-89, 
93, 95-96,99, 104-10, 113, 
115-16, 119-41, 145, 147. 152. 
154-57, 159, 164-67, 169-70, 173, 
179, 183-84, 194, 198, 199, 201, 
203, 224, 572 
Mackay, 157, 200, 279, 336, 399, 
405, 407, 411, 415-17, 428, 444 
McKechnie, Peter, 510 
MacKenzie, Robert Ramsay, 12, 17, 
27, 45-46, 48-49, 51-52, 60-61, 
67-68, 76, 99, 571 
Mackie, Pat, 485 
McQueen, Humphrey, 523 
Macrossan, John Murtagh, xiii, xxii, 
2, 4, 93-117, 121, 155, 165, 198, 
199, 200, 201, 202, 207, 380 
Madsen, Otto, 489 
Maher, Edmund Bede, 395, 418, 
419, 420, 477 
Main Roads, Local Government, 
Police and Racing, Minister for, 
519 
Mannix, Daniel, 279, 281 
Mansfield, Alan, 480 
Manufacturing. See Secondary 
industry 
Marx, Kari, Marxism, 90, 120, 134, 
172, 319, 401 
Maryborough, 26, 133, 159, 169, 
224, 226, 228, 233, 265 
Masons, 467 
Maternal and child welfare, xxii 
Meat, meat companies, meat strike, 
meat workers, 272, 273, 274, 275, 
278, 286, 303, 304, 310, 319, 421, 
448-51. See also Cattle, pastoral 
industry 
Melbourne, 122-23, 153, 160-69, 
177, 188, 208, 264, 265, 279, 286, 
290, 315, 375, 379 
Menzies, Robert Gordon, 396, 423, 
427, 490 
Merchants, 43, 73, 146, 174, 196, 
213, 235, 236, 240, 272. See also 
Businessmen 
Milliner, Bertie, 501 
Minerals and mining legislation, 
coal, xxii, 31, 310, 444, 445, 447, 
449, 492, 520, 521 
bauxite, 492-95 
clay, 518 
copper, 298, 310 
gold, 55, 57, 75, 78, 82, 94-98, 
102, 107-8, 111-17, 122, 124, 
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133, 149-50, 195, 199, 200, 
296 
oil and petroleum, 464, 468, 497, 
489, 518 
tin, 298 
Miners, mines, mining, 3, 6, 144, 
164, 193, 198, 202, 204, 205, 210, 
216, 230, 232, 271, 284, 293, 295, 
296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 303, 308, 
309, 310, 335, 336, 337, 339, 340, 
343, 344, 362, 373, 426, 444, 447, 
449, 485-86, 492, 493, 518, 524 
Mines and Energy the Arts, Minister 
for, 510 
Mines, Frank, 460 
Mines, Secretary for. Minister for 
45, 54, 93, 95-96, 107, 113-14, 
119, 124, 198,203,207, 354, 393, 
460, 461 
Ministerial expenses, 519 
Monarchy, 12, 22, 34-36, 38, 57, 
83, 129, 153, 155, 188-89, 218, 
225, 288 
Monopolies, 269, 270, 272, 273, 348, 
468, 491. See also Capitalism 
Moonie, 489 
"Moonlight State, The", 508 
Moore, Arthur Edward, xvi, xxiii, 4, 
337, 362, 370, 372, 373, 375-96, 
405, 406, 407, 409, 410, 413, 418, 
421, 425, 429, 440, 441, 460, 575 
Morehead, Boyde Dunlop, 83-85, 
96, 106-7, 131, 157, 170, 573 
Moreton Bay, 33, 59, 72, 73, 165, 
177 
Morgan, Arthur, 188, 194, 212, 213, 
235, 238, 240, 242, 243, 244, 248, 
250, 259, 304, 317, 574 
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225, 227, 233, 261, 266 
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Morris, Kenneth, 479, 482, 484 
Mount Isa, 337, 370, 373 
Mount Isa Mines, 485-87 
Mount Morgan, 131, 169, 182, 306, 
343 
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Muller, Adolf G., 490, 491 
Mullins, Brian, 473 
Mungana mines, 295, 296, 298, 
337, 338-39, 341, 343, 362, 366, 
367, 370, 371, 372, 373, 392, 393 
Munro, Alan, 484 
Murphy, Denis J., xiii-xv, xx, xxi, 
xxiii, 468, 473 
Murphy, William Sidney, 212, 243, 
244 
Murrumba, 477 
Nanango, 500 
Nathan, Matthew, 219, 321, 322, 323 
National, Nationalist Party, 121, 
145, 164, 217, 263, 283, 284, 285, 
311, 317, 321,322, 323, 331,336, 
337, 370, 377, 378, 393, 426 
National parks, 506 
National Party of Australia, 
Queensland, xvii, xviii, xxiii, 
xxiv, 482, 485, 501, 502, 503, 
504, 505, 506, 508, 510, 511,512, 
517, 521, 525, 526. See also 
Country Party 
Nationalism, 1, 120-21, 135-37, 
139-40, 144, 164, 180-82, 191, 
265, 270, 271, 280, 282, 284, 296, 
333, 384 
Nationalization, 334, 335, 401 
Natural resources, 493 
Nelson, Hugh Muir, 186, 188-89, 
194, 206, 213, 228, 250, 573 
New Guinea, 32, 119, 135, 157, 
159-61, 163, 189-91, 193 
New South Wales, 1, 2, 11-13, 
15-16, 19-20, 22, 31, 33-35,42, 
47-48, 59, 64, 72-73, 86-87, 105, 
107, 143, 145, 150, 153, 157, 
159-61, 173, 189-90, 223, 260, 
284, 307, 318, 319, 337, 339, 354, 
370, 392, 401, 408, 423, 447, 523 
Newspapers, 17-18, 24, 30, 34, 38, 
49, 57,63, 68, 87-88,90-91,94, 
97-99, 131, 145, 147-48, 152, 
170-71, 180, 186, 188, 211, 215, 
230, 247, 264, 269, 277, 278, 280, 
281, 286, 289, 290, 293, 297, 303, 
307, 311, 317, 320, 321, 322, 338, 
339, 350, 363, 364, 365, 372, 373, 
391, 393, 410, 420, 427, 428, 447, 
453, 463, 475, 486, 491 
New York, 86, 318, 319, 357. 
New Zealand, 25, 43, 87-88, 90, 94, 
128, 139. 159, 168, 255, 348, 375, 
421 
NickHn, George Francis Reuben, xv, 
xvii, xviii, xix, xxi, xxiii, 5, 464, 
468, 475-93, 500, 576 
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North Queensland, xxii, 2, 13, 16, 
29, 43, 54, 62, 76, 88-89, 94, 
96-98, 102-3, 105-6, 108, 110-11, 
115-17, 161-62, 165, 182, 184-85, 
190, 193, 194, 197, 199, 200, 201, 
202, 203, 226, 269, 278, 297, 298, 
299, 310, 313, 314, 318, 325, 331, 
336, 343, 346, 356, 399, 404, 406, 
407,426, 428, 441, 445, 446 
Northern Territory, 123, 260 
Opposition, Queensland, 4, 18-19, 
24, 39, 45-48, 51-52, 54, 63, 69, 
74-75, 80-81, 95, 99, 103, 108, 
146, 148, 154, 159, 172, 175, 206, 
207, 213, 228, 229, 230, 232, 233, 
234, 235, 240, 243, 244, 254, 258, 
264, 275, 284, 306, 310, 313, 321, 
322, 323, 324, 348, 349, 350, 352, 
353, 354, 355, 362, 364, 366, 368, 
369, 370, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 
380, 381, 392, 393, 394, 404, 405, 
408, 418, 420, 421, 422, 425, 426, 
440, 463, 464, 474, 477, 478, 479, 
484,489, 512, 513, 517, 519, 522 
Oratory, 17-18, 74, 81, 83, 89, 
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240, 242, 265, 268, 269, 283, 300, 
305, 323, 348, 349, 356, 369, 381, 
399, 400, 406, 400, 441 
O'Sullivan, Thomas, 238, 258, 303, 
306, 320, 348 
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102, 108, 110, 113, 121, 135, 140, 
149, 152, 157, 164, 167, 170, 182, 
184-85, 190, 193, 198, 199, 201, 
202, 203, 209, 220, 244, 249, 399, 
428 
Palmer, Arthur Hunter, 46, 51, 
55-56, 58, 63, 67, 69, 79-83, 86, 
99, 124, 133, 145-48, 152, 155, 
183, 188, 572 
Papua. See New Guinea 
Parkes, Henry, 91, 96, 109-10, 
153, 160-63 
Parkinson, Michael, 522 
Parliament, Commonwealth, 208, 
234, 252, 260, 261. 266. 269, 270, 
282, 284, 286. 289. 290. 291, 293, 
308, 313, 331, 335, 336, 337, 353, 
380, 423, 426, 427, 464, 501, 517 
Parliament, Queensland, xviii, 11, 
12-14, 19, 24, 26, 30-31, 33, 
37-39, 42, 139, 141, 143-44, 206, 
207, 208, 210, 224, 230, 232, 233, 
234, 236, 245, 246, 250, 252, 256, 
257, 258, 260, 264, 267, 268, 269, 
270, 273, 275, 278, 279, 280, 281, 
288, 289, 290, 300, 301, 302, 304, 
312, 315, 320, 321, 326, 327, 329, 
331, 332, 337, 341, 347, 348, 350, 
351, 353, 355, 357, 362, 366, 369, 
370, 373, 375, 376, 381, 386, 391, 
393, 399, 401, 402, 403, 410, 420, 
422, 425, 427, 428, 429, 440, 443, 
446, 464, 512, 513 
Parliament, Queensland. See 
Cabinet, Government and various 
Ministries 
Parties, Queensland Political, xvi, 
xvn, xviii, 19, 23-24, 36, 43, 
45-57, 97-98, 104-5, 109-10, 
114-17, 126, 131, 145, 148, 152, 
165, 234, 236, 238, 240, 250, 251, 
252, 253, 254, 258, 259, 267, 322, 
323, 324, 347, 375, 377, 378, 379, 
380, 381, 390, 394, 395, 421, 425, 
441, 459. See also separate entries 
for each party 
Pastoral Industry, Pastoralists, 
5, 6, 16, 21, 25-27, 37, 43, 46-48, 
50-52, 55, 64-68, 72-73, 75-78, 
80-81, 83-84, 96-99, 102, 106, 
123-24, 127, 133, 135, 138-39, 
145-46, 148-49, 152, 164, 167, 
170, 173-74, 202, 209, 211, 218, 
224, 226, 273, 274, 281, 284, 286, 
303, 315, 318, 320, 354, 356, 357, 
376, 383, 389, 466, 503, 524 
leases, rents, 315, 317, 318, 320, 
356, 357, 382, 387, 388, 389, 
464 
Patriotism, 274, 277, 279, 282, 382 
Pensions, 59, 84, 252, 258, 320 
Philp, Robert, xix, xx, 3, 4, 191, 
193-220, 233, 234, 235, 236, 240, 
243, 244, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 
255, 256, 258, 259, 261, 317, 320, 
322 
Pizzey, Jack Charles Allen, xvi, 4, 5, 
489, 500, 576 
Playford, Thomas, 495 
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Police, Police Commissioner, Police 
Minister. 13. 30. 32. 41, 42, 43, 
93,271, 310, 319, 346, 353, 363, 
436, 454, 486, 491, 502, 508, 509, 
514, 515, 516-18 
Population, xxiii, 1, 3, 22-23, 27-28, 
49, 72, 78, 146, 150, 188, 330, 
445, 446, 448 
Porter, Charies, 484 
Ports, xvi, 3, 13, 16, 26, 31, 32, 
47, 67. 133. 161. 233 
Postmaster-General. 76, 143, 157, 
166, 207, 233 
Premier, Chief Secretary, Colonial 
Secretary, xv-xx, 2, 4, 5, 7, 
12-15, 17, 37, 45-46, 48-49, 54, 
61, 65, 67, 71. 76-77, 93, 96, 107, 
113, 119, 126, 143, 166, 177, 188, 
190, 194, 201, 206, 209, 210, 212, 
218, 224, 230, 233, 236, 240, 244, 
250, 251, 252, 254, 256, 258, 259, 
260, 261, 264, 271, 274, 275, 276, 
277, 278, 279, 281, 284, 289, 291, 
293, 295, 296, 300, 303, 315, 316, 
317, 318, 319, 324, 325, 328, 329, 
330, 331, 332, 335, 337, 340, 341, 
347, 357, 361, 365, 367, 369, 370, 
375, 384, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 
391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 
399, 400, 402, 403, 407, 408, 414, 
415, 416, 417, 418, 419. 421, 422, 
423, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 
433, 442, 443, 444, 448, 451, 452, 
455, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 
465, 466, 467, 470, 471, 472, 473, 
474, 475, 478, 483, 484, 485, 488, 
489, 490, 495, 498, 511, 514, 516, 
519, 520, 524, 525. See also Chief 
Secretary 
Acting, 313, 314 
New South Wales, 307 
Victoria, 260 
Premiers' conferences, 246, 260, 315, 
386, 408, 409, 427 
"Premiers' Plan", 386, 405, 406, 
408,409 
Presbyterian, 132, 198 
Primary Industry, xv, xxii-xxiii, 
xxiv, 1, 6, 25-28, 43, 46, 48, 
50-52, 57, 63-68, 85, 94, 128, 
131, 138, 145-49, 164, 167, 177, 
209, 232, 243, 263, 272, 273, 283, 
293, 295, 323, 329, 330, 331, 336, 
361, 383. 387, 402. 403, 444, 445, 
478, 523, 524. See also 
Agriculture, Land 
Prime Minister, 266, 269, 276, 281, 
282, 295, 308, 311, 312, 338, 397, 
400, 408, 423, 439, 446 
Pring, Ratcliffe, 12, 17, 39, 74-75, 
77, 152 
Private enterprise, entrepreneurs, xxi, 
119-20, 122. 126-27, 132, 135-41, 
156, 201, 204, 205, 210. 251, 283, 
309, 310, 315, 331, 376, 382, 384, 
424, 497, 499, 502, 508, 522, 524. 
See also Capitalism 
Proctor, Roderick, 506 
Protestant Labor Party, 461 
Protestants, 23, 106, 164, 179, 279, 
284,421, 425, 442. See also 
various denominations 
Public accounts committee, 504 
Public Instruction, Secretary for, 
Minister for, 143, 147-48, 
150-51, 166, 203, 207, 357, 407, 
466 
Public Lands, Secretary for, 45, 
48-49, 51-52, 59, 61, 64-68, 76, 
148, 167, 207, 208, 240, 353, 354, 
356 
Public Lands and Irrigation, 
Minister for, 464, 465 
Public Service, Servants, xix, 14, 15, 
33, 211, 242, 245, 250, 274,275, 
278, 303, 306, 310, 316, 326, 329, 
355, 384, 399, 406, 451, 487, 512, 
515, 516 
Public works, 245, 304, 309, 313, 
314, 315, 326,411,412-17 
Public Works, Minister for, 45, 
48-49, 51-52, 54, 59, 61, 65-67, 
75-76, 93, 95, 103-4, 107, 114, 
119, 124, 136, 143, 147, 151, 198, 
203, 207, 208, 258, 295, 303, 304, 
314-14, 327, 332, 402, 407, 416 
Queensland Central Executive 
(QCE), 314, 326, 327, 328, 335, 
353, 354, 355, 356, 360, 365, 367, 
404, 421, 422. 424, 439, 440, 461, 
467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 
479, 487. See also Central 
Political Executive (CPE) 
Queensland National Bank. 209. 243, 
244-45 
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Queensland People's Party, 472. See 
also Liberal Party of Australia, 
Queensland 
Queensland Prices Commission, 468 
(^uinn, James, 22-24, 41-43 
QTQ-9, 506, 518 
Racism. See White Australia 
Radical, radicals, radicalism, 6, 72, 
77, 83, 85, 88-90, 96-97, 108, 
111, 113, 126, 137, 171-73, 208, 
216, 219, 225, 264, 265, 272, 273, 
275, 282, 283, 312, 314, 324, 353, 
408, 419, 432 
Railways, xvi, 6, 49-52, 55, 62, 79, 
88-89, 90, 96, 102-8, 117, 
122-24, 126, 129, 133, 135-38, 
140, 146, 151, 153, 157, 164, 167, 
169, 182, 191, 197, 200, 201, 204, 
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